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EDITORIALS

It is with great pleasure that I present the current state of undergraduate research in the arts, social sciences, and humanities at the University of Glasgow in this, the fifteenth volume of *Groundings*. In a departure from the model of previous years, we have divested from a thematic editorial direction, choosing instead to represent the full breadth of student academic inquiry in all its diversity. I am glad to say that this change was received with great enthusiasm by the student body, and the Editorial Board were delighted to receive a record number of article proposals. Given the exceptional standard of submissions received, the selected articles in this year's volume are a testament to the dedication and ingenuity of our authors, to whom the Editorial Board and I are deeply thankful for their hard work. Their research charts the entire scope of the liberal arts: from political epidemiological studies (Xinyue Wang and Mahi Singh) to representations of identity in the visual arts (Marta Przygodzka and Iana Dzhakupova).

It would be impossible to publish undergraduate research without University of Glasgow faculty members sitting on our Academic Advisory Board and current students working on our Editorial Board. Thank you all so much for freely offering your time and expertise, your help was invaluable in developing the work of our authors and was essential to facilitating the peer review process.

I hope that this new editorial direction will continue to serve *Groundings* well in the future and wish the best of luck to its new sister publication, *Groundings Postgraduate*, publishing in 2025 following student demand. Please enjoy reading *Groundings 2024*, turn straight to the articles that immediately perk your interest and have a leaf through those that will surprise you.

James A. Murdoch, Editor-in-Chief

This 15th volume, 16 years on from the first copy, has been an incredible labour of dedication, commitment, and countless keystrokes; a wholesome effort of both our exceptional editorial board and cohort of extraordinary authors. It has been 162 days since we opened the Call for Papers for this volume, followed by 92 days since our esteemed Academic Advisory Board meticulously scrutinised each submission – and from fingers to keyboards, our authors can see their inspiring work inked on quality-printed paper.

This year, James and I decided to take *Groundings* in a new direction, opening the rare opportunity of publication to a much wider selection of papers and audience to peruse. Our submissions this year increased by over 400%, and the quality of submissions were second to none. The competition for selection was immense, and it was incredible to see the devotion and aptitude of all University of Glasgow students who had something to say.

There is no longer a theme, just a passing thought – write about something important. In the breadth of arts, humanities and social sciences, there is plenty to write about. One of our authors spent his days interviewing a Sudanese immigrant, exploring the complex ways in which strength and hardship can impact those around us. Another author surveyed the diachronic nature of culture, politics, and religion through the lens of the street names of Inverness. Whichever papers you chose to browse, they highlight the extraordinary vision and ability our undergraduate researchers possess.

Leading the Editorial Board with James and working alongside such a committed Editorial Board has been not only a privilege, but one of the highpoints of my academic career. Before I leave you to promptly stick your nose in this Journal from beginning till end, I must thank our Production Manager and my loving partner, Alex, for working with Adobe, with as little frustration as possible, in putting this all together. I wish the Journal every success – in the wise words of Leslie Nielsen, '*good luck we're all counting on you*'.

Caleb J. Black, Deputy Editor-in-Chief

Monstrous Races in the Medieval English Psalter World Map

Marta Przygodzka

This article examines medieval Monstrous Races in the Psalter World Map from the thirteenth-century English Map Psalter (British Library, Add. MS 28681). It suggests the map's reading as a pictorial expression of liminality situated in a to- and fro-ing between conceptions of Us/the Self and Them/the Other. I consider how the map exiles the Monstrous Races through spatially articulated geographical distance; inserts Them into notions of Us via inclusion in God's salvation plan; and gestures towards a category crisis in the Us-Them divide by celebrating England's own peripheral placement on the *mapa mundi*'s border. The border-space which constitutes the nexus of my investigation extends to encompass the Psalter World Map's materiality and the self-definition by means of difference enacted by the reader-viewer in corporeal terms.

*The Monster always escapes because it refuses easy categorisation.*¹

The medieval Monstrous Races are, in Debra Strickland's words, 'imaginary groups of elusive, malformed, and misbehaving creatures located at the edges of the known world, vaguely defined as India, Ethiopia, and the Far North.'² These monsters embody the liminal. They occupy a geographically understood border-space.³ They are oftentimes hybrid, incorporating animal and human parts into the very grammar of their monstrosity.⁴

1 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, "Monster Culture (Seven Theses)," in *Monster Theory: Reading Culture*, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 3-25, 6.

2 Debra H. Strickland, *Saracens, Demons & Jews: Making Monsters in Medieval Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 20.

3 John Block Friedman, "Cultural Conflicts in Medieval World Maps," in *Implicit Understandings*, ed. Stuart B. Schwartz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 64-96, 69.

4 Asa S. Mittman, *Maps and Monsters in Medieval England* (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), 46.

They epitomise the external Outsider, deployed in moulding the internal boundaries of ‘Us’ and the essence of the ‘Self’.⁵

Deriving from classical authorities, information about the Monstrous Races was disseminated throughout the Middle Ages, largely in pictorial terms.⁶ The medieval *mappae mundi*, or maps of the world – of which one might want to think as ‘framework[s] where information is placed in the relevant spatial position’ rather than maps in our contemporary understanding, driven by notions of supposedly scientific accuracy – conveyed the monstrous geographical remoteness most effectively.⁷ The thirteenth-century English Psalter World Map (Fig.1.) is a medieval *mappa mundi* featuring an assortment of fourteen monsters lined in a series of frames to its southern outskirts: a Cynocephalus, or ‘Dog-Head’; an Anthropophagus, known for eating human flesh; an Artibatirae, walking on all fours; a Troglodyte, or ‘Hole-Creeper’ who dwells in caves (Fig.4.); a Blemmyae with its face on its chest; an Epiphagus with eyes on its shoulders (Fig.10.); an Amyctyrae with an enlarged lip; a Sciopod who uses its outgrown foot as protection from the sun; a Maritimi Ethiopian shown with an extra set of eyes, illustrative of a particularly keen eyesight; a Psambari with no ears; a Speechless Man; a Straw-Drinker, noseless and mouthless, with only a narrow orifice; a noseless Sciritae; and a Panotii with extremely large ears (Fig.7.).⁸

The Psalter World Map is found on folio 9r of the Map Psalter (British Library, Add. MS 28681). The Psalter Map takes its name from its appearance within a psalter, while the Map Psalter takes its name from the map it contains.⁹

Aside from the List Map (Fig.2.), situated on the verso of the same

5 Michael Uebel, “Unthinking the Monster: Twelfth-Century Responses to Saracen Alterity,” in *Monster Theory: Reading Culture*, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 264-291, 265-266.

6 Ibid.

7 P.D.A. Harvey, *Medieval Maps* (London: British Library, 1991), 19. On shifting approach to mapping see: Asa S. Mittman, *Maps and Monsters*, 27-44.

8 Identification based on John Block Friedman, *The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 10-21.

9 “Psalter Map,” *British Library Digitalised Manuscript*, accessed 28th Sept. 2023. Temporarily unavailable.

folio, the Psalter Map is considered to be the only medieval *mappa mundi* extant within a Book of Psalms and, measuring less than ten centimetres in diameter, one of the smallest to survive from the Middle Ages.¹⁰ The manuscript has been dated to the second half of the 13th century on account of its mention of the feast day of St Richard of Chichester (f.12v), established after 1262, in the Psalter's calendar, whereas its original entries and the style of illumination point to London or Westminster as possible provenance loci.¹¹ The map presents a tripartite T-O construction with the three known continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa dissected by the green Mediterranean Sea and enclosed within an O-shaped ring, ornate with embodiments of the winds.¹² Asserting the convergence of the earthly and the spiritual within the space of the folio is the dominant figure of Christ, presiding over the world and flanked by censuring angels.¹³

In the following study, I wish to propose that, as a multivalent object¹⁴, the map not only gives visual form to the liminality of the Monstrous Races but, in its semiotic construction, fosters disjunction in an open spatial organisation for the coexistence of contradiction. For the purpose of this work, my analysis adopts a bipartite structure focused on two lenses: the collective 'Us' and the individual 'Self'. Firstly, I will consider how the map simultaneously exiles the monstrous 'Other' by means of a spatially articulated geographical distance; connects the Monstrous Races to a notion of Us through their inclusion in God's salvation plan; and gestures towards a category crisis in the Us-Them divide by celebrating England's own peripheral placement on the *mappa mundi*'s border. Secondly, I will examine how, in the Psalter World Map, the 'Othering' of monstrosity via its association with sin is juxtaposed with the synchronous closeness of the monstrous body

as it activates the viewer-reader's corporeal engagement with the

10 LauraLee Brott, "Psalter List Map (British Library Add. MS 28681, f. 9v)," in *Virtual Mappa*, eds. Martin Foys, Heather Wacha et. al. (Philadelphia: Schoenberg Institute of Manuscript Studies, 2020). <https://sims2.digitalmappa.org/36>. DOI: 10.21231/ef21-ev82.

11 "Psalter Map," *British Library*, op.cit.

12 Harvey, *Medieval*, 20.

13 LauraLee Brott, "Psalter," op.cit.

14 Mittman, *Maps*, 31.

Book of Psalms. In view of the Psalter World and List Maps being the only medieval *mappae mundi* extant in a Psalter, the following examination engages with psalm texts as a core primary source in the hope of drawing connections between the map and its unique textual landscape.

A Remote Them

Firstly, the Psalter World Map functions as an Othering device in which geographical remoteness signifies difference as articulated through the physical distancing of a presumed ‘Them’. The Psalter *mappa mundi* situates the Monstrous Races in the sub-Nilotic band, on the southern extremes of Africa.¹⁵ Here, clustered along the world disk’s edge, their bodies visually contract into a collective entity, defined by means of a shared, peripheral location.¹⁶ The notion that place is a factor relevant to monstrosity is consolidated upon consultation of the aforementioned Psalter List Map, on the verso of the same manuscript folio (Fig.2.). The List Map enumerates the provinces and cities on each of the three continents in a format echoing the T-O construction of the World Map.¹⁷ Nevertheless, when compared to Asia or Europe, the Africa section is idiosyncratic in its consideration of the natural features of the land and climate.¹⁸ The southern edge of the continent is, for instance, delimited by the ‘torrid zone’ and, further, Cadiz’s proximity to the Atlas Mountains is noted.¹⁹ Even more interestingly, the section’s concluding statement, only partly legible due to damage, reads: ‘[i]n outer Ethiopia, monsters’ (Fig.3.).²⁰ Therefore, via a comparative reading of the two Psalter *mappae mundi*, a connection comes into view between the viewer-reader’s understanding of the Monstrous Races and their geographical location on the World Map. The contemporaneous audience of the manuscript would have

15 Friedman, *The Monstrous*, 37, 43.

16 On mapped collectivity, see: Mittman, *Maps*, 45.

17 On T-O format, see: David Woodward, “Medieval Mappaemundi,” in *Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient, and Medieval Europe and the Mediterranean. The History of Cartography*, eds. J.B. Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 286–370, 296.

18 LauraLee Brott, *Psalter*.

19 Translation: Ibid.

20 ‘In Ethiopia ulteriore, monstra su[illegible]’ (Ibid.).

formulated predictions regarding the physiology and psychological makeup of the collectivity of peoples depicted on the Psalter Map based solely on their dwelling place on the southern outskirts of Africa. Medieval thought entertained a series of regional stereotypes, heirs of antique texts like the Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places*, Pliny's *The Natural History*, and Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*.²¹ *Airs, Waters, Places* is the first to diligently discuss the effects of a given physical environment upon physiology or character.²² Clarence Glacken notes the treatise's explicit concern with difference, rather than similarity amongst people, and suggests its influence on subsequent environmental theories – including Pliny's and Ptolemy's – in which a similar emphasis can be observed.²³ For Pliny, 'Æthiopians are scorched by their vicinity to the sun's heat' and, for Ptolemy, they are 'for the most part savage because their homes are continually oppressed by heat.'²⁴ In contrast, still according to Ptolemy, inhabitants of regions that 'share in the equable temperature of the air' are supposedly 'civilized in their habits,' in agreement with Pliny's assertion that '[t]hey have formed empires which has never been done by the remote nations.'²⁵ In the Middle Ages, the Monstrous Races on the southern edge would have also been considered melancholic in character, owing to the humoral imbalance produced by the heat and in opposition to more well-balanced types.²⁶

These ethnocentric accounts are therefore inscribed in an ordered ontology in which, on account of interrelations between one's

21 Regional stereotypes as amalgamations of climatic, astrological, and humoral theories, see: Debra H. Strickland, *Saracens*, 3-13.

22 Ibid., 8.

23 Clarence J. Glacken, *Traces on the Rhodian Shore* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), 80-115, 85. Part on southern hot extremes is lost.

24 Pliny, *The Natural History*, eds. and trans. John Bostock, and Henry T. Riley (London: Taylor and Francis, 1855), 2.80. <https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Plin.+Nat.+toc>. Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, trans. F. E. Robbins (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940), II.2., 121-123.

'Ethiopia' should be understood in literary terms as it was often confused with India in Greco-Roman sources (Friedman, *Monstrous*, 7).

25 Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II.2., 125. Pliny, *Natural*, 2.80.

26 Marian J. Tooley, "Bodin and the Medieval Theory of Climate," *Speculum* 28, no. 1 (January 1953): 64-83, 73.

psychophysical makeup and their environment, the southern periphery becomes coterminous with savagery. Furthermore, placement on the map encompasses and explicates an even more elaborate pictorial code of otherness grounded in cultural difference – alien diet, nudity, or dwelling outside the city, for example – and ascribed to the Monstrous Races via their indirect conceptualisation as barbarians.²⁷ And so the Anthropophagus, situated in Ethiopia by Pliny, fittingly clasps a human limb on the Psalter Map, whilst the Troglodyte, who Pliny describes as dwelling in ‘excavations in the earth’, is seen capturing game afoot (Fig.4.); the elongated shape of the antler appears reminiscent of the serpent designated by Pliny as the Troglodytes’ implicitly alien sustenance.²⁸ Therefore, southern, peripheral location functions as a marker of otherness and a differentiating conceptual template within the pictorial *modus operandi* of the Psalter *mappa mundi*.

A Christian Us

Nevertheless, the Psalter Map, much like the Monstrous Races, holds space for self-contradiction; it functions as an Othering device and yet also bridges the distance between Us and Them by affirming the place of the Monstrous Races in God’s salvation plan. The map situates the walled city of Jerusalem at its nexus in accordance with Psalm 73:12 where God ‘hath wrought salvation in the midst of the earth’.²⁹ The concentric pattern symbolising the city radiates outwards and, being echoed in the outer ring of winds, symbolically encompasses the earth’s disk.³⁰ As a result, the fabric of the *mappa mundi* visually knits the world, which evidently includes the Monstrous Races, into

the site of salvation history – associated with Jerusalem as the setting of Christ’s Passion and Resurrection – and further into the communion

27 Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 1, 5. On cultural differences, see Friedman, *Monstrous*, 27-33.

28 Pliny 5.8. Troglodyte identification based on comparison with Sion College Bestiary, see Friedman, *Monstrous*, 21.

29 *Douay-Rheims Bible (DV)*.

30 Mittman, *Maps*, 39. Diarmuid Scully, “Medieval Maps and Diagrams,” in *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Iconography*, eds. Colum Hourihane (London, New York: Routledge, 2017), 399-411, 404.

of the *orbis christianus*.³¹ Christ's providential care for all wonders of the globe is restated in his dominating presence on the folio. Blessing the Psalter Map with one hand, he is holding an orb in the T-O format in the other. The arrangement of Christ's body evidently speaks to the top register of the historiated initial for Psalm 80 (Fig.5.), which follows the same format but substitutes the Host for a T-O sphere.³² Comparably, the List Map, which mirrors the miniature orb's T-O construction, seems held by – or superimposed over – the body of Christ. Read in conversation with the List Map and the Psalter text, the World Map thereby reiterates 'scriptural promises that we are all members of Christ's body and that salvation encompasses the whole world' (1 Cor 12:27, Rom 12:5).³³ Further evidence for the Monstrous Races' place in God's salvation plan is deducible from their analogous arrangement at the outer edge of a concentric design in the Psalter *mappa mundi* and the rose window of the Lausanne cathedral (Fig.6.).³⁴ Here, Monsters such as the Sciopod and Blemmye are encompassed in the macrocosmic order via a series of interlacing circles linking them to personifications of seasons, winds, elements, and constellations, all pointing to a central Christ.³⁵ Subtly echoing this format in its bringing together of the microcosm of the monstrous body and the macrocosm of the world, the map therefore performs a unifying motion and reads as the pronouncement of the Monstrous Races' state of humanity, which follows the theological line provided by Augustine of Hippo. Augustine extends the Church's missionary obligation to the hostile domain of Monstrous Races by considering the possibility that they have 'descended from the one man who was first created' and thus capable of receiving God's salvation if they are *rational* and *mortal*.³⁶ A Cynocephalus (Fig.4.), who would have been seen as the target of missionary conversion par excellence on account of familiarity and

31 Marcia Kupfer, "The Jerusalem Effect: Rethinking the Centre in Medieval World Maps," in *Visual Constructs of Jerusalem*, eds. Bianca Kühner et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 353-365, 353-354.

