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EDITORIAL

The contentions inherent within a theme that deals with individuals and extremes also give rise to reflections which can be localized, national or international. Equally, elements of the personal overlap with considerations of the professional, in ways that illustrate the complexities of interpretation in literature, politics, anthropology and philosophy. Perspectives, be they historical or contemporary, highlight degrees of difference; positive and negative, comparative and superlative. Author and reader alike are allowed to determine what a word, story, agenda or opinion mean for them, and to them.

In what has been a landmark year for the Dialectic Society, with the 150th Anniversary dinner (since reinstitution), the opportunity to engage undergraduates at the University of Glasgow has, again, been extended by *Groundings*, with the excellence of education in the Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences showcased in this unique peer-reviewed journal.

It seems appropriate to repeat the words of Editorial Board predecessors: 'Our common identity has been as undergraduate students of the University of Glasgow. This academic community informed our work as authors and editors.' (Volume 1, September 2007) 'Our aim, today, is to further debate on issues of importance to students at Glasgow and other campuses, in interdisciplinary perspective, through the critical insights of talented undergraduate students.' (Volume 2, September 2008)

Special thanks are owed to the Heads of Colleges – Professor Murray Pittock (College of Arts); Professor Anne Anderson (College of Social Sciences) – for their unstinting support, both in administrative terms and in sharing the ethos of *Groundings*: the advancement, and enhancement, of undergraduate experience at the University of Glasgow.

GROUNDINGS EDITORIAL BOARD

To what extent did censorship affect the writing of *Cinco Horas con Mario*?

Colin Tarbat

The censorial regulations introduced by the Franco regime created a harsh environment for authors wishing to include dissenting messages in their writing. Despite being published after the supposedly liberating Press Law of 1966, Miguel Delibes clearly felt the need to self-censor while writing *Cinco Horas con Mario* as letters between the Spanish author and his editor testify. Although perhaps less conservative in his approach to censorship than his predecessors, the minister of culture and tourism, Manuel Fraga, who introduced the law, only appeared to encourage greater caution from Spanish writers while approaching their work. If any viewpoint criticizing the regime was traced, the offending novel would be confiscated and its author either fined or imprisoned. Through intelligent use of characterisation, imagery and authorial silence, Delibes edited and altered his work sufficiently in order to smuggle his dissenting opinions past censors. As a result, his novel *Cinco Horas con Mario* included subtle criticism of the on-going ideological conflict, the Church's dubious relationship with the regime and the disadvantaged situation of women in Francoist society whilst maintaining a legitimate relationship with the regime after its publication.

By the time Franco declared his final victory over Republican forces in a radio speech on 1st April 1939, his Nationalist movement had already begun to

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COLIN TARBAT is currently in his fifth year at the University of Glasgow, studying Spanish and History. The intelligent use of the Spanish language, employed by Miguel Delibes in *Cinco Horas con Mario*, to survive the harsh writing environment under Franco while smuggling subversive messages past his censors, combined interests he has in both of his degree subjects. He hopes that, through this article, he can clearly communicate this fascination which has greatly developed throughout this academic year.

introduce censorship regulations. The Press and Propaganda office had been established in Salamanca in 1936 and immediately attempted to control the content of public media within the areas of Spain where Franco's forces held power. During the last year of the Civil War, and throughout the subsequent regime until 1966, The Press Law of 1938 required that every piece of written material seeking publication had to first be scrutinized by censors. Any material deemed to be incompatible with the ideals of the Nationalists would either be edited or prohibited.[1] In practice however, due to the lack of detailed censorial criteria, it proved difficult for the authorities to establish any uniform treatment of submitted manuscripts. The authorization of a novel largely depended on an individual censor's interpretation of both the ambiguous questions on censorial reports and the text that required analysis. As a result, a number of authors found themselves editing their work, and even changing their initial ideas before putting pen to paper, in order to try and avoid a confrontation with the censors. Although restricted by the regime's regulations, many writers persisted in developing literature that would circumvent censorship while containing coded criticism in its subtext.

Miguel Delibes is widely considered to be one of the finest post-Civil War Spanish writers and has admitted to having self-censored in order to try and circumvent Franco's censors. Although he has only ever referred to practicing conscious self-censorship, it is worth noting that the refined social criticism apparent in much of his writing may have also been influenced by factors unrelated to the regime. If Freud's analysis is correct, some of his critical nuances may also have originated from an unconscious revision of his ideas before writing. This analysis, however, will focus on the conscious efforts to

[1] Maria DiFrancesco, 'Censorship and Literature in Spain' in Maureen Ihrie and Salvador A. Oropesa (eds.) *World Literature in Spanish: An Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara, 2011), 170

deliberately evade Franco's censors practised by Delibes during the writing of his extensively acclaimed work, *Cinco Horas con Mario*.[2]

To avoid censorship while preserving the social commentary in his work, Delibes developed various literary techniques which effectively avoided penalization. Using intelligent style and structure in *Cinco Horas con Mario*, the Spanish author succeeded in creating a notable novel that was applauded for its literary achievement whilst simultaneously criticizing aspects of the regime under which he was living. It is, perhaps, this conscious effort to hide authorial opinion which led Vilanova to describe *Cinco Horas con Mario* as "the deepest, most complex and most ambitious" of his novels that "most directly connected with Spain's social and political reality."[3] The lack of any clearly oppositional writing encouraged a large number of the literate Spanish public to read between the lines of new works of fiction in the hope of discovering the author's critical sentiments. The analysis of Delibes' intelligently chosen dialogue and distancing of authorial opinion will demonstrate how his composition maintained a legitimate relationship with the regime. Franco desired to manipulate and control the language used by the Spanish people to promote the regime's 'legitimacy'. Delibes, however, recognized the impact that the control of language could have, and succeeded in outplaying the regime at its own game. His seemingly innocuous literature was permitted publication and went on to spread coded dissenting messages amongst its readers through perceptive use of imagery, characterization and, most importantly, carefully chosen silences.

During the Spanish Civil War, Miguel Delibes had sided with the Nationalists with a view to defending the Catholic faith, volunteering as a seaman in

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[2] M. L. Abellán, 'Censura y autocensura en la producción literaria española', *Nuevo Hispanismo 1* (1982), 169-80

[3] '*Cinco Horas con Mario*, la más honda, compleja y ambiciosa de las novelas escritas por Miguel Delibes y la más directamente conectada con la realidad social y política de España en que vive', Antonio Vilanova (ed.), *Miguel Delibes Josep Vergés: Correspondencia, 1948-1986* (Barcelona, 2002), 16

Franco's navy. His support for Franco diminished after the war, as he felt a need to bring democratic values back to Spain. According to Oropesa, Delibes greatly influenced intellectual Catholics who wished to maintain their faith while upholding a middle political stance between the idea of Marxist liberation and Franco's National Catholicism. The increasing resentment that both Delibes and his editor, Josep Vergés, developed towards the regime and its censorship is evident in their correspondence throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In a letter from Doctor Demetrio Ramos, a provincial delegate of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Vergés is accused of being a "suspicious person."[4] Knowing that his editor, and friend, was suffering under the regime's pressure, Delibes asked Vergés in a letter on the 17th February 1962 to "accept things as they are, without too much irritation. You only have one life and it is senseless to let four fools bother you."[5] In July of the same year, Manuel Fraga was appointed as Franco's new director of censorship. Although widely considered to be a more liberal administrator than his predecessor, dissidents clearly still suffered during his time in power. In 1958, Delibes became director of Valladolid based newspaper *El Norte de Castilla*, where he had begun his career as a cartoonist. In 1963, however, a year after Fraga's appointment, he was pressured by the authorities to step down for refusing to follow regulations limiting freedom of expression in the press.

Delibes claimed that, under the censorial restrictions at *El Norte de Castilla*, "journalism showed me how to put the maximum amount of information into the minimum number of words".[6] Before starting the writing of *Cinco Horas*

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[4] 'Persona sospecha' Letter from Demetrio Ramos to Josep Vergés, *Ibid.*, 22

[5] 'Admite las cosas como son, sin demasiado calor. Dispones solamente de una vida y es insensato dejar que te la amarguen cuatro majaderos' (17/2/1962) Letter from Miguel Delibes to Josep Vergés, *Ibid.,* 193

[6] Miguel Delibes quoted in Alasdair Fotheringham 'Miguel Delibes: Spanish writer who found a way past Franco's censors with his stark novels of rural and provincial life', *The Independent* (2010, Apr 2), retrieved 22/12/2011 [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/miguel-delibes-spanish-writer-who-

con Mario, Delibes was already evidently well aware that he would have to censor himself if he hoped to get his work published. Around the time of the novel's publication, the Valladolid based author wrote in a letter to his editor that work was going badly at the newspaper and that the authorities made "constant use of blackmail and threats."[7] It would appear that *Cinco Horas con Mario* would serve as a coded and deeply sought after outlet for Delibes' frustration with the regime.

The supposedly liberal Press Law of 1966, which came into effect about half a year before *Cinco Horas con Mario* was published, appears to have only encouraged the author to be even more cautious when writing. Although not believing in freedom of the press, Franco had conceded that a reform was needed to give an impression, externally as much as internally, that Spain was progressing towards democracy. The law abolished pre-publication censorship, which had been enforced in Spain since 1938, theoretically providing authors with a greater liberty to express dissenting viewpoints. The ambiguity of the law's Article 2 understandably encouraged suspicion amongst writers and editors however. It stated that "freedom of expression and the right to spread information, recognized in Article 1, will have no limitation other than that imposed by the law." It appears that it was now the official responsibility of the Spanish citizen to adhere to the regime's doctrine. Failure to do so could result in fines, confiscation or imprisonment.[8] The claim that novels were now free to be published without any censorship whatsoever was clearly extremely misleading. Writers were now arguably under even more pressure to cut out passages that could ultimately offend the principles of the regime. A vast increase in editorial censorship is evident after 1966 as it became the publisher's

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found-a-way-past-francos-censors-with-his-stark-novels-of-rural-and-provincial-life-1933731.html]

[7] 'Se valen del chantaje y de la amenaza' (23/8/1966) Letter from Miguel Delibes to Josep Vergés in Antonio Vilanova (ed.), *Miguel Delibes Josep Vergés: Correspondencia, 1948-1986*, 284

[8] Cristina Palomares, *The Quest For Survival After Franco: Moderate Francoism and the Slow Journey to the Polls* (Brighton, 2004), 91

responsibility to act as censor and decide whether a book was likely to be confiscated or not. [9] Contrastingly however, Vergés appears to have been convinced that *Cinco Horas con Mario* would not be censored and would have published it "without any fear whatsoever."[10] It was Delibes who demonstrated doubt in the apparent new found tolerance, admitting to changing his original idea for the novel due to censorship. With friends in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism such as the general managers Juan Beneyto and Florentino Pérez Embid as well as the censor and monk Padre Miguel de la Pinta Llorente, Delibes still felt the need for a censor to look at his work before publication.[11] In a letter to Vergés on 7 August 1966, justifying why he approached a friend and censor to look over his manuscript, Delibes demonstrated how paranoia and self-censorship continued to affect authors in this supposedly more liberal period:

> I took this decision to take advantage of a friend's offer because of a fear – which has now subsided – that the book would be appropriated after its

[9] Amongst the numerous examples is that of Luis de Caralt: When publishing a Spanish edition of Hemingway's *Old Man at the Bridge*, a story about the Spanish Civil War, Caralt changed the word 'fascistas' to 'tropas' in the phrase 'Era domingo de Resurección y las tropas avanzaban hacia el Ebro.' When the publisher Planeta tried to reintroduce the word 'fascistas' while re-releasing the book in 1969, the censors eliminated the entire sentence. Douglas E. LaPrade, *Censura y Recepción de Hemingway en España* (Valencia, 2005), 75 ; Similarly, Juan Mollá's novel *Segunda Compañía* was rejected for release by the publisher Destino and after being presented to Plaza & Janés, the literary director, Mercedes Salisachs, cut a number of passages before submitting the book to the censor's office. Manuel L. Abellán, *Censura y Creación Literaria en España (1939-1976)* (Barcelona, 1980), 99

[10] 'lo hubiera publicado sin temor alguno' (2/8/1966) Letter from Josep Vergés to Miguel Delibes in Antonio Vilanova (ed.), *Miguel Delibes Josep Vergés: Correspondencia, 1948-1986*, 281

[11] Cristina Palomares, *The Quest For Survival After Franco*, 91

> distribution. Now everything is in order and no one can suggest an argument against the book's publication.[12]

No alterations or editing were ultimately needed, demonstrating that Delibes' own self-censorship, due to his fear of the novel's confiscation, was sufficient to avoid its prohibition. Writing with Franco's censors in mind allowed Delibes to create a novel that appeared superficially legitimate whilst subtly criticizing Spain's ideological conflict, societal inequality and the Church's support of Franco.

Bourdreau claims that due to its ironic criticism of Francoist society, it is "surprising" that *Cinco Horas con Mario* wasn't censored.[13] When Delibes' intelligent structuring of the novel and discreet concealment of his own opinions are examined, however, it is perhaps no surprise that the dictatorship's censors overlooked any oppositional sentiment. In a letter to his editor, a year before the novel was published, Delibes wrote that he intended to "… leave it up to the reader to see through the composition."[14] During the prologue of *Cinco Horas con Mario*, set in Spain in 1966, a narrator prepares the reader to enter the thoughts of the protagonist, alone with her deceased husband for the central part of the novel. Even before Carmen's monologue begins, the ideological tensions between the two families present at Mario's wake, suggest that Mario did not die "comforted by spiritual aids" as the funeral notice on the

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[12] 'Tomé esta decisión aprovechando los ofrecimientos de un buen amigo y ante el temor - como ahora acaba de ocurrir - de que se produjiese un secuestro del libro después de editado. Ahora todo está en orden y nadie puede oponer ningún argumento contra la edición del libro' (7/8/1966) Letter from Miguel Delibes to Josep Vergés in Vilanova, Antonio (ed.) *Miguel Delibes Josep Vergés: Correspondencia, 1948-1986*, 280

[13] H. L. Bourdreau, 'Cinco Horas Con Mario and the Dynamics of Irony', *Anales de la novela posguerra,* Vol.2, (1977), 7-17

[14] 'se lo dejo ver al lector a través de la composición' (7/8/1966) Letter from Miguel Delibes to Josep Vergés in Antonio Vilanova (ed.), *Miguel Delibes Josep Vergés: Correspondencia, 1948-1986*, 281

opening page claims.[15] As the reader enters the mind of the complex, unhappy and frustrated protagonist, Delibes has already greatly distanced his own opinion from his writing. It is solely Carmen's internal sentiments and judgments that are exposed in her recollections, without any interference from the author. By entering her mind, the reader is encouraged to judge and analyze the views of the protagonist. In the five hours that Carmen is beside Mario's side, she reviews almost thirty years. During this period, social injustices take place off-stage and are alluded to indirectly. They are presented through the eyes of the protagonist, who, ignoring the social and political subtext, uses them as a method to criticize her husband. When reflecting on an incident where Mario has appeared to have been intentionally knocked off his bicycle by a police officer, Carmen reprimands her spouse for having been out so late, rather than regarding the incident as needless rough treatment. She then claims that "if he'd killed [Mario]…it would have been in the course of his duty."[16] Similarly, when Mario's publication appears to be under governmental pressure for its content, Carmen fails to see that the intervention of the authorities is unjust. Due to the connotations of police brutality and censorship that these events evoke, critical judgment is encouraged from the reader without any provocation from the author. By structuring the novel around the inner workings of Carmen's mind, Delibes was able to successfully obscure his own viewpoint and encourage his readers to think critically about the Franco regime. [17]

The ideological differences that had polarized Spain throughout the Civil War caused significant societal tensions during the regime that followed. Although the demonizing of leftist supporters became less prominent towards the end of the regime, pro-leftist literature continued to be regarded as an attack on the

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[15] 'confortado con los Auxilios Espirituales' Miguel Delibes, Leo Hickey (ed.), *Cinco Horas con Mario* (London, 1977), 7

[16] Miguel Delibes, (trans.) Frances M. López-Morillas, *Five Hours with Mario* (New York, 1988), 63

[17] Miguel Delibes, Leo Hickey (ed.), *Cinco Horas con Mario*, vii-ix

regime's ideology, qualifying it for censorship. Writing in 1939, Giménez Caballero demonstrates the Nationalist sentiment towards Republican supporters that is evident in the characters of both Carmen in *Cinco Horas con Mario* and Matia's grandmother in *Primera Memoria*:

> We - the Imperial – do not however ignore the fact that the 'class struggle' is an eternal reality of history. Because there have always been weak and strong, ugly and handsome, stupid and intelligent, cowardly and brave. And the struggle and hate of the miserable, the ugly, the stupid and the cowardly, will always exist against the wealthy, the handsome, the able and brave man.[18]

A Decree passed on April 18, 1947 highlights the continuing ideological struggle that existed during Franco's dictatorship. In its introductory paragraph, an attempt was made to dehumanize the few Republican guerillas still active in certain regions of the country:

> Crimes of terrorism and banditry, which constitute the most serious forms of offence in the postwar situation, a consequence of the relaxing of morals and the exalting of the cruelty and aggressiveness of criminals and misfits, require special measures of repression, the seriousness of which will correspond to the crimes it is trying to eradicate.[19]

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[18] 'Nosotros – los imperiales – no ignoramos en cambio que la 'lucha de clases' es una realidad eterna de la historia. Porque siempre ha habido débiles y poderosos, feos y guapos, tontos e inteligentes, cobardes y valientes. Y siempre existirá la lucha y el odio, del miserable, del feo, del tonto y del cobarde contra el pudiente, el apuesto, el capaz y el hombre bravo', Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España: Exaltaciones a una Resurrección Nacional y del Mundo* (Barcelona, 1939), 235

[19] 'Los delitos de terrorismo y bandidaje, que constituyen las más graves especies delictivas de toda situación de posguerra, secuela de la relajación de vínculos morales y de la exaltación de los impulses de crueldad y acometividad de gentes criminales e inadaptadas, requieren especiales medidas de represión, cuya gravedad corresponda a la de los crímenes que se trata de combatir.' Boletín Oficial del Estado, May 3, 1947 in José,

Although Delibes did not choose to resort to violence to express his frustration with the regime, he still needed to take care when expressing liberal opinions in a dictatorship which evidently regarded all opposition as a threat.

Janet Pérez notes how 'the rhetoric of silence' enabled a number of post-Civil War writers to express discontentment in a covert manner. She remarks how the conscious decision to omit certain material, or the deliberate allusion to a character's silence in a text, was an effective technique to circumvent censorship and criticize Spanish social issues. Its use often aroused an interest in the reader who would subsequently look at a passage in more depth to find a hidden meaning. Pérez also notes that the use of silence during Franco's dictatorship contributed to a subtlety and aesthetic refinement she feels regularly lacks in the literature produced after state censorship was lifted.[20]

In *Cinco Horas Con Mario*, Delibes appears to use subtle irony to attack the regime's rightist ideology which the protagonist Carmen represents. The reader is subjected to Carmen's personal view of her late husband who reconstructs his personality in a way that suits her. She immediately begins to criticise Mario, rather than mourn his death, suggesting that there may be a hidden reality that isn't directly obvious to the reader at first. The death of Mario off-stage before the novel begins immediately presents a 'silenced' protagonist unable to state his case. In an interview in 1980, Delibes commented that his "first idea was to present Mario alive, but the censors would never have allowed Mario to speak against...society".[21] Alterations such as these, caused by censorship, encouraged Delibes to claim, like Pérez, that censorship didn't necessarily always have a

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B. Monleón, 'Dictatorship and Publicity. Cela's Pascual Duarte: The Monster Speaks', *Revista Canadiense de Estudios Hispanicos*, Vol.18, 2 (Invierno, 1994), 266

[20] Janet Pérez, 'Functions of the Rhetoric of Silence', *South Central Review*, Vol.1 No.1/2 (Spring-summer, 1984), 117

[21] 'mi primera idea fue presentar a Mario vivo, pero Mario hablando contra la sociedad que estábamos viviendo nunca hubiera aceptado por la censura', Miguel Delibes in Pilar Concejo, 'Miguel Delibes: Realismo y Utopia', *Hispanic Journal* 2.1 (1980), 105

negative effect on literature and occasionally "operated in a convenient way," allowing writers to "retain subtlety" in their writing; a refinement which he laments disappeared in Spanish literature during the years following Franco's death in 1975.[22]

According to Bourdreau, through Delibes' choice to 'silence' Mario, alongside his clever and subtle use of 'covert irony', the reader concludes that there is more depth to the novel than at first thought, and begins to "reconstruct unspoken meanings…that for some reason cannot be accepted at face value."[23] This conclusion cannot be drawn at first however as the irony lacks context. Carmen proves to be self-centred, materialistic, small minded and naive whilst behaving insensitively towards her children unless she uses them as a means for her own contentment. She appears to be the polar opposite of the 'silenced' Mario who she criticises throughout the novel for being idealistic, humane and academic. Convinced that "a strong authority is a guarantee of order," Carmen manipulates the novels discourse.[24] Correlating to the censorship imposed by Franco on any dissenting views of the regime, she censors the memory of her silent dead husband. She also appears to act as a censor towards her own children:

> … if personality means refusing to wear mourning for a father or having no respect for a mother, then I don't want children with personality.[25]

Just as subversive messages succeeded in circumventing Franco's censors, the 'true' image of Mario, which Carmen attempts to suppress, materializes in her thoughts. She criticizes Mario for having refused to accept an apartment to protect his five children which at first seems like a plausible complaint. She

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[22] 'A veces la censura ha operado de manera conveniente en cuanto que nos ha hecho sutilizar las formulas…esa sutileza se ha perdido al perderse la censura', *Ibid.*

[23] H. L. Bourdreau, *Anales de la novela posguerra,* Vol.2, (1977), 7-17

[24] Miguel Delibes, (trans.) Frances M. López-Morillas, *Five Hours with Mario*, 114

[25] *Ibid.*, 113

later concedes, however, that as a Republican idealist, Mario felt that being offered a subsidized apartment for government employees was a governmental method to buy his silence. She also attacks her husband for having refused to sign an agreement for the rigged acts of a referendum which she felt showed weakness in his character.

Before having completed the novel, Delibes wrote to his editor on 2 August 1965 stating that he intended to "oppose the two ways of thinking that exist in the country: the obstinate, traditional and hypocritical, and the open and healthy advocated by John XXIII." Due to the characterised ideological conflict between Mario and Carmen, one progressive and the other conservative, Bourdreau argues that the reader assumes that there must be an authorial preference for one of the conflicting sides.[26] In Carmen's reports of Mario's dark mood after discovering the outcome of the Civil War, it is clear that her husband supported the defeated liberal ranks while Carmen appears to have supported whatever her conservative bourgeoisie family and friends suggested. Demonstrating more unattractive personality traits, Carmen can't seem to understand that it is remotely possible that Mario was brought up with different values to her. When reflecting on the 'Crusade', a term which Franco and his supporters used to define the Spanish Civil War, Carmen is still surprised that it "seemed like a tragedy" to Mario and can't ever seem to comprehend the fact that they may have had different standpoints.

Due to the negative portrayal of Carmen, there appears to be a subtle insinuation that the protagonist stands in stark contrast to Delibes' ideological beliefs. For a reader overlooking the irony of the novel, it is possible that Carmen could be seen as a victim after losing a husband who didn't fulfil her needs in life. On 10 October 1966, Delibes wrote: "it scares me to think that

[26] H. L. Bourdreau, *Anales de la novela posguerra,* Vol.2, (1977), 9

someone could regard Carmen's position as plausible."[27] The idea may have alarmed him, but it was evidently his intention to allow such a reading when he claimed to Josep Vergés that "the monologue of this woman and the criticism of her husband will appease the censors."[28] He was right to assume so. Evidently failing to detect the irony of the novel, and therefore adopting Carmen's viewpoint, one of Franco's censors, an acquaintance of Delibes, noted on 23 July 1966 that the novel had a "moral intention" and didn't require any changes.[29] As Carmen consistently represents a social standpoint that was shared by a significant proportion of the higher classes, and therefore an ideology coherent with the regime's dogma, *Cinco Horas con Mario* successfully avoided censorship. Delibes' subtle and indirect criticism of her personality, however, ensured that *antifranquista* readers would take note of his opposition to the regime.

