Lockean Matter and its Discontents
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.36399/GroundingsUG.9.194Keywords:
Locke, Physicalism, Metaphysics, Corpuscles, Cartesian, MaterialAbstract
Materialism/physicalism purports to be a significant metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reality, being the standard position in many contemporary philosophical debates. It is my view that this doctrine is misguided, a remnant of the categories of the 17th century. To argue for my position, I examine Locke’s commitment to corpuscularianism – a prevalent view about the nature of matter in the early scientific period – and the erroneous conclusions he draws from it. This historical reflection serves me to make a broader point: we do not anymore hold a strict conception of the material or the physical for good reasons, while these terms have no place in our technical subjects of inquiry. I conclude that materialism and any ontological position which depends on it are of no consequence.
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