32 LauraLee Brott, "The Geography of Devotion in the British Library Map Psalter," *Cartographica* 53, no.3 (Fall 2018): 211-224, 218.

33 Scully, *Medieval*, 402.

34 Friedman, *Monstrous*, 25. Strickland, *Saracens*, 39.

35 Ibid.

36 Augustine, *The City of God*, trans. Gerald Walsh (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 16.8, 504). Strickland, *Saracens*, 32.

grotesque nature,³⁷ is featured closest to England on the map, perhaps as bait, encouraging the spreading of the word of God. Coalescing within God's salvation plan, all peoples are effectively brought together on the *mappa mundi*. Them is Us in Christ.

A Peripheral Us-Them

If the Psalter Map provides visual form for monstrous liminality via a persistent to- and fro-ing between Us and Them, it also communicates border identity by questioning the very nature of the binary. The Monstrous Races are othered by means of their geographical remoteness and yet the English willingly locate themselves in an equally peripheral position with relation to Jerusalem, in a state of monstrous exile.³⁸ England and the sub-Nilotic strand are conceptually connected through placement on the most outer ring, which might gesture towards an English and Christian internal threatening alterity projected onto the Other.³⁹ The Monstrous Races are signalled as threatening indeed. This is evident in the careful framing of each monstrous specimen in a red or blue tessera and the prominent wall, implicitly erected to safely trap Gog and Magog, in the map's north-east. In the Alexander Legend, the threat of Gog and Magog, a nation associated with various ungodly behaviour, is contained by the building of a huge wall.⁴⁰ In the Psalter Map, what remains is the wall— the expression of the necessity for containment. The desire to provide visual form, to carefully categorise in the essentialising gesture of an ethnographer, and to exemplify the Monstrous Races' most typical habits (such as eating human flesh for the Anthropophagus or archery for the Maritimi (Fig.7.)) shows a longing to control that which threatens.⁴¹

Kathy Lavezzo qualifies the medieval English obsession with their own

37 Friedman, *Monstrous*, 6. Ratramnus, "Epistola de Cynocephalis," in *Carolingian Civilization*, ed. Paul Dutton (Plymouth: Broadview Press, 2004).

38 Kathy Lavezzo, *Angels on the Edge of the World* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 7. Mittman, *Maps*, 37-42.

39 Strickland, *Saracens*, 19. Lavezzo, *Angels*, 13.

40 Mittman, *Maps*, 55.

41 *Ibid.*, 53, 83.

strangeness and attraction to the edge as a means of religious elevation to the status of a chosen people.⁴² Whilst non-Christian markers of religion are omitted from the map, the monstrous Other occupies a prominent position which asserts its importance in the process of the English Christians' own definition by means of difference.⁴³ Indeed, the map emerges as the medium par excellence for the articulation of the liminal and the disjunctive; England is defined as peripheral in cartographic terms whilst its election and distinctiveness is clear in juxtaposition with the monstrous creatures.

A Bad Other

Having looked at the Psalter Map as the dramatisation of a liminal state between Us and Them, I now wish to turn to notions of liminality between the Self and the Other inscribed in the personal devotional use of the Psalter.⁴⁴ The following section demonstrates an Othering motion in the didactic function of the Psalter Map which, being the pictorial frontispiece of the manuscript, employs the Monstrous Races as symbols, to communicate meanings regarding the use of the text that follows. Prayers from the Book of Psalms would be sung; sound is therefore primordial in the Map Psalter context and constitutes a recurrent theme throughout the text as evidenced also by historiated initials.⁴⁵ For instance, three singing monks (Fig.8.) preface Psalm 97 which reads: 'Sing joyfully to God, *all the earth*' (97:4).⁴⁶ Interestingly, an emphasis on music – or rather its dearth – is also inferred in the cluster of Monstrous Races. According to the *Liber Monstrorum* – an instance of medieval "Wonders" literature featuring a catalogue of 'monstrosities' – the dog-headed Cynocephali 'spoil every word they say with mingled barks' (Fig.4.).⁴⁷

42 Lavezzo, *Angels*, 27-44.

43 Gillian Overing and Clare Lees, "Before History, Before Difference," *Yale Journal of Criticism* 11, no. 2 (Fall 1998), 315-334, 316.

44 Kathleen M. Openshaw, "Weapons in the Daily Battle: Images of the Conquest of Evil in the Early Medieval Psalter," *The Art Bulletin* 75, no. 1 (1993): 17-38, 17. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3045930>.

45 Brott, *Geography*, 216.

46 *Ibid.*, 222.

47 In Andy Orchard, *Pride and Prodigies: Studies in the Monsters of the Beowulf-Manuscript* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1995), I.16, 269. Pliny, *Natural*, 7.2.

Moving towards the east on the Psalter *mappa mundi*, for Pliny, there are ‘a people among whom all the quadrupeds are without ears,’ which perhaps applies to the featured Artibatirae, whilst Troglodytes ‘have no articulate voice, but only utter a kind of squeaking noise’ (Fig.4).⁴⁸ The Amyctyrae’s enlarged lip would have likely been seen as an impediment to speech and the Races that follow are even more explicitly speechless: the Psambari have no ears, the Speechless Men only ‘employ gestures,’⁴⁹ and the Straw-Drinkers lack speech on account of their reduced mouth (Fig.7).⁵⁰ Finally, the Panotii with ‘ears like fans’⁵¹ must also entertain a particular relationship with sound. Speech and hearing are relevant from a theological perspective, being imperative for the dissemination and apprehension of the Word of God. Psalm 32 proclaims:

“Let all the earth fear the Lord, and let all the inhabitants of the world be in awe of him. For he spoke and they were made.” (Ps. 32:8-9)

Similarly, in Psalm 18, ‘The heavens tell of the glory of God’ (Ps, 18:2). Considering the importance attributed to the word in the Psalter’s context, I wish to suggest a didactic role performed by the Monstrous Races at the Psalter’s gateway. More pejorative origin stories associated monsters with descendants of Cain or disobedient daughters of Adam which evidences pre-existent negative attitudes.⁵² Furthermore, a direct connection between outward physical deformity and sin existed in Medieval England and granted the Monstrous Races a prominent position in Christian moralisations where monstrosity would function symbolically.⁵³ Considering specifically speech and hearing, a scene of Jesus preaching to Dog-Heads in the eleventh-century ‘Theodore’ Psalter for instance alludes to medieval associations of dogs with heretics, barking against the doctrines of Jesus (Fig.9).⁵⁴

48 Pliny, *Natural*, 6.35, 5.8. On transferal of meaning across Races, see Friedman, *Monstrous*, 24.

49 Pliny, *Natural*, 6.35.

50 Friedman, *Monstrous*, 29.

51 Orchard, *Pride*, I.43, 281.

52 Friedman, *Monstrous*, 89.

53 Mittman, *Maps*, 90. Strickland, *Saracens*, 33-36. The Monstrous Races functioned as figures of both vice and virtue.

54 Friedman, *Monstrous*, 61.

In the text of Douce 88, the Panotii are said to hear evil with their oversized ears, whilst the Amyctyrae allegorise ‘those covered with mischief’ on account of their big lip.⁵⁵ Assuming that the monstrous meanings were transferable, as they could be transported from a source familiar to the viewer to understand new text-image relationships,⁵⁶ the ominous presence of Monstrous Races in the Psalter Map might have functioned as a symbolic threat encouraging the reader-viewer to actively engage with the word of God so as to not mutate under the guilt of sin. Consequently, the *mappa mundi* here enacts a distancing manoeuvre, foregrounding a separation between the Self – the Christian user of the manuscript – and the sinful Other.

A Bad Self

Nevertheless, the aforementioned blurring of boundaries between Us and Them is again enacted on the level of the individual viewer-reader as the pictorial code of the *mappa mundi* softens the rift between Self and Other. Presupposing that the historiated initial for Psalm 97 (Fig.8.) is representative of the intended use of the Psalter, the performative act of reading imagines the world disk in a human, vertical orientation. Therefore, the association of God’s head with the east on the List *mappa mundi* is echoed in the spatial positioning of the reader-viewer’s own body.⁵⁷ On the World Map, divine power is positioned in the east, as indexed by the location of Paradise, above which Christ presides, cast against a deep blue background with a tripartite pattern evocative of the Heavenly realm. In juxtaposition, the reader-viewer is situated at the lowest echelon on account of the cartographical placement of England, but also in corporeal terms, due to the proximity of two wyverns (identified as evil in Psalm 90:13) on the bas-de-page. Considering the importance of the head in medieval thought as the locus of the human soul governing the whole body and its implicit association with Paradise and Heaven on the *mappa mundi*,⁵⁸ I believe that the Psalter Map established a connection between the spiritual advancement of the reader-viewer journeying

55 See: Strickland, *Saracens*, 37.

56 Ibid., 45.

57 Friedman, *Monstrous*, 70.

58 Strickland, *Saracens*, 28-29.

through psalms; its spatial, macrocosmic mapping in the ascent towards Jerusalem and Paradise at the ‘head’ of the map; and the physiognomical, microcosmic manifestation of virtue and sin mentioned above.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, whilst the Holy upper level emerges in juxtaposition to the wyvern-infested bas-de-page, a visual form of physicality is required to make the reader-viewer aware of their own embodied reading – a function fulfilled by the presence of the Monstrous Races. The Psalter Map features the headless Epiphagus and Blemmye (Fig.10.), the dog-headed Cynocephalus, the Amyctyrae with an enlarged lip, the four-eyed Maritimi Ethiopian, the noseless Sciritae, and the Panotii with huge ears. The monstrous and deformed head, a mark of deep-seated moral bankruptcy or godlessness,⁶⁰ brings attention towards the materiality of devotion and the corporeal manifestation of one’s moral makeup. But, in the act of acquiring perception of one’s corporeality via the fleshy, phenomenal monstrous body, a physical proximity between the Monster and the Self materialises.

To conclude, the Psalter World Map too adopts elements of monstrous liminality. Whilst it others the Monstrous Races in their barbarous remoteness and sinful deformity, it also brings them closer as beings embraced in God’s salvation plan and as corporeal creatures evocative of the reader-viewer’s own physicality. Moreover, it evidences the ways in which, within the spatial organisation of medieval thought that is the *mappa mundi*, the Other might situate the Self and They might course on the same orbit as Us.

59 Ibid., 14.

60 Ibid., 28-29. Mittman, *Maps*, 91, 94.

Appendix



Fig.1. Psalter Map from a psalter (London? after 1262). London, British Library, Add. MS 28681, fol. 9r.



Fig.2. Psalter List Map from a psalter (London? after 1262). London, British Library, Add. MS 28681, fol. 9v.



Fig.3. In Ethiopia ulteriore, monstra su[illegible]. Psalter List Map from a psalter (London? after 1262). London, British Library, Add. MS 28681, fol. 9v.



Fig.4. Detail: Cynocephalus, Anthropophagus, Artibatirae, and Troglodyte Psalter Map from a psalter (London? after 1262). London, British Library, Add. MS 28681, fol. 9r.



Fig.5. Psalm 80: Christ and musicians (London? After 1262). London, British Library, Add. MS 28681, fol. 100r.




Fig.6. Transept rose from Lausanne Cathedral, exterior and interior, 13th-century. Lausanne, France.



Fig.7. Detail: Amyctyrae, Sciopod, Maritimi Ethiopian, Psambari, Speechless Man, Straw-Drinker, Sciritae, and Panotii. Psalter Map from a psalter (London? after 1262). London, British Library, Add. MS 28681, fol. 9r.



Fig.8. Three Singing Monks. London, British Library, Add. MS 28681, fol. 116v.



Fig.9. Christ with Cynocephali. London, British Library, "Theodore" Psalter, MS Add. 19352, fol. 23r.



Fig.10.(right) Detail: Blemmyae and Epiphagus. Psalter Map from a psalter (London? after 1262). London, British Library, Add. MS 28681, fol. 9r.

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The Street Names of Inverness: A Diachronic Study of their Cultural, Political & Religious Connotations

Varshneyee Dutt

Onomastic evidence offers a unique opportunity for us to understand and reflect upon what we find important enough to notice and lend a name to. This paper studies the street nomenclature of Inverness, a city of key importance throughout Scottish history, to explore what can be inferred about its political, religious and historical past from its street naming patterns and priorities. At its core, this paper surveys the diachronic development of Inverness by looking at maps and town plans from different time periods and qualitatively analyzing the ways in which they represent the fundamental ethos of the city.

Introduction

In the study of toponymy, street names have come to play an essential role in facilitating an understanding of the fundamental fabric of a town because, as Kenneth Cameron puts it, ‘they often give useful information on the early history and development of the particular town, and especially on the different trades represented there and the location of them’.¹ Studying the street names of a town, therefore, enables us to narrow down our research focus and make empirical observations about what might have been collectively considered significant enough to acknowledge in the form of odonyms by a large population. This, in turn, helps us to ascertain the generally prevailing ideologies of the place. Keeping that in mind, the aim of this paper is to conduct a case study of the street names of Inverness in an attempt to shed light on its socio-historical characteristics as a town. I will adopt a qualitative research methodology and focus on a handful of street names to relate them to the broader cultural spirit of Inverness.

¹ Kenneth Cameron, *English Place-Names* (London: Methuen, [1961] 1969), 194.

Unless otherwise stated, this paper will consider the corpus of street names curated by Geographic.org (see Bibliography, Primary source 1) and group them chiefly in terms of their religious, historical and political contexts. To that end, I will also choose a handful of maps to study from the National Library of Scotland (NLS) website (see Bibliography, Primary sources 2). Additionally, some attention will be lent to exemplifying how street names can sometimes fail to wholly capture the historical background of a town by undertaking a study of the lack of occupational and Jacobitism-related toponyms in Inverness - the purpose of this is to demonstrate the limitation of solely considering street names for historical research in toponomastics.

Political Nature of Inverness

Cameron notes that ‘most street-names are descriptive, whether of situation, size or importance’² - that is to say, studying them gives us an idea of their direct link to the events or features or people that they are describing, and enables us to then examine their unique context. On that note, the first context for street nomenclature in Inverness that I will look at constitutes the commemoration of local as well as royal people. The inclusion of important royal figures in a town’s street names can often be indicative of its prevailing political allegiance and reverence for the reigning sovereign, whereas the commemoration of natives in its street names can reflect a town’s localised sense of community. Bearing that in mind, a look at how Inverness honours royals and locals in its toponymy will be a good starting point to determine its political stance and cultural and social priorities.

Albert Place, Bruce Avenue, Bruce Gardens, Charles Street, Crown Drive, Crown Road, Crown Avenue, King Duncans Road, King Duncans Gardens, Queensgate, Victoria Circus, Victoria Lane and Victoria Terrace are some of the street names listed by Geographic.org that seem to commemorate royal figures and associations. Out of the above listed street names, Bruce Gardens, Charles Street, Crown Drive, Crown Street, Crown Avenue, Victoria Circus, Victoria Terrace and Queens Gate are recorded for the first time in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1899). Given that Queen Victoria ascended to the throne

Cameron, *English Place-Names*, 194.

of Great Britain and Ireland in 1837, it is unsurprising that street names in Inverness started being named after her possibly in order to commemorate her reign from this period onwards. Albert Place, which is recorded in the Ordnance Survey (OS) Map (1895), also perhaps commemorates Queen Victoria's husband, Prince Albert - the inclusion of their names in the street names of Inverness could very well have political connotations and be suggestive of its inhabitants' gradual acceptance of the reign of Queen Victoria, an English-born monarch. Crown Drive, Crown Avenue and Crown Street too have clear royal connections and possibly reflect the town's acknowledgement of the sovereign power of the monarchy.