Under Franco's government, the traditional roles of daughter, mother and housewife were regularly imposed. This included the enforcement of the *permiso marital* law which prevented women from finding work without first asking the permission of their husbands.[30] Moral codes and sexual restrictions were implemented on the Spanish female population while no comparable limitations applied to men. If a woman wanted to stay on at work after getting married she would be refused any family allowance while a 'wedding bonus' would be presented to those who left work after their wedding. The propaganda and legal restrictions imposed by the dictatorship appear to have

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[27] 'me asusta pensar que alguien pueda tomar la postura de Menchu [Carmen] como plausible' Letter from Miguel Delibes to Josep Vergés in Antonio Vilanova (ed.), *Miguel Delibes Josep Vergés: Correspondencia, 1948-1986* (Barcelona, 2002), 287

[28] 'El monólogo de esta mujer y los reproches al marido darán por el gusto de los censores' (2/8/1965) Letter from Miguel Delibes to Josep Vergés, *Ibid.*, 281

[29] 'La novela esta de Miguel Delibes nos parece de intención moralizada' Censors report for *Cinco Horas con Mario* in Hans-Jörg Neuschäfer, *Adiós a la España Eterna: La Dialéctica de la Censura. Novela, Teatro y Cine bajo el Franquismo* (Madrid, 1994), 327

[30] Kristin A. Kiely, *Female Subjective Strategies in post-Franco Spain as presented by Rosa Montero and Lucia Etxebarria* (Florida, 2008), 15

made it very difficult for women to escape taking up a traditional motherly role in the home. According to Balfour, this produced a quick turnaround in numerous businesses, such as textile factories, which allowed employers to pay less for new, younger, less experienced female staff.[31] As any direct criticism of the disadvantaged female position during the regime would have been considered an attack on its moral code, writers needed to employ intelligent use of metaphor and characterization to highlight these issues while avoiding censorship. The despair and lack of ability to escape the enforced traditionalist ideals is evoked through the protagonist in *Cinco Horas con Mario*.[32]

Carmen is bound by tradition and actively wants to promote the moral values of 'the old Spain' to her daughter in an almost dictatorial manner:

> What's the use of a girl going on with studies, I'd like to know? What does she get out of it, you tell me? Make herself all mannish…. A young lady only needs to know how to walk, how to look, and how to smile, and the best professor in the world can't teach those things.[33]

Carmen, convinced that Mario was lying when he assured her that he was a virgin, holds a universal distrust of men. She appears to desire the attention of males, but, at the same time, wishes to have complete control over them. When referring to her husband's dead body, she is convinced that "he was her corpse; she had manufactured him herself". Carmen is obsessed with what a woman 'should' be and 'should' do in her society. As well as demonstrating authoritarian qualities, Carmen also appears to represent a helpless uneducated woman who has been brought up to believe that "reading and thinking are bad".[34] Throughout the novel she refers to Mario and his male friends "speaking in code", excluding her from conversation and never taking the trouble to

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[31] Sebastian Balfour, *Dictatorship, Workers, and the City:Labour in Greater Barcelona Since 1939* (Oxford, 1989), 11

[32] Miguel Delibes, Leo Hickey (ed.), *Cinco Horas con Mario*, xxxv

[33] Miguel Delibes, (trans.) Frances M. López-Morillas, *Five Hours with Mario*, 69-70

[34] *Ibid.,* 46

explain what they were talking about.[35] This may have been due to the fact she either didn't understand or simply preferred not to. It is her intellectual friend Esther who is laughed at within their group of friends for claiming to understand Mario. Comparable to Franco himself, Carmen criticizes intelligent, politicised women like Esther for "destroying family life."

The protagonist has been coerced into her role in society and appears to have nothing else to believe in besides the morals she was taught as a child: "a person has principles and principles are sacred."[36] A lot of her comments represent, as Highfill suggests, a "psycho-logic" of how women are 'supposed' to feel and to behave, given their situation.[37] She has accepted the role that society expects her to perform and has become a negative character as a result. When reflecting on her sister who was cast out of the family for having a child out of wedlock, Carmen appears to fantasize about a liberty she doesn't possess: "imagine Julia, seven years alone in Madrid, and with such a little child, the freedom that implies"[38] Although given the opportunity to break from her role and commit adultery, she fails to do so. She suffers emotional and sexual frustration in a failing marriage and yet stands by what she is convinced every woman 'should' believe in. Although the depiction of marital conflict may have been a taboo subject in a country which didn't legally permit divorce until 1982, through Carmen's troubled portrayal, Delibes draws attention to the exceptional lack of freedom which women suffered under Franco.[39]

The regime's relationship with the Catholic Church was clearly exceptionally important due to the fact it represented the only realistic claim of 'legitimacy' that Franco possessed. During the Second Vatican Council which took place between 1962 and 1965, this idea was challenged. In 1963, *pacem in terris* was

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[35] *Ibid.,* 14
[36] *Ibid.,* 31
[37] Juli Highfill, 'Reading at Variance: Icon, Index, and Symbol in *Cinco Horas con Mario*', *Anales de la literatura española contemporánea*, Vol. 21, No.1/2 (1996), 64
[38] Miguel Delibes, (trans.) Frances M. López-Morillas, *Five Hours with Mario*, 186
[39] Janet Pérez, 'Functions of the Rhetoric of Silence', 123

published by Pope John XXIII, urging the importance of freedom of speech and democracy.[40] Although also aimed at eastern communist countries, it was also unmistakably a warning to the only non-democratic nation in Western Europe. A document named *Dignitalis humanae* encouraged religious tolerance and freedom of practice, a freedom which at that moment in time didn't exist in Spain. *Christus Dominus* added to the liberal demands and invited civil authorities to surrender their right to elect bishops which Franco refused to do. The Council encouraged Catholic lay organizations opposed to the close relationship between Catholicism and the regime to express their views. In 1960, 339 priests, the majority of whom were based in the Basque country, signed a letter demanding the end of the Church's involvement with the dictatorship. Three years later, the abbot of Monserrat, the religious symbol of Catalonia, publicly attacked the authoritarian rule of a country, which, at the time, held more Catholic priests in its prisons than anywhere else in the world.[41] Delibes was greatly encouraged by the developments and evidently felt that if such progressive thinking had existed earlier, it may have prevented his country from descending into conflict:

> And talking about Christ, I think the histories of the Spanish Civil War have undervalued the role of religion. My own judgment is that this is a key factor. I have the opinion, that, if there had been a John XXIII before 1936, the Spanish Civil War would not have started or at least it would have had a different character.[42]

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[40] Salvador A. Oropesa, 'The Never-Ending Reformation: Miguel Delibes's *The Heretic*' in Mary R. Reichardt (ed.), *Between Human and Divine: The Catholic Vision in Contemporary Literature* (Washington, D.C., 2010), 86-102

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] "Y ya que hablamos de Cristo, yo pienso que el factor religioso no se ha valorado lo suficiente en las historias de la guerra civil y, a mi juicio, es clave, hasta el punto de que yo soy de los que creen que si hubiera habido un Juan XXIII antes de 1936, la guerra española no se hubiera desencadenado o hubiese tenido otro carácter." César Alonso de los Ríos from *Conversaciones con Miguel Delibes* (Madrid, 1971), 50, trans. in Salvador A. Oropesa, 'The Never-Ending Reformation: Miguel Delibes's *The Heretic*' in Mary R.

This was an issue he would later explore in more depth in his historical novel *El Hereje* without the watchful eye of Franco's censors.

Cinco Horas con Mario, published a year after the Council had concluded, presented subtle but similar religious challenges to Franco's regime. Manuel Ibrarme Fraga, the head of censorial operations at the time, employed a number of young Catholics, some of whom had previously contributed to Catholic journals. As this was a period of uncertainty for Catholicism in Spain, Delibes was careful to avoid any obvious criticism of the volatile religious situation and used Carmen as a shield for his own beliefs.[43]

Carmen's intransigent views are evident as she attacks Vatican II: "Nowadays everything's all stirred up with that business about the Council"[44] Representing the regime's standpoint, she later states that the "wretched Council" is "turning everything upside down."[45] Carmen appears to have suffered during her upbringing in a household where Catholicism was regarded as a status symbol and a privilege for her class. As a result, the newly proposed liberal laws don't appear to sit well with her: "John XXIII…placed the Church in a dead-end street…[He] has done and said things that are enough to scare anybody."[46] Contrasting completely with Carmen, Mario is found to have been a progressive Catholic. It is learned he lost two brothers during the Civil War, one killed by the Republicans and the other by Nationalist forces. The Catholic Mario evidently suffered during the papacy of Pius XI, who, agreeing with the Nationalist's cause in the Civil War, blessed Franco's forces and declared it a 'Crusade.' As the authorities regarded Carmen's standpoint to be genuine, the novel remained legitimate. The intended reader, however, was clearly expected

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Reichardt (ed.), *Between Human and Divine: The Catholic Vision in Contemporary Literature*, p.91

[43] Cristina Palomares, *The Quest For Survival After Franco*, 89

[44] Miguel Delibes, (trans.) Frances M. López-Morillas, *Five Hours with Mario*, 58

[45] *Ibid.*, 59

[46] *Ibid.*, 123

to recognize the allusions to the identity crisis that the Catholic Church was suffering at the time, and, in doing so, completely disregard Carmen's views as ultra conservative and absurd.

After the more liberal Manuel Fraga Iribarne took charge of censorial operations in 1962, many authors hoped that writing through the regime's repression would become easier. In letters sent to his editor, Josep Vergés, it is clear that Delibes viewed this supposedly more liberal period with suspicion however. Despite his editor's confidence in the regime's supposed new found liberalism, and the fact that pre-publication censorship was now optional, Delibes wrote *Cinco Horas con Mario* with a view to intelligently hiding any material that the authorities might judge to be censurable.[47] Even with Fraga's reforms of Francoist censorship, the fear of a novel's confiscation by the authorities evidently still weighed heavily on the writing of established authors such as Delibes.

Through the use of 'authorial silence' and intelligent structuring, Delibes managed to obscure his relationship with his own creation. The Spanish author succeeded in stepping back from his work whilst subtly insinuating to readers which particular criticisms should be made of Franco's society.

Delibes used the protagonist Carmen to screen his sentiments in *Cinco Horas con Mario*. The world is seen through her eyes and the body of the text is revolved around her monologue.[48] As a result, no obvious contradictory opinion is evident. She alludes to injustices such as police brutality and imposed censorship, but, due to her conservative upbringing, rather than seeing them as unjust repression, she prefers to use these events to vent her frustration on her dead husband. Those reading the novel were expected to see through Delibes' irony and observe for themselves that such incidents were discriminatory and commonplace in Francoist society.

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[47] Cristina Palomares, *The Quest For Survival After Franco*, 91
[48] H. L. Bourdreau, *Anales de la novela posguerra,* Vol.2, (1977), 7-17

It is clear that, due to state censorship, a large number of fundamental literary elements such as characters, dialogue and structure needed to be completely rethought. Having enlisted his intended readers as critical co-creators of his novel, Delibes was ensured that his subtle, but judicious, metaphors would be understood.

Carmen, in *Cinco Horas con Mario*, as an advocator of Nationalist ideals, was brought up to behave as a woman in her society 'should' do. No alternative has been offered to her throughout her life which encourages her dictatorial approach towards her children. She has been coerced into a traditional role in the home and can't escape.[49] As the reader discovers that, at heart, she is an insecure, frightened individual, Carmen provides a prime example of the negative effects that having a promoted national female stereotype can have. Throughout the novel, Carmen consistently criticizes the Second Vatican Council and the progressive Catholicism it proposed.[50] The novelist evidently intended that his readers would react against her unreasonable opinions and decide, if they hadn't already, that it was time to actively oppose the Church's close involvement with the dictatorship.

Delibes' coded writing provided a legal, and therefore much more readily available, denouncing of Franco's dictatorship to the Spanish public. The fact that much of the content and structure of *Cinco Horas con Mario* was specifically contrived to circumvent Franco's censors, demonstrates the great extent to which the fear of censorship influenced his writing. Despite having suffered with the imposed restrictions, his self-constraint and exploration of refined writing resulted in the creation of an outstanding composition. The notable amount of literary criticism and appreciation that the novel has

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[49] Juli Highfill, 'Reading at Variance: Icon, Index, and Symbol in *Cinco Horas con Mario*', 64

[50] Salvador A. Oropesa, 'The Never-Ending Reformation: Miguel Delibes's *The Heretic*', 86-102

attracted strongly suggests that the effect Franco's censorship had on Delibes' literature wasn't necessarily entirely negative.

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Speciesism and Equality of Consideration

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Speciesism, like racism and sexism is an extreme view that turns individuals into an isolated group in order to attack it and this should be halted with immediate effect. Speciesism is a practice by which we judge non-human animals and treat them in certain ways for no other reason than that they are of a different species. To illustrate the importance of rejecting speciesism, I will consider what the best form of anti-speciesism to defend is, namely a principle of weak anti-speciesism that I believe arises from a general principle of equal consideration. I will argue that equal consideration of every individual leads to a society of fewer extremes.

1) WHAT IS ANTI-SPECIESISM?

To begin with, I will consider what speciesism consists in, especially in the view of Peter Singer. I will then explain what versions of anti-speciesism are available to defend; a strong version and a weak version.

Peter Singer advocates anti-speciesist behaviour in his book *Animal Liberation*. Speciesism on a basic level is the act of treating a non-human animal differently to a human animal just because of their species. Singer calls it 'a prejudice or attitude of bias in favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species.'[1] Singer likens this to sexism where the way a woman is treated has nothing to do with her background or intelligence, it merely relates to her sex. The idea that speciesism is akin to

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[1] Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation* (New York, 2002), 6

sexism, and wrong for the same reason, goes back to 1792: after Mary Wollstonecraft argued for rights for women, Thomas Taylor wrote a satirical response arguing that 'If the argument for equality was sound when applied to women, why should it not be applied to dogs, cats and horses?'[2] He thought this to be an absurd extreme much like women's rights, but, since we consider one to be a valid argument for rejecting sexism, we might also allow the same argument to be used to defend animals and reject speciesism.

There seem to be two clear versions of anti-speciesism, one strong and one weak. The stronger form is the principle that we must treat all animals, both human and non-human, exactly the same. The weaker form is the principle that treating animals and humans differently is unacceptable, if the only motivation for that treatment is the difference in species. On the weaker, but not the stronger version, it can be permissible to treat them differently, so long as the justification for doing so is on the basis of other features which coincide with species-difference. So, for example, it could be acceptable for us to only feed Koala bears eucalyptus leaves because there is a substantive justificatory property that koalas have, of being able to digest eucalyptus leaves, which maps onto the species difference. However, it would be unacceptable to keep a koala in a small cage as it has no special property that would cause it not to suffer in such a situation.

2) THE ARGUMENT FOR EQUAL CONSIDERATION

Arguing for equal consideration is what tells us we must not act in this extreme speciesist way. First, then, we must consider exactly why Singer believes that animals deserve equal consideration. I will also consider Bernard Williams for some positive reasons for equal consideration that Singer does not propound.

Singer's discussion of this in *Animal Liberation* is very persuasive, as he argues that the same line of reasoning can be used for animals as it is used to support a

[2] *Ibid.*, 1

woman's right to abortion. The argument comes about like this: men and women have undeniable differences, as do humans and non-human animals but, though there seem to be more similarities between men and women, the differences between animals and humans should still not be used as 'a barrier to the case for extending the basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals.'[3] Feminists campaigning for equality between the sexes do not commit themselves to saying that when a woman is granted the right to abortion that the same right must be granted to a man. That would be nonsensical, as they do not have the physiological makeup that would ever allow for an abortion. Equality does not prevent difference in treatment where actual differences exist. As Singer says, 'The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical *treatment*; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.'[4]

The reason Singer insists upon equal consideration rather than straight equality is that he thinks, partly, that equality is an unfeasible goal. Due to the immense differences between individuals; their talents, capacities, preferences, intellect, physiology and suchlike, it is impossible to achieve equality and he says; 'if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality.'[5] If we cannot demand a true equality in the discussion of human kind, we certainly cannot demand it or even desire it across species. And although there are many differences between humans and non-humans that we may consider important, like intelligence, consciousness, language and the like, recognising this 'is no barrier to extending the basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals.'[6] Whatever we were to discover about different capacities between races, sexes or species, what Singer wants us to understand is that none of them matter, that equality of consideration comes out-with the sphere of practical differences.

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[3] *Ibid.*, 2
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*, 3
[6] *Ibid.*, 2

So far, Singer has told us why there is no good reason not to treat all beings with equal consideration, and implied that the burden of proof lies on anyone who wishes to treat beings differently. What we have not yet seen is any positive reason to forward equality of consideration. Here we can look at the argument Bernard Williams makes in his essay 'The Idea of Equality', which supports the notion that individuals deserve equal consideration, in order to support Singer in his extension of the principle to non-human animals.

His argument starts by addressing the very problem we have seen above that the many things we differ in may well be important to how we are treated: 'It is not, he may say, in their skill, intelligence, strength or virtue that men are equal, but merely in their being men: it is their common humanity that constitutes their equality.'[7] It is the fact that "men are men" which he thinks makes them worthy of some sort of equal treatment, despite it being impossible for them to be equal in all morally relevant characteristics. This, initially, seems to be a platitude, as denying that men are indeed men would be ridiculous, and, it seems that the arguments that Williams propounds are just for the equality of human beings (i.e. without any significant normative consequences – how can a tautology have any substantive consequences, after all?). Williams argues that, though at first it seems tautologous, reminding the reader that "men are men" serves a very great purpose. This purpose is that it serves as a useful reminder that we are all much alike in many ways, 'notably the capacity to feel pain'.[8] However, I believe that the argument works equally well for animals if the properties appealed to are ones which animals share as well. After all "men are men" can instead be viewed as "individuals are individuals".

Williams goes on to say that this assertion of being alike is far from trivial in the moral sphere and, indeed, in our consideration of equality. Knowing that

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[7] Bernard Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in P. Laslett & G. Runciman (eds.) *Politics, Philosophy and Society*, 2nd series (Oxford, 1962), 110
[8] *Ibid.*, 112

individuals are alike in their possession of something, like pain, groups them together; let us call that group X (the group of things that suffer pain). When groups within X are ignored, i.e. black people by racists, what the racists do is link those characteristics we would normally use as a moral claim, like pain, to contingent factors, like being black, and say that those factors 'may be cited as the grounds of treating them differently,'[9] rather than the possession of pain. If we are to justify a policy by appealing to some property of a particular group, then that same principle should be extended to all those who possess that property. In this case it is pain and Williams argues that, if pain is the property, then all those who feel pain, including black people, deserve the same consideration as each other regardless of other differences. Williams says; 'The principle that men should be differentially treated in respect of welfare merely on grounds of their colour is not a special sort of moral principle, but (if anything) a purely arbitrary assertion of will,'[10]. He goes on to explain that racists themselves concede this point when they try to justify their racism, by trying to correlate blackness to some other consideration that might be relevant to how we treat people, like stupidity. This relevance is hugely important as;

> … it gives a force to saying that those who neglect the moral claims of certain men that arise from their human capacity to feel pain, etc., are overlooking or disregarding those capacities; and are not just operating with a special moral principle, conceding the capacities to these men, but denying the moral claim.[11]

So, what Williams argues is that our common humanity, the fact that men are men, imposes a burden of proof on anyone who wants to endorse discriminatory policies; they must show some relevant difference by which they can justify the discrimination.

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[9] *Ibid.*, 113
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*, 115

I take this further than Williams intended and I believe the same can be applied to animals: if this shows that the burden of proof must be met to discriminate against people, then the same arguments prove as much for non-human animals as well because they are all simply individuals. In particular, when we consider pain important (as I will show in section 5 that we should), it would be inconsistent under Williams' model to exclude animals from equal consideration.

This awarding of equality of consideration across the species-divide forces us to reject the extremes of speciesism wholeheartedly. A treatment based on species' differences is an unacceptable pursuit. As Singer says, 'To avoid speciesism we must allow that beings who are similar in all relevant respects have a similar right to life – and mere membership in our own biological species cannot be a morally relevant criterion for this right.'[12]

3) AN ARGUMENT FOR WEAK ANTI-SPECIESISM

So, having discovered that speciesism is unacceptable on the sound basis of equality of consideration for individuals, we must now decide which version of anti-speciesism should be defended. I will give reasons to think that weak anti-speciesism is the version we should endorse and that we should go no further than that.

First, weak anti-speciesism allows us to have differential treatment if the reason for that difference is not species-based but merely maps onto the species difference. Treating non-human animals in the same way as humans in all respects is either impossible or pointless. So, why should we endorse weak anti-speciesism? It allows us to consider humans and non-human animals on their own scale of interests and thus means we focus on the individual rather than on a species or any one quality. This allows us to embrace the principles of equality

[12] Singer, *Animal Liberation*, 19

of consideration whilst still recognising relevant differences between individuals.

Further, I believe that the strong version of anti-speciesism, cannot truly and should not be defended. The only way that such a theory could be justified is if we acted on the basis of absolute equality. This version does not satisfy itself with equal consideration but insists upon absolute equality of outcome. A kangaroo must be treated as a human in all aspects; so whatever we think right for a human's treatment, the kangaroo must also be treated in the same way. Considering the implications of this and their enormity must inevitably lead us to understand that, due to the existence of differences between us and other animals as well as between humans, it is irrational to treat all equally. It is still right, however, to consider each being equally. "Treating equally" and "considering equally" may sound similar initially, but a large difference separates them; the latter allows for inequalities which exist naturally to become a part of the way we treat an individual. This seems logical, as trying to deny initial inequality as "treating equally" does, only leads to confusion. If inequalities or differences exist naturally between or within a species, the only thing to do is work around those differences (if not seen as significant for interests) to allow 'each to count for one and none for more than one.'[13]

Strong anti-speciesism gives us a blanket policy for treating all beings one way, and it fails to take into account individual needs, which is why we cannot condone it. Having said that, I see no better option than for us to promote weak anti-speciesism and take each individual, whether human, cat or chimpanzee, on their merit alone when we decide how to treat them.

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[13] Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation*, J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (eds.) (Oxford, 1996)

4) AGAINST THREE ARGUMENTS FOR SYSTEMATICALLY DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

Granting weak anti-speciesism, there could still be some features which justify systematically treating humans and animals differently. I will consider three arguments that have been made in order to justify treating humans better but will argue that all fail. These are common arguments and even those who consider themselves animal lovers are often found to have speciesism inherent in their daily thought.

A common view is that intellect as mental capacity is the decider for rights. But why should intelligence determine whether one enjoys rights or deserves equality? 'Equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact,'[14] so even if it were true that any race, sex or species had fewer intellectual capacities than any other, that itself would not show anything about consideration of equality. Also, if intelligence was something we considered to be relevant here, it would be difficult to draw the line between levels of stupidity and intelligence.[15] Sojourner Truth, a feminist, puts it beautifully: 'If my cup won't hold but a pint and yours holds a quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?'[16] This illustrates that one's interests and entitlement to equal consideration have little to do with our intellectual prowess. If you are at the bottom of the class you have no less entitlement to as much learning as you can take in than your more intelligent peers. Similarly, we can say that those with conceivably no intellect at all still have interests that deserve consideration. Thus we believe that intellect or capacity should have no place in the discussion of rights. And, if it did then we would commit ourselves to saying that infants, young children, mentally retarded adults and most nonhuman animals are on

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[14] Singer, *Animal Liberation*, 4

[15] Cf. Ian Carter, 'Respect and the Basis of Equality', in *Ethics*, Vol. 121, No. 3, (April., 2011), 538-571; Carter's views on range property could be of interest here.

[16] Reminiscences by Frances D. Gage, from Susan B. Anthony, *The History of Woman Suffrage*, vol. 1; the passage is to be found in the extract in Leslie Tanner (ed.), *Voices From Women's Liberation* (New York, 1970)

the same level and thus similarly undeserving of equal consideration. Since most humans are appalled by such an extreme thought, we should believe that intellect or capacity has no place here. So we have ruled out intellect as a relevant consideration for equality.

Let us now consider another common misconception, rationality. I will define rationality as the ability to reason and process information to get an answer, regardless of basic IQ. Rationality has long been thought of as a uniquely human characteristic, all the way back to Aristotle:

> For being alive is obviously shared by plants too, and we are looking for what is particular to human beings... There remains a practical sort of life of what possesses reason; and of this, one element 'possesses reason' in so far as it is obedient to reason, while the other possesses it in so far as it actually has it, and itself thinks.[17]

However, this is not only something we should ignore in terms of awarding equal consideration, but is also categorically untrue. Many animals, particularly higher apes, dolphins, dogs, octopuses and the like have shown reasoning ability: they can work out puzzles, they can work as a team, they can rationally decide upon the best course of action. This shows that to think that rationality distinguishes humans and animals is unhelpful. Further, we have the same problem we had with intellect: why should rationality be a consideration within equality? There is no substantive reason why having the ability to reason is actually a moral difference that we should bow to when doling out treatments, and where there is no justification for picking this as a difference we must assume that those who do so are simply clutching at straws, in an extreme self-serving attempt to distinguish humans from animals cleanly, so they can continue to treat animals in whatever way they so choose. Given Williams' argument, the proponents of rationality as the decisive differential

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[17] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, (eds.) Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe (Oxford, 2002) 1.VII 1097b34-1098a7; also see, Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, (ed.) Mary Gregor (Cambridge, 1998)

factor have the burden of proof heavily on their shoulders, to prove beyond reasonable doubt why differential treatment is acceptable. They have not yet achieved that.

Another line that people try to draw in order to systematically treat humans differently to non-human animals, is that of self-consciousness. The argument is that humans are self-conscious where animals are not: we possess knowledge of ourselves and our existence, whereas animals do not self-reflect, they just exist. But, Singer says 'if the existence of self-consciousness does not affect the nature of the interests under comparison, it is not clear why we should drag self-consciousness into the discussion at all, any more than we should drag species, race or sex into similar discussions. Interests are interests,'.[18] When I am considering whether certain beings should be kept in a dark box for any period of time, the interest I should be considering is if the individual will suffer in any way from that treatment. Whether or not the being has self-consciousness will not, or will rarely, affect how they suffer in that situation.

A related criterion is other-consciousness. Other-consciousness is what we can call the ability to translate other people's beliefs, intentions or emotions. It is consciousness not of ourselves but of others around us. This is sometimes seen to be a relevant consideration as 'a being that considers the beliefs, intentions and emotions of others may be said to deserve more consideration itself than a being that does not do so, other things being equal.'[19] Responsibility should be considered here, as it seems to imply the existence of other-consciousness. *Mens rea*, or intent, is what makes a person responsible for their actions. So, when I take responsibility for tripping up my competitor in a race, it implies, and must assume, that I possess other-consciousness and am thus aware of how my actions affect my competitor. These assumptions have infiltrated the law

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[18] Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge, 1979), 65

[19] Abraham Rudnick, 'Other-Consciousness and the Use of Animals as Illustrated in Medical Experiments' in *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (2007), 202-208, 207

too and Moore says, 'rights, like obligations, apply only to accountable agents. Agents who cannot choose to exercise a set of rights are not the holders of moral or legal rights.'[20] This suggests that to have rights or even something like them i.e. your interests recognised, you must have other-consciousness. Nevertheless, this does not give us a systematic reason to treat all humans differently than other species. We know there are plenty of human examples that do not fulfil these criteria and yet we think they ought still to have their interests promoted. 'Impaired other-consciousness is associated with serious mental disorders, such as autism and schizophrenia, resulting – among other things – in difficulty representing (accurately or at all) beliefs, emotions and intentions of others.'[21] It certainly seems like animals suffer from the same problem as babies and other marginal cases. We cannot then, if we want to respect our intuitions about these human cases, draw the line, based on consciousness, at the species-divide, when lines of consciousness are clearly blurred.