King Duncans Road, King Duncans Gardens and Bruce Avenue are not recorded in any of the town plans of Inverness available from the NLS website that this paper chose to study (see Bibliography, Primary sources 2). They can all, however, be spotted on Google Maps (see Bibliography, Primary sources 3) - and for that reason, it is plausible to argue that they are fairly recent coinages of street names and offer evidence for the modern town planning conventions observed in Inverness. What this actually seems to indicate, however, is the centrality of royal influences on the street naming patterns practised in Inverness across different periods. In any case, they offer a unique chance to study Inverness's interactions with royal politics in a diachronic manner. Even if the last few aforementioned street names are modern coinages, the fact that they commemorate royal figures has much to reveal about Inverness's continual cultural and political values since it is undeniable that all of the above examples encapsulate the constant respect that the inhabitants of Inverness must have harboured for the monarchy to commemorate it in their street names. The inclusion of royal members in its street names also suggests Inverness's inclination towards commemorating figures of national importance, and could perhaps be interpreted as having potentially patriotic undertones.

Taking a cue from the above observations, it might seem plausible to conclude that King Street, which is first recorded in John Wood's Plan of the Town of Inverness from actual survey (1821), also exemplifies

a royal commemoration. In fact, given that after the Acts of Union in 1707, a succession of male monarchs from the Hanoverian dynasty reigned over Britain, it is understandable why one might feel tempted to interpret King Street in that light. However, that argument can be contested by using comparative evidence from the naming patterns of nearby streets. In John Wood's Plan of the Town of Inverness from actual survey (1821), King Street runs parallel to Nelson Street, Brown Street and Anderson Street, and also leads to Grant Street. The OS Map (1895) offers a new instance of King Street - and although it lies in close proximity to Queen Street, it is also quite close to Fairfield Lane, Telford Street and Young Street. All of these instances indicate a clustered preponderance of street names derived from family names, and considering the fact that in both of the aforementioned cases, King Street is situated near these clusters makes it possible that it is also a street name derived from a surname.

Similarly, Douglas Row recorded for the first time in John Wood's Plan of the Town of Inverness from actual survey (1821) is notable. Kenneth Street, Duff Street, Huntly Place, Beaton's Lane, Baron Taylor's Lane recorded in the OS Map (1895) should also be noted. Hanks et al. note Inverness as one of the main areas of usage for the surname 'Beaton' and acknowledge the widespread presence of the surnames 'Douglas' and 'Duff' in Scotland.³ Now, it is worth mentioning that this paper admits the ambiguous existence of 'Kenneth' and 'Huntly' as a personal name and a place-name in Aberdeenshire respectively. And although Hanks et al. do not explicitly mention the presence of the other aforementioned surnames in Inverness,⁴ considering the clustered presence of most of these street names, it is plausible to categorise all of them as surname-derived odonyms because it is only likely for a closely-situated group of street names to share related characteristics.

3 Hanks et al., *The Oxford Dictionary of Family Names in Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), accessed 8th January, 2024, https://www-oxfordreference-com.ezproxy2.lib.gla.ac.uk/display/10.1093/acref/9780199677764.001.0001/acref-978_0199677764

4 Ibid.

Now, the incorporation of surnames offers a strong ground to argue that these street names celebrate people of local importance to Inverness because, as Adrian Room notes, toponyms that carry family names tend to either refer to the aristocrats who owned properties on which the streets were built or those who were linked to the streets for various reasons ranging from administration to construction.⁵ Drawing inspiration from Rex Taylor's technique of relating his chosen street names in Dumfries to the locals that they commemorate,⁶ an attempt was made to speculatively point out the locals who might have been commemorated in the aforementioned street names, but to no avail. I looked at *The Inverness Directory* (1873) and *The Inverness Burgh Directory* (1899) available from the NLS website, but given that the actual survey date for the OS Map (1895) referred to here is from 1866-67, they did not quite serve the purpose.

Nevertheless, it is fair to assume that the people commemorated in these street names must have gained popularity among locals for various reasons and could, therefore, be easily recognised on the basis of their family names. What we can infer about the nature of Inverness from the above examples is that its street names tend to strike a good balance between local and royal commemorations. The inclusion of local figures in its street names gives us an impression of Inverness as a town that offers recognition and appreciation for its inhabitants and enables the formation of a synergetic sense of community by celebrating each other's accomplishments and social standing in a public manner, whereas its royal commemorations enable Inverness to participate in upholding the national legacy of the monarchy and the politics that surrounds it.

5 Adrian Room, *The Street Names of England* (Stamford, Lincolnshire: Paul Watkins, 1992), 144.

6 Rex Taylor, "Street Names and National Identities: An Exploratory Study between Montblanc, France, and Dumfries, Scotland," *The Journal of Scottish Name Studies*, 13 (2019): 87-88.

Colonial Legacies in Inverness' Odonyms

Complementary to the aforementioned discussion on the interrelationship between national politics and street names, a curious observation about the political involvement that Scotland might have had in British imperialism crops up while studying Inverness's street names. King Street, recorded in John Wood's Plan of the Town of Inverness from actual survey (1821) changes to Madras Street in David Stevenson and Thomas Stevenson's map titled Inverness-Harbour (1863). India Street is recorded for the first time in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1899), whereas Jamaica Street crops up in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1905). Madras, the former name of Chennai, was one of the key trading ports during the British rule in India, and is the possible referent of Madras Street - this speculation is based on India Street's eventual closeness to Madras Street in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1899). Jamaica Street, on the other hand, possibly exemplifies Scotland's participation in Britain's colonisation of Jamaica. The Scottish Parliament acknowledges that Scotland flourished economically between the late seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century because of the Jamaican slave-trade economy.⁷ And, further narrowing its context in Scottish odonymy, Carol Foreman notes that Jamaica Street in Glasgow derives its name from the profits that Glaswegian traders made from Jamaican tobacco and sugarcane plantations.⁸

Taking these facts about British colonialism and the clustered presence of Madras Street, India Street and Jamaica Street in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1905) into account, it could perhaps be speculated that these three street names are possible references to the British colonial projects in India and Jamaica, and reflect Scotland as a whole or perhaps even specifically Inverness's interactions with these

7 The Scottish Parliament, section on 'Scotland's Economy and Slavery in Jamaica', accessed 8th January, 2024, https://archive2021.parliament.scot/gettinginvolved/petitions/PE01500-PE01599/PE01585_BackgroundInfo.aspx#:~:text=Scotland's%20economy%20and%20slavery%20in%20Jamaica&text=Edward%20Long%2C%20who%20was%20a,descendants%20from%20those%20who%20were.

8 Carol Foreman, *Glasgow Street Names* (Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2007),

101.

colonies. The latter point is obviously something that requires further investigation. These street names certainly shed light on Britain's territorial expansion from the seventeenth century onwards and offer impetus to further research on what it signified for Scotland.

Religious Picture of Historical and Modern-Day Inverness

Apart from making revelations about the political nature and the local priorities of a town, street names can reveal information about a place's association with different religions or religious groups. Room notes that the commemoration of religion in street names is an ancient practice that involves commemorating both religious figures and places.⁹ Inverness is no exception to this. Church Street, Church Lane, Friars Street, Friars Lane and Friars Place recorded by Geographic.org count as street names with evident religious associations. Church Street is recorded for the first time in John Home's Plan of the river Ness to the north of the bridge of Inverness (1774), whereas Church Lane, Friars Lane and Greyfriars Street are recorded for the first time in John Wood's Plan of the Town of Inverness from actual survey (1821). The subsequent change of Greyfriars Street to Friars Street is recorded in the OS Map (1895). Evidently, Church Street, Church Lane and Chapel Street indicate the early establishments of Inverness's various places of worship, whereas the presence of Friars Lane and Friars Street seems to allude to a Catholic religious order and perhaps suggests that these streets were popular for housing predominantly members of this religious group. In The Ordnance Survey Name Book for Inverness-shire Mainland, Friars Street is described as:

*Friars Street extends from Glebe Street to the middle of Friars Lane. This street and the preceding one commemorate in their names, Friars Street & Friars Lane, the monastery belonging to the Grey Friars tradition tells us stood here previous to the Reformation.*¹⁰

9 Room, *The Street Names of England*, 73.

10 *The Ordnance Survey Name Book for Inverness-shire Mainland, 1876-1878*, Vol. 33, ScotlandsPlaces website, OS1/17/33/122, accessed 8th January, 2024 <https://scotlandspplaces.gov.uk/digital-volumes/ordnance-survey-name-books/inverness-shire-os-name-books-1876-1878/inverness-shire-mainland-volume-33/122>

Although its wording is slightly confusing, this description gives us an insight into the impact that the Protestant Reformation must have had on the presence of the Greyfriars Order in Inverness, which in turn prompted the aforementioned change in the street's nomenclature. It is not explicitly specified if the Greyfriars monastery was demolished, but the fact that it went out of use during the Reformation reveals the kind of religious turmoil that Inverness dealt with from this period onwards. This also clarifies that the aforementioned street names referring to the friary indicate the early influences of Catholicism in Inverness from the pre-Reformation era. Geographic.org also lists, for instance, St Andrew Drive, St Mungo Road, St Valery Avenue, St Ninian Drive, St Margaret's Road and St Mary's Avenue, which have clear religious associations. These street names have also not been recorded in any of this paper's chosen maps of Inverness from the NLS website (see Bibliography, Primary sources 2), but they can be spotted in clusters on Google Maps (see Bibliography, Primary sources 3).

These modern street names might not add to our understanding of the religious history of a specific period in Inverness, but given their commemoration of numerous saints, we can perhaps speculate that these saints had some kind of following in Inverness and left a sustained legacy for posterity, and have therefore been honoured in Inverness's street names. Alternatively, these saints' legacies across Scotland at large might have inspired the commemorative naming of these streets in Inverness. Either way, all the aforementioned street names reflect the continual influence of religion in Inverness and also enable us to make inferences about the manner in which Inverness responded to the rise and fall of Catholicism in Scotland.

Lack of Occupational Street Names in Inverness

While the aforementioned street names have revealed quite a bit about the general characteristics of Inverness - ranging from religion to politics - interestingly enough, the studied maps (see Bibliography, Primary sources 2) include very few street names in Inverness that reflect the popular occupational pursuits of its people. Factory Street

and Tanners Lane are recorded for the first time in the OS Map (1895), whereas Market Street is recorded for the first time in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1905). They seem to be the only streets that refer to occupations. It is possible that Factory Street derives its name from the industries that might have been built on the street, though what kind of industries they were cannot be determined because of the street name's lack of specificity. Market Street is quite self-explanatory and probably refers to a street on which market stalls were set up. Prior to its attestation in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1905), Market Street was originally referred to as 'Markets' and is recorded in this form for the first time in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1899). 'Markets' reaffirms the argument that this street was known for housing numerous shops and the like.

Lastly, the case of Tanners Lane is an intriguing one. Given that in the OS Map (1895), Tanners Lane is clustered with Kenneth Street, Young Street, Fairfield Lane - all of which are surname-derived odonyms - one may assume that Tanners Lane is also a surname-based local commemoration. Hanks et al., however, list 'Tanner' instead of 'Tanners' as a surname and do not list Scotland as a place of its occurrence.¹¹ Had Tanners Lane been in its genitive possessive form - as is the case with Beaton's Lane and Baron Taylor's Lane recorded in the OS Map (1895) - it would have still been fair to speculate about whether it is indeed a surname-based odonym. But in this case, it seems that Tanners Lane probably just refers to a street inhabited by numerous people involved in the tanning industry. The presence of only three occupational street names indicates that Inverness's odonymy perhaps does not do justice to its business and trading history.

Lack of Jacobite Commemoration in the Street Names of Inverness

Similarly, considering that Inverness witnessed many Jacobite uprisings and most importantly, the Battle of Culloden - that stamped out the Jacobite cause - one would expect to find quite a few street names remembering these rebellions. But that is not the case with

11 Hanks et al., *The Oxford Dictionary of Family Names in Britain and Ireland*

this paper's examined maps (see Bibliography, Primary sources 2). Fraser Street is recorded for the first time in John Wood's Plan of the Town of Inverness from actual survey (1821) and MacDonald Street is recorded for the first time in the OS Map (1895), whereas Lovat Road is recorded for the first time in the Plan of the Town of Inverness (1899). A new occurrence of Fraser Street also crops up in the OS Map (1895). Fraser Street, MacDonald Street and Lovat Street possibly refer to the Fraser, the MacDonald and the Fraser of Lovat clans respectively, although given that they are not clustered together, it is difficult to claim that for certain - they could alternatively be local commemorations of people with the same surnames. Evidently, the limited presence of occupational and Jacobite street names in Inverness serves as a strong example of the fact that the street names of a town cannot always fully document its past and can sometimes limit our understanding of history. Despite Inverness's connections with Jacobitism and its proximity to the River Ness - which surely facilitated trade and business - its street names do not substantially reflect these realities and leave gaps in our knowledge about certain key factors that contributed to the historical evolution of the town.

Conclusion

Quite a few conclusions emerge from the above discussions. To a large extent, studying odonymy can aid our understanding of a town's historical past - as evidenced by Inverness's inclusion of royals, locals, religion and colonial legacies in its street names, which helps us trace the town's cultural development and make deductions about its nature and communal ideologies. This paper has made use of various maps ranging across different time periods to illustrate the geographical link between street names and what socio-cultural and religious undertones might lie therein. Studying the odonymy of a town can often produce interdisciplinary research findings, ranging from, for instance, the religious affiliations of a town to its trade and economy - my research has attempted to position Inverness's odonymy as a good starting point to determine and conduct interdisciplinary studies on the town's nature.

As is the case with most qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, the research approach adopted in this paper has its own shortcomings. I did not have a hard-and-fast strategy for the sampling of street names - I have either included all of the street names pertaining to a specific category in the paper or given a few examples to illustrate my argument, and this is certainly something that can be improved for future studies. This paper demonstrates the potential research limitation of basing one's academic focus entirely on ononymy in order to gather information on a town's history by setting the paucity of occupations and Jacobitism in Inverness's street names as examples. One of the main reasons why I chose to study the ononymy of Inverness is because of my interest in Jacobite history and Inverness's role in it - the relative absence of this period of Scottish history in Inverness's street names pointed out the possibility that street names can indeed sometimes fail to capture the quintessence of a town in its entirety. Nevertheless, the end result of my research has been to exemplify the contribution that examining street nomenclature can make to the conduct of historical research on towns and their diachronic growth, and this paper's preliminary findings about the remnants of colonial legacies in Inverness's street names pave the way for further investigation on the nature of Inverness's relationship with the Empire.

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Glasgow in the Year of Revolutions – A Commentary and Analysis of the Glasgow Riots of 1848

Euan Bell

In 1848, a series of revolutions and demonstrations occurred across Europe, though Britain was comparatively unaffected aside from generally peaceful Chartist agitation and a handful of small riots. One of these riots occurred in Glasgow between 6th-8th March, following increasing unrest surrounding the scale of poverty and unemployment, involving thousands of Glaswegians and inspiring further unrest in towns across Scotland.

Using a variety of sources, though principally local and national newspapers, this paper will assess the context preceding the riot, provide a microhistory of the riot itself, its consequences, and explore the significance of the riots within the history of Glasgow, and within the context of Scottish and British Radicalism. It will argue that the riots demonstrate both the scale and circumstances of poverty within Glasgow in the 1840s, and the social divisions existing within Glasgow's Chartist movement.

In 1848, Europe was beset by an avalanche of revolutions. In France, an attempt to crackdown on democratic reformers spiralled into a revolution which overthrew the King and established the Second French Republic.¹ The French Revolution gave inspiration to other radicals across Europe, sparking a Liberal Pan-Nationalist revolt in Germany, Liberal-Democratic revolutions in Italy and Denmark, Nationalist revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and Ireland, and many more small outbreaks and constitutional changes that redefined Europe.² “France resembled a fiery volcano in the moment of irruption [sic], of which the throes were watched by surrounding nations with trembling anxiety for their own existence” wrote Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine in October 1848.³

Britain maintained a comparatively more liberal constitution and broader electorate than most of its European counterparts, minimising

1 Mike Rapport, *1848* (London: Abacus, 2008), 47-57.

2 Ibid., ix-xii.

3 *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, Vol. 64, Iss. 396 (Oct 1848), 475.

unrest to an extent, though poverty was still immense, and the overwhelming majority of the population remained ineligible to vote.⁴ “No wonder that the cries of Paris are finding an echo in the streets of London, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Manchester; and that Great Britain should pant after the liberty of France” declared *The Northern Star*.⁵ Predominantly, British radicalism was represented by the Chartist movement, a broad cross-class, essentially reformist campaign focused on the implementation of ‘The People’s Charter’; six reforms including universal male suffrage, secret ballots, annual elections, and constituencies of equal size.⁶ Consequently, most histories of Britain in 1848 focus on Chartism, particularly the underwhelming conclusion of their Parliamentary petition in April, and the movement’s subsequent decline.⁷

However, a handful of small, spontaneous uprisings occurred in Britain that year, including one in Glasgow, where a public meeting agitating for poor relief spiralled into days of violence and unrest, as well as inspiring smaller-scale riots in Edinburgh, Kilmarnock, and Lanarkshire. This paper will attempt to detail the context leading to the Glasgow riots, provide a microhistory of the riots themselves, and assess their significance within the wider context of early Victorian Scottish radicalism, arguing that the Glasgow riots demonstrate the social tensions existing in early Victorian Glasgow, the class divisions within Chartism, and the role which public opinion and fear of revolution played in influencing political decision-making.