The argument in this section is inductive. I have looked at three features which are commonly thought to justify systematic differential treatment of humans, by dint of being possessed by all and only humans, and shown that no such argument actually works. None of the above features give us good reason to treat all humans differently from all animals in line with the extremes of speciesism. It is still possible that some feature may exist which allows us to always treat animals differently consistently with weak anti-speciesism, but we have yet to find such a feature. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that equal consideration and weak anti-speciesism actively rule out systematically treating human and non-human animals differently.

[20] M. S. Moore, *Law and Psychiatry* (Cambridge, 1984), 93
[21] Rudnick, 'Other-Consciousness', 204

5) AN ARGUMENT AGAINST SYSTEMATICALLY DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

The argument in the previous section is sufficient to reject the extreme views of speciesism but in this section I offer a further and stronger reason for believing that individuals ought to be considered on a property intrinsic to them. While the previous section showed us which features fail to justify systematic differential treatment, now I suggest that the real property or feature in question is one where we can see that humans and animals do not differ. That property I will argue, is suffering.

Let us consider then whether animals have any feelings, whether they can suffer, as that is what I believe grounds interests. The reason for this is that it seems to be the only property that all individuals have and, further, our interests are those things by which we are not caused to suffer. If I have an interest in being educated, then not gaining that education causes me to suffer; if my dog's interests lie in being fed and watered, not providing that causes suffering. I believe that suffering and interests are inextricably linked and interests cannot exist without the notion of suffering: as Singer says, 'The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is *a pre-requisite for having interests at all*'.[22] I aim to show that as long as we can establish that non-human animals suffer like humans animals do, then there is no reason to treat animals as-such, differently to humans.

The question then is, can we ever know that animals feel pain or pleasure? If we require certainty, the answer to that question is 'no': I may never even know for sure whether I myself am actually in pain. If I cannot know this completely then I can never be sure of another's pain. However, let us suppose that I know that I feel pain when I fall over, does this give me the knowledge that my friends also feel pain when they fall? Seemingly, it does not; if anything, pain is a mental process and is therefore, by definition, internal.

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[22] Singer, *Animal Liberation*, 7

However, I can infer from their behaviour (crying, pointing agitatedly at the area, telling me they feel pain) that they too have a similar experience of pain as I do. If I can legitimately infer that, which I think is possible if we want to live our lives fully on a level that does not question everything with scepticism, then, we also must be able to infer the same about nonhuman animals. The reason for this is that animals show many of the same pain behaviours as humans do (whimpering or howling and agitatedly licking or looking at the area). To believe in my friend's pain but not my dog's would be ridiculous when they act in much the same way to express it. As Singer says, 'This is an inference, but a pretty reasonable one'.[23] So, if we think other humans feel pain, we should think that animals can suffer too.

In this way, there is no arbitrary line drawn that allows for a being to deserve equal consideration or rights, no other way advocates interests but this does. As Jeremy Bentham says, 'The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*?'[24] Therefore, suffering has to be the only thing we consider when deciding how to treat an individual and whether to award them rights.

The fear about equal consideration, for Singer, is that it may commit him to placing equal importance on an animal life and a fully-functioning adult human. This fear is unfounded. What Singer is advocating is merely equal consideration, not straight equality. As a utilitarian, Singer believes that there are still instances where an animal life or the wellbeing of an animal is more expendable than that of a human. For example, if a normal adult is aware that the Government has been stealing people away during the night for random experimental tests then he or she will be very afraid. The quality of life they normally have will be threatened by the negative anticipation of being stolen away and subjected to hideous experiments. An animal that is being tested upon does not have the awareness to understand that their life and freedom are being

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[23] *Ibid.*, 10

[24] Bentham, *An Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation*, chapter 17

affected by the experimenters and, thus, they do not have the same complex levels of fear and suffering which an adult human would have. They both suffer and, ideally, neither should, but, in the case of making a choice over which is a more desirable situation, Singer would always choose to leave the nonhuman in the laboratory and rescue the human. This, despite appearances, is not a form of speciesism. The point is that even if human and non-human animals all suffer, the fact that different things (like anticipation) can make us suffer further, can justify differential treatment, consistent with weak anti-speciesism. The fact that the animal loses here is simply a case of other considerations mapping onto the species difference.

It seems that our discussion thus far has led to the conclusion that the weaker form of anti-speciesism, that we must not treat beings differently if the reason we do so is based solely on species, is the most defensible theory against the extremes of speciesism. Not only is there no good reason for treating non-human animals differently solely based on their species, there are also a multitude of reasons why doing that is completely unacceptable. We have seen arguments for a unique moral quality of human beings, from rationality to other-consciousness, fall down and fail to separate humans from animals (or at least all humans from all animals), which leaves the defenders of those ideas in a predicament. Either they must accept that their "difference" has no bearing on consideration of interests and, in fact, all individuals ought to be considered equally. Or, they must allow extreme marginal human cases to take the same moral low-ground as non-human animals in their view. They must do one of these things on pain of inconsistency. The only way to dispel the extreme views of racists, sexists and those advocating speciesism, is to employ equal consideration of individuals as, 'the boundary of our kind is not marked by species or moral agency. What kind are we? We are conscious, sentient beings, [capable of suffering], and many human and non-human animals are like us in that.'[25]

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[25] Nathan Nobis, 'Carl Cohen's 'Kind' Arguments For Animal Rights', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 21, No. 1, (2004), 43-59, 57

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Can terrorism ever be justified?

Frederick Richters

Paul Christopher defines terrorism as "any act that involves the [...] intentional threat or use of random violence against innocent people for the purposes of instilling fear in others to bring about a political agenda." The globalisation of terrorism in the 21st century has made these acts of random violence a prevalent issue of public debate and academic research, with a multitude of arguments either criticising or defending the extreme methods used by terrorist groups or actors. The arguments put forward not only address issues of normative ethics in relation to violent conflict, but they also raise the important question of whether terrorism can ever be justified.

As Martin puts it fittingly, "the beginning of the 21st century is an era of globalized terrorism"[1]. While the globalisation of terrorism has changed the way terrorist groups operate and function, the justifications brought forward by individuals and groups to rationalize the violent means that they have used to achieve their extreme goals seem to have changed very little. This makes it plausible to ask whether terrorism can ever be justified. This essay will be working with the definition of terrorism by Christopher[2] and will analyse four different arguments justifying terrorism: the consequentialist argument (including utilitarianism and the 'anti-oppression exception'), the 'supreme emergency' argument, the argument of 'collective responsibility' and the

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[1] Gus Martin, *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues* (London, 2006), 3

[2] Paul Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues* (New Jersey, 2004), 182

'divine command' argument. From this analysis it will be concluded that terrorism can never be justified.

Every serious discussion of terrorism needs to begin with an attempt at defining what exactly terrorism is. Although there is widespread disagreement over which acts constitute terrorism, this essay will use the definition of terrorism brought forward by Paul Christopher as a starting point:

> Any act that involves the [...] intentional threat or use of random violence against innocent people for the purposes of instilling fear in others to bring about a political agenda.[3]

Even if somewhat vague, this definition does capture the four necessary conditions for an act to be considered 'terrorist'. The first is the "intentional threat or use of [...] violence", in relation to which Crenshaw argues that "terrorism is [primarily] manifested in a series of individual acts of extraordinary and intolerable violence"[4]. It is also important to note that for Christopher the threat of violence has the same moral weighting as the actual use of violence.

The use of the expression 'innocent people' to describe the victims of terrorism can be criticised because it implies that combatants – unlike the 'innocent' non-combatants – are 'guilty'. For purposes of simplicity, however, the expression 'innocent people' will be equated for now with 'non-combatants', although it must be remembered that authors like Zohar argue that the distinction between the guilty and the innocent does not match the distinction between combatants and non-combatants[5]. As Smilansky points out, "terrorism has typically and specifically targeted civilians without concern for their

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[3] *Ibid*.

[4] Crenshaw cited in Jan Oskar Engene, *Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the Trends since 1950* (Cheltenham, 2004), 6

[5] Noam J. Zohar, 'Innocence and Complex Threats: Upholding the War Ethic and the Condemnation of Terrorism' (2004) 114 *Ethics* 735

innocence"[6]. In 'just war' terminology, referring to a tradition of military ethics which holds that violent conflict ought to meet certain criteria, the disregard for the principle of discrimination and the resulting intentional violation of non-combatant immunity form the conceptual core of terrorism.[7]

The fear induced by terrorism results on the one hand from the threat that violent acts will be repeated and on the other hand from the indiscriminate selection of victims. Targets of violence may also be selected for their symbolic or representative value by having a certain political or social status; however, it should be clarified that victims are not chosen so selectively that they could not have been substituted with other members of the same category of people. In both cases there is an element of randomness which distinguishes terrorism from assassination.[8] It follows that terrorism is not an ideology but a method of struggle because the violence unleashed against the victims serves only as a means to communicate a political message to the target audience.[9]

The last characteristic of terrorism is the political motivation behind it. The political agendas of terrorists – be they ethno-nationalist, ideological or religious in content - distinguish them from those who commit violent acts for criminal or sociopathic reasons; terrorists are often motivated by what they pretend to be a 'just cause'.[10] Inducing fear is therefore instrumental in creating "a general context of societal fear that will coerce those in authority to accede to the terrorists' demands"[11]. What exactly these demands are can vary from case to case, but usually they involve changing a political system or seizing political power from the incumbent government of a state.[12] It is through the publicity generated by the use of violence that terrorists seek to obtain the

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[6] Saul Smilansky, 'Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion' (2004) 114 *Ethics* 791
[7] *Ibid.*, 790
[8] Engene, *Terrorism in Western Europe*, 9-14
[9] Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace*, 182
[10] *Ibid.*, 183
[11] Alex J. Bellamy, *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq* (Cambridge, 2008), 138
[12] Crenshaw cited in Engene, *Terrorism in Western Europe,* 6

influence and power they otherwise lack in order to bring about this political change.[13]

The advantage of this definition is that it focuses primarily on the means employed by actors rather than on their identity or standing. By not singling out particular actors, this definition emphasises that terrorist violence can be employed by not only individuals and non-state groups but also states, thereby avoiding a one-sided application in the subsequent analysis.[14]

From a deontological perspective, the *jus in bello* principle of non-combatant immunity invokes an absolute moral prohibition upon intentionally attacking non-combatants. Since the intentional targeting of non-combatants forms the conceptual core of terrorism, any justification of terrorism has to justify the violation of the principle of non-combatant immunity. The central question is whether there are cases where this principle may be overridden or restricted.[15]

The first argument employed to justify terrorism is based on consequentialism. Consequentialists believe that the morality of an act should be judged by its outcomes and consequences. From a consequentialist perspective, violent means are considered legitimate if they are used to achieve worthwhile ends and succeed in doing so. However, the premise that *any* action might be permissible for the sake of worthwhile ends is not tenable from a consequentialist perspective because there is always a limit to the extent of harm that an actor can reasonably carry out for the sake of these worthwhile ends.[16]

Bellamy distinguishes between two different types of consequentialist justifications: utilitarianism and what may be described as the 'anti-oppression

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[13] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (Oxford, 1999), 44
[14] Engene, *Terrorism in Western Europe*, 12
[15] C.A.J. Coady, 'Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency' (2004) 114 *Ethics* 777
[16] Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace*, 186-187

exception'.[17] In its simplest form, utilitarianism holds that moral constraints like the principle of non-combatant immunity should be overridden if calculations of the overall outcomes of doing so prove that it creates more good than harm. Utilitarianism denies the moral absolutism of the principle of non-combatant immunity, but, in Coady's opinion, it also trivialises the profound moral constraints against intentionally targeting non-combatants.[18]

It is interesting, however, that consequentialists like Hare believe that history shows that terrorism usually fails to achieve a balance of good which would justify the intentional targeting of non-combatants.[19] Yet even if terrorism were to achieve a balance of good, the question would arise whether this balance of good could not be achieved by a different means.

Walzer, believing that consequentialist arguments are defective in their own terms, considers the efficiency excuse that "terrorism works (and nothing else does)" to be flawed and argues that the success of this argument largely depends on the premise that targeting non-combatants is the only option that terrorists have. For him, alternative strategies are available in liberal democracies and, in any case, terrorism never works against totalitarian states. As a conclusion, Walzer expresses his doubt "that terrorism has ever achieved national liberation"[20]. Coady, however, points out that the claim that "terrorism works (and nothing else does)" does not necessarily mean that terrorism must work all by itself, but rather that nothing else will fulfil the role that has been assigned to it. This hints at the question whether terrorism has ever made an irreplaceable contribution to national liberation, a question to which there is no simple answer.[21] In 1956 the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria decided to use bombings and assassinations against the French population of

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[17] Bellamy, *Just Wars*, 141
[18] Coady, *Terrorism*, 777-778
[19] Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, *Terrorism and Collective Responsibility* (London, 1992), 36
[20] Coady, *Terrorism*, 785
[21] *Ibid.*, 786

Algiers in order to put pressure on France and appeal directly to international opinion.[22] While it cannot be claimed that the struggle for national liberation in Algeria was resolved by the FLN's terror campaign, it can be argued in this specific case that terrorism has at least partially contributed to the end of French colonial rule by influencing public opinion.

Bellamy's 'anti-oppression exception' refers to the argument that terrorism is justified when used as a means by the weak against the oppressor. This argument is based on the presumption that if the weak were obliged to follow the same rules as the strong, they would never prevail. Theorists like Nielsen seem to argue that 'revolutionary terrorism' is justifiable if the violent acts are effective in the revolutionary struggle and if the suffering caused by terrorism is lower overall than the suffering inflicted by the prevailing injustice.[23] The Islamic Resistance Movement, known as Hamas, has often portrayed terrorism as the only weapon available to the weak in confronting a stronger opponent and has argued that it is the most effective weapon at its disposal for inflicting harm with a minimum of losses.[24]

Bellamy identifies three problems with this argument. First of all, if terrorists can justly ignore the rights of non-combatants, then pressure is put on states to abandon moral constraints in counter-terrorism. Secondly, accepting an 'anti-oppression exception' to non-combatant immunity creates the potential for abuse by dissident or separatist groups in democratic states that will portray themselves as being oppressed.[25] Finally, the claim that terrorism is a legitimate form of self-defence against the oppressor is invalid because the intentional

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[22] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 61-62

[23] Igor Primoratz, 'Terrorism' in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition)*, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/terrorism/ [accessed March 19 2011]

[24] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 99

[25] Martin, *Understanding Terrorism*, 156-157

targeting of non-combatants does nothing to directly protect the terrorists or the communities that they claim to represent from actual attack.[26]

A second justification used by terrorists to justify their acts is the argument of 'supreme emergency' which is closely linked to consequentialism. According to Walzer, there are situations in which the danger confronted is so great and the options available are so limited that extreme measures must be taken. This argument of necessity depends on the imminence and seriousness of the threat and only allows the state to override the principle of non-combatant immunity when faced with "defeat likely to bring disaster to a political community"[27]. The emphasis, therefore, is on the extreme nature and the rarity of the situation. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have often used this argument by equating the Sri Lankan government's oppressive efforts to racial holocaust and by implying that the Sinhalese plan to destroy the national identity of the Tamil people.[28]

Bellamy has a two-fold objection to this argument. Firstly, the case for 'supreme emergency' contains the potential for abuse because the situations in question are open to different interpretations by various actors. Furthermore, the argument is based on the fallacious assumption that sometimes there seem to be no alternatives to killing non-combatants. This argument, therefore, needs to prove beyond all doubt that targeting non-combatants can actually defend a state facing 'supreme emergency' and that it is the 'only option' available.[29] Orend discards the argument of 'supreme emergency' because an appeal to military necessity cannot be considered enough to override the principle of non-combatant immunity which has been established in the first place with military necessity in mind. However, he also concedes that a strict

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[26] Bellamy, *Just Wars*, 142
[27] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York, 1977), 268
[28] Michael P. Arena and Bruce A. Arrigo, *The Terrorist Identity: explaining the Terrorist Threat* (New York, 2006), 180
[29] Bellamy, *Just Wars*, 144

respect for non-combatant immunity, in this case, might result not just in victory for the aggressor, but also in slaughter and ultimate catastrophe. Therefore, Orend compares the adherence to the principle of non-combatant immunity in a situation of 'supreme emergency' to fighting with one arm tied behind one's back.[30]

Coady for his part attacks the implicit pro-state bias of Walzer who argues that it is the duty of statesmen to preserve their polity. Ignoring the claims that many of the arguments for terrorism are similar to his state-based arguments of necessity and last resort, Walzer denies that there can be justifications for terrorism.[31] It could be argued, however, that there are some groups like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam who can plausibly claim to represent political communities and to deploy violence in defence of a threatened community. In fact, the Sri Lankan government has oppressed the Tamil minority through discriminatory legislation like the Sinhala-Only Act, the practice of standardisation, and the denial of linguistic as well as educational rights.[32] But on the contrary, the LTTE have often simply ignored or dismissed their culpability for terrorist actions by referring to themselves as 'freedom fighters' who condemn acts of violence against civilians.[33]

In general, it would not seem implausible that various groups fighting against tyrannical regimes could be described as facing 'supreme emergency'. This leads, however, back to the criticism that intentionally targeting non-combatants is not the 'only option' that terrorists have. Moreover, the broadening of the definition of 'supreme emergency' would also reduce the rarity value of the exemption and hence dangerously expose the possible justifications for targeting non-combatants to abuse.[34] Smilansky argues that the

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[30] Brian Orend, 'Is there a Supreme Emergency Exemption?' in Mark Evans (ed.), *Just War Theory: A Reappraisal* (Edinburgh, 2005), 144-145

[31] Coady, *Terrorism*, 782-784

[32] Arena and Arrigo, *Terrorist Identity*, 180

[33] *Ibid.*, 196-198

[34] Coady, *Terrorism*, 786-787

justification for Palestinian terrorism fails due to the existence and feasibility of alternatives to terrorism, but concedes that terrorism might be justified in situations where there is a genocidal threat to a group's very existence, as there was in Rwanda in 1994. While it is highly doubtful that terrorism would have been effective in preventing genocide in this case, the argument raises questions of 'collective responsibility'.[35]

Many terrorists argue that non-combatants who benefit materially from an oppressive regime lose their innocence and become legitimate targets. Wilkens argues that it is legitimate to target non-combatants provided that they are "members of a community which is collectively guilty of violence"[36]. He points out, however, that this justification only applies to those who "either have themselves been the actual or intended victims of violence, or are members of a community [...] which has been the actual or intended victim of violence". He admits that this may involve "inflicting violence upon those who in their individual capacity may have done or intended no harm to the would-be terrorists or [their] community"[37]. The problem with this reasoning is that it equates non-combatancy with innocence and combatancy with guilt which brings us back to the problems of defining terrorism.

If a community including innocent non-combatants can be held collectively responsible for the crimes of combatants – whether these crimes be real or perceived - and if the non-combatants simply lose their innocence by virtue of belonging to the same community as the combatants, then this argumentation is not only an excuse for terrorism but also for mass slaughter. Left-wing terrorist groups like the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany have used this kind of argument to justify their revolutionary anti-establishment ideology and the deliberate targeting of non-combatants belonging to the 'imperialist'

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[35] Smilansky, *Terrorism*, 797
[36] Wilkens, *Terrorism and Collective Responsibility*, 29
[37] *Ibid.*, 31

establishment.[38] The concept of 'collective responsibility' makes the right to life conditional on an individual's relationship to oppression.[39] Hostility or political support does not turn innocent civilian members of a community into combatants; only actions, not sympathies, can change the status of non-combatants.[40] Moreover, if communities can be collectively judged for their wrongdoing, then the victims of terrorism can also collectively judge the terrorists and their communities and use that judgement to (further) justify oppression.[41]

The last argument invoked to justify terrorism is that of 'divine command' which holds that terrorist acts become morally right when they are commanded by God.[42] This justification is highly problematic: a divine mandate is impossible to disprove, it can be claimed by anyone without restriction, and it can be used to justify any act, no matter how abominable.[43] Even if leaving open the theoretical possibility that God could mandate terrorist acts, those invoking such a mandate need to prove its veracity by more than faith and have to recognise the possible corruptibility or self-interest of those who convey such messages to them.[44] Hamas has often claimed to wage a 'holy war', fought by divine command, against a foreign invader that has usurped Palestinian land.[45]

As the analysis has shown, consequentialism and its related arguments are unable to justify terrorist violence because terrorism fails to achieve a balance of good and is rarely the 'only option' available. The argument of 'supreme

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[38] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 80-83
[39] Bellamy, *Just Wars*, 143
[40] James Turner Johnson, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare* (New Haven, 1999), 131-132
[41] Bellamy, *Just Wars*, 143
[42] Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace*, 184
[43] Bellamy, *Just Wars*, 144
[44] Christopher, *The Ethics of War & Peace*, 186
[45] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 98

emergency' is invalid because it creates the potential for abuse and is unable to prove that targeting non-combatants can actually defend a state or group facing 'supreme emergency'. Wilkens' argument of 'collective responsibility' has to be discarded because its argumentation can be misconstrued to justify mass slaughter and the logic of 'collective responsibility' can also justify the victims of terrorism taking revenge on the terrorists and their communities. The argument of 'divine mandate' fails because those invoking such a mandate are unable to prove its veracity by more than faith and have to recognise the possible corruptibility of those conveying the message to them. Since the various excuses for terrorism fail to justify the violation of the principle of non-combatant immunity, it can be said in conclusion that terrorism can never be justified.

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The Self Under Extreme Conditions in Virginia Woolf's Writing

Gemma Macdonald-Washington

In her writings, Virginia Woolf illustrates the struggles of the individual under extreme conditions through the prism of the self: the crux of the individual. Psychoanalysis, as advanced by Freud and Lacan, in addition to more recent theories of gender performativity, will afford comment on Woolf's texts and the nature of selfhood. Ultimately, the self is shown to be compromised by social restraints and patriarchal impositions; this is reflected both in terms of Woolf's characters and in terms of the individual female artist. As a corrective to the repressions of patriarchy, Woolf advocates an androgynous selfhood.

Virginia Woolf introduced a new style of writing, applying feminist principles to literature and allowing the female voice finally to be heard. Woolf aimed at creating a radical new form of androgynous expression, which attempted to marry both the sexes together, forging a kind of equality (at least within the mind of the individual) where neither sex is privileged over the other, in contrast to traditional social and literary structures. Through 'A Room of One's Own', *Mrs Dalloway*, *Orlando* and *The Waves*, Woolf explores the idea of the fragmented self, the deconstruction of social and gender norms, and reaches for the underlying unconscious self that remains at the core of our existence.

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Through the study of psychoanalysis of the self, the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious is explored as sites constituting the individual. Woolf explores the division between these sites as they are brought into conflict by external cultural constructions. This is exemplified by patriarchal impositions upon the self, which are rooted in a flawed conception of bodily aesthetics that transcends into the literary domain. By dismantling boundaries through her literary portrayal of the self, Woolf is able to liberate the self despite the extreme impositions of social patriarchy.

PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE SELF

Psychoanalysis was first introduced as an investigation into psychosis, for example studying patients suffering from schizophrenia and paranoia.[1] It was later applied to the general sphere as an investigation into the individual, examining the buried repressions embedded within the unconscious[2] that formulates a sense of self fragmentation.

Freud's psychoanalysis first emerged in the early 1900s and acted as a theoretical study in which sexuality and the unconscious were centred at the core of the individual.[3] Freud's purpose was 'to derive the mind from the body' through several domains of the self which permeate the individual.[4] He explains that the self consists of three main disciplines. The first is the Dynamic, which is described as 'the site where the instinctual drives meet the necessities of external reality' usually connected to the feelings of pleasure and pain.[5] The second discipline is known as the Economic, where the 'ego evolves to mediate the actions of the body so as to achieve optimal satisfaction of its needs. The ego is particularly concerned with self-preservation,' implying a

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[1] M. Sarup, *Jacques Lacan* (London: Biddles Ltd, 1992), 9
[2] *Ibid.*, 1.
[3] *Ibid.*, xv.
[4] *Ibid.*, 1.
[5] *Ibid.*, 2.

need for 'control of the basic instincts if there is to be adjustment to reality'.[6] This results in 'a struggle between the reality principle and the pleasure principle in which the body has to learn to postpone pleasure and accept a degree of unpleasure in order to comply with social demands.'[7] The third and final discipline**,** which Freud revisited in 1923, was that of the Typographical which was split into three subsystems: the instinctual drive, the ego, and the superego, a new term used to define the representation of parental and social influences upon the drives. Thus the 'superego acts as a conscience constantly castigating the ego for failing to control the id [instinctual drives]. The ego is seen to be the vital arbiter between the conflicting demands of the id, the external world, and the superego.'[8]

To summarise: the ego is the conscious visual representation of the self displayed to the world by the individual, repressing certain "weak" qualities and formulating a front (hence there is a distinction and conflict between the public and private self). The superego unconsciously undercuts this egotistic front through the repression of desire. The individual therefore consists of a fragmented self whose actions (sometimes regulated by the subconscious) cannot always be justified, and sometimes this self struggles to accept reality.

Within *Mrs Dalloway*, the character of Septimus Warren Smith resembles the supposed schizophrenic who cannot differentiate between reality and the imaginary. However, Septimus' struggles are not purely internal, but also reflect external impositions upon the self, namely that of patriarchal ideology. Fighting in the war, the paragon of masculine activity, Septimus is forced to suppress "feminine" feelings, relegating them to the private and unconscious sphere. When his comrade Evan dies he is 'far from showing any emotion or recognising that here was the end of a friendship, congratulated himself upon

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[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*

feeling very little and very reasonably.'[9] Nevertheless, these unconscious repressions inevitably resurface and this trauma leads to Septimus' suicide. This is demonstrative not merely of the violence of patriarchal society, as Woolf shows:

> Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate, people feeling the impossibility of reaching the centre which, mystically, evaded them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded; one was alone. There was an embrace in death.[10]

The fragmented and conflicting sites of the self are thereby harmonised in death as the self is liberated from external constraints. Through the destruction of the body, the self finally achieves transcendence, and this can be read as the first of Woolf's challenges to restrictive structures in her search for the true nature of the self.

THE ORDER OF THE SYMBOLIC

The extreme conditions imposed by patriarchy are likewise reflected in Lacan's Order of the Symbolic which facilitates between the stages of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real, the identification of the individual through their insertion into the sphere of language. The initial concept used to define these terms appears in Lacan's 'The Mirror Stage' (1936), which relays the image of a small child recognising itself in the mirror for the first time.

> The concept of the mirror phase draws our attention to the interdependency of image, identity and identification. One of the main features of the mirror phase is that the child is in a state of nursling dependency and relative motor inco-ordination and yet the image returned to the child is fixed and stable. The basic relation, then, is

[9] V. Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 1925 (London: Penguin Modern Classics, 2002), 94
[10] *Ibid.*, 202

> between a fragmented or inco-ordinate subject and its totalising image.[11]

When the small child first recognises itself in the mirror, the symbolic matrix comes into play whereby 'I' is precipitated. The child identifies itself through coordination of its action with the reflection in the mirror. The Symbolic stage is thus the symbolism and meaning of language imposed onto the child; one is immersed in the symbolic order of language and is subjected to its meaning whether there exists any truth to meaning at all. Lacan's theory of the self that is manifested through language is influenced by French structuralist Ferdinand De Saussure's study of language as 'individual signs […] composed of sound or written signifiers and signifieds (meanings)'[12]. Additionally, much of Lacan's theory is inspired by the ideas of Levi-Strauss who writes:

> Access to the Symbolic Order is achieved by crossing the frontier, out of the Imaginary, the dyadic world of mother and child, into recognition of the Father's Name and his Law. That is one created by social exchange, culture and taboos.[13]

Moreover, Levi-Strauss argues that 'society should be seen as an ensemble of symbolic systems'[14] whereby each individual knows where he or she fits into the order and can identify with this position. This structuralist theory is fundamental within *The Waves* and distinguishes its characters, investigating the depth of patriarchal manipulation of the self through the symbolics of language.

The three female characters of *The Waves* – Susan, Jinny and Rhoda – could be interpreted as representations of the mother, the lover and the virgin within

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[11] Sarup, *Lacan*, 102
[12] C. Weedon, 'Subjects' in M. Eagleton (ed.) *A Concise Companion to Feminist Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 125
[13] Levi Strauss cited in Sarup, *Lacan*, 48
[14] *Ibid*.

the patriarchal symbolic order. Women are interpreted as inherently inferior within this order because of their symbolic "castration", which will be considered later in relation to gender. Consequently 'women must either accept the laws and conventions of language, or reject it entirely and be silent, or hesitate and risk going mad.'[15]

Within Lacan's Imaginary Stage, language does not exist; it is only when meeting the symbolic, language is born. Susan identifies with the Imaginary Stage, but her refusal of the language of the Symbolic Stage means she cannot disassociate herself with the image of the mother, as she opts to remain quiet, declaring 'I need no words'[16]. Susan considers language detrimental as it falsifies the world we live in, and instead insists upon on a return to the Imaginary: 'When you are silent you are beautiful again.'[17] The Symbolic structure does not merely reduce her to the role of mother, but as previously suggested by Levi-Strauss, it threatens to deprive her of this role, when her child too crosses into the Symbolic Order and identifies with the paternal system.

Jinny however inserts herself into the Symbolic, rejecting the maternal and embracing a more masculinised role. Despite her assumed inferiority, Jinny exploits her difference to attain sexual power, traditionally associated with the male:

> Living by means of the body and of a repetitive sex ritual symbolizes the existence of Jinny. Her bedroom is her temple; her mirror, her altar. Sexual consummation for her is mystical union of subject and object, of microcosm and macrocosm. It is also her way of knowing both self and world.[18]

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[15] C. Taylor, 'Kristevan themes in Virginia Woolf's "The Waves"' (2006) 29.3 *Journal of Modern Literature*, 62

[16] V. Woolf, *The Waves,* 1931 (London: The Hogarth Press, 1960), 209

[17] *Ibid.*, 98

[18] J. Love, *Worlds in Consciousness* (London: University of California Press, 1970), 210

Jinny denies other aspects of selfhood, privileging her sexuality in an attempt at empowerment. Whilst her conscious ego projects the sexual validation to entice men to her window, she constantly seeks self-reassurance through her obsession with her own reflection. This reasserts her identity within the symbolic order as a sexual object to reside under the male gaze, thus she remains subjected under patriarchy.

In contradistinction, Rhoda refuses the Symbolic of her own reflection, avowing 'I hate looking glasses which show me my real face'[19], thus denying her obligations as a woman in the Symbolic Order. She opts to retain her virginity which is prized amongst many feminists as a way of abstaining from the patriarchal system and thereby retaining the self. Maria DiBattista suggests 'virginity is an exclusively feminine symbol of freedom and integrity'[20]. Rhoda's ultimate downfall occurs however when she succumbs to sexual desire and is 'stained… and corrupted'[21]. The loss of her virginity casts her into the domain presided over by men, and non-identification with either sex within the symbolic order means that she would rather 'diminish to nothingness'[22], committing suicide, than have to submit herself artificially to something she is not. Ultimately, whilst all three of the female characters of *The Waves* attempt to elude the constraints of patriarchy, all are eventually subjected to its pervasive power.

Patriarchy attempts to solidify the roles of both men and women within structures, yet Woolf demonstrates through the character of Bernard that the complexity of the self is such that it does not adhere to ideological limitations. Like Derrida, Bernard strips back the individual to the core, dispensing with the physical. He questions what sex is and what it means to have a sex through the

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[19] Woolf, *The Waves*, 31

[20] M. DiBattista, *Virginia Woolf's Major Novels* (London: Yale University Press, 1980), 38

[21] Woolf, *The Waves*, 145

[22] See *Ibid*.

underlying power of the unconscious. The mind and the self are shown to be androgynous, capable of containing both male and female attributes, as Bernard implies when stating 'nor do I always know if I am man or woman, Bernard […] Jinny, or Rhoda'[23]. Bernard therefore illustrates the limitations of the Symbolic Order which is stagnant and lacks the fluidity to incorporate the vastness and complexity of the unconscious in formulating identity and selfhood. He avers:

> We are not slaves bound to suffer incessantly unrecorded petty blows on our bent backs. We are not sheep either, following a master. We are creators. We too have made something that will join the innumerable congregations of past time.[24]

The possibilities of the self are thus shown to be infinite, and moreover cannot be truly contained by the arbitrary distinction of sex. Woolf validates and champions the potential of the self beneath the shell of sex.

SOCIETY AND PERFORMANCE

Freud's infamous Oedipus Complex offers a synopsis of repression rooted both in sex and the unconscious. Freud argues 'that sexual identity is not merely anatomically determined, but psychologically constructed'.[25] Initially, the young boy naturally initially identifies with his mother through the maternal bond, but upon realising his father constitutes a rival for her attentions fantasises about eliminating the competition. However, this incestuous notion is later abandoned and the child aligns with the father upon realising his mother is "castrated", perceiving himself likewise threatened with emasculation; moreover, by identifying with the paternal order, he too could occupy a position of power.[26]

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[23] *Ibid.*, 199
[24] *Ibid.*, 105
[25] Sarup, *Lacan*, 4
[26] *Ibid.*, 5

Female subordination occurs then because of the lack of the phallus. The female sex therefore is destined to become the inadequate form of the male sex, submitting to the phallic order as Catherine Belsey comments:

> If the slash of castration is logically prior to the oblique stroke of difference, women, always already castrated, can never enter fully into the symbolic order, have inevitably a shaky purchase on meaning, and remain forever at the mercy of the phallic power which is patriarchy.[27]

Freud's theory is susceptible to challenges however, as reflected by feminist Simone de Beauvoir's discussion of the differences between the two sexes. Beauvoir states 'a woman is not born a woman, but rather becomes one'[28] aiding the notion that gender and sexuality are not related, and nor are gender and the self. Gender roles are socially constructed and regulated by the societal sphere of radical taboo. Beauvoir therefore argues one does not have to be female to necessarily become a "woman". Butler notes:

> If "the body is a situation," as [Beauvoir] claims, there is no resource to a body that has not always already been interpreted by cultural meanings; hence, sex could not qualify as a prediscursive anatomical facticity. Indeed sex, by definition, will be shown to have been gender all along.[29]

However, a distinction can be made between sex and gender. Sex applies to the biological state of the body (the hormones and genitalia of the body that distinguish male and female bodies) but gender refers to the social constructions of identity, being masculine or feminine, man or woman. The individual is

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[27] C. Belsey, 'The Romantic Construction of the Unconscious' in F. Barker, et al., (eds) *Literature, Politics and Theory: Papers from the Essex Conference 1976-84* (London: Methuen, 1986), 61

[28] S. Beauvoir, cited in J. Butler, *Gender Trouble* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 11

[29] Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 11

forced to enact stereotypical gender roles through the external pressure of social expectations. Gender roles are not intrinsic then, but performative. As Belsey (following Foucault) states: 'The body has no "natural" being which precedes culture: it is too socialised, held in the signifying chain from the moment of birth'[30], compromised first through gender ideology, and later the system of language.

Just as the mind can be viewed as androgynous and sexually neither, so the body can similarly be perceived as anatomically neither. Woolf explores this notion in *Orlando* through the metamorphosis of the eponymous protagonist as he transforms from he to she, and her to him, over several centuries until the birth of modernity. The physical body acts merely as a vehicle of the self - the self "Orlando" remains constant throughout the novel in mind and thought; although as shown previously the aesthetics of the body can impinge upon the potential for self-realisation.

The artificiality of gender roles is highlighted not merely through Orlando's physical transformations, but also through the power of sartorial changes. Woolf is quick to address how clothes and modes of dress can distinguish male from female by the means of *Orlando*: 'Had they both worn the same clothes, it is possible that their outlook might have been the same too'[31]. This emphasises that the extreme conditions imposed upon the self are rooted in superficial distinctions. Woolf writes that clothes 'change our view of the world and the world's view of us.'[32] Clothes provide a means of identifying with, or performing, masculinity or femininity: 'For the probability of breeches she exchanged the seductiveness of petticoats and enjoyed the love both sexes equally.'[33] Orlando disguises his/her physical body with the symbolism of

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[30] Belsey, 'The Romantic Construction of the Unconscious', 61
[31] V. Woolf, *Orlando*, 1928 (London: Penguin Modern Classics, 2000), 108
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*, 128

clothes, in order to express his/her underlying self which refuses to adopt the repressive codes instigated by gender.

These codes are shown to be entrenched within the figure of Clarissa in *Mrs Dalloway*. As a woman under patriarchy, she is reduced to a commodity owned by man; Mrs Dalloway appears as the possession of her husband. This implied ownership is manifested in her name: she is not 'Mrs Dalloway; not even Clarissa anymore' but 'Mrs Richard Dalloway.'[34] This finds stark contrast in the figure of Miss Kilman, whose name is expressive of her self-autonomy as an unmarried woman. The notion of patriarchal ownership, is not simply restricted to the domestic, but is likewise evident within the domain of literature.

RE-WRITING PATRIARCHY

Against this backdrop, Woolf, as a forerunner of feminism, challenges the supposed male supremacy within the literary sphere, dismantling patriarchal structures and advocating androgyny in self and art.

In one of her most famous essays 'A Room of One's Own', Woolf challenges masculine ownership of the literary domain. She declares that 'a woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction'.[35] However, the argument of the essay lies within the social irony that for a woman to have access to literature and education, although her self has infinite potential, she is reliant on man's assistance for her liberation; given that man retains ownership of capital under patriarchal hegemony. Thus 'intellectual freedom depends upon material things'.[36] Woolf insists on the universality of literature, asserting:

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[34] Woolf, *Mrs Dalloway*, 11
[35] Woolf, *A Room of One's Own*, 1928 (London: Penguin Modern Classics, 2000), 6
[36] M. Barrett, *Virginia Woolf: Women and Writing* (London: Women's Press, 1979), 8

> Literature is open to everybody. I refuse to allow you, Beadle though you are, to turn me off the grass. Lock up your libraries if you like; but there is no gate, no lock, no bolt that you can set upon the freedom of my mind.[37]

Woolf instigates a literary revolution which embraces variety in order to achieve intellectual growth, not solely for the individual and self, but for society as a whole. This is most acutely expressed in her advocacy of androgyny, where the "feminine" self is not repressed but is equally weighted alongside that of the male. Woolf validates the notion, previously espoused by Coleridge, that 'a great mind is androgynous'.[38] Indeed, Woolf sees the fusion of the male and female in androgyny as essential to art and self-expression. She therefore argues that:

> Some collaboration has to take place in the mind between the woman and the man before the art of creation can be accomplished. Some marriage of opposites has to be consummated. The whole of the mind must lie wide open if we are to get the sense that the writer is communicating his experience with perfect fullness.[39]

The emphasis lies on the creative and unconscious self that is not confined by the conscious ego of sex; indeed, Woolf praises the female writers whose 'pages were full of [the] curious sexual quality which comes only when sex is unconscious of itself.'[40] It is this form of androgynous expression that Woolf invokes and deploys in deconstructing patriarchal structures superimposed upon literature.

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[37] V. Woolf, *A Room of One's Own,* 76
[38] *Ibid.*, 97
[39] *Ibid.* 103
[40] *Ibid.*, 92

CONCLUSION

Throughout Woolf's works, the individual's selfhood is shown to be compromised by the extremes of patriarchal ideology. Woolf illustrates patriarchy's destructive potential through the filter of her characters. As an enthusiast of the study of psychoanalysis herself, Woolf penetrates her literary works with the questioning of the self, illustrating the fragmentation and complexity manifest within the self. This complexity cannot be contained within the rigidified structures of patriarchy represented through Freud's notion of "castration", and Lacan's Symbolic Order. Gender is shown to be a social construct rather than an intrinsic truth, an external imposition that subjectifies the individual within a repressive framework. Although males and females are biologically different, underneath this there is nothing to distinguish the two, as demonstrated through the notion of gender performativity promoted by theorists such as Butler and Foucault. The self is therefore a site of both masculinity and femininity which are only in conflict due to external factors. Woolf champions androgyny and the liberation of the unconscious and thereby demolishes the patriarchal extremes manifested in society and literature. Woolf seeks not only the emancipation of females through her writings, but, more broadly, the liberation of the self from collective repression.

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Landmark developments in the understanding of Neanderthal Disappearance: An appraisal of the emergence and potential of new interpretations

Lauren Davidson[·]

This essay deals with the evidence and theories surrounding the disappearance of Neanderthals from the archaeological record. The essay charts the development of our understanding of this event while assessing the media's portrayal of archaeological findings. It first addresses the early and stereotypical explanations of Neanderthal extinction by modern human colonisation, a view which was well-suited to contemporary thinking, but lacked evidence. It then discusses the Multi-Regional Evolution theory which suggests that Neanderthals evolved into modern humans and how this theory was disproved using absolute dating techniques. A substantial review of genetic evidence follows, showing that we cannot draw dramatic conclusions from ancient DNA despite numerous attempts by the media to do so. A model which allows Neanderthal extinction to have been a non-catastrophic result of modern humans' superiority is discussed, followed by a number of studies which propose slight adaptability advantages in AMH. Lastly the work of paleoclimatologists is considered, which is shown to be scientifically sound and allows us to think of Neanderthals as just another ancient species. This allows the essay to conclude that there is no one decisive reason why AMH replaced Neanderthals and that there are a number of technologies which have the potential to give us a broader understanding.

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As long as there has been interest in history, there have been questions over how and why people change. This is significantly true in the case of the Neanderthal demise. For this phenomenon, a wealth of hypotheses have been investigated using a developing range of techniques and methods. The level of interest in the issue stems from the coincidence of climatic change, the first evidence of Anatomically Modern Humans (AMH) and the disappearance of a hardy species; Neanderthals had survived and evolved for over 100,000 years in difficult and varying climate before the arrival of AMH. Two common hypotheses, upon which most other theories are based, are 'Out of Africa' and 'Multiregional Evolution'. 'Out of Africa' suggests that a small group of AMH spread from Africa and replaced the Neanderthals; 'Multiregional Evolution' proposes that AMH evolved from Neanderthals. This essay will discuss the presentation of these hypotheses to the general public by assessing the literature and evidence surrounding them. We will first discuss the 'Violent Invasion Hypothesis', then move onto 'Multiregional Evolution' and 'Out of Africa', before discussing the significance of competition between Neanderthals and AMH and the impact of climate. Each theory represents a landmark in our understanding as they indicate changes in opinion and evidence. The difficulty of accessing reliable and conclusive evidence for academics and non-academics will provide the basis for the discussion, and the potential of new technologies will be considered.

Many of the original opinions formed about Neanderthals have been disproved or out-dated, as opinions change and new evidence becomes available. Ape-like or savage Neanderthal stereotypes, stemming from Boule's partly fictional drawings, have been found to be either inaccurate or un-founded. It has been shown that the Old Man of La-Chapelle's bow-legged gait was, in fact, caused by arthritis and that healthy Neanderthals would have walked upright[1]. The discovery that Shanidar 1 and La-Chappelle's Old Man lived for years after sustaining disabling injuries contradicted the common opinion that Neanderthals were savage brutes, by indicating cases of social care and

[1] R. Lewin, *The Origin of Modern Humans* (New York, 1993), 58

dependence[2]. Similar to Boule's fanciful depictions is the 'Violent Invasion Hypothesis', which casts Neanderthals as the primitive native and AMH as the civilized coloniser, and which was once considered to explain the disappearance of the Neanderthals:

> The fate of the Neanderthals symbolized what many then saw not only as inevitable but also as the desirable removal of other so-called primitives from the earth – an everyday story of colonial folk.[3]

Early 20th century writers recognized the superiority of modern human's Aurignacian technology over the Neanderthal Mousterian technology and constructed two opposed cultures, one advanced and one simple. The typically colonial school of writing assumed that any civilised society, coming across a less advanced social group, would destroy or civilise the natives. Many novels have been written concerning this situation from stand-points with a varying degree of sympathy for the 'natives'[4]. It is fair to consider colonial views as a landmark in the understanding of the disappearance of Neanderthals, because it displays how contemporary thinking and literature can affect the interpretation of archaeological data. The current distrust of the theory, despite this and other incidences of potential violence, indicates a shift in thinking; we have either moved on from colonial minded interpretations or now require substantial evidence of theories.

There is a distinct lack of evidence for this theory of violence, which belongs to the 'Out of Africa' model. Any evidence of AMH violence towards Neanderthals is contentious and it is also significant that these results rarely reach academic publication, but are widely available in the media. The Guardian reports on Rozzi's suggestion that the Les Rois jawbone indicates butchery techniques used by AMH, and quotes him saying "I think we have to

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[2] C. Stringer & C. Gamble, *In Search of the Neanderthals* (London, 1993), 94
[3] *Ibid.*, 195
[4] *Ibid.*, 31-33

accept it [cannibalism] took place"[5]. Yet, the report in the Journal of Anthropological Science concludes that "… available data on the treatment and symbolic use of human remains during the Aurignacian do not appear to support this interpretation."[6] We may conclude from these, seemingly contradictory, statements that Rozzi personally believes that cannibalism took place, but cannot assert this academically; the evidence is not conclusive. Even if it were, we ought to follow d'Errico's cautious example and remember that "One set of cut marks does not make a complete case for cannibalism"[7], though further discovery of similarly treated Neanderthal remains would create a stronger case for cannibalism. It is fair that the Guardian reports both d'Errico and Stringer's reservations about the evidence, but with the headline 'Devoured by humans', and the fact that they don't mention the report's cautious conclusion, we have to question whether the media is appropriately presenting facts to the public[8]. Having access – online or in the media – to evidence about the disappearance of the Neanderthals is a landmark in terms of public understanding, but we must question whether or not this is a positive step. Perhaps archaeologists should be creating accessible work in the media to engage the public; this would eliminate the misrepresentation of archaeological knowledge and would generate a more informed public engagement with the debate.

Milford Wolpoff is reported to have told Discover magazine that "There is no way one human population could replace everybody else and wipe out their

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[5] Fernando Rozzi quoted in R. McKie, 'How Neanderthals met a grisly fate: devoured by humans', *The Observer*, 2009

[6] R. Rozzi *et al.*, 'Cutmarked human remains bearing Neadertal features and modern human remains associated with the Aurignacian at Les Rois' in *Journal of Anthropological Sciences* 87, Rome, 2009

[7] Francesco d'Errico quoted in R. McKie, 'How Neanderthals met a grisly fate: devoured by humans', *The Observer*, 2009

[8] R. McKie, 'How Neanderthals met a grisly fate: devoured by humans', *The Observer*, 2009

genes, except through violence"[9]. As we have already discussed the lack of evidence for AMH violence towards Neanderthals, it may be worth considering Wolpoff's alternative: the 'Multiregional Evolution' hypothesis. This theory proposes that AMH evolved from each Ancient species independently and that inter-breeding between these AMH in each region created one diverse modern species[10]. The theory is based on fossil evidence and represented a radical overhaul of the Neanderthal image; they had previously been considered too inferior to have had any part in our ancestry, but Wolpoff and others took no heed of the fictional stereotypes. Although it was now socially acceptable to consider the Neanderthals as potential ancestors, thanks to the examples of humanising Neanderthals we discussed in the first paragraph, the evidence which Lewin summarises made it scientifically impossible: "If Neanderthals had evolved into modern humans […], as the Multiregional Evolution hypothesis holds, then no Neanderthals would be expected after the appearance of modern humans"[11]. The overwhelming evidence to the contrary was provided in 1988 by thermoluminescence dating of Anatomically Modern Qafzeh fossils to 92000 BP, and the Kebara Neanderthal remains to 60000 BP[12]. It was followed by similar examples of Neanderthals at the Tabun and Kebara caves, post-dating those of AMH found at Skhul[13]. This revolution in dating technology provided a new landmark in our understanding of Neanderthal disappearance; the case was no longer a clear cut replacement of Neanderthals by AMH and, as such, became more complicated. It may be worth noting the abundance of space given to Stringer's opinion in Lewin's book, which seems to indicate some sort of personal affiliation with the author, and we may comment on the misquoting of Wolpoff ("the mark of Java" was a term which Wolpoff utilised but did not coin) as indicative of Lewin's bias against Wolpoff[14]. Yet, there is literature which directly attacks the 'Multiregional Evolution' theory and which

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[9] Lewin, *The Origin of Modern Humans*, 72
[10] *Ibid.*, 80
[11] *Ibid.*, 84
[12] *Ibid.*, 83-84
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*, 80

disproves it indirectly. It seems we must conclude that advances in dating techniques and the Middle Eastern discoveries have invalidated the 'Multiregional Evolution' hypothesis.

Before 1997, opinion generally held that the Neanderthals had not contributed any genes to modern humans. Although this was deemed to be scientifically proven, it may still have been linked to the social desire to distance ourselves from Boule's continually perpetuated stereotypes. The inadequacies of previous technologies are discussed by Krings and his team:

> … these analyses rely on assumptions, such as the absence of selection and a clock-like rate of molecular evolution in the DNA sequences under study, whose validity has been questioned. [15]

Their landmark 1997 study extracted the first mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from the La-Chapelle Neanderthal remains, in order to analyse the biological relationship between modern humans and Neanderthals[16]. It was found that Neanderthal DNA differed too significantly from that of modern humans for them to have contributed to the gene pool. The susceptibility of ancient DNA to contamination could have invalidated the results, so each part of the experiment was repeated independently to ensure their reliability, indicating the significance the team placed on this new technology being respected and used to its full potential[17]. The lack of correlation between human and Neanderthal DNA proved that Neanderthals could only have had a small, if any, input to the gene flow[18]. As scientific evidence, such as DNA, is more objective than, arguably, subjective fossil evidence, the 1997 test marked a move from conjecture to an understanding of the facts, as related to the disappearance of Neanderthals. The results also provide the basis for the belief

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[15] M. Krings *et al.*, 'Neandertal DNA Sequences and the Origin of Modern Humans' in *Cell*, Massachusetts, 1997

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Ibid.*

that all human genetics can be traced back to one female ancestor, known commonly as the Mitochondrial Eve theory. This theory is more relevant to a discussion of the emergence of AMH than the disappearance of Neanderthals, and is therefore not discussed here.

Following this breakthrough study, mtDNA technology has been in continual use, though it has been limited due to its destruction of remains. Serre and Pääbo recognise the potential of the following areas:

1. the analyses of genetic diversity within Neanderthals that can lead to a greater understanding of their demographic history; and
2. the investigations of potential demographic changes in animal populations contemporary with the Neanderthals to obtain a more global understanding of the environment and its influences.[19]

Through understanding the geographical make-up of Neanderthal society and the environmental impact on contemporary fauna, mtDNA could help us move even closer to understanding the physical, rather than theoretical reasons for Neanderthal decline. It is worth remembering that there is a limit to the number of examples of ancient DNA which have been preserved, so most results, like the 1997 study, are based on small sample numbers.