I - Context

Immediately following the riot, the North British Daily Mail claimed that the authorities “had plenty of warning from the proceeding of the last three or four days”, and the events leading to the riot do reveal

4 Henry Weisser, “Chartism in 1848: Reflections on a Non-Revolution,” *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 1981): 12-14.

5 “Parliamentary Review,” *The Northern Star*, March 11th, 1848, 12.

6 Irene Maver, *Glasgow* (Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 91.

7 John Saville, *1848: The British State and the Chartist Movement*, (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 120.

much about its nature.⁸

Glasgow in 1848 was deeply impoverished even by standards of the period: In 1848 Glasgow Parish Council estimated that within the City of Glasgow around 40% of the city's population was receiving or eligible for poor relief, compared with 7-8% in Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and Paisley.⁹ It was getting worse too - in 1845 there were 63,070 officially registered poor, in 1846 It had risen to 69,484, and in May 1847 sat at 146,370.¹⁰ This ever growing poverty put pressure not just on individuals but also the state – In 1836 £171,042 was spent on poor relief across Scotland, and by 1848 that had risen tremendously to £544,334, with £67,418 of that spent in Glasgow.¹¹ Poor Law authorities were also notoriously reluctant to give out payments, so these figures are likely below what should have been paid out.¹²

An 1839 report to Parliament read “I have seen human degradation in some of the worst places, both in England and abroad, but I did not believe until I had visited the wynds of Glasgow that so large an amount of filth, crime, misery, disease existed in one spot in any civilized country”.¹³ In 1841, life expectancy was just 37.40 for men and 39.94 for women.¹⁴ The 1840s also saw large-scale immigration from Irish refugees fleeing the famine, who would make up 20% of Glasgow's population by 1851,¹⁵ and who were overwhelmingly destitute, adding to the already overcrowded slums.¹⁶ Typically of the period, this poverty grew as wealth simultaneously increased – Just two days before the riots began one contemporary Scottish periodical

8 “Serious Riot in Glasgow.” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

9 William Logan, *The Moral Statistics of Glasgow*, Pamphlets, Scottish Temperance League, 1849, 24.

10 “City Parochial Board,” *Glasgow Courier*, March 4th 1848, 3.

11 Logan, *Moral Statistics*, 24.

12 “The Glasgow Riots...” *Express* (London), March 9th, 1848, 2.

13 Charles Oakley, *The Second City* (London & Glasgow: Blackie & Son Ltd., 1946), 68.

14 Hamish Fraser and Irene Maver “The Social Problems of the City,” *Glasgow*, Volume II: 1830-1912, ed. Fraser, Hamish, & Maver, Irene (Manchester University Press, 1996), 352.

15 David Cannadine, *Victorious Century* (Penguin, 2017), 252.

16 *Ibid*, 69-72.

described Glasgow as having “Vast fortunes and luxurious houses in one district, masses of poverty in another”.¹⁷

This immense human suffering arguably presented fertile ground for political radicalism, which was certainly not new to Glasgow – very recently many Glaswegians had been incredibly active in the successful campaign to repeal the protectionist Corn Laws, which galvanised those protestors to seek further reform.¹⁸ In 1838, Glasgow’s first Chartist group was founded,¹⁹ and in 1842 78,000 Glaswegians signed the second Chartist petition to Parliament.²⁰ The later 1840s marked a comparative decline for Chartism,²¹ but it remained active in Glasgow: on the 28th February the Glasgow Chartists held a general meeting in the Dyers Hall in an ambitious and optimistic mood, where they announced their plans to move to their weekly meetings to a larger venue at the newly-named “Democratic Hall” at Glasgow Cross, in “the most public part of the town”.²² The Northern Star claimed that “All departed in high hopes of the future”, reflecting on Feargus O’Connor’s recent election to parliament,²³ and their recent victory three weeks ago when the Glasgow journeymen coopers unanimously endorsed Chartism at a meeting in Nelson Street Chapel.²⁴

Nominally, Chartism was solely concerned with political reform, though its progressive anti-establishment nature naturally attracted many individuals equally concerned by social injustices.²⁵ However, Glasgow Chartism, at least officially, was ambivalent towards issues such as factory or housing reform, and in 1841 even formed a brief

17 *Chambers’s Edinburgh Journal, Feb. 1832- Dec. 1853*, Iss. 218, (Mar 4, 1848), 147.

18 Fiona Montgomery, “Glasgow and the Movement for Corn Law Repeal,” *History* 64, no. 212 (1979): 370-376.

19 Maver, *Glasgow*, 91.

20 Cannadine, *Victorious Century*, 205.

21 F. Mather, 1980, *Chartism and Society*, 11-12.

22 “Correspondence: Glasgow,” *The Northern Star*, March 4th, 1848, 9 & “Commutations at Glasgow,” *The Northern Star*, March 11th, 1848, 25.

23 Ibid.

24 “National Association of United Trades,” *The Northern Star*, February 19th, 1848, 22.

25 Fraser, 203-207.

alliance with the Conservatives in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to disrupt the hegemony that Glasgow's Liberals had enjoyed since the 1830s.²⁶ Though Glaswegian Liberals were slightly more reformist than their party nationally, they were nevertheless thoroughly moderate, and often used anti-Catholic populism to maintain their ascendancy.²⁷

Nevertheless, the Liberals had a keen understanding of the unrest this scale of poverty could cause, and established a relief committee, comprised of all the city magistrates coordinating short-term relief for the unemployed.²⁸ They had attempted to create employment in the city through stone-breaking jobs, though workers were paid a paltry six pence per day, and the attempt to relieve trained loom weavers by providing them with material to weave was not quite as effective as hoped given most were lacking a loom.²⁹

On Friday 3rd March, around 3000 mainly unemployed people gathered in Glasgow Green, where they were addressed by Dr Peter Murray McDougall, a prominent Chartist from London, who delivered a "long Chartist harangue" as the *Glasgow Courier* described it, condemning the ineffectuality of the relief committee.³⁰ McDougall's presence is unsurprising, as Chartists often visited cities across the country, and Glasgow had hosted many during the campaign against the Corn Laws.³¹ Following McDougall's speech, 2000 people marched to the office of Glasgow City Treasurer to demand action on unemployment, and after the treasurer met with a small group of them and promised action, the crowd dispersed peacefully.³²

Shortly afterwards, the relief committee successfully appealed for a government grant of £2000, which was used to provide approximately

26 John McCaffrey. *Political Issues and Developments. Glasgow, Volume II: 1830-1912*, ed. Hamish Fraser & Irene Maver (Manchester University Press, 1996), 196-197.

27 Ibid.

28 "Serious Riot in Glasgow," *Glasgow Courier*, March 7th, 1848, 2.

29 "Meeting of Unemployed," *North British Daily Mail*, March 4th, 1848, 3.

30 "Serious Riot in Glasgow," *Glasgow Courier*, March 7th, 1848, 2.

31 Montgomery, *Glasgow and the Movement for Corn Law Repeal*, 369-372.

32 "Serious Riot in Glasgow," *Glasgow Courier*, March 7th, 1848, 2.

1000 bowls of soup on Sunday 5th March.³³ However, that day another crowd gathered on the Green, demanding further action still.³⁴ The authorities were conscious of growing discontent, and ensured that the gathering was left alone, hoping that tension would not escalate any further.³⁵ The authorities were also likely conscious of the size of these gatherings – the Glasgow Police Force had only 440 officers, tasked with policing a city of 300,000 and containing these gatherings that frequently numbered above 1000.³⁶

II - Riot

On Monday 6th, between 2000-5000 individuals³⁷ gathered in Glasgow Green, delivering speeches for economic justice and, in some cases, calling on the public to emulate the French Revolution of the previous month.³⁸ “To do a deed worthy of the name of France!”, as one speaker phrased it.³⁹ Despite one publication labelling them “Chartist Demagogues”,⁴⁰ Chartist leadership always avoided direct calls for revolution or comparisons with France, so these speakers are most likely either not affiliated with Chartism or represent a radical fringe, but certainly seemed to have lead the conversation of the crowd.⁴¹ The gathering was evidently diverse, with all accounts emphasising the number of women and children amongst it, and women accounted for just under half of those arrested in connection with the riots.⁴²

Around 2pm, the crowd left the Green and marched towards the police station, where they demanded food or employment, and remained

33 *The Examiner*, London, Issue 2093, March 11, 1848, 172.

34 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *Glasgow Courier*, March 7th, 1848, 2.

35 Ibid.

36 “The State of Glasgow,” *The Times*, March 13th, 1848, 6.

37 The Times (“Riots in Glasgow,” *The Times*, March 7th, 1848, 4.) claims merely 2000, The Glasgow Courier (“Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *Glasgow Courier*, March 7th, 1848, 2.) claims 3000-4000, The North British Daily Mail (“Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.) claims 4000-5000.

38 “Scotland,” *The Spectator*, 11th March 1848, 6.

39 *The Examiner*, London, Issue 2093, March 11, 1848, 172.

40 “Riot in Glasgow,” *Geelong Advertiser*, July 1st, 1848, 4.

41 Weisser, 22.

42 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

unsatisfied after the magistrates there replied that soup was currently being prepared for distribution.⁴³ Some were sceptical the soup was actually coming, and one witnesses later said in court that “he hoped they would not return to their starving wives and families [empty-handed] as they had done before”.⁴⁴ One man “asked what they were to do now? Were they to return home, or were they to have their rights? ‘Let us go,’ said he, ‘in a body to the town and have our rights’”.⁴⁵

The crowd moved along London Road and Trongate, looting several bakeries for food, and seizing a food cart in Buchanan Street.⁴⁶ In one shop, 130lb of cheese was stolen.⁴⁷ They also broke into an ironmongers, a toolmakers, and a gunsmith’s, equipping themselves with firearms and limited ammunition.⁴⁸ More shops were looted and windows were smashed, and as yet the police led by Chief Superintendent William Henry Pearce were totally inactive.⁴⁹ Despite this, the riot still did meet some resistance, such as from Mr. Russel, a printer who wrestled a loaded rifle from a rioter, or one Mr. Smith, who reportedly fought off rioters attacking his clothing store with a stick “with the greatest ease”.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the riot continued its march, chanting loudly “Bread or Revolution!”, “Vive la Republique”,⁵¹ and (disputedly) “Down with the Queen!”⁵² Around 4pm, virtually all shops that could, locked their doors as the crowd continued to the Gorbals, looting butter, cheese, and fish.⁵³

After hours of unrest, the Riot Act was read at 5pm in Royal Exchange

43 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

44 “Glasgow Judiciary Spring Circuit – The Late Riots,” *Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser*, May 9th, 1848, 2.

45 Ibid.

46 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

47 “Glasgow Judiciary Spring Circuit – The Late Riots,” *Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser*, May 9th, 1848, 2.

48 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

49 Ibid.

50 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

51 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

52 “Riots in Glasgow,” *The Times*, March 7th, 1848, 4. – This was disputed by the North British Daily Mail.

53 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

Square by Baillie Orr⁵⁴ in the absence of the Lord Provost Alexander Hastie, an MP who was in London at the time.⁵⁵ The Police finally responded, and 5000 volunteer Special Constables were enlisted from the public, meaning they possibly now outnumbered the rioters.⁵⁶ This tactic of recruiting “Specials” is remarkable in demonstrating the severity that the police felt, but was not uncommon for the period in times of crisis.⁵⁷ These specials were recruited from across society, with 2000 of them being workmen at factories throughout the city,⁵⁸ 150 were students and staff at the Glasgow Athenaeum,⁵⁹ and a large portion were retired soldiers or police.⁶⁰ Contemporary sources claim there was near-universal opposition to the riots, which should be viewed with immense scepticism, but there evidently was broad popular opposition to them.⁶¹ Additionally, military reinforcements were called in the form of 600 Infantrymen and 150 Dragoons from Edinburgh.⁶²

Across the city, placards were placed which declared “The Riot Act has been read. All well-disposed persons are implored to betake themselves to their homes”.⁶³ Within a few hours, the reinforcements arrived, and with the support the Specials, and the crowd was quickly dispersed.⁶⁴ By half-past midnight the police declared that “the town was as quiet as on any other night”.⁶⁵ Around 150 people were arrested in connection with the riots, and roughly 100 guns were confiscated by the police.⁶⁶

54 Ibid.

55 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

56 “Scotland,” *The Spectator*, 11th March 1848, 6.

57 R.E. Swift, “Policing Chartism, 1839-1848: The Role of the ‘Specials’ Reconsidered,” *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 122, No. 497 (Jun., 2007), 676-680.

58 “Riot in Glasgow,” *Geelong Advertiser*, July 1st, 1848, 4.

59 “Glasgow: Athenaeum Brigade,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 10th, 1848, 3.

60 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

61 “The Late Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Courier*, March 14th, 1848, 2.

62 “Riots in Glasgow,” *The Times*, March 7th, 1848, 4.

63 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *Morning Herald* (London) March 8th, 1848, 5.

However, the situation was far from over. The following day, “shops were all opened in the morning, as usual, and the belief seemed general that business would be allowed to go on undisturbed by any outbreak”, as the Daily Mail put it.⁶⁷ Despite this, the city was still intensely militarised, with the military guarding banks and the city chambers, and the special constables remaining on alert.⁶⁸ This caution proved prudent, as around 11am another crowd gathered again on Glasgow Green, and passed a resolution to dismantle the mills at Bridgeton and to cut off the city’s gas supply, for unclear reasons.⁶⁹ However, when they attempted to do so, the workers at the Bridgeton Mills fought them off from the walls, and the crowd returned to the Green.⁷⁰

The crowd was met by a small detachment of around 17 Special Constables, led by Police Assistant Superintendent James Smart, who were met “with hootings and showers of stones” from the crowd.⁷¹ Smart arrested a 20-year old man who had hit him with a stone, prompting the crowd to begin chanting “Rescue, Rescue, down with the b---- [sic], down!”, and “Murder the bloody b---- [sic], kill the fellows!”, as they threw more and more stones at the police.⁷² Smart reportedly gave the order to charge at the crowd, hoping to disperse it in the same manner as the previous night, but the specials either misunderstood or were overcome by panic and fired their rifles into the crowd.⁷³ Instantly, a bullet killed a Collier named David Carruth, fatally wounded a weaver named only as Campbell, and killed a provision dealer listed as Mr Alexander, who had actually enlisted as a special constable the previous night and who was in the process of offering to help the police just as he was shot.⁷⁴ Cries of “Blood for Blood” were briefly heard, and it seemed things might turn more violent.⁷⁵ However, at that critical moment cavalry reinforcements crossed the bridge, led by the Sheriff Archibald Alison, who after

67 “The Riots in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 8th, 1848, 3.

68 “Riot in Glasgow,” *Geelong Advertiser*, July 1st, 1848, 4.

69 “The Riots in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 8th, 1848, 3.

70 Ibid.

71 “Riot in Glasgow,” *Geelong Advertiser*, July 1st, 1848, 4.

72 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 “Riot in Glasgow,” *Geelong Advertiser*, July 1st, 1848, 4.

speaking to Smart promised the crowd that “if any party was to blame for what had occurred, they would be punished”, and implored them to return home.⁷⁶ He was reportedly cheered, and after tending to the dead and wounded the crowd quietly dispersed.⁷⁷

At 1pm on Wednesday, there was one more meeting on Glasgow Green, though it was much smaller than the previous two days.⁷⁸ This time however, the authorities took no chances and wasted no time, and as soon as the meeting had begun dragoons charged right into it, and the crowd was dispersed without much resistance.⁷⁹

The unrest in Glasgow sparked similar outbreaks across Scotland too – on Tuesday, a similar riot broke out in Edinburgh, though on a far smaller scale – it appears to have begun from a smaller group inspired by the events in Glasgow, smashing windows and as many as 1000 lamps.⁸⁰ However, it was quelled far quicker than Glasgow, although with similar usage of special constables and dragoon reinforcements.⁸¹ On Wednesday evening, a smaller riot was briefly active in Kilmarnock, with a crowd consisting largely of 14–16-year-olds smashing windows and lamps in the town centre.⁸² However, fearing a repeat of Glasgow’s trouble the magistrates had already enlisted special constables earlier in the day and were able to quickly suppress the riot without incident.⁸³

Ayr also experienced similar unrest that night, involving a crowd of young boys starting an oil fire in the town centre, before the cavalry quickly dispersed or arrested the participants.⁸⁴ While these cases do demonstrate the impact of Glasgow’s riots, they dissolved as quickly as they appeared, and do not appear to have been preceded or succeeded

76 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

77 Ibid.

78 “The Riots in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 9th, 1848, 3.

79 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

80 “Riot in Edinburgh,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 9th, 1848, 3.

81 Ibid.

82 “Attempted Riot in Kilmarnock,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 10th, 1848, 4.

83 Ibid.

84 “The Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

by significant political agitation.

III - Aftermath

Following the riots, public meetings were outlawed for several months, and the military remained in the city to suppress any attempts at resistance, though there was very little of it.⁸⁵ The Special Constables were not only maintained, but expanded to around 10,000 volunteers, and a new Volunteer Rifle Corps was formed comprised of 1500 men, which filled its ranks almost immediately.⁸⁶ There was some unrest – shortly after the riots, 15,000-20,000 Miners and Colliers in Glasgow, Airdrie, and Holytown went on strike, but the authorities were not particularly concerned that events would turn violent.⁸⁷ However, peaceful political agitation continued in defiance of the ban on meetings, with local clubs and workplaces petitioning for expansion of the franchise,⁸⁸ and in April as many as 100,000 gathered in Glasgow Green in support of Chartism, chanting “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”, and singing La Marseillaise.⁸⁹ While events remained peaceful, it evidently influenced the authorities to such an extent that in June Glasgow Town Council voting in favour of petitioning Parliament for a moderate expansion of the voting franchise.⁹⁰ While this remained far more conservative than Chartists wanted, and can critically be viewed as an attempt at appeasement rather than any real change of political opinion, it nonetheless demonstrates that the influence the reform campaign had in the city.

The Glasgow Police were intensely criticised for their handling of the riot from all sides, with the North British Daily Mail writing “The Riot could have been put down at once, had energetic measures been adopted at the commencement, or had the police done their duty.”, and for the deaths on 7th March.⁹¹ On 10th April, Pearce resigned as

85 “The State of Glasgow,” *The Times*, March 13th, 1848, 6.

86 “The Late Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Courier*, March 14th, 1848, 2.

87 “The State of Glasgow,” *The Times*, March 13th, 1848, 6.

88 “Glasgow,” *Glasgow Chronicle*, June 21st, 1848, 4.

89 Hamish Fraser, *Chartism in Scotland* (Merlin Press Ltd., 2010), 159.

90 *Ibid*, 167.

91 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

Chief Superintendent.⁹² After an eight-month interlude, Captain Smart would be appointed as Chief Superintendent, who would remain in post until his death in 1870.⁹³

With regards to the dead, 150 people attended Mr. Alexander's funeral on Saturday 11th, with most of the mourners also attending the burial of Campbell in the Calton Burial Grounds.⁹⁴ David Carruth was escorted to Sighthill Cemetery by two armed Cavalrymen, though his burial occurred without incident.⁹⁵ Mr. Alexander's family were compensated £150 by the city,⁹⁶ though the appeals of other participants' family such as David Carruth's widow had their requests rejected,⁹⁷ on grounds that "they ought not to have been on the spot at the time".⁹⁸

Lord Provost Alexander Hastie also faced immense criticism for his handling of the situation,⁹⁹ and when local elections were held on 7th November, Hastie came third in his own constituency.¹⁰⁰ The overall winner in his constituency was James Moir, a police commissioner and prominent Chartist delegate,¹⁰¹ whose victory reportedly gave "great satisfaction to the Chartists of Glasgow".¹⁰² Some sources including the North British Daily Mail claim that Hastie "took no personal interest in the election",¹⁰³ though the Northern Star claims that "every influence was used and money lavishly expended" in the campaign.¹⁰⁴

92 "Chief Superintendent William Henry Pearce," *The Glasgow Police Museum*, accessed 8th December 2023, <https://www.policemuseum.org.uk/personalities/chief-constables/chief-superintendent-william-henry-pearce/>

93 "Chief Constable James Smart," *The Glasgow Police Museum*, accessed 14th December 2023, <https://www.policemuseum.org.uk/personalities/chief-constables/chief-constable-james-smart/>

94 "The Late Glasgow Riots," *Glasgow Courier*, March 14th, 1848, 2.

95 Ibid.

96 "The Late Riots," *Glasgow Chronicle*, October 25th, 1848, 5.

97 "Glasgow Municipal Police Board," *North British Daily Mail*, April 4th, 1848, 3.

98 "The Late Riots," *Glasgow Chronicle*, October 25th, 1848, 5.

99 Maver, 76-78.

100 "Glasgow Municipal Elections," *Glasgow Herald*, November 10th, 1848, 2.

101 Maver, 77-78.

102 "Glasgow Municipal Elections," *Glasgow Herald*, November 10th, 1848, 2.

103 "Scotch Municipal Elections," *North British Daily Mail*, November 8th, 2.

104 "Glasgow Municipal Election," *The Northern Star*, November 11th, 1848,

Irrespective, the repudiation of the city's official representative and sitting MP by an outspoken Chartist is remarkable, particularly given the narrow propertied electorate. Moir would become a symbol of Glaswegian radicalism well into the 1870s, vehemently advocating for parliamentary reform, poor relief, and condemning "abuses existing in the management of our local and national affairs".¹⁰⁵ However, despite some major investments such as development of the city's water purification, Glasgow's civic agenda would remain fundamentally conservative for some time, and it would take until the 1880s for life expectancy to go above 40.¹⁰⁶

Over the courses of several months, nearly 100 individuals were tried on charges of "Mobbing and Rioting", as well as several charged with housebreaking, robbery, and assault.¹⁰⁷ The severity of punishment varied substantially – four individuals were tried on the 8th July, who pleaded guilty and were sentenced to sixty days of prison each, alongside one Elizabeth Kean who pleaded not guilty and was sentenced to a steeper four month imprisonment.¹⁰⁸ On May 6th, three of the rioters were found guilty and were sentenced to transportation for 7-10 years.¹⁰⁹ They were tried alongside 14-year-old Wells Miller

who was sentenced to only one year of prison.¹¹⁰ A very small handful of individuals, such as one John Ross, were brought to court in connection to the riots but were discharged shortly after.¹¹¹

IV - Interpretation

How should all this be interpreted? Should it be grouped with the riots over starvation and poverty that have been near historical constants,

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105 "Reform Banquet," *Glasgow Herald*, December 8th, 1848, 4.

106 Fraser & Maver, 352-364.

107 "Glasgow Judiciary Spring Circuit – The Late Riots," *Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser*, May 9th, 1848, 2.

108 "The Glasgow Rioters," *The Northern Star*, July 15th, 1848, 4.

109 "Glasgow Judiciary Spring Circuit – The Late Riots," *Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser*, May 9th, 1848, 2.

110 Ibid.

111 "The Glasgow Rioters," *The Northern Star*, July 15th, 1848, 4.

viewed within the context of a deeply impoverished city, or should it be conceptualised as more inherently political alongside the other attempts of revolution in 1848? In its first issue following the riots, the Glasgow Chronicle clearly stated its view:

*“...the riots had no connection either with the political feelings or with the social distresses of our population. Undoubtedly there are many belonging to our working classes who are at present sorely pinched by the privations they are undergoing; but no one who had an opportunity of seeing the rioters will be found to say that he believes they had any co-operation from the class in question. The disgraceful outrages committed yesterday and on Monday were the work of a comparatively small number of those degraded and brutal ruffians...”*¹¹²

An anonymous eyewitness interviewed by The Spectator agreed:

*“All this convinced me, [...] that the affair was neither more nor less than a most audacious robbery, committed by common thieves under the colour of a political row. Now and then a fellow would quietly drop his gun and sneak off, having got something valuable; and when they attacked a cart of meal, they merely tumbled the sacks into the street, and allowed the contents to be carried off by a crowd of ragged women and boys—common beggars. The moment the soldiers appeared the rascals ran like quicksilver.”*¹¹³

The eyewitness’s claim would be unsurprising if true – Gang violence and robbery were extremely prevalent in 1840s Glasgow,¹¹⁴ and all sources agree that rioting certainly occurred, with one jeweller claiming to have lost £2000 worth of goods (Approx. £160k today).¹¹⁵ On Friday 10th “a parcel of watches was found secreted in a dunghill”, and for several days following the riots there were rumours of gold watches being traded about town.¹¹⁶ It is however notable that the

112 “The Riots of Monday and Tuesday,” *Glasgow Chronicle*, March 8th, 1848, 4.

113 “Scotland,” *The Spectator*, 11th March 1848, 6.

114 Oakley, *The Second City*, 69.

115 “Riot in Glasgow,” *Geelong Advertiser*, July 1st, 1848, 4. Approximate Currency Conversion cf. www.nationalarchives.gov.uk

116 “The Late Glasgow Riots,” *Glasgow Courier*, March 14th, 1848, 2.

majority of goods looted were food, and the attacks on the likes of jewellers only occurred slightly later in the riot, by some accounts by groups that had separated from the main crowd.¹¹⁷

The obvious counterargument is to look for a Chartist presence in the riots, which contemporaries certainly saw: in the midst of the riot, a telegram sent at 4pm by *The Times*' correspondent described the rioters as a "Chartist Mob".¹¹⁸ As already noted Chartists both natives and visitors to Glasgow had been extremely active in the days prior to the riots, so almost certainly played a role in at least maintaining tensions, if not exacerbating them. The *Glasgow Herald* suggested that:

*"The disturbance had its origin, no doubt to some extent, in the feelings of discontent which have been industriously excited amongst the unemployed by the Chartist orators who were lecturing them day by day for a week previous to the outbreak"*¹¹⁹

Although the *Herald* seems to deny the unemployed any agency of their own, it does seem accurate that even if the riot itself were not fundamentally Chartist, it was heavily influenced by their activities.¹²⁰ The Chartists themselves, however, repudiated this, saying at their National Convention that "Chartists had no connexion [sic] with them

[the Glasgow riots] whatever, except to oppose them."¹²¹ One Chartist group even suggested that the riots were intentionally prolonged by the authorities "for the purpose of furnishing a pretext for getting up a force to attack and abuse the Chartists."¹²² However, the Chartist Newspaper did add that the riots "attest the restless heaving of the elements under our own political and social system", while expressing no opinion on the morality of the riots.¹²³

117 "Serious Riot in Glasgow," *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

118 "Riots in Glasgow," *The Times*, March 7th, 1848, 4.

119 "The Glasgow Riots," *Glasgow Herald*, March 10th, 1848, 2.

120 Ibid.

121 Fraser, 155.

122 Ibid.

123 "Parliamentary Review," *The Northern Star*, March 11th, 1848, 12.

As already noted, the riot was punctuated by various slogans, which while often very radical were notably not Chartist. In any other political movement, difference in communication of this nature might be insignificant, but Chartism was a movement with a distinct cultural identity, known for its distinctive slogans, poems, and chants, which are overwhelmingly absent here.¹²⁴ When those radical chants were heard, many contemporary publications explained them as rioters crying familiar slogans rather than actually understanding their meanings; a point often made quite patronisingly but which is very possible.¹²⁵ As noted earlier, the cries of “Down with the Queen!” were even disputed by the *North British Daily Mail*, who stalwartly proclaimed “The Queen, we believe, has neither more loyal nor more attached subjects in any city in all her dominions than in Glasgow”, though that repudiation should be approached with some scepticism.¹²⁶ The situation was extremely similar in Edinburgh, with identical occasional cries of “Vive la Republique”, but nothing more than Glasgow.¹²⁷ Therefore while there was undoubtedly a Chartist presence, their role is overshadowed by both more radical and more apolitical participants.

Another facet worth exploring is the popular opinion of the riots. In this, the role of Special Constables is significant – looking at the impoverishment in Glasgow it is perhaps natural to sympathise with the rioters, to some extent, but evidently their contemporaries did not – they were not suppressed by the full force of the state but in large part by their fellow Glaswegians. However, some scepticism is warranted, as various cases exist throughout the 1830s-40s of employers obligating their workers to enlist as Specials, which certainly may have occurred here, though very unlikely on a scale which would account for all volunteers – evidently the riot did inspire many Glaswegians in defence of the status-quo, or at least in defence of order.¹²⁸ Conversely, however, the grassroots campaign for suffrage

124 Gareth Jones, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History 1832–1982* (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 95-97 doi:10.1017/CBO9780511622151

125 “Serious Riot in Glasgow,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 7th, 1848, 3.

126 “Telegraph dispatches...,” *North British Daily Mail*, March 9th, 1848, 3.

127 Ibid.

128 Swift, *Policing Chartism, 1839–84*, 684-685.

expansion and the subsequent election of Chartists including James Moir seems to indicate remarkable sympathy towards radical ideology. Evidently, there was a clear distinction between many of the generally middle-class democratically minded Glaswegians and impoverished rioters.

To argue against that the riots were totally apolitical is to ignore the increasing politicisation which preceded them, and that the gatherings which the riots stemmed from were imbued with political agendas and ideas. The Revolutionary and often French-inspired chants and songs of the riot makes clear that the participants were inspired by the French Revolution. Simultaneously, however, the rioters do appear disconnected from the broader Radical movement in Glasgow, which actively condemned them.

Following the French Revolution of 1848, the new republic was divided between revolutionaries primarily interested in political reform (who were often more middle-class) and the working-class revolutionaries seeking a so-called “République démocratique et sociale” which was just as focused on social reform.¹²⁹ Ultimately, this tension culminated in an outright uprising amongst the radicals, which was brutally crushed by the Republican government.¹³⁰ In Glasgow, a similar divide can be seen between the middle-class Chartists who

peacefully advocated reform and elected Chartist representatives, and the working-class participants in the riots whose attention was focused on social reform and short-term relief. Both groups contributed to the city’s unrest and deeply influenced each other, but in this instance cannot be conflated.

The Glasgow Riots of March 1848 clearly demonstrate two broader elements – firstly, the class conflicts which existed within the Scottish Chartist movement, which underscores the fundamental reformism of British radical campaigners. Secondly, as the London-based Express put it shortly after the riots, “This frequency [of riots], however, is

¹²⁹ Samuel Hayet, *Revolutionary Republicanism: Participation and Representation in 1848 France* (London: Routledge, 2023), 186-187.

¹³⁰ Rapport, 209-211.

rarely, if ever, observed where there is not some real grievance at the bottom.”¹³¹ Britain avoided revolution in 1848 as the burgeoning middle-class was far better represented and protected than in the rest of Europe, preventing the kind of broad cross-class revolutions as seen in France and Germany, but the Glasgow riots demonstrate the clear unrest many working-class individuals felt in Britain, and Glasgow represents a relatively unique example of that unrest manifesting into open violence.

131 “The Glasgow Riots...,” *Express (London)*, March 9th, 1848, 2.

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“Meeting of Unemployed.” *North British Daily Mail*, March 4th, 1848, 3.

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Alice and Alisa: Different Aesthetics of Wonderland

Elisa Rigamonti

This article compares the aesthetics of Wonderland in two animated adaptations of Lewis Carroll's classic tale, examining Disney's 1951 rendition and Kievnauchfilm's 1981 adaptation. Through an analysis of animation techniques, art styles, and cultural influences, it explores how each production visually depicts Alice's adventures. Disney's approach is characterized by a grounded, simplified style, while Kievnauchfilm fully embraces the surrealism of Carroll's text. The essay discusses how Disney's use of photographic references results in a more realistic portrayal, albeit somewhat lacking the unrestrained nonsense of Carroll's world, and contrasts it with Kievnauchfilm's use of multiple art styles to capture Wonderland's absurdity. It also considers the influence of market demands and religious aesthetics on the American and the Soviet adaptation respectively, and it explores the social and ideological ramifications of Eisenstein's concept of "plasmaticness" in the animation of both films. Ultimately, this research provides insights into how cultural context shapes the aesthetics of visual storytelling.