The limitations posed on the study of ancient genetics do not stop the media from sensationalising the results of studies to their most extreme conclusion. When we consider Neanderthal genetics we find such conflicting titles as 'Neanderthals, Humans Interbred – First Solid DNA Evidence', and 'Neanderthals Didn't Mate With Humans, Study Says'; both claim to be fact,

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[19] D. Serre & S. Pääbo, 'The fate of European Neanderthals: results and perspectives from ancient DNA analyses' in K. Haarvati & T. Harrison (eds), *Neanderthals Revisited: New Approaches and Perspectives* (Dordrecht, 2007), 215

but only one can be correct[20]. We need to look at the developing realm of publicly accessible content because it currently hinders public understanding of the disappearance of the Neanderthals. The former of these articles states that between one and four percent of modern human's genetic make-up is Neanderthal, which provides conclusive evidence that there was inter-breeding between AMH and Neanderthals[21]. The article acknowledges that the new report contradicts previous DNA evidence, but does not inform us of the differences in the technologies:

> In contrast [to mtDNA], the nuclear genome is composed of tens of thousands of recombining, and hence independently evolving, DNA segments that provide an opportunity to obtain a clearer picture of the relationship between Neandertals and present-day humans" [22]

It also fails to mention that the two reports are not completely at odds; the 1997 report concludes that AMH "… replaced Neandertals with little or no interbreeding" and Green's report that "… the actual amount of interbreeding between Neandertals and modern humans may have been very limited"[23]. The study's main development for our understanding is in its surprising discovery that, if inter-breeding took place, it took place before the split of homo sapiens. This discovery was given only secondary importance in the article indicating that the media are not considering the case in full. This example

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[20] K. Than, 'Neanderthals, Humans Interbred – First Solid DNA Evidence' in *National Geographic News*, 2010
K. Than, 'Neanderthals Didn't Mate With Humans, Study Says' in *National Geographic*, 2008
[21] K. Than, 'Neanderthals, Humans Interbred – First Solid DNA Evidence' in *National Geographic News*, 2010
[22] R. Green *et al.*, 'A Draft Sequence of the Neandertal Genome' in *Science* 328, 2010
[23] M. Krings *et al.*, 'Neandertal DNA Sequences and the Origin of Modern Humans' in *Cell*, Massachusetts, 1997
R. Green *et al.*, 'A Draft Sequence of the Neandertal Genome' in *Science* 328, 2010

indicates that theories are not being effectively presented to those for whom academic reports are inaccessible and that confusingly contradictory views are being published, to the detriment of public understanding of the disappearance of the Neanderthals.

In 1974, Zubrow created models of interactive growth between AMH and Neanderthals. These models showed that minimal changes in mortality or fertility rates in one group could have a rapid and significant influence on population size[24]. Specifically, "… a Neanderthal mortality rate of only 2 per cent higher than that of the Moderns could have resulted in Neanderthal extinction within about 1,000 years"[25]. This time frame matches the archaeological evidence and requires neither that a speedy evolution, nor an archaeologically invisible genocide, took place; in other words, it is archaeologically and scientifically viable. The models may not tell us exactly how Neanderthals became extinct, but they have led to the understanding that the events need not have been as dramatic as previously thought. As such, the conclusion represents a landmark in our understanding of the disappearance of Neanderthals, as we can now consider factors which had previously been thought too insignificant.

Zubrow's model allowed for speculation about a slightly superior, or more adaptable, survivability of AMH over Neanderthals, as a sole or contributing factor in the demise of the Neanderthals. A non-exhaustive list of such advantages includes: superior hunting skills; a more varied diet; resources for surviving colder climates; division of labour; superior communication skills. By discussing each of these ideas no preference towards one theory is indicated and the brevity of discussion does not indicate dismissal, but summary, of a few available theories. Rhodes and Churchill's results, though experimental and

[24] C. Stringer & C. Gamble, *In Search of the Neanderthals*, 194
[25] *Ibid.*

requiring further investigation, are soundly prepared and presented[26]. They match the available archaeological evidence on projectile weapons and what is known about Neanderthal and AMH hunting, suggesting that AMH were using projectiles and therefore reducing risk of injury. Isotopic analysis of dietary habits is reliable and the conclusion that AMH had a more varied diet than Neanderthals, whose preference for red meat was not exclusive to other food groups, seems a valid indication of adaptability[27]. Although Gilligan's conclusion relies on indirect evidence, the thorough examination of Aurignacian and Mousterian technologies and their implications, combined with an interesting interpretation of the climate which takes into account the human susceptibility to wind chill, is sound[28]. His conclusion of superior AMH adaptability is aligned with commonly accepted opinion and is a logical deduction from the available evidence.

Similarly palatable to modern opinion is the discussion of the Neanderthal's lack of labour division. The study uses archaeological evidence that young children of both sexes were involved in dangerous work and presents the direct, increased mortality and decreased fertility (compared to AMH), and indirect, over-reliance on one food source consequences of this[29]. Lieberman makes a questionable assertion that Neanderthals were anatomically incapable of communication, but is justified in claiming that Neanderthal communication

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[26] J. Rhodes & S. Churchill, 'Throwing in the Middle and Upper Paleolithic: Inferences from an analysis of humeral retroversion' in *Journal of Human Evolution* 56:1, London, 2009

[27] M. Richards & E. Trinkaus, 'Isotopic Evidence for the Diets of European Neanderthals and Early Modern Humans' in *PNAS* 106:38, Washington, 2009

[28] I. Gilligan, 'Neanderthal extinction and modern human behaviour: the role of climate change and clothing' in *Worl Archaeology* 39:4, Oxford, 2007

[29] S. Kuhn & M. Stiner, 'What's a Mother to Do? The Division of Labor among Neandertals and Modern Humans in Eurasia' in *Current Anthropology* 47:6, Chicago, 2006

would have been simplistic because it had not been necessary to survival[30]. The sound evidence backing each suggestion, and the over-lapping theories connecting them, indicates that there is perhaps no one factor that was individually responsible for the demise of the Neanderthals. Each theory represents, not a landmark, but a small signpost towards new ways of understanding Neanderthal disappearance.

Van Andels and Davies decided that the case required a fuller understanding of the climate in order to progress; the 'Stage 3 Project', considering the effects of the last glaciation period on humans, was published in 2003 after ten years of collaboration between paleoclimatologists and archaeologists. Naturally, their models focus on the climate: "It may not be necessary to invoke a role for modern humans in the demise of the Neanderthal […] a solely climatically driven extinction mechanism may be sufficient."[31]. It had generally been assumed that the coincidence of AMH emergence and Neanderthal decline is significant and indicates a necessary role for humans. By removing humans from the equation, the Stage 3 project moved towards new understandings of Neanderthal disappearance. The quoted report aligns the fate of the Neanderthals with that of Late Pleistocene megafauna; similarities can be discussed by cross-checking the evidence for both animal and Neanderthal decline, providing a fuller picture of the Late Pleistocene "'faunal revolution'"[32]. The approach overcomes one of archaeology's major pitfalls: the difficulty we have in distancing the actions of archaic human societies from our own. By discussing Neanderthals as just another species influenced by climatic change, it is easier to accept that a simple temperature drop could have wiped out a race of human beings.

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[30] P. Lieberman, 'On Neanderthal Speech and Neanderthal Extinction' in *Current Anthropology* 33:4, Chicago, 1992

[31] J. Stewart *et al.*, 'Neanderthals as Part of the Broader Late Pleistocence Megafaunal Extinctions?' in T. van Andel & W. Davies (eds) *Neanderthals and modern humans in the European landscape during the last glaciation* (Cambridge, 2003), 229

[32] *Ibid.*, 223

In a way, Tattersall pre-empted the social significance of this report in his wide-reaching and accessible discussion of *The Last Neanderthal*:

> Even the much-debated disappearance of these humans [Neanderthals] is in this larger perspective not much of a mystery […]. New species of all kinds have regularly replaced each other in the fossil record […]; and *viewed in this way* the disappearance of one more species, albeit a human one, hardly disturbs the larger pattern. [Emphasis added][33]

It could be considered landmark, or highly interesting at the least, that modern perception is recasting Neanderthals as an independent species rather than a race of humans. This consideration is fairer than it was in the times of Boule and others, as Neanderthals are now being presented in a scientific manner; recognition of their human attributes is balanced with an understanding of their undefined evolutionary inferiority. It is disappointing that the Stewart report is shrouded in scientific jargon, making this forward-thinking study inaccessible to those, inclusive of many archaeologists, unfamiliar with the complex science employed. It could be hoped that the 'Stage 3 Project' collaborators could produce a simplified picture of Neanderthal and AMH populations alongside the precise climate they lived in: changes in temperature and landmass as well as flora and fauna availability. Other models in the project present the effects of not just temperature, but climatic stress and resource availability on the Neanderthals during the last glacial period[34].

So, opinion has ranged from the colonial-minded 'Violent Invasion Theory', to a less defined, but better evidenced 'Out of Africa' model; from politically resonant, imagined novels to comparatively dull, scientific evaluation. Revolutions in dating and genetics have invalidated the 'Multiregional

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[33] I. Tattersall, *The Last Neanderthal* (Oxford, 1999), 147

[34] T. van Andel & W. Davies (eds) *Neanderthals and modern humans in the European landscape during the last glaciation* (Cambridge, 2003)

Evolution' theory and, though sensationalised by the media, genetic advancements have not often contradicted general opinion. Zubrow's model provided the key turning point, from imagining a dramatic Neanderthal finale to searching for a range of seemingly mundane factors; these are too numerous to name and discuss in detail, but they all suggest either AMH, or climatic, influence on Neanderthal decline. That the issue of Neanderthal disappearance is constantly re-visited and re-revolutionised, and yet always ends in uncertainty or contended conclusions, is comparable to the state of Neanderthal conception as a whole; we want to fictionalise, or sensationalise, their life and disappearance, but archaeologically their story is either too mysterious or too ordinary for these purposes. This is not least the case regarding their disappearance; any number of factors could have contributed to their demise and the only conclusion we seem capable of reaching is hardly a conclusion, but an anti-climax: "The Neanderthals probably went out with a whimper, not a bang"[35].

[35] C. Stringer & R. Grün, 'Time for the last Neandertals' in *Nature* 351, London, 1991

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The Significance of Tita's Feminine and Transformative Power in Laura Esquivel's *Como agua para chocolate*

Lindsay Linning*

We can analyse Laura Esquivel's Como agua para chocolate as a novel which delivers a message of female emancipation impeded by the shackles of tradition. In this extract of my dissertation, I examine the plight of the protagonist, Tita, by considering the roles played by the kitchen domain and her mother and sister in her plight as a female struggling for liberation. In Como agua para chocolate, Tita's outcry for a voice of her own from within the kitchen realm contends with the voice of the patriarchal society of the early 20th century Mexico as embodied by her mother, and it is this conflict which generates scope for feminist analysis of the novel. Therefore, I aim to demonstrate that Tita is instrumental in projecting the novel's feminist message.

1) INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

Laura Esquivel's *Como agua para chocolate* has enjoyed an unequivocal success in both the Mexican and international markets since its publication at the close of the 20th Century and into the new millennium – a pivotal period in terms of the development of the modern Mexican female's status within society. As Catherine Davies acknowledges, works such as *Como agua para chocolate* centre around the household and bring to the reader's attention 'important, often controversial, social and economic issues […] Most importantly, all these

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novels address such issues from a woman's point of view'.[1] It forms a cardinal part of modern Latin American literary tradition which strives to address women's identities, applied within the context of the Mexican Revolution at the turn of the Twentieth Century. The novel promulgates a deeply feminist statement through the presentation and acknowledgment of the reality of the challenges facing females during this turbulent period in Mexican society. From a retrospective position the image of the emancipated modern Mexican woman is juxtaposed against the suffocating and constricting roles for females, characteristic of the Revolutionary period.

Esquivel constructs the self-sufficient Ranch community as a femino-centric microcosm of Mexican society where the woman takes precedence and is depicted against her male counterparts as 'an equal participant and, more frequently, higher up in the level of command, dominating all the various aspects of society'.[2] In an entirely female milieu, it is Tita's relationships with her mother and sisters which provide the greatest scope for analysis as she bears the burden of tradition perpetuated by Mama Elena. These dynamics serve as the catalyst for the key events of the novel, which have serious ramifications not only for Tita, but for her sisters too. Amidst the tangled De la Garza construct, how do we relate to this heroine? Why do we consider her precisely as a heroine? She proves challenging to interpret, yet is nonetheless the character through whom we are best able to decipher Esquivel's pervading messages concerning feminism and the female's role in Mexican society.

The essential areas for interpretation of these issues include the subjugation suffered by Tita and her subsequent liberation under her mother's dictatorial domestic regime and the motivating forces behind her. Food and the female art of cooking are placed at the core of this struggle and emancipation. As the

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[1] Catherine Davies, 'Gender Studies', in *The Cambridge Companion to The Latin American Novel*, (ed.) Efraín Kristal (Cambridge, 2005), 90

[2] Jeffrey Oxford, 'Unmasked Men: Sex Roles in Like Water for Chocolate', in *Laura Esquivel's Mexican Fictions*, (ed.) Elizabeth Moore Willingham (Eastbourne, 2010), 76

dominant metaphor throughout the novel, food becomes a tool to expose women's capacity to address the inequalities that percolate numerous areas of their lives. Paradoxically, Tita's relationship with food is at once entrenched at the core of her suffering and also of her liberation due to her feminist response to her situation. Significant too is her sister Gertrudis's response to Mama Elena's regime. The authoritarian environment invokes radically different responses from the two sisters who are construed as a united force. Tita's on-going conflict with her remaining sister, Rosaura, a mere incarnation of their mother, results in the destruction of the cycle of subservient female responsibility as she educates Rosaura's daughter, Esperanza, under her own terms. These pivotal elements of *Como agua para chocolate* produce a valuable historical insight on the steadily changing status of the female voice in the Mexican State. The disputes arising within this fully female community are emblematic of the conflicts that have faced, and continue to face, women across Mexico and indeed on the global scale. What are the overarching lessons we can absorb from a feminist reading and interpretation of the novel? Tita's reaction to her fated circumstances speaks to generations of women as she negotiates and subverts the prevailing cultural ideologies which grip Mexico.

2) TITA'S SUBJUGATION BY HER MOTHER

Nuala Finnegan's critique of Mexican poet Rosario Castellanos depicts female familial dynamics as 'mother against daughter, sister against sister, women against women in an inexorable cycle of revenge and betrayal'.[3] This tension between women only undermines female unity, and dominates the female relationships on the Ranch. It is Mama Elena's role at the heart of the Ranch society and her particular relationship with Tita that provides the greatest scope for feminist analysis in the novel. Her preservation of an austere, age-old tradition stipulates that her youngest daughter, Tita, is committed to a lifetime of parental care and prohibition from marriage. In a further attack, she goes on

[3] Nuala Finnegan, *Monstruous Projections of Femininity in the Fiction of Mexican Writer Rosario Castellanos* (New York, 2000), 5

to enslave Tita to the realm of the kitchen, forcing her to adopt the role of family cook. It is from within this sphere that Tita manages to elevate herself into a liberated realm with her own individual identity upon the novel's conclusion. Mama Elena serves as Tita's chief antagonist and she is, essentially, the very antithesis to the core values of feminism. She morbidly blocks all the liberties of her daughter, limiting her to the sole creative outlet of cuisine, an activity customarily ascribed to women. In this sense, she rigidly conforms to society's constructs of gender roles by wholly repressive means.

Mama Elena fulfils the role of 'matriarch-patriarch.' Her merciless image of brutality even serves to unnerve the Revolutionary soldiers who threaten the ranch to whom she casts a 'severa mirada'.[4] It percolates to the Captain of the soldiers that 'con Mamá Elena no valían las chanzas, ella hablaba en serio, muy en serio'[5]. It is this penetrating glare of Mama Elena's, recurrent throughout the novel, which communicates more effectively than words the ferocity of her spirit. From the novel's onset Esquivel describes how 'Mamá Elena le lanzó una mirada que para Tita encerraba todos los años de represión que habían flotado sobre la familia'[6]. It is this gaze that 'subjects Tita with the same weight in which the male gaze objectifies women'.[7] In her role as leader and without the weight of the male gaze in the Ranch environment, Mama Elena adopts the dominant male role which has serious consequences for Tita. Her position within the patriarchal family dynamic relates to John Berger's observations that 'traditionally woman has already lost herself, for she has seen and been seen as

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[4] Laura Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate* (New York, 2001), 90: '…a fierce, domineering look'.
[5] *Ibid.*, 89: '…the captain could see you didn't fool around with Mama Elena, what she said was serious, very serious'.
[6] *Ibid.*, 9: 'Mama Elena threw her a look that seemed to Tita to contain all the years of repression that had flowed over the family'
[7] Miguel A. Segovia, 'Only Cauldrons Know the Secrets of Their Soups', in *Velvet Barrios: Popular Culture & Chicana/o Sexualities*, (ed.) Alicia Gaspar de Alba (New York, 2003), 163-178 (esp. 165)

a function of the (usually, but not necessarily male) spectator/dictator, whose desires she continually tries to anticipate'[8].

As a consequence of her mother's behaviour, Tita is reduced to the status of voiceless 'Other.' She is coerced into unwillingly adopting a role imposed on her by her mother throughout *Como agua para chocolate*, manifested through her repressed emotions and desires. The male-like gaze and the authoritarian regime in place compound to rob the last vestiges of Tita's identity; after all, Mama Elena's forte lies in 'partir, desmantelar, desmembrar, desolar, destetar, desjarretar, desbaratar [y] desmadrar'[9]. The silent mask Tita must adopt and shield herself behind is a direct product of her mother's brutality and the subjugating cultural codes that suppress them both as women. Such destructive tendencies from Mama Elena and her inclination to victimise is a direct consequence of her own prohibition from marrying the man she loved in her youth. She therefore falls prey to the prevailing values of her generation, eventually embroiling herself in misogynistic cultural practices. This strips her of any true female or feminine tendencies, as she venomously dismisses 'todo lo relacionado con el mundo de la sensualidad y de los instintos femininos'[10]. By perpetrating this custom, she is at once victimiser and victim; entangled in a web of self-destructive and out-dated practices, sacrificing her daughter's happiness and fulfilment in her all-consuming bitterness. Tita's castigation by her mother proves to be particularly compelling as her confinement negates one of the key principles of feminism – the freedom of the female to live according to her own mandates.

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[8] Cited by Sharon Magnarelli, 'On Griselda Gambaro's 'El despojamiento'', in *Latin American Women's Writing: Feminist Readings in Theory and Crisis*, (ed.) Anny Brooksbank Jones and Catherine Davies (Oxford, 2004), 34

[9] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate* , 97: '… dividing, dismantling, dismembering, desolating, detaching, dispossessing, destroying [and] dominating'

[10] Ana Ibáñez Moreno, 'Análisis del mito de la madre terrible mediante un estudio comparado de *La casa de Bernarda Alba* y *Como agua para chocolate*', *Espéculo: Revista de estudios literarios, Universidad Complutense de Madrid* (2006) <http://www.ucm.es/info/especulo/numero32/mitomad.html> [accessed 5 October 2011]

Mama Elena's character enables the reader to consider gender as a product of the society we live in. She vehemently proclaims her radical outlook to Padre Ignacio, whose closest relationship ironically is with the quintessentially male image of God, 'Nunca lo he necesitado para nada, sola he podido con el rancho y con mis hijas. Los hombres no son tan importantes para vivir padre'[11]. Undoubtedly she conveys a fiercely independent image and ardent resilience during the turmoil of the Revolution. Indeed, through her character we are offered a potential vision of a hypothetical society in which gender boundaries are blurred; one in which 'women and men [are] individuals, […] Real women […] may have 'masculine' attributes such as strength and courage, just as real men may show 'feminine,' nurturing sides'[12]. This radical shift of roles 'structure[s] [the] fictional society and appropriate[s] power within it'[13]. The Ranch is a microcosm world in which the stereotypically dominating and chauvinistic Mexican male poses little threat to the seemingly self-sufficient troupe of females, insofar as men are neither a regular nor a significant constituent in the novel's events.

In principle, the Ranch develops as a self-contained, efficient society governed by a woman, yet throughout the novel Tita remains chained to an existence embedded within this domestic domain by her mother and is never permitted to truly live by venturing into the public sphere in order to integrate with society. As Zubiaurre reminds us, 'Such lonely reclusion [and] severe discipline […] make it difficult to read *Like Water for Chocolate* as a festive tale of romanticized female solidarity and belonging'.[14] Esquivel denounces 'las normas sociales y […] las tradiciones que han impedido que la mujer se realice como

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[11] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate* , 82: 'Men aren't that important in this life, Father'

[12] Kristine Ibsen, 'On Recipes, Reading and Revolution: Postboom Parody in Como agua para chocolate', *Hispanic Review*, 63 (1995), 133-146 (esp. 143)

[13] Elizabeth Moore Willingham, *Laura Esquivel's Mexican Fictions* (Eastbourne, 2010), xi

[14] Maite Zubiaurre, 'Culinary Eros in Contemporary Hispanic Female Fiction: From Kitchen Tales to Table Narratives', *College Literature*, 33 (2006), 29-51 (esp. 40).

persona y elija el destino de su propia vida'[15]. The protagonist is aware of the plethora of injustices challenging her, and whilst she may be manifestly restricted and oppressed within the confines of her kitchen and of her gender, she recognises her situation and strives to conquer this subjugation.

3) TITA'S LIBERATION THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF FOOD

Our protagonist exists in a 'gigantesco mundo que empezaba de la puerta de la cocina hacia el interior de la casa […] [y] le pertenecía por completo, lo dominaba'[16]. The parameters of the kitchen zone are extended through the powers vested in her culinary skills as she instigates many of the novel's crucial events. In theory, Mama Elena's castigation of Tita ironically sees a transferral of female power from matriarch-patriarch to the only viable motherly figure present in the novel. In theory, motherhood is usually equated with empowerment in the domestic family setting. However, whilst Tita is unable to claim the status of biological 'mother', her elevated position as ranch cook as prescribed by Mama Elena places her in the category of nurturer and provider, fulfilling the previously vacant role of compassionate 'mother' on the ranch. It is in performing this role of surrogate mother, albeit against her wishes, that Tita asserts her power in the private sphere[17].

For example, when feeding Rosaura and Pedro's child, she is transformed and exhalted by Pedro, becoming 'la misma Ceres personificada, la diosa de la alimentación en pleno'[18]. The affinity Tita has with Esperanza allows her to liberate the future generation and therefore she bears the greatest power to

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[15] Moreno, 2006: '…the social standards and… the traditions which have prevented the female from self-fulfilment as a woman and the ability to choose her life's destiny'.
[16] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate* , 5-6: '[a world that] was an endless expanse that began at the door between the kitchen and the rest of the house… [and it] was completely hers – it was Tita's realm'.
[17] Nora Domínguez, *Latin American Women's Writing*, 34
[18] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate* , 77: '…Tita looked like Ceres herself, goddess of plenty'.

effect lasting change and rebellion in the Ranch. The kitchen adopts mythical qualities in response to this transformative potential, and indeed it morphs into a supernatural realm with Tita as its sorceress, generating a revolution for the De La Garza family in subsequent generations. Her cuisine adopts catalytic and magical qualities which render her as a shamanistic figure. Although Tita is confined to a historically 'female' role which does not typically extend outside the domestic context, her cuisine serves as the supernatural impetus for change in the stagnant ranch environment, insofar as she dictates pivotal incidents in the lives of those who consume her creations.

In *Como agua para chocolate*, the kitchen generates a new female dialogue and builds its reputation 'as a locus of female power'[19]. The products of Tita's enslavement serve not only as a source of sustenance and nourishment, but also of illness and even death. Accordingly, there is a literal transferral of the protagonist's emotions and sentiments onto the plates she serves up, with direct repercussions upon those who consume them. Paradoxically, in quarantining her daughter to the kitchen, Mama Elena effectively provides her with an empowering vehicle through which to express herself. Food becomes a channel of communication for the voiceless Tita and it eventually becomes the tool offering her an ultimate means of liberation from the overbearing figures in command of her life. In this sense, food forms a discourse in its own right for her; revealing her innately human nature. It is through this language that Esquivel's reader accesses a truly raw depiction of the reality of Tita's life against the turbulent backdrop of the Mexican Revolution.

This depiction is augmented by the consistent employment of truly visceral food imagery. For example, to illustrate her loneliness, Tita describes the feeling as akin to being the last chilli remaining after a dinner 'que contiene todos los sabores imaginables, lo dulce del acitrón, lo picoso del chile, lo sutil de la nogada, lo refrescante de la Granada, ¡un maravilloso chile en nogada! Que contiene en su interior todos los secretos del amor, pero que nadie podrá

[19] Moore Willingham, *Laura Esquivel's Mexican Fictions* , xii

desentrañar a causa de la decencia'[20]. The intriguingly unique language of food invites the reader of *Como agua para chocolate* to appreciate Tita's emotions at a more profound level. Food and cooking become 'an unspoken form of communication in a censored environment. Tita uses the gender role forced on her against itself, to subvert the old order from within'[21]. Cruel traditions disintegrate with the death of the mother and subsequent death of Rosaura; and it is the potent amalgamation of the ingredients in Tita's cooking which cause both of these dramatic incidents. The perpetual cycle of tradition is broken, and Tita is released from her interminable struggle. Mama Elena's authority remains omnipresent and 'aún despúes de muerta su presencia segía causando temor'.[22] However, Tita destroys the last vestiges of her mother through a final confrontation with her spirit, and 'La imponente imagen de su madre empezó a empequeñecer hasta convertirse en una diminuta luz'.[23] Tita's conjuring up of the family's traditional dishes is her most influential weapon as it is her sole form of self-expression; it enables her to elevate herself from her imposed constriction to a state of freedom where her own identity and autonomy are recognised.

The culinary discourse throughout the novel also expresses the violence contained within Tita which is targeted against the archaic cultural practices of this period in history. Cuisine is as intrinsic to Tita's individual identity as it is to the identity of the Mexican state as a whole, and the violent repercussions of her cooking which grip the ranch symbolise a microcosm of the violent protest against Díaz's corrupt governance shaking Mexico at the time of the Revolution. From a female and feminist perspective Esquivel depicts the

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[20] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate* , 57: '… which contains every imaginable flavour; sweet as candied citron, juicy as a pomegranate, with the bite of pepper and the subtlety of walnuts, that marvellous chilli in walnut sauce'

[21] Catherine Davies, *The Cambridge Companion to The Latin American Novel*, 195

[22] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate*, 160: '… even after she was dead her presence was enough to inspire terror'.