Introduction

Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* was first published in 1865, but it remains an influential text which can boast a substantial number of adaptations across all types of media. In this paper, I will compare two of its animated adaptations coming from very different cultural contexts. The first and most famous adaptation is an American classic: Disney's *Alice in Wonderland*, directed by Clyde Geronimi, Hamilton Luske, and Wilfred Jackson in 1951. The second, less known adaptation is from a film studio which was based in Kiev during the time of the Soviet Union: Kievnauchfilm's *Alice in Wonderland*, directed by Yefrem Pruzhansky in 1981. I will refer to this adaptation with its Romanised Russian name, *Alisa v Strane chudes*, to avoid confusion. The two animated features have many differences, beginning with their length and mode of release: the first has a runtime of 75 minutes and was released in theatres, while the second only has a runtime of

30 minutes, and was aired on television divided in three short films. Created during the Cold War with a 30-year gap between each other, both productions cut down a significant amount of the original source material's plot; however, this paper's focus will not be on narrative differences or how faithful the transposition of each literary passage from book to screen is, nor on how the shifting tensions between USA and USSR might have affected characterisation and plot. Instead, the subject of discussion will be how each production approaches the visual depiction of Alice's adventures in wonderland. Through an analysis of techniques and influences, I will argue that Disney's approach to the distinctive surrealism characterising *Alice in Wonderland* is more grounded in reality than that of Kievnauchfilm. As this paper will argue, Disney's choice to employ more consistent modes of representation than those of Kievnauchfilm (which in turn makes use of multiple art styles and animation techniques), is fundamental to create a cohesive look for the film's landscape, giving the impression that as fantastic as Wonderland may be, everything that happens in the story and all the participants involved are part of the same world. Situating each production within their specific cultural context, I will explain why Disney chose to paint Wonderland's unreality through bright colours and expressive characters interacting in a generally playful mood, while Kievnauchfilm's wonderland emphasises the absurdities described by Carroll without restraint. Firstly, I will focus on the photographic reference-based techniques employed by Disney and analyse the profit-based motivation behind aesthetic choices they made. Then I will address the plurality of art styles and animation techniques in *Alisa v Strane chudes*, considering their suitability to depict Carroll's text. Considering external influences, I will examine the different impacts that marked demands and religious aesthetics have had on *Alice* and *Alisa* respectively, leading to the creation of very different versions of Wonderland. After exploring their differences, I will consider the core element of plasmaticness shared by both films, concluding with a reflection on its social and ideological ramifications.

Disney's Approach: Wonderland Restrained

Alice in Wonderland, like many other Disney classics, was produced thanks to the help of live-action models. Kathryn Beaumont, the young actress who voiced Alice, posed for the camera to provide the animators with real life references to use for their drawings (Figure 1).

The joint use of photography and drawing to produce animation is regarded as dialectical by Japanese literary critic Kiyoteru Hanada.¹ He considers the tension between the initial creation of images through photographic recording and the following hand drawing of pictures to be related to how, in dialectics, progress is achieved through the synthesis of opposing forces. Through hand drawing, the movements captured by the camera are decomposed, and eventually reassembled in animation. The final product of the Disney animation process is then a fusion of the 'documentary process of scientific observation and the avant-garde process of imaginary deformation [...] a kind of dialectical synthesis that preserves the traces of both stages of preparation'.² Thanks to this technique, the animators were able to achieve realistic movements and proportions for Alice's character as she navigates Wonderland (Figure 2). While Hanada appreciates the avant-garde qualities of Disney's approach to the production of *Alice in Wonderland*, he 'couldn't help but feel an infinitely great sense of dissatisfaction at the poverty of the imagination that this film manifested'.³ As much as I personally enjoy Disney's creation, Hanada's sentiment is understandable: Carroll carried out a considerable creative effort to craft an unreality governed by chaos alone, and while the Wonderland of this animated adaptation does a good job of turning extraordinary events into regular happenstances typical of a quirky world, it simply lacks the aura of unrestrained nonsense which permeates the original Wonderland.

1 Kiyoteru Hanada, "Cheshire Cat," Translated by Robin Thompson. *Art in Translation* 8, no. 1 (2016): 79-91. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17561310.2016.1143710>, 85.

2 Yuriko Furuhashi, "Rethinking Plasticity: The Politics and Production of the Animated Image." *Animation* 6, no. 1 (2011): 25-38. <https://doi-org.ezproxy2.lib.gla.ac.uk/10.1177/1746847710391226>, 33.

3 Hanada, "Cheshire Cat.", 84.

Indeed, Disney's *Alice in Wonderland* was subjected to a consistent amount of criticism: audiences felt that the movie failed to 'capture the unique atmosphere of Lewis Carroll's story'.⁴ The reason for this is easily explained: afraid of how young viewers might react to Carroll's intensely surrealist tale, Disney opted for simplifying its characters and relied on the use of musical numbers and a vibrant colour palette to reimagine a more kid-safe, parent-approved version of Wonderland. That being said, the film is not all sunshine and rainbows either:

*"...the colourful characters intersect visually with the deeper palette used in the backgrounds. Wonderland is painted in shadowy greens, blues and browns, which in certain scenes give way to a dense black void spreading to the edges of the frame; even this zany, music-filled version of Alice in Wonderland acknowledges the menacing shadow side of Carroll's tale."*⁵

Disney's effort to produce a more digestible product- paired with Western 'optimization and universalization of the drawings' undertaken 'to increase box office success' by employing a standard style of drawing 'that guaranteed the most attention from users'⁶- ultimately proved themselves counterproductive. Those familiar with the original work did not appreciate how its adaptation 'filter[ed] out most of Carroll's complexity and much of the book's humor and pathos [...]', transforming the story into a generic alternative-world adventure, or '[...] yet another melodramatic Oz wannabe'.⁷

As eye-catching as the film's saturated designs are, its visuals are overall 'are rather staid and restrained, mainly literal, representational renderings of the story done in the highly finished, realistic style for

4 Christopher Finch, *The Art of Walt Disney: from Mickey Mouse to the Magic Kingdoms*, Edited by Andrea Danese (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2004), 234.

5 Susan Bye, "Imagination and invention: 'Alice in wonderland' on screen," *Screen Education*, no. 92 (2019): 30-37, 33.

6 Yanni Liao, "The influence of Russian religious aesthetics on Russian animation." *Visual Studies* (2023): 1-11. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1472586X.2023.2259350>, 4.

7 Joel D. Chaston, "The 'Ozification' of American Children's Fantasy Films: The Blue Bird, Alice in Wonderland, and Jumanji," *Children's Literature Association Quarterly* 22, no. 1 (1997): 13-20. <https://doi.org/10.1.353/chq.0.1124>, 16.

which the studio was famous'.⁸ Ross makes an example of Alice's fall down the rabbit hole:

“[marking her] entry into the dream state, [the fall] might have lent itself to surrealistic treatment like that of *Dumbo*'s “Pink Elephants on Parade” sequence, but instead it is simply a serial listing in images of the objects Carroll mentions that Alice sees on her way down.”⁹

Ross' example perfectly showcases how Disney could have achieved a higher degree of surrealism without having to resort to mixing animation techniques like in Kievnauchfilm's adaptation. The sequence she cites begins with *Dumbo*'s surroundings starting to morph and distort, as a consequence of the little elephant's intoxication. The outline of bubbles twists and gives life to the first pink elephant, who materializes more by blowing them out of its proboscis. Soon there are multiple elephants interacting in a hallucinatory chaos (Figure 3a), dancing and contorting in unnatural ways, moving around in swirling and kaleidoscopic configurations. The limitless creative potential of animation is unleashed through lines, shapes, patterns and colours merging and transitioning through different types of abstract imagery before forming new- surreal, but recognisable- figures: snake-like elephants morph into trunks of other elephants, which melt into one and then stretch until they burst in an explosion resulting in multiple elephants, who then morph in one being made of multiple elephants' heads, and their eyes become pyramids, behind which a camel-like elephant appears, and so on (Figures 3b-3j).

The representation of the key moment in which Alice is removed from the real world remains instead actually tethered to reality, a fact that is also exemplified by the use of the real-life reference (Figure 4). By contrast, the fall down the rabbit hole pictured in *Alisa v Strane chudes* sees Alisa's body parts changing unnaturally (Figure 5). Purposefully altering the girl's proportions, the film conveys an idea of dreamlike distortion that feels appropriate for a sequence in which the protagonist is abandoning reality.

⁸ Doris Ross, “Escape from wonderland: Disney and the female imagination,” *Marvels & Tales* 18, no. 1 (2004): 53-66. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41388684>, 58.

⁹ Ross, “Escape from wonderland”, 58.

Kievnauchfilm's approach: Wonderland unleashed

Disney's adaptation toned down the outlandishness of its source material; its Soviet counterpart instead opted to embrace the eccentricity of Carroll's work wholly and unapologetically. This work does not employ photographic references for its drawings in the way Disney does, aiming instead for a look that is much more disconnected from reality and its proportions. The film avoids 'Disney's crude treatments of Carroll with novel, angular cut-outs and an impressive use of incongruously fluid, essential line drawings'.¹⁰ Wonderland then comes to life through a variety of art styles and mediums, with scenes switching back and forth between using cel animation, stop-motion paper cutouts, and occasionally superimposition (Figure 6), achieving an undeniably avant-garde final product. Different art styles are used to represent different scenes: for example, whenever Alice's thoughts are shown, they are in (mostly) black and white pencil sketches (Figure 7a-b). Plenty of peculiar events take place in Alice's thoughts- when she grows in size, she pictures as her feet as growing in distance from her point of view horizontally rather than vertically, carried away on a carriage pulled by a teapot (Figure 7b). However, it is interesting to notice that by portraying Alice's thoughts with less colour than her surroundings, Kievnauchfilm seems to communicate that what is supposedly Alice's inner world, what her mind can conjure, is a mere flat and almost colourless representation of (ir)reality compared to what Wonderland can instead achieve. This is particularly ironic, considering how Wonderland itself is a dream experienced by Alice, a product of her imagination, but nonetheless the stylistic choices discussed so far help evidence how Wonderland operates on a level of fantastical which goes beyond even the most unconventional imagination, like that which Alice makes use of to picture her thoughts.

In Wonderland, Alice's surroundings do not stick to a single style – the background changes depth, becomes either flat or projected into the distance, blurs in and out of focus between scenes fading

10 Donald MacFadyen, *Yellow crocodiles and blue oranges: Russian animated film since World War Two* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 115.

from a place to the next (Figure 8). The film employs a plurality of techniques to represent backgrounds, ranging from watercolours to pencil-line textures (Figure 7), experimenting with multidimensional aesthetic perception. Characters within the same shot are portrayed with differing techniques, exacerbating the peculiarity of some of Wonderland's inhabitants: Alice's drawn movements contrast the choppy ones of the Cheshire Cat and the Queen of Hearts, who appear to be animated through stop-motion paper cut-outs (Figure 9). The protagonist's own art style also varies between different shots when she is shown in closeups (Figure 10), underlining the high degree of mutability that characterises Wonderland and meddling with the viewers' own perception, giving them a taste of what being immersed in an ever-changing reality- powerful enough to alter not only any of its own elements but also the appearance of those who enter it- might be like. While some of the film's nonsensical passages are surreal in an almost disturbing way, it is interesting to notice that- unlike Disney-Kievnauchfilm did not consider its earnest approach to Carroll's tale to be too intense for children to watch; 'youthful audience[s]' were in fact considered by the studio as 'the locus of animation's rebirth'.¹¹

While Disney's techniques have been longtime subjects of international attention, 'the aesthetics of Soviet animation and its history have been relatively poorly researched [and a] significant part of this research is inaccessible or unknown to the Western academic reader as it has not been translated into foreign languages'.¹² It is particularly difficult to provide a generalised overview of Soviet animation, as it was not focused on profit like its Western opponents and therefore did not develop a universal style recognisable across its various features and authors. Nonetheless, some have tried to identify key influences stemming from shared cultural backgrounds, such as that of Orthodox Christianity. According to Liao, while Soviet animated films produced between the 1970s - 1990s feature 'extremely diverse production technology and unique authorial drawing', many of them 'can act as manifestations of religious aesthetics in Soviet and early Russian

11 MacFadyen, *Yellow crocodiles and blue oranges*, 115.

12 Liao, "The influence of Russian religious aesthetics on Russian animation,"

animation'.¹³

For *Alisa v Strane chudes* specifically, there are some similarities that can be drawn between the film and stylistic concepts from religious art. On a very basic level, the flatness of some of Alisa's closeups as seen in the first example (Figure 10) recalls the lack of depth that is typical of Eastern European religious imagery. The film also makes a significant use of symbolism, as religious art often does. An instance of this can be found, once again, in the fall down the rabbit hole: while Disney's Alice is simply shown gazing upon a world map as she questions whether she is falling through earth (Figure 11); when Alisa ponders at the same matter, she is instead shown literally passing through a sphere representing the globe, piercing it (Figure 12). The two interpretations of the same passage curiously provide a metaphorical mirror of Disney's and Kievnauchfilm's respective and widely differing approaches to the original source material. The first is a quirky but superficial approach: Alice is upside down, but merely looking at the map, an illustrative example of how Disney attempts to use creativity while unable to take the interaction with Carroll's work a step further- beyond looking. The second approach fully embraces surrealism and symbolism showing a literal depiction of Alice falling through earth, similar to how Kievnauchfilm interact with Carroll's work by choosing to actively and fully immerse the viewers in the world he created. The two films then present different degrees of success in their attempt to stylistically embody the general weirdness of Wonderland.

On the topic of Orthodox iconography's influence on animation, Liao writes that 'the diverse range of animation styles during this era exhibits shared ideological and contemplative characteristics, aligning with [...] the 'conciliarity' and 'sophianism' inherent in religious creativity'.¹⁴ Before delving into how these concepts are connected to *Alisa v Strane chudes*, some fundamental explanations must be offered. Firstly, conciliarity is defined as 'a harmonious complementary

13 Liao, "The influence of Russian religious aesthetics on Russian animation.", 4.

14 Liao, "The influence of Russian religious aesthetics on Russian animation.", 5.

unity that preserves and strengthens its elements within the whole and realizes its completeness through them'.¹⁵ This relates to the film as the work undoubtedly relies on the interplay between its plurality of art styles and techniques discussed above to paint a varied but complete picture of wonderland, making them complementary in their surrealism. Secondly, sophianism is defined as 'art's endeavour to comprehend the timelessness and draw nearer to Divine wisdom (Sophia), distinguishing itself from mere mirroring of the world'.¹⁶ When considering sophianism in *Alisa v Strane chudes*, Divine wisdom is not actually at the centre of the discussion, a fact which I can appreciate the irony of, considering how this section of the paper is discussing the influence of religious art. However, the focus of this analysis is on how these elements from Orthodox iconography affect the film's style rather than its intellectual content. The influence of sophianism on the film is then to be intended in the sense that Kievnauchfilm's art takes great care to go beyond a mere mirroring of the world; once again, the employment of multiple animation techniques is the key factor that allows the film to go beyond reality, capturing the viewer's attention thanks to a transcendent look that spans across a variety of art styles.

Context Overview

Having described the two movies' varying approaches to the same story, it is now time to briefly explore some of the historical reasons for their differences and the visual manifestations of their ideological connections. From the 1930s, Soviet animation had actually began adopting both Disney's form of production and Disney animation's the stylistic characteristics: 'Soviet cartoonists followed Disney's 'realistic' approach to the depiction of animated characters and for about three decades this remained the major Soviet cartoon style'.¹⁷ Blackledge explains that this decision was taken in an effort to pursue Socialist Realism, which was meant to promote an idealized

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Olga Blackledge, "Violence, Chases and the Construction of Bodies in American and Soviet Animated Series," *Animation* 5, no. 1 (2010): 41-56. <https://doi-org.ezproxy2.lib.gla.ac.uk/10.1177/1746847709356642>, 44.

yet realistic portrayal of characters for the purpose of indoctrinating new Soviet citizens. Disney's animation then entirely supplanted the experimental animation that had started to emerge in the Soviet Union, since it better matched the new aesthetic direction of the country. However, during the decades following the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union entered a period of so-called 'thaw', which 'was characterized by a relative liberalization of the Soviet society'.¹⁸ *Alisa v Strane chudes* makes its appearance at a time in which Soviet Aesthetics have departed from the Disney style, as made possible by the progressive destalinisation of society. Decreasing the authoritarian atmosphere that permeated Soviet society opened the doors for artists to practice with new aesthetic experiments.

Plasmaticness

While this paper has discussed the many differences between *Alice in Wonderland* and *Alisa v Strane chudes*, outlining how they are connected to each production's cultural context, there is a fundamental characteristic that both films share, though each in its own way - a feature that Soviet pioneer film theorist Eisenstein calls 'plasmaticness'. This was for Eisenstein, the most significant and alluring quality of the first Disney characters. He defined their plasmaticness as '[a] rejection of once-and-forever allotted form, freedom from ossification, the ability to dynamically assume any form',¹⁹ or 'liberation of forms from the laws of logic and forever established stability'.²⁰ The dreamlike world of *Wonderland* is then the perfect ground to employ the concept of plasmaticness, and its dreamlike qualities and aura are in turn reinforced by the plasmaticness there displayed through magical metamorphoses. Fahmi explains that Disney's *Alice in Wonderland* 'exhibits both dimensions of "plasmaticness" (fluidity of identity and malleability of form) since inorganic objects and animals dance to rhymed tunes, stretch and twist their shapes and resist the laws of nature'.²¹ For what concerns the main character specifically, I must

18 Blackledge, "Violence, Chases and the Construction of Bodies", 49.

19 Sergei Eisenstein, *Eisenstein on Disney*, Edited by Jay Leyda (London: Methuen, 1988), 21.

20 Eisenstein, *Eisenstein on Disney*, 22.

21 Marwa Essam Eldin Fahmi, "Fantasy Chronotope in Two Animated

return to my initial considerations on Disney’s use of photographic references and the distortion of Alisa’s proportions. When considering the differences between Alice’s and Alisa’s physical transformations in fact, it becomes evident that the latter shows even more plasmaticness than the former. While Alice’s growing and shrinking are indeed changes of form that defy the laws of logic, her proportions remain unchanged, as they are firmly tethered to reality through the already discussed use of photographic references. Alisa’s malleability on the other hand- stemming from a design that is completely disconnected from photographic reality- displays a greater freedom from ossification, as evidenced by her hands growing larger than her head in Figure 4. Further examples of plasmaticness presented by inanimate objects can be found in both films. In *Alisa v Strane chudes*, when the executioner is summoned by the Queen, he promptly produces a balloon which morphs into an axe once it is inflated (Figure 13). In *Alice in Wonderland*, during ‘the frenzied chase sequence [which] is, in its celebration of the magical possibilities of animation, classic Disney’,²² the ground on which Alice is running suddenly morphs into the table from the Mad Hatter’s tea party (Figure 14).

Social and Ideological Ramifications

Finally, after plasmaticness has been established as a fundamental characteristic shared by both works considered, it is important to compare its ideological function and implications in the respective home countries of both films. On this topic, Fahmi wrote:

*“Eisenstein shows a utopian affirmation of the therapeutic function of Disney’s animation to escape from the rigidity of life under capitalism. In other words, he believes that the Americans who suffered under the Fordist system of regimentation would desire “plasmaticness” actualized by malleable and protean quality of animated images on screen.”*²³

Children’s Films: Walt Disney’s *Alice in Wonderland* (1951) and Hayao Miyazaki’s *Spirited Away* (2001),” *Studies in Literature and Language* 14, no. 1 (2017): 28-38. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/9120>, 32.

22 Bye, “Imagination and invention,” 34.

23 Fahmi, “Fantasy Chronotope in Two Animated Children’s Films,” 32.

Just as the flexible and changeable nature that animation embodies through its images can provide relief from the stiffness of life in a capitalist society, it could also offer the same kind of comfort to people living under the dogmas of a communist regime. In this sense, both *Alice in Wonderland* and *Alisa v Strane chudes* make use of Carroll's work to deliver the elasticity that both audiences long for, albeit while living under opposing political system. This outlook shapes animation as a uniting medium, capable of exemplifying human desires which are shared even by people inhabiting realities that appear as remote from one another as possible. Bye seems to agree, also underlining the power of the medium:

*“Animation is about imagining the impossible in a way that speaks directly to Carroll’s radical overturning of the rules and reasoning that dominate everyday life. [...] As the dreamer, Alice is liberated from the sense-making strictures of the everyday, and is determinedly curious to learn more about the impossible.”*²⁴

However, she also reflects on how ‘Wonderland is a dreamscape always teetering on the brink of nightmare’.²⁵ From this perspective, people’s longing for elasticity could be concealing hidden anxieties regarding insecurity that would result from the lack of structure associated with one’s own everyday reality. In any case, both interpretations have one thing in common: they feature animation as a creative channel of expression for society’s innermost thoughts, whether they regard things which are desired or feared.

Conclusion

In this paper I have compared Disney’s and Kievnauchfilm’s adaptations of Lewis Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland*. Firstly, I argued that the photographic reference-based techniques employed by Disney deliver a final product with stronger connections to real life aesthetics. I analysed the creative choices they made, discussing how the company’s focus on making a profitable product led to a result that was

24 Bye, “Imagination and invention,” 34.

25 Ibid.

perceived as oversimplified. By contrast, I argued that the complexity of *Alisa v Strane chudes*, with its plurality of art styles and animation techniques, maintains a better relationship with Carroll's text, though future research would benefit from the help of translators to widen the pool of accessible resources. Engaging with relevant academic sources, I have argued that each production has been differently influenced by the market and religious aesthetics respectively, showcasing how the two films overall present starkly different moods and interpretations of the absurd and dream; the American cartoon attempts to please and amuse viewers, while the Soviet one delves more deeply into symbolism and attempts to visually recreate the tone of Carroll's text. After analysing their differences, I considered the core element of plasmaticness shared by both films, providing relevant textual examples as evidence. To conclude my comparison, I considered the social and ideological ramifications brought forth by the presence of Eisenstein's plasmaticness in films coming from such different context, highlighting the creative communicative power that animation has in providing a closer look into the minds of people.

Appendix




Figure 1: Photographs of Beaumont on top of which has been sketched the design for Alice, tracing it according to the actress' anatomy.




Figure 2: A side-by-side comparison of a frame from the film and the photographic reference used by the animators. *Alice in Wonderland* (Geronimi, Luske & Jackson, 1951).



Figure 3a: Pink Elephants on Parade; *Dumbo* (Sharpsteen, 1941).



Figure 3b (left), Figure 3c (centre), Figure 3d (right).



Figure 3e (left), Figure 3f (centre), Figure 3g (right).



Figure h (left), Figure i (centre), Figure j (right).




Figure 4: Side-by-side comparison of Alice's landing after falling down the rabbit hole and the photographic reference used by the animators.
Alice in Wonderland (Geronimi, Luske & Jackson, 1951).



Figure 5: Alisa falling down the rabbit hole.
Alisa v Strane chudes (Pruzhansky, 1981)



Figure 6: Superimposition of Dinah the cat. *Alisa v Strane chudes* (Pruzhansky, 1981).




Figure 7a: Alisa thinking about herself potentially drinking poison (left). Figure 7b: Alisa's feet are carried away by a teapot working as a steam-engine (right). *Alisa v Strane chudes* (Pruzhansky, 1981).



Figure 8: Background transitions. *Alisa v Strane chudes* (Pruzhansky, 1981).




Figure 9: Differences in animation of characters within the same shots.
Alisa v Strane chudes (Pruzhansky, 1981).




Figure 10: Examples of art style changing between closeups.
Alisa v Strane chudes (Pruzhansky, 1981).



Figure 11 (left): Alice considering whether she is falling through the earth. *Alice in Wonderland* (Geronimi, Luske & Jackson, 1951). Figure 12 (right): Alisa considering whether she is falling through the earth. *Alisa v Strane chudes* (Pruzhansky, 1981).



Figure 13: Balloon morphing into an axe. *Alisa v Strane chudes* (Pruzhanskyy, 1981).



Figure 14: Ground morphing into the Mad Hatter's table. *Alice in Wonderland* (Geronimi, Luske & Jackson, 1951).

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Your Ramadan, My Ramadan: Exploring the Dynamic Shades of the Holy Islamic Month in Hyderabad City

Mehak Siddiqui

The commercialisation of festivals can be clearly observed around the world and the term “festivalisation” has been coined to suggest an over-commodification of festivals exploited by tourism and place marketers. While this has attracted a substantial amount of academic work, not many works have focused on Islamic observances like the holy month of Ramadan, particularly in India. In this context, this paper seeks to explore the varying expressions and significations of Ramadan in modern-day Hyderabad, an Indian metropolis whose history is rooted in Islamic tradition. In-depth interviews were conducted with eight participants from different age groups and social strata, seeking anecdotes and experiences about the observation and/or celebration of Ramadan and Eid-ul-Fitr in Hyderabad. Responses were then broadly thematised to bring out the following major points of discussion: first, the multiple interpretations of the Islamic month within the Muslim community, namely variances in Ramadan culture among Islamic sub-communities; secondly, class differences in celebration of Ramadan among cosmopolitan groups; third, gendered notions about Islamic festivities, and lastly, indulgence in pleasure and public display of religiosity through Ramadan. This revealed the dynamic shades that Ramadan has taken on within the culture of Hyderabad City.

The commercialisation of festivals can be clearly observed around the world and has attracted a substantial amount of academic work, though not many works address this in the context of India. Festivals have been defined in the classical cultural-anthropological perspective as “a sacred or profane time of celebration, marked by special observances.”¹ More recently, Getz defined them as “themed, public celebrations”.²

1 Alessandro Falassi, *Time Out of Time: Essays on the Festival* (University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 2.

2 Donald Getz, *Event Management & Event Tourism* (Cognizant Communication Corporation, 2005), 21.

Further, the term “festivalisation” has been coined to suggest an over-commodification of festivals exploited by tourism and place marketers.

A religious festival intrinsic to Hyderabad City is the Islamic month of Ramadan, more commonly pronounced as *Ramzan*. It is an annual thirty-day ritual during which Muslims across the world are obliged to abstain from food, drink, and sex during the day. It is also a time to devote oneself to prayer and free oneself of what Islam deems to be “negative” thoughts and emotions.

Furthermore, giving alms to charity forms a crucial part of the Ramadan ritual, and believers are obliged to give cash and in-kind donations to the less fortunate. The month culminates in the celebration of *Eid-ul-fitr*, arguably the most important day of the Muslim calendar. Although *Eid-ul-fitr* has traditionally been associated with fanfare and festivities, recent years have seen the pious month of Ramadan transform into a euphoric spectacle of conspicuous consumerism and extravagance. It has transformed from a religious month to a cultural and commercial holiday,³ and the festivities are not just limited to Muslims anymore. People of all faiths and ethnicities partake in the celebration through shopping and seeking entertainment after *iftar* (the breaking of the fast at sundown). This results in new expressions and meanings of the existing ritual, which can be connected to Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque.⁴ Since individuals of different social backgrounds participate in the same religious obligation, fostering a sense of unity and solidarity, it results in a communal celebration marked by inversion of social hierarchies, a temporary suspension of norms, and a sense of renewal and rejuvenation, all of which are factors that shape the carnivalesque as described by Bakhtin.

Additionally, Henri Lefebvre’s ideas on festivals can provide a lens through which to analyse the significance of Ramadan as a cultural

3 Ozlem Sandikci and Sahver Omeraki. “Globalization and Rituals: Does Ramadan Turn Into Christmas?,” *Advances in Consumer Research* 34, (January 2007): 610-615. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279674339_Globalization_and_rituals_Does_Ramadan_turn_into_Christmas

4 Mikhail Mikhaïlovich Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*. (Indiana University Press, 1984).

and religious event.⁵ For instance, Lefebvre argued that space is not merely a neutral backdrop, but a dynamic social construct shaped by human activities and interactions. In this regard, Schmidt's study of Ramadan in the Indonesian city of Yogyakarta describes the transformation of urban spaces, particularly the shopping mall, during the month of Ramadan.⁶ The space of the mall becomes charged with ideological symbols associated with Islam, creating a distinct public space for the expression of Islamic modernities. These transformations can be observed through changes in the mall's aesthetics, such as the use of Arabic-looking fonts, stereotypical desert-camel imagery, and specific themes like "Enchanting Sahara". Symbols of excess, such as greetings for *Idul Fitri* (the celebration marking the end of Ramadan) and traditional food like *ketupat* (rice dumplings wrapped in palm leaves), are prominently displayed in malls throughout Ramadan. This increased presence and visibility of Islam in the public space during the thirty days of the holy month creates an "other space" within "normal, secular" public spaces.

At the same time, Lefebvre's concept of festivals as moments of collective celebration and social interaction resonates with the communal spirit of Ramadan, where people come together to break their fast, share meals, and engage in acts of worship and charity. These communal gatherings create opportunities for social bonding, cultural exchange, and the production of collective identities within urban settings.

Moreover, it would also appear that the "festivalisation" of Ramadan allows Muslim women to emerge from private domestic spaces and engage more in public life. Writing about women's roles in the commercialisation of Christmas, Schmidt argues that modern celebrations were ritualised by women in the nineteenth century, who welcomed an area of power in domestic life.⁷ It was an event that afforded them the opportunity to step out of the domestic sphere, shop,

5 Henri Lefebvre, *Critique of Everyday Life* (Verso Books, 1991).

6 Leonie Schmidt, "Urban Islamic Spectacles: Transforming the Space of the Shopping Mall during Ramadan in Indonesia," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 13 (September 1, 2012): 384–407. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2012.689708>. 384.

7 Leigh Eric Schmidt, *Consumer Rites: The Buying & Selling of American Holidays* (Princeton University Press, 1997), 148.

and exchange gifts, mostly with other women. The author describes how detailed accounts of Christmas shopping endeavours have been discovered in the personal diaries of several women of that era, which clearly points to their emergence as superintendents of Christmas gift-giving.

Such commercialisation and reinvention of Ramadan, like that of other festivals, is not a recent phenomenon, but one that has evolved over several decades. Evaluating the historical emergence of this phenomenon, Schmidt speaks of American festivals in the early 1900s:

*“The modern, up-to-date businessperson recognised the economic potential in holidays, exploited them through sales and advertising, and took the lead to promoting them. Whether the occasion was Easter or the Fourth of July, Thanksgiving or Memorial Day, ‘wide awake’ retailers were to conjure up ‘the spirit of hearty celebration’ for the purposes of merchandising and consumption.”*⁸

Under the logic of capitalism, the masses easily took to the sales tactics and the advertising which resulted in the kind of widespread consumerism associated with most holidays today. However, one cannot completely disregard the presence of religious sentiment in the phenomenon of festival consumerism as there seems to be a complex and ambiguous interplay between piety and commercialisation. As Karaosmanoglu points out:

*“Notions such as “commodification of the past” and “late capitalism” can only describe one part of the whole picture of Ramadan spaces in Istanbul. The other part of the picture has less to do with consumerism, but more to do with the formation of a temporalized space, which produces new discourses and new experiences of life”*⁹

8 Schmidt, *Consumer Rites*, 18.

9 Defne Karaosmanoglu, “Nostalgia Spaces of Consumption and Heterotopia Ramadan Festivities in Istanbul,” *Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research* 2 (June 11, 2010). <https://doi.org/10.3384/cu.2000.1525.10216283.285>.

In this context, this paper seeks to explore the varying expressions and significations of Ramadan in modern day Hyderabad, a city whose history is rooted in Islamic tradition.

Methodology

To investigate the changing face of Ramadan and its varied interpretations and meanings, I used purposive sampling to select eight individuals (four male and four female) in Hyderabad City, whom I already knew and whom I thought would provide valuable insights for the purpose of this research. The table (Figure 1) further describes the respondents, who all self-identified as belonging to the middle and upper-middle class during the interview process.

I conducted semi-structured interviews in-person with each of the participants about their knowledge, experience, opinions and feelings about the month of Ramadan in Hyderabad City. Open-ended questions were asked and the entire interview recorded then transcribed. The interviews were conducted in a mixture of English and Urdu languages depending on the participants' fluency. Transcripts were analysed vis-à-vis literature related to the topic and recurrent themes were identified.

Community Sub-culture

This was a major theme that surprisingly did not emerge in any of the reviewed literature. Muslims are divided into two major communities—the Sunnis and the Shias, each of which is further subdivided into various groups whose beliefs slightly vary. Although a complete analysis of how the observation of Ramadan differs among all these communities is beyond the scope of this paper, a major finding that cannot be ignored is the marked difference between the Ramadan rituals of the Shias and the Sunnis. The Shias break fast communally at the mosque every evening, with one or more families sponsoring the catering for each night of the month. Women too go to mosque and prayers are offered before the fast is broken at sundown. The Sunnis, on the other hand, break the fast at home, following which only the men go to the mosque while the women pray at home. Dinner or iftar

is then had at home and is usually a meal prepared by the women. A twenty-one-year-old female postgraduate student responded strongly when asked what she feels about the extravagance that has crept into a holy month of prudence:

“I belong to the Shia community and we observe Ramadan in a very different way than the Sunnis. We have a simplistic ritual of going to the mosque, offering prayers and then having a light iftar after which we offer prayers again. We do not engage in the lavish feasts and materialistic culture of other Muslim communities because Ramadan is a time of devotion and self-restraint. At the same time, Sunni Muslims hold a similar view of the Shias, thinking that the daily gatherings at the mosque are parties of sort and that iftar should be a family affair at home.”

A middle-aged female homemaker from the Old City area of Hyderabad said:

“Ramadan is a time when the whole family eats together every day. My husband and son arrive from work early and my daughter helps me prepare a hearty meal that we all enjoy together. Once a week, we eat out but whether at home or outside, iftar brings us closer together while prayer brings us closer to Allah. I don't like the Shia ritual of going to the mosque every evening. They are only interested in dressing up and going to the mosque to socialise and eat expensive catered food.”