[23] *Ibid.*, 200: 'the imposing figure of her mother began to shrink until it became no more than a tiny light'.

marked juxtaposition of this violence within the domestic and political domains alongside the recurrent themes of human desire and sensuality underpinning the characters' lives. Mama Elena's brutal reign of the household causes Tita to develop her state of suffering into a metaphorical weapon; 'su mejor arma'.[24] Her ability to redefine her own voice by subversive means from the depths of her isolation within a kitchen, and to lever this voice in a dignified manner to an influential status by rebelling against the matriarch-patriarch constitutes a shift in power down the generations, signalling the introduction of a new order in Ranch life.

Tita demolishes patriarchal ideologies which have been inscribed upon her through society's entities of education, religion, and her family and therefore is no longer subscribed to a state of submission and dependence'.[25] She threatens the hegemonic cultural standard through her feminine qualities and skills which results in the demise of her mother and with her, the demise of a regime denying female autonomy and independence which once dominated their very society.[26] In doing so, Tita's character communicates to every female reader of *Como agua para chocolate* a reminder of women's potential; she becomes a voice for the voiceless. She encourages women to rise from within their realms in Mexico and beyond, to make their voices heard, and to address the vital societal change which needs to be initiated.

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[24] Alberto Julián Pérez, 'Como agua para chocolate: La nueva novella de mujeres en Latinoamérica', in *La nueva mujer en la escritura de autoras hispánicas: Ensayos críticos*, (ed.) Juana Alcira Arancibia (California, 1995), 49

[25] Cathia Jenainati and Judy Groves, *Introducing Feminism* (Cambridge, 2007), 118

[26] Mama Elena's demise coincides with her loss of sanity, which proves ironic given her insistence that 'En esta casa no hay lugar para dementes!' (41). This theme is poignant in the works of Argentine poet Alejandra Pizarnik who addresses the subject of insanity and its relation to women's violence towards one another. In 'La condesa sangrienta' Pizarnik relates psychological illness with the capacity for violence and immoral reasoning, which correlates appropriately to Mama Elena's abuse of others from the elevated position of power she finds herself in. See Davies and Jones, *Latin American Women's Writing: Feminist Readings in Theory and Crisis* (Oxford, 2004), 5

4) TITA'S SISTER – A COMPLEMENTARY FEMINIST ROLE MODEL

Tita's sister Gertrudis provides a complementary feminist message of empowerment. Her suffering is akin to Tita's under the authoritarian rule imposed by Mama Elena and a lifetime without male influence gives rise to her and Tita's deep-rooted desire for male companionship, described as 'una inevitable curiosidad morbosa'.[27] She is able to satisfy her desires by means of escape from the Ranch to join the Army for the Revolutionary cause and work in a brothel, a decisive action which forms an outlet for her sexual prowess. Her defiance of Mama Elena enables her to 'calmar el fuego que le ha producido esa castidad impuesta'.[28] Esquivel's portrayal of her as the most radical and revolutionary of the De La Garza sisters corroborates the feminist overtones of the novel; she is at once the incarnation of masculinised female *soldadera* and sexually driven female predator. She possesses a multi-faceted character as she shifts from daughter to prostitute to married woman upon the novel's conclusion.

Through her, Esquivel challenges traditional notions of gender definitions as she does not prescribe Gertrudis to archetypically restrictive feminine roles. It is these societal 'norms' which women have been unrealistically expected to conform with throughout history and into the present day, regardless of culture, that Esquivel raises as a focal element of *Como agua para chocolate*. The stark juxtaposition of the domesticated and quarantined Tita with Gertrudis, who abruptly flees the ranch and familial constraints in a sexually driven flurry of fire and passion, leading her into the Army, obliges the reader to acknowledge the marked differences in the two women's life experiences. For both women, however, the root of their oppression is generated by Mexican cultural codes and it is their mutual recognition of this that unites them in a feminine consciousness.

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[27] Moreno, 2006: 'an inevitable, grotesque curiosity'.
[28] Moreno, 2006: 'to calm the fire that this enforced chastity had provoked inside her'.

The progress of the two sisters entrapped by their mother and, in particular, by the cultural and historical context in which they find themselves, substantiates the popular feminist belief that women are victimised as a result of society's interpretations of the sex disparity between men and women, and their respective roles dictated by their gender.[29] Indeed Esquivel demolishes strictly defined sex definitions through her promising representation of Gertrudis who, in spite of her mother and demanding societal expectations, is able to break away from the limiting and often detrimental family unit in order to quench the 'fuego muy intenso [que se] quemaba por dentro'.[30] Her subsequent choice to marry after prostitution epitomises her free will and thereby offers a thoroughly positive hypothesis of female life which grants equal rights of liberty to both sexes. Notwithstanding Mama Elena's response to her actions, Gertrudis is not rejected or demonised by society for the life decisions she takes and this opens up the potential of a hopeful outcome for the future female members of the De La Garza family.[31] Whereas Gertrudis physically fights on the battlefield to earn herself title of General, Tita realises that 'obtener el derecho de determiner su propia vida le iba a costar más trabajo del que se

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[29] Cathia Jenainati and Judy Groves, *Introducing Feminism*, 117

[30] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate*, 126: '… an intense fire burning [inside her]'.

[31] It is appropriate here to cite the radical Mexican feminist Hermila Galindo de Topete, who played a pivotal role in the First Feminist Congress of Mexico in 1916. As a nonconformist freethinker, many of her views surrounding women's suffrage, rights to education and sexuality were opposed by conservative feminists of the generation. Amongst the most controversial of her statements at the Congress was the following: 'the sexual instinct prevails in woman in such a way and with such irresistible resources that no hypocritical artifice can destroy, modify or restrain it'. Esquivel's depiction of Gertrudis relates closely to this jubilant vision of women's sexual liberty, insofar as Gertrudis exhibits a sexual prowess comparable to that of the stereotyped Latino male. See Jocelyn Olcott, *Revolutionary Women in Postrevolutionary Mexico* (Durham, 2005), 28–32

imaginaba. Esta lucha la tendría que dar sola, y esto le pesaba'.[32] Both women must fight to master their own destinies and those of the future female generation. Gertrudis and Tita's endeavours open up the potential for feminist interpretation of the novel as they symbolise a feminine perspective of the Revolutionary period in Mexican history in which examples of female integrity, strength and endurance take on many guises and forms, often in an implicit rather than overt fashion.

Critic Vincent Spina makes an insightful observation regarding the nature of the relationship between Tita and Gertrudis, observing the degree to which their characters complement one another and the conflicting forces that serve to unite them:

> It is as though the kitchen itself (rather than Mama Elena) becomes the 'maternal' space, a dynamic area in which the process of creation and destruction contend with each other, ultimately to complement each other and become a whole. Just so, Gertrudis's life resonates with the same contention. In her role as military leader she is a destroyer. Yet her affiliation with the kitchen and with her sister Tita aligns her with the creative aspects of the creation/destruction complex.[33]

The two sisters form a complementary team bonded in their suffering by their sisterhood. It is from within Tita's kitchen that Gertrudis grows to find a reassuring familiarity and comfort, stating 'La vida sería mucho más agradable si uno pudiera llevarse a donde quiera que fuera los sabores y los olores de la casa

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[32] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate*, 168: '… the right to determine the course of one's own life would take more effort than she had imagined. That battle she had to fight alone, and it weighed on her'.

[33] Vincent Spina, 'Like Water for Chocolate and The Silent War', in *Imagination Beyond Nation: Latin American Popular Culture*, (ed.) Eva P. Bueno and Terry Caesar (Pittsburgh, 1998), 215

materna'.[34] The 'kitchenspace' assumes a maternal quality and reassurance, with the cuisine it generates feeding her impulsions to rebel against the cultural constraints imposed on her. The potent effect of Tita's food on Gertrudis proves so strong that it acts as a catalyst in her escape from the ranch, and in a frenzied and brazen flurry she flees naked, 'endowed with incredible sexual prowess'.[35] The impact of Tita's rose petal and quail dish upon Gertrudis serves as a fine illustration of potent magical realism. Tita's emotions of loneliness and desire are literally served up for consumption, and as a consequence Gertrudis finds herself overwhelmed with an insatiable amorous longing. Food generates a line of communication between the two sisters and assists Gertrudis in her crusade to satisfy herself with men. The aforementioned dish of Tita's unleashes the stifled passion contained within Gertrudis and so 'allows her – or impels her – to pass from the private realm of history […] to the national stage of history as an officer in the Revolution'.[36]

The revolution Tita initiates from within her kitchen and the subsequent role Gertrudis plays on the battlefield are demonstrative of the sisters' use of their different aptitudes, but to the same propitious effect. Prominent feminist author Naomi Wolf claims an elemental aspect of women's difficulties concerning gender parity coincide with their reluctance to attain the necessary power to affect change which 'strips women of many of the identities of femininity that feel right and comfortable'.[37] Yet in her depiction of Tita and Gertrudis, Esquivel creates two females who present, and most importantly, embrace distinct, alternative models of femininity through their life decisions. Their defiance and rebellion against normative culture typifies an ardent commitment

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[34] Esquivel, *Como agua para chocolate* , 179: 'life would be much nicer if one could carry the smells and tastes of the maternal home wherever one pleased'.
[35] Ibsen, 'On Recipes, Reading and Revolution: Postboom Parody in Como agua para chocolate', 235
[36] Pérez, *Laura Esquivel's Mexican Fictions*, 218
[37] Naomi Wolf, *Fire with Fire* (London, 1993), 249

to generate positive advancement at home and in wider society, thus serving as the manifestation of a pure female power.[38]

Within their respective circumstances, both Tita and Gertrudis create their own history. They symbolise the foundation of change in Mexican society; one in which the outspoken, empowered female has a role to fulfil. Both sisters serve as metaphors for the plight of the Mexican female and of her release from society's shackles over the tract of time. Although Tita herself does not fully infiltrate into the public sphere, her food stimulates Gertrudis to make the decisive move into the outside world, typically exclusive to men. Via the language and subsequent bond established by cuisine, Tita and Gertrudis are able to penetrate the male sphere of influence, becoming the very image of 'la mujer sensual, seductora y peligrosa, [que] es también mujer libre, creativa, revolucionaria'.[39]

Tita proves that women need not passively accept their subjugated predicament and can, like the protagonist, exploit the necessary culinary ingredients by chopping, stirring, shaking up and dissecting the cultural standard to establish a

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[38] In the analysis of Tita and Gertrudis it is appropriate to highlight Naomi Wolf's definition of 'power feminism'. This form of feminist thought 'encourages a woman to claim her individual voice rather than merging her voice in a collective identity, for only strong individuals can create a just community. […] [She] seeks power and uses it responsibly'. This feminist stance demonstrates a move away from 'victim feminism' as it acknowledges the opportunities for equality in society that must be, and can be, grasped by *women*. However, there are limitations to this avenue of feminist thought when poorer, less privileged females who have significantly fewer opportunities than their middle class, educated, white equivalents are taken into consideration. This merges into the field of *intersectionality* that examines the combination of factors which hinder individuals, such as race, class and education, which could be an interesting avenue for analysis in terms of *Como agua para* chocolate. See Wolf, *Fire with Fire*, (London, 1993), 147 – 156, and Grabham et al (eds.) *Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location* (London, 2008)

[39] Pérez, *La nueva mujer en la escritura de autoras hispánicas: Ensayos críticos*, 55

personal revolution of their own. Tita fertilises and grows the seeds of change in order to feed them to her family. These seeds, containing the essence of her outcry for autonomy, can be used to poisonous and potent effect. By extracting and subsequently removing the corrupt and detrimental influences of her mother and Rosaura who have persecuted her, Tita vanquishes the two victimising patriarchal agitators present in the Ranch environment and promotes Getrudis's flight from familial confinement via her cuisine.

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George Eliot, the proto-Poststructuralist: The Essential Duplicity of Realism

Peter Slater

In this article I argue that there is an essential, but contradictory, duplicity in George Eliot's realism. Her work is suffused with; on the one hand, the need to represent life as it really is in order to cultivate morality and sympathy in her readership, and, on the other, the impossibility of ever representing reality with language. I explain how George Eliot uses her position at the extremes of this duplicity – between realistic necessity and realistic impossibility – and how she puts it to good use, to such an extent that it informs the narratives and determine the questions they seeks to explore. Basing my argument on, arguably, her three greatest works, I show that the duplicity is only embryonic in *Adam Bede* (1859), adolescent in *Felix Holt* (1866) and reaches maturity in *Middlemarch* (1871-72).

In her vital contribution to the realist theoretical canon, *Realism*, Pam Morris lucidly explains the epistemological problems that realist fiction encounters:

> During the second half of the twentieth century a new theoretical understanding of what constitutes reality developed … The new paradigm wholly rejects the human capacity for knowledge creation, recognising instead the constituting force of an impersonal system of language to construct the only sense of reality we can ever achieve.[1]

Realism's claim to have any access to reality, to supply a secure link between

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[1] Pam Morris, *Realism* (London, 2003), 27

signifier and signified, is challenged by this 'new theoretical understanding.' Derrida blamed the view that one can have access to reality through language on Western logocentrism[2]; the idea that the meaning of a word is centred in the external essence of the thing described, that the word has some definite relation to an entity in the actual world and that it is irreducible to anything else; whereas, '… language does not serve as a neutral or translucent means of communication. [We] can only ever 'know' reality by means of the conceptual categories [that a] language system allows [us].'[3] Reality, then, cannot be got at using language; however, many novelists begin writing on the supposition that it can. The mistake is an easy one to make, as Morris continues, '… our intuitive, commonsensical view of language is that words refer to a pre-existing reality beyond linguistics.'[4] She then attaches George Eliot to this collective of writers with the 'commonsensical' view; '… clearly this is the view of language informing the narrative of *Daniel Deronda*'[5]. What Morris has missed, however, is that the questions that plagued theorists during the second half of the twentieth century are the same questions that George Eliot begins to ask as early as *Felix Holt*, *The Radical* (1866).

In mapping out George Eliot's career it is possible to see an evolution in literary ideology that traverses from the 'commonsensical' view of language and reality, expressed in her pre-fictional career and *Adam Bede* (1859), to her later work, in which this very duplicitous or non-commonsensical view of language and reality inform the narratives and determine the questions they seeks to explore. A close look at George Eliot's career will show that she *was* aware of the contradictions of representing reality with language. As the dissenting preacher-come-thinker, Mr Lyons, put it in a discussion with Felix:

> I am an eager seeker for precision, and would fain find language subtle

[2] This, now axiomatic, term is succinctly developed in Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences" (London, 1978)
[3] Morris, *Realism* , 27
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*, 24

> enough to follow the utmost intricacies of the soul's pathways, but I see not why a round word that means some object, made and blessed by thy Creator, should be branded and banished as a malefactor.[6]

'Thy Creator', to Mr Lyons, is obviously God, but to the reader it is also the narrator, who is the *creator* of the characters. This passage, then, achieves its goal by complicating the relations between character and word, and between the narrator and the narrated; a complication that is at the heart of the theorists' debate, and one that creates a necessary duplicity in mimetic representation. This complication, when studied for long enough, starts to insist upon a radicalization that can stretch its consequences over the entire arena of social human discourse; the essence of this duplicity gestures towards the extremities of language use and can mystify the connection between a word and its meaning to render even the most simple written sentence undecidable or openended. Mr Lyons feels aggrieved that, even with his conception of God as 'Creator' and centre, the meaning of a word still has the potential to "play" or slip and can be 'branded and banished' as malefactors, because the meaning intended gives no guarantee of transference. He feels the tension of the ruptured link between signifier and signified; language is not subtle enough to follow the intricacies of the soul's pathways, because a signifier only ever points to another signifier in a "malevolent" deferral of meaning. George Eliot followed a path to the extremities of linguistics, in that she recognised that we can only deconstruct a discourse like realism from the inside, using the very same tools used in its construction.

The duality that George Eliot began to recognise is thus: on the one hand, her moral, realist literary ideology held sway over her style and mode of writing; she saw realism as socially necessary and was rather forceful about the moral responsibilities that powered it; writers, to George Eliot, had an undeniable duty to edify their readers by representing events that mirrored, in some way, real-life social and personal injustices; on the other hand, though, as her career

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[6] George Eliot, *Felix Holt* (London, 1931), 63

progressed, she became aware of the contradictions that this threw up. How can someone writing from their imagination claim any level of reality? And how can an artist expressing themselves with language rely on those words 'branded and banished as a malefactor' to accommodate an ideological thrust? This duality is at the heart of her career, yet it takes a while to develop. Her pre-fictional writings seem only preoccupied with the edifying element of literature. The essential duplicity, as I will show, is only embryonic in *Adam Bede*, adolescent in *Felix Holt* and reaches maturity in *Middlemarch* (and, perhaps, superannuation in *Daniel Deronda*).

In "The Natural History of German Life", George Eliot sets out a manifesto that encourages writers to 'represent people as they are'[7]. The same sentiment is behind her much-talked-about intermission in Chapter XVII of *Adam Bede*. The story pauses for a while and we hear a reader chastise the novelist's characterisation. This, now seminal, display of rhetoric is the ultimate example of her early, almost militant, crusade of realistic literary ideology. A reader complains, 'You might have put into his mouth the most beautiful things', to which the narrator replies 'Certainly I could, if I held it the highest vocation of the novelist to represent things as they never have been and never will be'[8]. The suggestion is, then, that a novelist's 'highest vocation' is to represent things as they *have* been, or *might* be. 'I might refashion life and character', she continues, 'entirely after my own liking'[9]. The rhetoric is palpable. Of course, she is not suggesting that she is writing entirely after her own *un*liking or somehow against her will. What she *is* saying is that there are certain moral principles that guide her writing; that the novel rests on a particular moral fulcrum which compels or obliges the story in some way. For the novel to achieve its moral end there needs to be some way of connecting the relations between language and life, or between art and life. She plays with the idea that this connection needs to be qualified, '… to give a faithful account of men and

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[7] George Eliot, *The Natural History of German Life* (*WR*, July 1856), 62
[8] George Eliot, *Adam Bede* (Edinburgh, 1901), 265
[9] *Ibid.*

things *as they have mirrored themselves in my mind*'[10]. However, George Eliot is aware that the qualification may render the connection impossible, when she admits '… the mirror is doubtless defective'[11].

The mirror is George Eliot's mind, but there is another distorted mirror in the process of reflection: language. George Henry Lewes made the same qualification in an article in the *Westminster Review*. Sounding like a magistrate, he prefigured George Eliot's idea of a narrator narrating her story under oath, in his averment that 'Art aims at the representation of Reality i.e. Truth … [and] no departure from Truth is permissible, *except* such as inevitably lies in the nature of the medium itself'[12]. This get-out clause shows the crux of the duplicity; we know that language struggles to get anywhere near the real, but, to Lewes, an artist is by no means allowed to depart from "truth", even if he is using a medium which can only ever achieve "falsehood". Eight years after this firm announcement of literary prescriptivism, George Eliot seems aware of its over-cooked intensity when she has Mrs Transome say to her son, Harold, '… it seems easy to deal with farmers and their affairs when you only see them in print'[13]. On the level of plot, Mrs Transome is referring to the mismanagement of Transome Court, the country estate she had been left to deal with while her son was abroad in the colonies. On a level above this, it is passing judgement on the plutocratic government trying to legislate on matters of which they have no experience. But, also hovering behind this statement is a sense that George Eliot is passing judgement on her former narratorial stance. If we take 'print' to mean language, we can see that she is half-conceding that the printed word cannot take the reader any further into reality, because its mode of conveyance is language. It is easy to remain at the level of word, but difficult, as in impossible, to go in any way beyond it. George Levine was on the same

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[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] George Henry Lewes, "Realism in Art: Recent German Fiction" (*WR,* October 1858), 493

[13] George Eliot, *Felix Holt*, 99

track when he remarked that '… whatever else it [realism] means, it always implies an attempt to use language to go beyond language'[14].

Duplicity is, again, tangible as the narrator describes a meeting between Esther and Felix. The two are caught musing on the possibility of being lovers, when we hear that '… he [Felix] was accustomed to observe himself. But very close and diligent looking at living creatures, even through the best microscopes, will leave room for new and contradictory discoveries'[15]. Of course, the microscope George Eliot uses is language and hers is one of the very best; but still, the contradiction arises. Mimetic representation, typically in George Eliot, is given a scientific counterpart. She peers through her lingua-scope, as it were, and is aware of the contradictions it brings to life. Perhaps most remarkable, however, is that we are referred to the duplicitous contradictions that realism encounters while being given a structurally measured realistic illusion. The suggestion is that readers should observe Felix in the same way he observes himself – closely and diligently – but with some contradictions in mind. This dynamic sets up an illusory realistic space that we have to peer into, like a scientist looking into a microscope, to see Felix observing himself. This element, therefore, is vital to understanding the essential duplicity of George Eliot's realism; she questions the assumption of realism within a carefully constructed, *illusory* realistic space.

An example of the careful construction is when Felix fixes Esther's watch as it has been '… losing a long while …'[16] and so an illusion of realistic time is created in the novel. The narrator draws attention to this by suggesting that Esther somehow sits outside of it: her watch is slow, so her life within the realistic space is slow; Felix fixes her watch and drags her back to the same level of illusory time that the other characters reside in. It is this that prompts her

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[14] George Levine, "The Realist Imagination" from *The Realist Novel*, (ed.) Dennis Walder (Oxford, 2006), 240
[15] George Eliot, *Felix Holt*, 213
[16] *Ibid.*, 208

inheritance of the Transome Estate to come to fruition, as she is nudged into par with the novel's chronotopic settings. Realistic allusion by realistic illusion remains a dominant feature of George Eliot's aesthetic, at the same time as she becomes aware of the inherent and self-effacing cognitive weaknesses of realism. There is a sense that she is trying to lift herself up by her bootlaces.

This is an extreme position to assume, not because of the subtlety of her perception of language but because of what the consequences of her perception of language entail; the extent to which she uses realism to step "outside" of realism, and uses language to step "outside" of language, and so uses discourse to show the extreme limitations of discourse in general. If language and discourse cannot access the real then what does this mean for theology, for philosophy, for epistemology, for history, and, most importantly, for the impetus that ignited her literary endeavour in the first place, for ethics? What this double-binded observation of language means for all of these interrelated disciplines is that the medium they use for precision and literalism can only ever achieve inaccuracy and metaphor; the best we can hope for, as Hamlet knew, is direction through indirection. There is, however, certainly a sense that George Eliot hopes this indirection will not attenuate her moral agenda. The ethical gesture of her texts may even help bring into focus the observations of language that she subtly proposes; the extreme contradiction that the duplicity contains – that ethical realism is a paradox – tells us that all language is persuasive and, in this instance, ethical rhetoric through metaphor, direction through indirection.

Middlemarch is given similar duplicitous treatment in its *reductive* realism. Dorothea is beginning to find out that her idealized view of marriage is a false one. She envisioned marrying a John Milton that it would be '… glorious piety to endure'[17]. She does not, however, get her John Milton; instead, she gets Edward Casuabon, the dusty, old, misguided scholar-clergyman. The point George Eliot is labouring to make is that nobody can aim for an idol that does not exist. A key technique of her realist enterprise is this Hegelian, or, perhaps

[17] George Eliot, *Middlemarch* (Oxford, 1998), 56

more directly to her, Feuerbachian method of reduction or reverse-deification. She ruralizes her characters, which is a strand that perpetuates from the-artist-as-moral-guide idea, possibly inherited from Wordsworth and the Romantics. Nowhere more forcefully advertises this idea than in Wordsworth's Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*. This artistic manifesto argues that to represent men, as they really are, is the only true 'worthy purpose' of the poet; the poet has to see man as Man,[18] not as a lionized demi-deity, bearing little reflection to the life that surrounds us. The narrator of *Felix Holt* describes Esther as being a type '… verging neither towards the angel or the saint …'[19], and this can be said of all George Eliot's characters. Marxist literary critic and contributor to the arena of theoretical realism, Gyorg Lukács, placed the same moral weight as George Eliot on this reductive realist method. In doing so, he elevated realism to a position of vital cultural importance. To Lukács, the body of realist fiction provides, among other things, valuable socio-cultural records that allow us to learn from the mistakes societies make. This reduction is as much a moral technique as a stylistic one. Edward Casaubon suffers a similar reductive realisation. The failing classicist has a *Madame Bovary* moment, when he wonders why he had won Dorothea but had '… not won delight …'[20], despite the tales he has read in the classics inciting a belief that he would. In other words, the 'reality' within the novel is not what the heroic stories in the classics have prepared us for. The lesson here is to shift the boundaries of your expectations from the extremes of romantic and idealized iconolatry to recognise life in its locality; but, typical to the duplicity, George Eliot recommends a reduction of the boundaries *ethically* at the same time as she effaces them *linguistically.*

Again, this reductionism relies, fundamentally, on the faulty concept of logocentrism; a concept that George Eliot both uses and critiques in the same

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[18] William Wordsworth, "Preface to *Lyrical Ballads* (1802)" from *William Wordsworth, The Oxford Authors* (Oxford, 1990), 608

[19] George Eliot, *Felix Holt*, 397

[20] George Eliot, *Middlemarch*, 79

action and with the same instrument. Moreover, this reductionism is forced upon the characters in the same way it is forced upon the readers. It is used by George Eliot to provoke revelations about the ultimate expression*less* capabilities of language, and the extreme undecidability that meaning has the potential to procure; they are similar revelations that emerge from the poststructuralist and deconstructionist discussion of the late twentieth century. To this end, Dorothea finds herself weeping over her failed marital and educational ambitions. Couched in this section of the novel is the feeling that we all, no matter how hard we try, fail to escape from the prison that language keeps us locked away in, with access neither to reality nor originality:

> *If* we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrels heart beat, and we should die of that roar that lies on the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity.[21]

Stress on 'if' in this passage is crucial. The barrier that language builds between the realist writer and access to the 'real' is one that the narrator of *Middlemarch* recognised. It is the same barrier that theorists in the latter half of the twentieth century began to see clearly; it is the same 'if' that confirmed '… the aesthetic and cognitive bankruptcy [of realism] …'[22]. It is also the same 'if' that releases George Eliot from the '… accusation of linguistic and cognitive complacency by demonstrating that [her] writing is covertly proto-poststructuralist, experimental, sceptical and self-reflexive'[23]. *Middlemarch* harbours a large amount of tension in its duplicity because, despite this 'proto-poststructuralist' awareness, it still feels compelled to reach its moral end. Philip Davis discerned the same tension when he argued that 'George Eliot's own books would offer realism, and would struggle inside themselves for a true

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[21] *Ibid.*, 182
[22] Pam Morris, *Realism*, 37
[23] *Ibid.*, 37

relation to the world outside'[24]. *Middlemarch* is the pinnacle of this tension as the dual extremes of literature's moral needs on the one hand, and the *aporia* of meaning on the other, both fold themselves into the structure of the narrative.

George Eliot fictionalised this duplicity she feels as a realist writer. The manuscript suggests that it was originally written as two separate novels that were fused together or written into one another. Presumably, the protagonist of one of the novels was Dorothea Brooke and the other Tertius Lydgate, and, perhaps, a reason for the fusion was that George Eliot saw a coextensive hallmark in the two characters and, thereby, decided to combine them to make *Middlemarch*. Dorothea and Lydgate are similar because they both *perform* like their narrator; they dramatize the tension that their creator felt when creating them. The narrator is reforming fiction in her insistence on representing everyday life that has not had the attention in world literature that it deserves. Society, according to George Eliot, needs the '… unhistoric acts …'[25] of a '… home epic …'[26]. Lydgate sets out grand ambitions to reform the healthcare of the town by rooting out poor practitioners who are paid for negligent drug dispensing, just like the narrator embarks on a grand ambition to alter the anodyne quality of literature. The extremity of Lydgate's goal is to completely revolutionise the medical profession. Similarly, George Eliot wants to redraw the boundaries of literary language and realism as a mode, at the same time as questioning its operational legitimacy. The negligent practitioners that Lydgate sets out to radicalize and deracinate are too firmly rooted in the past, like those writers who slightly modify pre-existing idealised character types; those that were denounced by George Eliot in "Silly Novels by Lady Novelists" (1856). Just as the duplicity of realism renders its original ambition, realistically speaking, a non-starter, Lydgate's ambitions suffer a shortfall because of his aesthetic and classed-based choices.

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[24] Philip Davis, "High Realism" from *The Victorians: Vol. 8 1830-1880* (Oxford, 2004), 385

[25] George Eliot, *Middlemarch*, 785

[26] *Ibid.*, 779

Dorothea, similarly, behaves like her narrator. Her eager philanthropic push for new cottages for the tenants of Tipton Grange is a fictional dramatization of the narrator's provincial and moral motivation. Dorothea wants to house society in a better way, like George Eliot's narrator wants to house fictional characters in better, less idealised, novels; both to a moral end. We are told just after Dorothea and Casaubon's honeymoon argument, as her mind drifts back to her meeting with Ladislaw, that '… she was alive to anything that gave her an opportunity for *sympathy*'[27]. George Eliot's narrator frequently interjects with her own sympathetic reactions to her character's affairs: when we hear the very personal details of Casaubon's intellectual anxieties, about how his masterpiece in the making, *The Key to All Mythologies*, may be, after all, a pointless pursuit; about how he suspects that none of his contemporaries have even read his one published pamphlet. He is stuck in the hatch he was born in, says the narrator, '… thinking of his wings but never flying'. Importantly, the narrator then adds, '… for my own part I am very sorry for him …'[28]. This interjection of sympathy is a trope used in her other novels and stems from the motivation of her realist enterprise: to kindle sympathy in her readers. This device is folded into the narrative through Dorothea's affections; she is, like the narrator, 'ardently' sympathetic[29], and Dorothea recognises the main aim of the work is to incite an awareness of the '… equivalent centre of self …'[30] in others.

Dorothea, then, expresses an artistic ideology coterminous to the novel she appears in; she criticises Ladislaw's sketch in the garden at Lowick because she fails to see any connection between it and the natural subject it is meant to represent. This is the same relation the novel has to the novel's world. Lydgate and Dorothea go wrong by not seeing the world of the novel as it is, their connection with it fails, like that of the link between the narrator and the

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[27] *Ibid.* etc., 191
[28] *Ibid.* etc., 263
[29] *Ibid.*, 26
[30] *Ibid.*, 198

narrated world. The performance of the ruptured relation is the same. Dorothea's anxiety and sense of isolation, when she is walking around the oppressively pictorial Roman streets and galleries, coheres with the narrator's mythic disenchantment or ideal reductionism. Moreover, George Eliot's narrator behaves like Lydgate, as he too is an inspector of the human body. Lydgate, like the narrator, is trying to find '… hidden facts of structure …'[31] in the field he excels in. We are told of Lydgate, but suspect of the narrator as well, that he tries to offer '… the most direct alliance between intellectual conquest and the social good …'[32], but all he manages to achieve before his premature death is a treatise on Gout; the bathos is palpable. Both characters' attempts are frustrated by the cultural and personal milieu that surrounds them, as the narrator's realist exertions are strained by the medium through which the exertions are executed. In Dorothea and Lydgate, George Eliot saw two characters that best represented her realist ploy. Davis argued along the same lines when he remarked that 'George Eliot builds … self-checking thoughts into her work, always ready as realism is to turn round upon itself and examine its own real status'[33].

It is clear that a close look at George Eliot's career will show that she had an acute awareness of the draw backs and troubling nuances provided by the medium she used to paint 'thinking pictures'. In fact, she manages to take this apparent weakness and turn it to good use by stretching the extremities between ethical realism and realistic impossibility; which amounts to a radicalization of not just literary language but language and discourse in general. If realism is impossible because it uses language, is history impossible for the same reasons? Is our conception of history no more than a montage of fictive narratives that fail with the failure of logocentrism? It is also clear that her realist endeavour abated in heat from her early days as a writer, but this enhanced the complexity and richness of her later work. The duplicity becomes

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[31] *Ibid.*, 135
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] Davis, "High Realism", 391

essential in *Middlemarch*, as it surfaces within the text itself and, regardless of this duplicity, her moral and sympathetic tone still stands firm. The proto-poststructuralist George Eliot reconciled herself with the duplicitous nature of her endeavour by recognising that realism assumed an odd position in the literary world; a position that a writer cannot avoid, yet, cannot attain.

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The African-American poet's dilemma: Langston Hughes' and Countee Cullen's poetic response to a prejudiced world.

Sibyl Adam[·]

The black poet's identity is directly affected when living in a society of mixed messages caused by segregation laws, where socially he is deemed inferior, and consequently this is reflected in his poetry, as is the pressure of integrating with established white poetics forms. In an attempt to find a place in which to belong, he utilises his African heritage and a feeling of collectiveness within his community, but this is not always successful. More hope lies in his ability to assimilate into the American poetic structure, adding his own input along with the white literary canon.

The area of Harlem, in New York City, during the 1920s and 30s was the cultural centre for the African-American arts movement known nowadays as 'The Harlem Renaissance'.[1] The literary foundations of this movement included the poetry of Langston Hughes, 1902 – 1967, and Countee Cullen, 1903 – 1946. A consideration of their work offers interesting and varied evidence for how these poets felt about their racial identities in the context of when and where they were writing and how they responded to the extremes of the racist society in which they lived. A time of mixed messages: the grandchildren of freed slaves, yet bound by segregation laws. Hughes was one of the most famous and 'most productive poet'[2] from the movement, whose poetry includes jazz and a

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[1] Jean Wagner, *Black Poets of the United States: from Paul Laurence Dunbar to Langston Hughes*. Translated from French by Kenneth Douglas (Urbana; London, 1973), 149
[2] *Ibid*, 386

certain 'racial romanticism'[3] in his earlier years. Cullen was similarly a celebrated poet, who experienced 'a most tormented personality'[4] due to his issues with his race.

African-Americans had steadily gained freedom and rights, including that to education, since the American civil war, which in turn caused an 'ever-increasing race consciousness.'[5] They now had the artistic power to verbalise their thoughts on the role of the African-American in modern America, but still faced the challenges of institutionalised racism, Jim Crow laws and the fallacy of segregation 'separate yet equal' laws. It is a good idea to use poetry to investigate how an individual may respond to the extremes of discrimination precisely because the nature of poetry allows for a personal response and a capacity for an abstract consideration of how they feel. Both Cullen and Hughes make copious reference to race within their poetry. This seems inevitable due to the nature of their racial status as 'other'. With a heightened sense of race engendered by an environment of racism, the African-American poet will refer to their race prolifically. This heightened sense of awareness comes from the way they are treated in society, where they can sit on a bus or what doors they can use. Wagner describes how, 'While he is no longer inferior essentially, the self-image thrown back at him by his human environment still mirrors his presumed inferiority.'[6]

We must consider how far their experiences can be understood as extreme. The experiences of their close ancestors stolen from Africa and sold into slavery are uncontrovertibly extreme. The violent struggle of contemporaries in gaining human rights is easy to understand as extreme. The day-to-day humiliations and exclusions such as standing on a bus when there is a seat next to a white

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[3] *Ibid*, 294

[4] *Ibid*, 283

[5] Jeffrey B. Ferguson, *The Harlem Renaissance: a Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008), 16

[6] Wagner, *Black Poets of the United States*, 14

person, or using a separate, and always inferior, restroom is a form of 'symbolic violence'[7] on a spectrum of extreme experience. Exposed to these experiences, how do Hughes and Cullen respond? Through collectivism, as an attempt to gain acceptance and power: the individual stands for the nation which is a form of synecdoche. They attempt, not always successfully, to find a place of acceptance through identification with an African heritage. This is problematic as they must rely on hegemonic white poetic forms within their writing, which poses questions about how an African-American poet copes with writing in a field which is traditionally and tyrannically white. How does an African-American show they have the same talent and can write as well as white poets if they are using the white poets' forms? It is the dilemma of trying to establish a different literary form which may never be recognised, the question of whether 'The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House'.[8]

Searching for a heritage on which they can depend on for dignity, which can make sense of extreme experiences of both past and present, both poets discuss their African identities. Hughes's 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers'[9] and 'Negro'[10] invoke strong images of African origin, where the nameless Negro stands as a symbol for this powerful nation. In 'Negro', the affectionate use of the possessive in 'my Africa'[11] emphasises an identity deeply bound with Africa. 'Black' is associated with a deeper cultural experience in 'Black like the depths of my Africa'[12] yet a secretive, not fully realised 'Black as the night is black'.[13]

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[7] James F. Bohman, 'Practical Reason and Cultural Constraint' in *Bourdieu: A Critical Reader,* (ed.) R. Shusterman (London, 1999), 129-152

[8] Audre Lorde, 'The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House' in *Sister Outsider, Essays and Speeches* (Berkeley, CA, 1984), 110-113

[9] Langston Hughes, 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers' in *Selected Poems of Langston Hughes* (New York, 1988), 4

[10] Hughes, 'Negro', *Ibid.*, 8

[11] *Ibid.*, l. 3

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*, l. 2

The poem lists the identities that the Negro has been, from 'a slave'[14] of Caesar and Washington, to a worker of Ancient Egypt[15] and the modern American buildings, to a singer in 'Georgia'.[16] The overall suggestion is that to have African heritage is to be a part of a long and deep, thus empowering, history. The difference in tense between 'I am'[17] and 'I've been'[18] suggests a solid identity despite the events that have transpired. 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers' similarly depicts the Negro experiencing all of his people's history, including in Africa, as a continuous succession with a deep, 'ancient'[19] identity. Jones describes how,

> To Blacks who had often suffered from popular misunderstandings of evolutionary theory, it was indeed important to be able to have come from the creators of pyramids and other ancient glories. Too many assumed that the Blacks' ancestors had but lately descended from the trees.[20]

From this, we can see how Africa is used as an empowering symbol for Hughes, against the context of racism in the society in which he was writing his poetry. His assertion is of an identity as deep as the white and historically European identity.

The 1920s were the first time poets were using Africa as a 'potent positive symbol'.[21] This symbol induces a feeling of collective identity because of the linking together of people with African descent. In the absence of an accepted

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[14] *Ibid.*, l. 4
[15] *Ibid.*, ll. 7-8
[16] *Ibid.*, l. 11
[17] *Ibid.*, l. 1
[18] *Ibid.*, l. 4
[19] Hughes, 'Negro Speaks of Rivers', l. 2
[20] Norma Ramsay Jones, 'Africa, as Imaged by Cullen & Co', *Negro American Literature Forum* 8.4 (1974), 264
[21] Ibid, 263

place in American society, Hughes is searching for an accepted place of origin. Jones describes this renewal of interest in Africa as 'a displaced people were finally discovering their roots.'[22] However, this explanation for the use of Africa seems too simplistic. The African-American poets are discovering their roots, yet they are so removed from these roots that it must give little meaning to their modern identities. When Hughes visited Africa they laughed at him and called him 'white man'[23] because he came from America, which suggests that the African-American can neither belong in Africa nor America, but somewhere in between.

Further problems with using an African identity as a place of refuge can be identified in the poetry of Cullen. Cullen's 'Heritage'[24] is an African identity conflicted and confused, seen with his repeated question 'What is Africa to me?'[25] Africa is a symbol that is vivid, 'Copper sun or scarlet sea'[26], 'spicy grove, cinnamon tree'[27] and yet distant, 'Africa? A book one thumbs/ Listlessly, till slumber comes'[28] implying an Africa that is not relevant to his reality. Therefore, he asks himself 'Do I play a double part'[29] in his feelings towards Africa, emphasising a split identity at once African and yet not assimilated with his idea of Africa. Africa is integral to his notion of selfhood, 'dark blood dammed within'[30] but 'dammed' implies he is ashamed.

Much criticism of Cullen has focused on what Wagner describes as an

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[22] Ibid,
[23] Langston Hughes, *The Collected Works of Langston Hughes: Volume 13, Autobiography: The Big Sea* (Columbia and London, 2002), 96
[24] Countee Cullen, 'Heritage' in *The Portable Harlem Renaissance Reader,* (ed.) David Levering Lewis (New York, 1995), 244-247
[25] *Ibid.*, l. 9
[26] *Ibid.*, l. 2
[27] *Ibid.*, l. 9
[28] *Ibid.*, ll. 31-2
[29] *Ibid.*, l. 97
[30] *Ibid.*, l. 26

'impassible barrier between the poet and the people of his own race.'[31] In other words, Cullen appears to be ashamed of his race and shows a desire to be white. Wagner claims that this reflects the 'presumed inferiority'[32] that the African-American has in society, and so consequently he develops a poor opinion of himself, 'ends up hating everyone of his own race'.[33] Hughes wrote in his famous essay 'The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain' about a Negro poet who wanted to write outside of the constraints of his race, and infers from this that the poet is proclaiming he wants to be white.[34] Smethurst claims that this poet is in fact Cullen, as the statement resembles what Cullen said in an interview in 1924.[35] If Cullen is showing a desire to be white, then this can only occur in a society where white is seen as superior over black. Indeed, living in a society where one is treated badly due to the colour of one's skin can produce the negative effect of being ashamed, as well a desire to fight and have pride. Cullen is attempting to show his pride in his reclamation of the African identity, and yet cannot fully commit himself to such a claim, which could be due to the effects of racism on his identity. Carroll describes this as 'both his distance from Africa and his inability to separate himself from it.'[36] This is emphasised by the fact that the version of the poem in the journal 'Survey Graphic' had photos of African masks and statues, yet in the 'New Negro' version, most of these were removed, leaving the connection with Africa more ambiguous.[37]

The connection with Africa which Hughes and Cullen make is undermined

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[31] Wagner, *Black Poets of the United States*, 283
[32] *Ibid.*, 14
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] Langston Hughes, 'The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain' in *The Portable Harlem Renaissance Reader*, 91
[35] James Smethurst, 'Lyric Stars: Countee Cullen and Langston Hughes' in *The Cambridge Companion to the Harlem Renaissance*, (ed.) George Hutchinson (Cambridge, 2007), 112
[36] Anne Elizabeth Caroll, *Word, Image and the New Negro* (Bloomington, 2005), 177
[37] *Ibid.*

when we closely inspect the images of Africa they used. Jones argues that the image of Africa must have been gained through pictures of African art such as the African masks seen in the popular anthology 'The New Negro',[38] widely held notions of Africa and a 'form of wish-fulfillment'.[39] Some of the images of Africa in Cullen's 'Heritage' are primitive, savage images, such as 'wild barbaric birds/Goading massive jungle herds'[40] and 'Tread the savage measures of/Jungle boys and girls in love'.[41] Arguably, these are classic white and largely negative images of the primitive Africa. This begs the question of how it can positively reinforce an identity created by African-Americans if it is just reusing white stereotypes. This suggests a fundamental flaw in the conception of African identity as a way of gaining dignity in the social environment of prejudice, because it is based on negative white stereotypes. Furthermore, I would argue that to summarise 'Africa' within a poem as one generalised representation is impossible; similar to the difficulties one would have in summarising 'America' or 'Europe' in such a way. Many African-Americans had roots in slavery from different areas of Western Africa and often had white relatives. Many descendants of slaves would have found it difficult to trace their roots, which means that using Africa for a specific, personal connection would be difficult to achieve. However, importantly Jones points out that 'What they conceived Africa to be is just as important as what Africa really is.'[42], suggesting what is really important is that they have chosen this symbolic African identity rather than it being forced upon them. The implication is that this is only important as an empowering symbol. If this symbol is not a real connection then arguably it is flawed in its inception. Hughes' later poetry relied less on the theme of Africa, which hints that he increasingly began to feel it was an imperfect connection.

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[38] Alain Locke (ed.), *The New Negro* (New York: Atheneum; New York; Oxford, 1925; repr. 1992)
[39] Jones, 'Africa, as Imaged by Cullen & Co', 264
[40] Cullen, 'Heritage', ll.13-14
[41] *Ibid.*, ll.13-14
[42] Jones, 'Africa, as Imaged by Cullen & Co', 264

The African-American can cope with the environment of institutionalised racism by forming a collective strength through joining together with one's fellow African-Americans. Both Hughes and Cullen demonstrate a will towards a collective identity. In Hughes' 'Negro' and 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers' he identifies a collective African-American identity and symbolic universality. In, 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers', the rivers of Africa and America are what links the collective 'I'[43] which transcends time from bathing 'in the Euphrates'[44] to raising 'the pyramids'[45]. Similarly in 'Negro', the 'I' encapsulates the African-American people in one, through history and geography. The nameless figure implies an 'every man'. The 'Negro' has been 'a slave…a worker…a singer…a victim'[46] but ultimately always a 'Negro'. This highlights a specific attitude espoused by Hughes, a common one amongst discriminated groups of individuals, of solid racial identity despite the outside events that may transpire.

Hutchinson describes how 'increasingly, African-Americans came to feel a common identity regardless of region or social status.'[47] He claims this was due to immigration, as well as intensification of racism and firm segregation. This collective nature can be seen in anthologies of poetry, essays, and pictures published, such as Alain Locke's 'The New Negro' in which both Cullen and Hughes are featured, as a growing need African-Americans felt at the time to express collectively what they wanted in American society. Nonetheless, this attitude creates serious problems. The issue with this collectiveness is it threatens 'an implied homogeneity';[48] that there are certain features all African-Americans share. In turn, this implies an exclusion of those members of the

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[43] Hughes, 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers', l. 5

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid.*, l.7

[46] *Ibid.*, ll. 4, 7, 10, 14

[47] George Hutchinson, *The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1997), 10

[48] Carroll, 'Word, Image and the New Negro', 157

race that do not fit in, which contradicts the positivity that the collectivism is trying to promote in the first place. The same problems arise with the collective identity as with the African identity, in trying to generalise a group of individuals. This collective identity is linked with Pan-Africanism, which seeks to unite Africans from all over the world together. This raises questions of generalisation of African-Americans with different roots; incurring issues of how collective they can be as a race, and whether this collective identity is detrimental. It is perhaps not possible for a group of people so varied in origins and opinions to be classified as having the same view.

A further flaw with the African-American poet speaking collectively for their race as a solid positive force in the face of racism is the pressure on them to represent their race in a positive light. Hughes says that,

> The Negro artist works against an undertow of sharp criticism and misunderstanding from his own group and unintentional bribes from the whites. "Oh, be respectable, write about nice people, show how good we are," say the Negroes. "Be stereotyped, don't go too far, don't shatter our illusions about you, don't amuse us too seriously. We will pay you," say the whites.[49]

This means that because he is representing his race and his race's response to the extreme experiences of the past and present, the African-American poet has a larger responsibility than if he were to represent only himself. This seems doomed to fail, as the abstract nature of poetry in itself is often open to different interpretations. A guarantee can never be made of poetic success. The pressure to speak for the whole race is perhaps why in 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers' and 'Negro', Hughes has felt the need to emphasise the great things, like Pyramids, that his race has created. We can see an example of this type of demand in the critic Harry Alan Potamkin's 1927 article on Cullen, in which he reproaches 'Cullen for not having been more notably the spokesman of his entire race, as if the collective experience should necessarily absorb the

[49] Hughes, 'The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain', 94

individual's creative activity whenever the individual does not enjoy the privilege of being white.'[50] Further problems with the collective African-American identity include the fact that it only emphasises the difference between black and white poets. It encourages this type of frame of mind, and encourages white poets and literary critics to see it in the same light.

An issue that cannot be ignored when discussing the African-American poets of the 1920s is the relation to their white counterpart. They are writing in a white-dominated field, with the outlines of European poetic traditions to compete with, so how do they respond in a manner in keeping with the positivity of the African identity and the will towards collectiveness? The problem with defining oneself as 'Negro' in 20th century American literature is that this is not always as distinct from 'white' as one might presume. Indeed, proclaiming one's African 'Negro' collective identity using a white literary form could be seen as undermining any distinction one is attempting to proclaim. Furthermore, African-American poetry is often critically analysed in light of white literary and cultural assumptions. In fact, it is difficult to analyse without the framework of the white literary canon purely because it is seen as the default, as Hutchinson points out, 'the only way to accomplish or even envision the shape of such a transformation is in the context of disputes between positions in the general, white-dominated cultural field'.[51] This would have been especially true in the time of publication of Hughes and Cullen because of the lack of previous African-American literature and literary criticism, compared to modern day. Indeed, perhaps a distinct African-American poetry is impossible. Schuyler declares that American black and white art are identical in that they show 'more or less evidence of European influence.'[52] Warren recently declared in an article titled 'Does African-American Literature exist?' that the literature created in the times of Jim Crow laws was a needed reaction,

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[50] Wagner, *Black Poets of the United States*, 292

[51] Hutchinson, 'The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White', 7

[52] George S. Schuyler, 'The Negro-Art Hokum' in *The Portable Harlem Renaissance Reader*, 97

> Because segregation rested informally on claims and beliefs about racial difference and inequality, it lent coherence to the notion of a collective race interest. That also meant that the publication of a work of literature or the success of a particular black individual could call attention to the falsity of racist beliefs and, through argument or demonstration, conceivably affect all blacks regardless of their class status.[53]

Although Warren's claim that African-American literature does not exist in the present day because it is firmly situated in a historical time frame of inequality is far-fetched, his point that African-American literature from the Jim Crow laws era exists purely as a form of reaction against racism is interesting. It suggests it is distinct because of its reactionary content. In other words, it is distinct from white poetry because it is a reaction to a prejudiced world where white poetry is not.

If we look closely at the language used in Hughes 'The Negro Speaks of Rivers' and 'Negro' both poems show 'a plain, almost colloquial, but not conversational character'[54] similar to Carl Sandburg, a major white poet. In fact, Smethurst claims that rather than writing in a markedly African-American diction, it is more, like Sandburg and Walt Whitman, 'a generic "American" language posed against a "high" literary diction like that of Cullen's that is more or less British in its derivation and alleged sensibility'.[55] In other words, Hughes and Cullen are choosing to represent themselves using a classically white poetic manner. Ferguson, writing a year after Smethurst, similarly compared Hughes to Whitman and Sandburg.[56] They are not alone in using white poets to analyse

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[53] Kenneth W. Warren, 'Does African-American Literature exist?' February 24, 2011 http://chronicle.com/article/Does-African-American/126483/ [Accessed February 15, 2012]

[54] Smethurst, 'Lyric Stars', 120

[55] *Ibid.*, 12

[56] Ferguson, 'The Harlem Renaissance: A Brief History with Documents', 14

Hughes and Cullen. David Kirby, in 1971, called Cullen's 'Heritage' a 'black Waste Land'.[57] This pattern seems to suggest an established practice of criticism of the poets. However, Hughes and Cullen may have been consciously using these white poetic forms. Cullen's 'Heritage' displays simple rhyming couplets, a traditionally white, European form of metre seen, for example, in Shakespeare's sonnets. To have thought of writing in this manner, Cullen must have been conscious of its history in white, European poetry and would have known he was exerting the cultural and literary associations by writing in that metre.

Arguably then, it was not the goal of Hughes or Cullen to write in a distinctly African-American style. In fact, they were attempting to write in a style that embraced both black and white literary styles and associations to produce something distinctly American. Hutchinson claims that '"white" and "black" American cultures as intimately intertwined, mutually constitutive'.[58] There is a strong theme of American nationalism in Hughes' 'I too' with the association of being 'beautiful'[59] as an American, and in 'America' where the country is described as 'the dream...the vision'.[60] Also, in Cullen's 'Heritage', his pride of his Christian values shows an affinity with America, 'I belong to Jesus Christ'.[61] In 'America', the display of Hughes saying 'I am American'[62] shows a reclaiming of an origin in America. Hanchard discusses the importance of nomenclature to African-Americans, and how self-definition and names affects identity.[63] His discussion is surrounding the label 'African-American', but the same investigation can be made into the labels Hughes uses. The move from 'Negro'

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[57] David K. Kirby, 'Countee Cullen's 'Heritage': a black 'Waste Land', *South Atlantic Bulletin* 36.4 (1971), 14

[58] Hutchinson, 'The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White', 3

[59] Langston Hughes, 'I Too' in *Selected Poems of Langston Hughes*, l. 15

[60] Langston Hughes, 'America' in *Selected Poems of Langston Hughes*, ll. 8-9

[61] Cullen, 'Heritage', l. 89

[62] Hughes, 'America', l. 7

[63] Michael Hanchard, 'Identity, Meaning and the African-American', *Social Text* 24 (1990), 31

to 'American' in his poetry gives evidence to his need to be assimilated properly and fairly into American society. 'Negro', which is the Spanish and Portuguese word for black, represents solely colour and therefore appearance. Adopting 'American' gives a greater sense of belonging.

Hutchinson suggests that the authors did not believe an autonomous African-American literary genre was possible.[64] The poets seem to be consciously, even possibly proudly, imitating white literary style. In Hughes' 'America', he concludes with 'I am my one sole self,/American seeking the stars.'[65] that strongly emphasises the unity of the American people named in the poem, whether black or white. Along with 'I too', these poems show an ideology similar to the ideology of the 'American Dream', showing how the speaker values himself as part of this. Schuyler says of the African-American writers that 'their work shows the impress of nationality rather than race. They all reveal the psychology and culture of their environment – their color is incidental.'[66] Hughes is possibly doing this to criticise racial injustice[67] which suggests therefore a political motivation in using the white literary canon to assimilate the African-American people within America. He is suggesting a way in which he wants to see his society: the assimilation of black and white, as a replacement of the of segregation laws. Furthermore, writing in white literary forms effectively and with talent to produce what is recognised as excellent poetry seems to only highlight the absurdity of racism, and the apparent inferiority of the African-American poet.

It is a strange and interesting time for the African-American poet: the freedom to write, to receive recognition for one's poetry yet to experience the lingering prejudices, racism and laws that give a reality far more unequal than they

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[64] Hutchinson, 'The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White', 5

[65] Hughes, 'America', ll. 63-4

[66] Schuyler, 'The Negro-Art Hokum', 98

[67] Jeff Westover, 'Africa/America: Fragmentation and Diaspora in the Work of Langston Hughes', *Callaloo 25.4* (2002), 1207

proclaim. We can see Hughes' and Cullen's poetry as a reaction to this situation, and the ways in which they cope with it as individuals, especially sharing a common heritage. They respond to extreme experience and ancestral experience by seeking heritage in an African origin, and strength through unity and collectiveness. Yet their experience of Africa is highly ambivalent. It is impossible for the poets to escape a vision of Africa through a white lens just as it is impossible to escape the white literary canon in their poetry. The very term 'Harlem Renaissance' implies that one should measure its cultural production against the Renaissance, the upsurge of artistic and scientific culture of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe. Naming it thus, in modern day criticism, invites us to understand it as 'the other' Renaissance, to be considered against the white European Renaissance. The poets' great awareness of their race can be seen with the extent to which they allude to race, but this is surely inevitable due to their racial status as 'other'. They seek ways of understanding and living with the past whilst looking to an African-American future. Finally, we can see an attempt to rectify this status as 'other' by using established white literary forms, and showing a love for America as a place for both black and white.

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The Extremities of the Borderlands: Gloria Anzaldúa, Sandra Cisneros and Chicana Identity Politics

Sophie Sexon

Writing from the border of Mexico and America, Gloria Anzaldúa and Sandra Cisneros are two Mexican female authors that have embraced poetry, prose and word art to articulate the 'Chicana' experience of life. Both writers engage with the concept of the 'border' within their work, both physical and theoretical. Through literary analysis of the work of these writers, more can be understood about the pressures and expectations that are placed upon the Chicana subject. The Chicana subject lives a life within a liminal space, within two or more cultures. A struggle to assimilate both Anglo and Mexican ideologies and mythologies is articulated by both of these writers. Cisneros and Anzaldúa overcome the dichotomies of North and South, male and female, Spanish and English by engaging in the act of 'revisionist' writing, adopting various forms and languages in their style to articulate the experience of the 'borderland' subject.

One may approach the concept of the 'border' in a variety of a ways. The extreme differences between disparate cultures can be highlighted by looking at factors which affect the individual within a writer's work. One can begin by looking at the physical divide between lands and cultures: the differences between geographical boundaries and man-made boundaries. The 'border' can exist as a physical inscription upon the body: a psychological border within the self. There is also the theoretical borderland: a space where literary forms or

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voices may collide and collude. Gloria Anzaldúa and Sandra Cisneros are two Mexican-American female writers that embrace a plurality of 'borders' within their texts. Anzaldúa's *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* is a text rich in a variety of forms, candidly discussing her experiences as a woman living a variety of 'borderlands' through poetry, criticism and prose. Sandra Cisneros has written both poetry and prose that describes the experience of being a Mexican female living on the border of Anglicized culture and Mexican traditions. This article will assess Cisneros' short story collection *The House on Mango Street,* and poetry collection *Loose Women*. Although the focus of this article is directed at literature linked explicitly to the U. S. and Mexican border, it is prudent to bear in mind Anzaldúa's words when thinking of all literature; 'the psychological borderlands, the sexual borderlands and the spiritual borderlands are not particular to the Southwest.'[1] The border is present within every individual, creating a rift in one's own identity politics.

In his 2004 work *Identity*, Zygmunt Bauman speaks of 'liquid modernity'. The subjects that live in the 'liquid modern era' inhabit a new kind of identity that is capable of assimilating and comprehending various cultures. Bauman articulates the difficulties inherent in being a 'liquid' subject. He writes:

> To be wholly or in part 'out of place' everywhere…may be an upsetting, sometimes annoying experience. There is always something to explain, to apologize for, to hide or on the contrary to boldly display…[2]

Bauman's 'liquid' subject bears the marks and traces of the borderland subject who struggles to assimilate different cultures. This 'liquid' subject can find it difficult to articulate one's individual identity as a result of living within 'liminal' identity politics, always between the extremes of two or more cultures.

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[1] Gloria Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders' in *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*, 3rd Edn. (San Francisco, 2007), 19

[2] Zygmunt Bauman, *Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi* (Cambridge, 2010), 13

Written in 2004, Bauman's text illustrates that a liberated identity politics which embraces heterogeneous existence is still an unlivable prospect for most. Anzaldúa and Cisneros' works voice this struggle from within a confluent mix of repressive ideologies. Both writers express lived experience as a Mexican woman, and they do so by embracing a 'liquid' plurality of forms and literary styles.

At the start of *Borderlands,* Gloria Anzaldúa talks of how the border interacts with the body:

> 1,950 mile-long open wound
> dividing a *pueblo*, a culture,
> running down the length of my body,
> staking fence rods in my flesh,
> splits me splits me.[3]

The border is inscribed on the female body as a 'wound'. A large part of Anzaldúa's text is concerned with a fear of healing the wound as this may bring on an unfavorable cultural assimilation or a culture of dichotomy like the Mexican-American and male-female dichotomies present in the text:

> no thought I want not to think
> that stirs up the pain
> opens the wound
> starts the healing [4]

There is fear that neither the extremities of the Mexican nor American culture can be incorporated into a third culture: the Borderland culture. The separation of 'the self' for the purposes of introspection encourage the change needed, as Anzaldúa says, 'wounding is a deeper healing'.[5] The body interacts

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[3] Anzaldúa, '*El otro México*' in *Borderlands,* 24
[4] Anzaldúa, 'Creature of Darkness', *Ibid.*, 208
[5] Anzaldúa, 'Poets have strange eating habits', *Ibid.*, 162

with all of these borderlands as a marker of one's intense individuality. The body is also a border between Chicana subjects as, 'to be close to another Chicana is like looking into the mirror. We're afraid of what we'll see there. *Pena*. Shame.'[6] The mirror image of the female form puts a barrier between Chicana females as they identify shared feelings of shame, and recognize in one another a patriarchal culture of female domination.

In Cisneros' texts and Anzaldúa's *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza* there is a feeling that the Chicana's body is not her own as it is controlled by a patriarchal Mexican society that puts pressure on the female:

> For a woman of my culture there used to be only three directions she could turn: to the Church as a nun, to the streets as a prostitute, or to the home as a mother… Women are made to feel total failures if they don't marry and have children.[7]

The female Chicana body is regulated by patriarchal religion and the institution of marriage, which leaves the woman with no choice of vocation for herself. Anzaldúa identifies that the Chicana's religion is patriarchal because:

> The male-dominated Azteca-Mexica culture drove the powerful female deities underground by giving them monstrous attributes and by substituting male deities in their place, thus splitting the female Self [sic] and the female deities.[8]

This masculinized religion enforced a border between the confluent feelings and elements of the female deities, and split the deities into those of 'light' of 'dark' elements, enforcing individual extremity upon gendered idols. Deborah Madsen recognizes why it would be hard for the Chicana to eschew such religious idols:

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[6] Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders', *Ibid.*, 80
[7] *Ibid.*, 39
[8] Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders', *Ibid.*, 49

> The virgin and the whore-these categories of "good" versus "bad" women are complicated by the perception, shared by many Chicana feminists, that they risk betrayal of the people if they pursue an alternative construction of femininity that is perceived to be Anglo.[9]

The Chicana individual must practice a religion that upholds a range of gendered and cultural borders in order to embrace her own Mexican culture.

Anzaldúa posits the Chicana idols as *Guadalupe* (the virgin mother), *la Malinche* (the raped mother) and *la Llorona* (the weeping mother who has lost her children).[10] There are elements of all three of these deities in both Cisneros's and Anzaldúa's texts and these elements possess the Chicana characters. Sonia Salvídar-Hull recognises that *la Llorona* is re-configured within different writers' work to unite the Chicana community:

> The centrality of *la Llorona* in Chicana oral and written traditions emerges in literature written by other contemporary Chicana feminists [such as Helena Maria Viramontes and Sandra Cisneros], a Chicana feminist transformation of the powerless waiting woman resonates with Anzaldúa's revisionary project.[11]

The idols must be transformed to empower the Chicana subject. Anzaldúa articulates a struggle with *la Llorona* during which the spiritual enters the physical, transgresses a border of the flesh, in 'My Black *Angelos*':

> *Aiiii aiiiii aiiiiii*
> She is crying for the dead child […]
> Taloned hand on my shoulder

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[9] Deborah L. Madsen, *Understanding Contemporary Chicana Literature*, (Columbia, 2000), 123

[10] Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders' in *Borderlands*, 52

[11] Sonia Salvídar-Hull, 'Introduction to the Second Edition' in *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*, 3rd Edn. (San Francisco, 2007), 6-7

behind me putting words, worlds in my head […]
She crawls into my spine [12]

La Llorona possesses the narrator of the poem, and as readers we identify with the bodily intrusion as we hear the wailing of the mother: '*aiiii*'. Fear is induced as a result of the descriptive wording, that 'taloned hand' and the spirit that 'crawls' into the body. This possession is a bodily fear of intrusion that evokes the symbolic destruction of fertility.

In Cisneros' *Loose Woman* and Anzaldúa's *Borderlands* the body is the border between the individual and her spiritual self, as it is fertile, like the land, and thus capable of being used by men to secure progeny. In Cisneros's poem 'Well, If You Insist' a Cartesian separation between self and body is expressed:

My body, this
body, that has
nothing to do
with who
I am. But
it's my body, [13]

The line breaks between 'this' and 'body' exhibit a feeling of inability to articulate or to identify with one's own body. The irregular line length and peculiar enjambment mirror the contours of a body itself. The narrator expresses a fear of bodily invasion, a fear of the physical and spiritual border being transgressed, when she says:

Little terrorist, you terrify me.
Come in then. Climb on. Get in.
Well, if you insist. If you
insist…[14]

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[12] Anzaldúa, 'My Black *Angelos*' in *Borderlands*, 206
[13] Sandra Cisneros, 'Well, If You Insist' in *Loose Woman*, (New York, 1995), 36

One could argue that the 'little terrorist' represents a fetus and the pressure that the Chicana feels to become a mother. Although 'come on in then' articulates consent, an unwillingness to be entered is expressed in the title 'Well, If You Insist'. This suggests a sense of an external force influencing the Chicana's decisions and culturally pressurizing her.

Sandra Cisneros' *The House on Mango Street* shows the extreme bordered conflict between masculine and feminine in Chicana literature. This is asserted by the ways in which women are repressed by their male counterparts. The women build their hopes around a man coming to take them away, such as Sally, a friend of the protagonist Esperanza. This notion of the male redeemer is an Anglo mythology that cannot be attained. The particular myth used in both *The House on Mango Street* and *Borderlands* is that of Rapunzel. The border means that Anglo myths influence the Mexican culture by oppressing the female with dreams of a redemptive patriarchal liberation. Anzaldúa articulates the reality for the Chicana female:

> Nobody's going to save you.
> No one's going to cut you down,
> cut the thorns thick around you.
> No one's going to storm
> the castle walls nor
> kiss awake your birth,
> climb down your hair,
> nor mount you
> on the white steed.[15]

The white steed could represent America's white Anglo culture, a desirable culture to the female inhabitants of Mango Street, which the female would be sexually 'mounted' upon.

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[14] *Ibid*.
[15] Anzaldúa, 'Letting Go' in *Borderlands*, 187

Living in America does not liberate the individuals living on Mango Street as the women of the neighborhood are all kept behind locked doors. They can only experience the world through windows:

> Such women experience the world in a series of vignettes which permit no unifying structure. They live lives without narrative, without context, but representing a logic of oppression and cruelty too ugly to confront.[16]

The windows of the community are physical borders which separate the Chicana female from the external world. The Rapunzel myth is re-enforced by Cisneros when she compares one of these locked up women of the neighborhood to Rapunzel, 'Rafaela leans out the window and leans on her elbow and dreams her hair is like Rapunzel's.'[17] The male is the border between the female Chicana and her choice to live a liberated identity politics. Esperanza is disappointed by the cultural normative upheld by the women in her neighborhood, which concerns the romantic Anglo mythology of the male saviour. This myth results in Esperanza being raped. 'They all lied. All the books and magazines, everything that told it wrong…'[18] Esperanza feels betrayed by both her culture and her gender, as both of these elements are influenced by the extremities of Anglo mythology which cannot be assimilated into Chicana life.

Both Cisneros' and Anzaldúa's writings break down linguistic borders, offering a new voice to the individual living between the extremities of disparate cultures. María González argues, 'an author's relationship to standard English is a political one.'[19] According to González there are three categories for the

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[16] Madsen, *Understanding Contemporary Chicana Literature*, 113

[17] Sandra Cisneros, *The House on Mango Street* (New York, 1991), 79

[18] *Ibid*., p. 100.

[19] María C. González, *Contemporary Mexican-American Women Novelists: Toward a Feminist Identity,* (New York, 1996), 15

language of Chicana writers: standard English (assimilationist), some bilingualism (accommodationist) and those who use nonstandard forms of both English and Spanish (revisionist). Language is the border the Chicana sets up between writer and reader, between Mexican and American culture, between her past and her future. González argues that Cisneros, in *Mango Street*, uses assimilationist language to narrate Esperanza's experience and that, 'the world Cisneros creates does not mirror that language of the community'.[20] She says that the text lacks verisimilitude; if one were to inhabit Esperanza's neighborhood one would hear Spanish. This then leads González to deduce that Esperanza is 'probably translating everything into English, yet the act of translating itself is muted, never fully represented.' One could argue that Cisneros's message is that there is a border between readership and self-articulation in the text; that the text is inaccessible to some members of the Chicano community because it is written in Standard English.

Anzaldúa's choice of language is very different. González states that the language in *Borderlands* is revisionist. Anzaldúa lists the many different languages she uses in her texts and states her reasons for doing so:

> The switching of "codes" in this book...reflects my language, a new language – the language of the Borderlands. There, at the juncture of cultures, languages cross-pollinate and are revitalized; they die and are born.[21]

It is important for Anzaldúa to politicize the language in which she writes because it enhances her message. González says that by switching from non-standard Spanish to English and otherwise 'the experience narrated in the novel includes the experience of reading the novel.'[22] The act of reading *Borderlands* is one of transgressing language borders, of encountering polyvocal discourse

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[21] Anzaldúa, 'Preface to the First Edition' in *Borderlands*, 20

[22] González, *Contemporary Mexican-American Women Novelists: Toward a Feminist Identity*, 66

that expresses the Chicana's inner conflict of selves. *Borderlands* is split into two parts: The first, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders' is a mix of poetry and prose, and the latter half is '*Un Agitado Viento* / *Ehécatl*, The Wind', a collection of poetry. All Spanish in distinguished from English by italicisation. Barbara Harlow argues that this use of many languages is negative for the Chicana writer as, 'that already complex identity is fragmented further in the bilingual, even trilingual, multigeneric textual composition which disarticulates Anzaldúa's expression – at once intimate and scholarly.'[23] Another way of approaching the text is to view Anzaldúa's expression as an embrace of a wealth of voices because this is her experience of being an inhabitant of the 'Borderlands'. She is the 'revisionist' that uses a third language composed of many other languages. By using many different languages and voices Anzaldúa defeats the silencing of so many generations before her as she says:

> Ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity—I am my language...I will have my voice: Indian, Spanish, white. I will have my serpent's tongue—my woman's voice, my sexual voice, my poet's voice. I will overcome the tradition of silence.[24]

Chicana writers transgress the borders of language to find universal expression for their experiences.

Anzaldúa's text is visually identifiable as a hybrid, a text that embraces liminality and overcomes extremities in its many different forms of expression, from poetry and prose to word art. *The House on Mango Street* may seem to have fewer forms as it is presented as a short story cycle with a linear narrative. However, Renato Rosaldo sees within this text that there are different forms and of different ways to express Chicana experience:

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[23] Barbara Harlow, 'Sites of Struggle: Immigration, Deportation, Prison, and Exile' in *Criticism in the Borderlands*, ed. By Héctor Calderón and José David Saldívar (Durham, 1991), 159

[24] Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders' in *Borderlands,* 81

> The stories in *The House on Mango Street* are near poems. Their play on themes of sexuality and danger occurs within the patter or precise and "childlike" diction which often imitates nursery rhymes.[25]

Both Ronato Rosaldo and María González argue that the form of Chicana literature expresses cultural identity because it embraces different ways of writing. For Anzaldúa, 'writing produces anxiety... Being a writer feels very much like being a Chicana... coming up against all sorts of walls.'[26] Writing has extremities and borders of its own that the Chicana writer must overcome.

Cisneros and Anzaldúa share some poetic metaphors in their writing: the use of serpent and eagle imagery, the use of water to transcend border, the metaphor of roots etc. but they also share some poetic techniques. Both women use internal rhyme within their poems. Anzaldúa writes:

> I am fully formed carved
> by the hands of the ancients, drenched with
> the stench of today's headlines. But my own
> hands whittle the final work
> me.[27]

'Drench' and 'stench' are internal rhymes, and because this rhyme separates them out from other words in the poem they are closer related to the isolated pronoun of the individual: 'me'. In Cisneros' work there is a similar example in the poem 'Loose Woman':

> They say I'm a beast.
> And feast on it. When all along
> I thought that's what a woman was.[28]

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[25] Renato Rosaldo, 'Fables of the Fallen Guy' in *Criticism in the Borderlands*, ed. By Héctor Calderón and José David Saldívar (Durham, 1991), p. 92.
[26] Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders' in *Borderlands*, p. 64.
[27] Anzaldúa, 'Cihuatlyotl, Woman Alone' in *Borderlands*, p. 195.

'Beast' and 'feast' rhyme internally and thus are separated out from the poem to be taken in conjunction with the conception of what a woman is; an animal creature that is devoured by those around her. Both internal lines focus on identification with shame, dirt and animal characteristics. Cisneros and Anzaldúa use similar poetic techniques, breaking down a border between Chicana writers, as Anzaldúa says, 'when I saw poetry written in Tex-Mex...I felt like we really existed as a people.'[29] Poetry aids the articulation of the individual living within the Borderland culture.

Within Mexican Chicana literature there is a response to its extreme counterpart: writing from within the canon of British and American writers. When María González discusses Chicana culture in literature she defines the accommodationist as someone who:

> […] attempts to combine the two values and not reject one for the other […] an accommodationist conception does not try to resolve the split caused by dualities – that split is accepted.[30]

Cisneros and Anzaldúa embrace the poetry of other cultures in different ways. For Anzaldúa female poetry is a discourse with other women. In her poem 'Holy Relics' the narrator says:

> We are the holy relics,
> the scattered bones of a saint,
> the best loved bones of Spain.
> We seek each other.[31]

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[28] Cisneros, 'Loose Woman' in *Loose Woman*, 112
[29] Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders' in *Borderlands,* 82
[30] González, *Contemporary Mexican-American Women Novelists: Toward a Feminist Identity*, 35/36
[31] Anzaldúa, 'Holy Relics' in *Borderlands*, 181

The book is dedicated to American poet Judy Grahn and English writer Vita Sackville-West and thus is a link to Anglo female writers. It is also about the writer's body being dismembered, idolized and given away to the reader just like the body of Teresa de Cepeda Dávila y Ahumada in the poem, who is buried 'in her threadworn veil.'[32] The writing itself is torn apart as, 'fingers that had once loved her-pinched off pieces of her flesh' and it echoes the way that Azteca-Mexican patrimony tore apart the female deities of Anzaldúa's ancestors.

In 'Down There' by Sandra Cisneros there is a response to writing of another culture but the response is not a dedication to another female poet. Madsen presents a reading of Ciseneros' poem:

> In the poem "Down There" Cisneros creates a vocabulary with which to write poetry about the reality of women's bodies….The poem is characterized initially by a sequence of "bad" macho habits: farting, peeing in the pool…Then the tone shifts slightly and the poem is likened to objects rather than behaviors: a used condom, a testicle skin… In these stanzas the poem is deliberately offensive…But then comes Cisneros's ironic twist: as she turns to the central (the real) subject of her poem, the language assumes a more serious, decorous, "poetic" tone, yet the subject itself is an outrageous violation of patriarchal poetic decorum – "men-struation".[33]

Cisneros creates the female body with a vocabulary that mirrors the act of writing in itself; 'Suddenly | I'm an artist each month.'[34] With blood the Chicana creates life and with blood she creates poetry, just as Anzaldúa does when she says, 'I write in red. Ink.' [35] Cisneros writes about shame and the Chicana body in the poems preceding this, but in 'Down There' she translates

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[32] *Ibid.*, p. 176.
[33] Madsen, *Understanding Contemporary Chicana Literature*, 120/121
[34] Cisneros, 'Down There' in *Loose Woman*, 83
[35] Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders' in *Borderlands,* 93

the real experience of womanhood without shame. Contrary to Madsen's view, the tone shifts in the poem could be seen as a challenge to the language of male Anglo writers, such as John Updike's poem 'Cunts', which was published in *Playboy* magazine in 1984;

> "Adore
> this hole that bleeds with the moon so you can be born!"
> Stretched like a howl between the feet pushing the stirrups […]
> I glazed my sallow fill in motel light until
> your cunt became my own, and I a girl. I lost
> my hard-on quite; my consciousness stayed raised.[36]

Updike crosses a border by use of extreme offensive language in order to reach out to the female and to share in her experience: to acknowledge the difficulties a woman experiences in childbirth and to acknowledge gender conflict. He disengages from 'patriarchal poetic decorum' to transcend the border of gender. The imagery of genitals that resemble a 'howl' is also mentioned recurrently through Cisneros's poems and so Cisneros engages in the act of responding to Anglicized writing to transgress cultural restrictions upon Chicana writing. Cisneros re-configures the female parts as engaged in the act of writing, and forms bonds with other females:

> I'd like to dab my fingers
> in my inkwell […]
> If blood is thicker than water, then
> menstruation is thicker than brother-
> hood.[37]

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[36] John Updike, 'Cunts' (January 1984) *Playboy*, 31.1 <http://english1022.tripod.com/id15.html> (9/12/10)
[37] Cisneros, 'Down There' in *Loose Woman*, 84

The power of the female writer eclipses masculine bonds. Her intention is to express the experience of being female and being empowered and liberated by her sex, as opposed to confined and repressed within it.

Chicana literature responds to many different kinds of borders, from the physical Texas-Mexico border to the psychological borderlands. In both Cisneros's and Anzaldúa's work an attempt to transcended borders is made, but there is also an acknowledgement of the pre-existing ideological borders that are rooted in patriarchal codes that are difficult to eschew. Anzaldúa asserts that the purpose of her text is to effect a change in the psychological that will hopefully in time change the physical Borderlands. She writes, 'awareness of our situation must come before inner changes, which in turn come before changes in society.'[38] Both writers experiment with forms and languages to translate the Chicana experience. For Anzaldúa, the act of complete translation to any one culture defeats the aim of her text. The individual Chicana writer forges a new ground for writing that chooses not to align one's self to extremities. She need not apologize for her strong, heterogeneous voice:

> But we Chicanos no longer feel that we need to beg entrance, that we need always to make the first overture—to translate to Anglos, Mexicans and Lations, apology blurting out of our mouths with every step. Today we ask to be met halfway. This book is our invitation to you—from the new *mestizas.*[39]

[38] Anzaldúa, '*Atravesando Fronteras* / Crossing Borders' in *Borderlands,* 109
[39] Anzaldúa, 'Preface to the First Edition', *Ibid.*, 20

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Glasgow University Dialectic Society

Founded c.1451 Reinstituted 1861

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The society has the duty of organising a variety of traditional events throughout term time. These range from formal social events such as the Annual Dinner, to grand showcase debates including the Honorary President's Debate and the Inter-board Debate. The Dialectic Society also holds the responsibility of awarding a number of trophies for the outcomes of internal competitions.

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