Similar sentiments were echoed by the respondent's husband and twenty-year-old daughter, both of whom reiterated that spending quality time with family, whether at home or outside, is what makes *iftar* and Ramadan time special for them, as opposed to Shia Muslims allegedly more focussed on “dressing up” and going to the mosque to “socialise and gossip”. Hence, there appears to be a process of “othering” between the two communities, with both thinking that “their way” of observing Ramadan is the “right” way. Individuals of both sub-groups therefore seem to define their own self-identity through the construction of the “other”.

Social Class

Almost all the respondents made some sort of reference to the class differences that exist in the observation/celebration of Ramadan. A twenty-two-year-old postgraduate student residing in Hyderabad, but originally from the state of Bihar, spoke about how food consumption and behaviour in public spaces in Ramadan are connotative of social status:

“There is a constant comparison that goes on between neighbours in a residential area with regard to who is having more lavish iftars or shopping for more expensive clothes and other commodities. The poorer people try to emulate the rich by eating out or by having more of expensive non-vegetarian food at home. People often go beyond their means in Ramadan just in an attempt to show that they can afford it, even if they actually cannot.”

An interesting manifestation of this can be observed in the trend of *iftar* parties that has become more popular in the past few years. Various organisations and elite families organise lavish feasts and invite high profile guests such as politicians to celebrate the “spirit of Ramadan.” This often includes consumption of “authentic” Hyderabad delicacies, such as *haleem* and *biryani*, catered by the most popular restaurants in the city. *Iftar* parties can be seen as status symbols where the guest list reflects influence, and where the focus is more on making connections rather than breaking fast. Recently, there has also been a trend of “*sahr* get-togethers” as recounted by Amjad Ali, a thirty-two-year-old respondent:

‘Sahr or sehri is the early morning meal that is consumed before dawn in order to fast for the day. Since most shops and restaurants in Old City area are open throughout the night during Ramadan, youngsters often get together for this meal, especially since many of them cannot meet for iftar as they work at various offices. Younger children often play cricket or some other sport late into the night as they cannot do so during the day-long fast.’

Such night-long entertainment activities are predominantly the preserve of lower-middle class families who live in and around the Old City area. It is often looked down upon by the upper-middle-class, who perceive it as a nuisance and disturbance of the “peaceful” and “spiritual” nature of Ramadan. “Ramadan nights are for prayer and devotion, not roaming the streets and restaurant-hopping,” said a twenty-one-year-old upper-middle class Muslim woman.

Despite the apparent class distinctions and status assertions that mark the holy month, Ramadan and *iftar* are widely portrayed – especially by the media – as common ground for a diversity of people, with no discrimination on the basis of religion, age, class, and ethnicity in any sense. Ramadan is constructed as producing a multi-cultural and a multi-religious space in the cosmopolitan city of Hyderabad.

The above findings are congruent to what Salamandra describes as the longstanding rituals of dining at *iftar* cafes and shopping during the holy month in Damascus.¹⁰ She talks of the early nineties and how this period saw increased public displays of religiosity during Ramadan, with people frequenting mosques as an expression of status rather than piety. She further discusses how Syrians agree that fasting is designed to promote empathy for the poor, and how feasts are often donated to the needy, but points out that such customs may reinforce, rather than undermine, social hierarchy.

In addition, food consumption reaches its height during Ramadan and prices rise considerably, which is ironic considering that the month is supposed to be a time of fasting and economic prudence. Luxury and exotic foods become available to the rich who can afford it, while the poor are “taunted” by images of this consumerist lifestyle which is completely out of their reach.¹¹

The homemaker from the Old City also spoke about how she likes to cook more non-vegetarian fare during Ramadan and experiment with different kinds of sweet dishes. Ironically, there is greater expenditure

¹⁰ Christa Salamandra, *A New Old Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria* (Indiana University Press, 2004), 94.

¹¹ Ibid., 96.

on food during Ramadan despite it being a month of abstinence.

Hence, it appears that Ramadan celebrations have become associated with elite status and wealth. People use it as a way of distinguishing themselves. It is all about eating lavishly, dressing up in finery, buying the best of goods, and attending the most happening *iftar* parties.

Gender Inequality

Strong gendered notions emerged with regard to the role and behaviour of men and women during Ramadan. Moreover, these are so deep-rooted and often linked to Islamic teachings and texts, that they are hardly questioned and enjoy a common-sense status. The women are responsible for preparing grand *iftar* meals and shopping for all necessary ingredients. They also have to plan family gatherings and take care of any gift-giving involved. Four female participants of the 20-28 years age group spoke about how they were expected back home earlier than usual during Ramadan in order to help with preparation of the *iftar* (in cases where it is prepared at home), or simply to engage in prayer. The same was not expected of male family members. Women also have to shop for gifts to exchange with cousins on *Eid-ul-fitr* and are generally expected to don more “Indian” clothes during Ramadan rather than jeans or other western attire.

This somewhat relates to what Salamandra says: “An ‘organised’ Damascene housewife stocks up on non-perishable provisions (for Ramadan) as early as possible, suggesting that it is the woman’s responsibility to shop for Ramadan eatables.”¹²

Furthermore, Frankl has mentioned how housewives buy various commodities for months before the onset of Ramadan because “however difficult the eleven non-fasting months, there are always more than enough supplies of food during Ramadan, oxymoron though that statement may be”.¹³

12 Ibid.

13 P. J. L. Frankl, “The Observance of Ramaḍān in Swahili-Land (With Special Reference to Mombasa),” *Journal of Religion in Africa* 26, no. 4 (1996): 416–34. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1581840>.

An extension of this can be observed in the trend of women always taking care of festival shopping, whether it is for new clothes for the family to wear or gifts/cards to exchange with relatives and friends. Amina, a twenty-six-year-old Muslim female respondent summed this up:

“I am not usually a shopping buff but during Ramadan, my female cousins and I all get together and shop for new clothes and accessories. Even if we are not actually buying things, we like to go around the shops and take in the sights. It is also the time of year when our parents allow us to go out at night alone to have haleem, followed by ice-cream. Ramadan evenings are lots of fun. Eid is the best because you get to wear beautiful new clothes and enjoy with cousins and friends all day. My non-Muslim friends also come over to my place to have the delicious food my mother cooks, and I love the whole atmosphere of festivity.”

Amina also mentioned, however, that although she is allowed more freedoms during Ramadan, it cannot be compared to what her younger brother Salim enjoys:

“My brother often stays out throughout the night playing with his friends and eating at various restaurants that remain open, but I being a girl can of course not do this. It is not safe and I also have to help out my mother with household chores, besides studying and other college-related work.”

Such gendered inequalities are not surprising given the traditionally patriarchal nature of both the Indian and Islamic cultures. However, Amira’s responses point to an interesting deviation from the norm when it comes to women’s everyday experiences. When questioned about being “allowed” to venture out alone during the night in Ramadan, she elaborated:

“Usually, I never go out in the nights. My family doesn’t like or permit it. Because as females, we have to be more cautious about things like safety. But in Ramadan, the nights are lively and so many women are

out, so my parents allow it as long as I'm with others whom they know. So, it turns into a good time of staying out, shopping, trying different food, and spending time with my cousins and friends."

The two other Muslim female respondents added to this view by describing how Ramadan is a more active communal time for Muslim women in Hyderabad City. They specifically talked about how girls and women organise and participate in communal activities such as *iftar* parties and prayer gatherings that are followed by time for socialising. Moreover, the respondents discussed how women's involvement in religious rituals and practices tends to intensify during Ramadan. This may include attending special prayers at mosques, reciting the Quran, and participating in religious lectures or study circles. This is a departure from the usual ritual of girls and women praying and engaging in other religious practices on their own at home. Therefore, although gendered notions and deep-rooted sex role stereotypes are integrated into the behaviour of men and women during Ramadan, just as they are throughout the rest of the year, Ramadan grants Muslim women increased opportunities for social interaction and networking in public spaces. Their presence in public spaces such as mosques may increase during Ramadan as they actively engage in spiritual activities alongside men.

Pleasure and Public Display of Religiosity

Scholars such as Bhabha have explored the festivalisation of religious events as a form of cultural politics that contributes to identity formation among minority communities.¹⁴ In the context of India, where secularism is synonymous to all religions playing an equal role in public life rather than none at all, the emergence of Islam in public spaces during Ramadan can perhaps be seen as a contestation against the dominant Hindu festivals of *Diwali*, *Dussera*, *Holi*, etc, which have always had greater public visibility. The "festivalisation" of Ramadan, therefore, can be viewed as a political act of the minority Muslim community to assert their faith and culture against homogenous constructions of national identity. Most respondents indicated some

14 Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Routledge, 1994).

semblance of this, as they all agreed that Ramadan is a time when the Islamic face of Hyderabad City is in the public limelight, attracting both Hyderabadis and visitors to the city. Rafiq Shaikh, a garments store owner in the Charminar area spoke at length about how Ramadan has, over the years, become almost synonymous to shopping:

“Ramadan is the best time of year for business in the Old City. People love to buy new things, especially toward the end of the month in preparation for Eid. Young girls come looking for latest fashions of ethnic clothing inspired from the Hindi and Telugu film industries. There is also added demand for fancy burqas (veils) and hijab (headscarves). Men don’t usually come to shop; it is the women who buy clothes for them too. Lots of tourists also come to Hyderabad at this time, some from abroad but also from other parts of India. The jewelled bangles that are a speciality of Hyderabad are in high demand, just like haleem and biryani at restaurants. People from all over the twin cities flock to Charminar to experience the true Hyderabadi Ramadan.”

In addition, a twenty-eight-year-old male, non-Muslim doctorate student pointed out how Ramadan in Hyderabad is a phenomenon worth witnessing:

“I think that Ramadan is that time of month which truly brings out the Islamic identity of Hyderabad. People of all ages and ethnicities love trying out traditionally Muslim food during this month and the mosques, especially in the Old City, are beautifully decorated and lit up. There is a general air of spirituality and festivity which is at once similar and distinct from that of other festival times in the city.”

Furthermore, Ramadan in Hyderabad involves a transformation of the Old City area into a tourist attraction, and certain factors like the consumption of the traditional dish of *haleem* mark it as a truly Hyderabadi ritual, unique to the city and its cultural ideology. Hyderabadi *haleem* has in fact acquired the much-coveted Geographical Indications certificate from the Government of India, which is a sort of intellectual property right granted to original products from a specific

region that carve a niche identity in the minds of consumers. *Haleem*-eating has in fact also been integrated into the high-tech face of the city with traditional restaurants around the Hitech city area taking up interesting names such as Hitech Bawarchi. Most restaurants provide special offers during Ramadan, and “*iftar*-packs” which can be home-delivered. The modest *iftar*, which was traditionally a small family affair has metamorphosed into a grandiose feast, what with families treating it as a get-together or a way of asserting their status, and corporate houses using it as a means of appeasing Muslim employees and patrons.

Amjad Ali, a respondent who is employed as a driver with an upper-class Sunni Muslim family, said:

“For the past few years now, during Ramadan, my employers host several grand iftar parties for their extended family, friends, and business associates. On such days, I am usually required to work overtime in order to pick up and drop off some of the guests. My boss provides iftar for me and my family too. They have several courses of food, including exotic delicacies that I have never tasted anywhere else. People come dressed in finery and often stay late, socialising with each other. Prayers are offered but they seem to be secondary to the main objective of feasting and having a good time. I am a middle-class man and had never imagined Ramadan could be such an extravagant affair. On days when my boss does not have a party, they are usually attending other parties and I am permitted to leave early. On these days, I eat simple food prepared by my wife and then take her out for a walk or some shopping after offering prayers. The Old City area is very lively during Ramadan nights and we enjoy going there.”

Non-Muslims too like to frequent the Old City area (especially Charminar) during Ramadan to shop and taste *haleem* and/or *biryani*. All five of the respondents in their twenties spoke of their experiences of going out with friends several times during Ramadan, especially to have *haleem* in the Old City. One female respondent who enjoys photography also said: “The Charminar and Mecca Masjid are simply beautiful during Ramadan. They are lit up and I love going there to

take some good photographs and of course, do some street shopping.”

These festivities can be compared to the culture of Ramadan festivals in Istanbul,¹⁵ wherein city squares are lit up and transformed into marketplaces and entertainment sites. This can be seen as an attempt to revitalise the spirit of “old” Ramadan culture and promote a sense of community among all social classes combined. Furthermore, Salamandra also writes about how mosques become part of a public culture of display during the holy month in Damascus.¹⁶ These places of worship are lit-up and decorated and it becomes customary for people to attend the special night prayers even if they do not attend the mandatory daily prayers during the rest of the year. Going to the mosque during Ramadan is a way of asserting one’s faith and Muslim status, a political act of reaffirming one’s Islamic identity and heritage.

The sort of phenomenon described above obviously has its critics. Not everyone is happy with what they see as the growing commercialisation and festivalisation of Ramadan, with conspicuous consumption and exhibitionism displacing the spirituality and expression of social connectedness which they feel once characterised the season. But such notions of austere Ramadan piety are just as beholden to modern constructions of nostalgia as are the commodified representations of the month.

To conclude, Ramadan has indeed taken on varied shades in Hyderabad City and expressions of dominance and resistance can be found in the behaviour and attitudes that people have adopted toward it.

Caste (or community), class, and gender may influence the multiple significances of the holy month, but Ramadan festivities on the whole are central to the experience of the past and the future, the new and the old, the global and the local. As well as a space of consumption and a site of spectacle, Ramadan allows a diversity of people from all ages, religions, classes, and ethnic backgrounds to unite to celebrate a common event. As a result, Ramadan attempts to create a space where “Islamist” and “secularist” discourses intertwine.

15 Sandikci and Omeraki, “Globalization and Rituals”, 610.

16 Salamandra, *A New Old*, 96.

It is perhaps a sign of Islam being a minority religion in Hyderabad that shopping malls in Hyderabad have not yet become sites for revival of the commodified version of the Ramadan ritual, as they have in places like Turkey and Indonesia. It is only the Old City area of Charminar, a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood, that is transformed during Ramadan, and not so much the glitzy modern face of Hyderabad City.

Processes of commodification and festivalisation are perceived and interpreted in different ways by different individuals and groups, often reinventing traditionally religious rituals. This is influenced by various stakeholders, including political parties, commercial sectors, and the media. The commercial sector in particular plays a significant role in the reinvention of festivals.¹⁷ Exoticised and commoditised celebrations help create new habits of consumption and consumerism. Furthermore, the mainstream media and popular culture also contribute to the reinvention and reinterpretation of religious festivals as more inclusive and diverse cultural celebrations. The representation of cultural events in media can impact how they are perceived and practiced by the masses,¹⁸ and the convergence of traditional values with modern media can lead to a reinterpretation of cultural events.¹⁹

In recent years, the resurgence of Hindu nationalism in India has had complex and varied impacts on Ramadan celebrations in the country. While it is important to recognise that India is a diverse and pluralistic society with a significant Muslim population, Hindu nationalist sentiments and policies have at times influenced social dynamics and interfaith relations. News reports have indicated instances of religiously motivated violence or hate crimes targeting Muslims, particularly during Ramadan. In March 2024, for example, international students at Gujarat University in Ahmedabad City were assaulted for performing Islamic prayers during Ramadan.²⁰ Such acts

17 Karaosmanoglu, "Nostalgia Spaces", 285.

18 John Fiske, *Reading the Popular* (Routledge, 1989).

19 Marwan Kraidy, *Hybridity, or the Cultural Logic of Globalization* (Temple University Press, 2006). https://doi.org/10.26530/oapen_626979.

20 Saikat Kumar Bose, "Centre's Firefight After Foreign Students In Gujarat Attacked Over Namaz," *NDTV*, March 17, 2024. <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/gujarat-university-mob-attacks-foreign-students-over-namaz-inside-gujarat-hostel-5-injured-5254783>.

have been enabled by a growing sense of Islamophobia in the country, propagated by political leaders, popular culture, and celebrities.

In such a political climate, Ramadan festivities become all the more vital as an act of dissent and in reclaiming public spaces. Its reinventions reflect the changing social, cultural, and historical dynamics of a society and contribute to the creation of new experiences and meanings associated with the event. Overall, contested understandings of religious festivals like Ramadan reveal the continual struggle in which modernity vies against tradition, commercialisation vies against religious sentiment, and varied interpretations and significances of festivals coexist in a multifaceted pluralistic society.

Appendix

Male Respondents	Female Respondents
Muslim, 44 years old	Muslim, 40 years old
Muslim, 32 years old	Muslim, 31 years old
Muslim, 22 years old	Muslim, 21 years old
Christian, 27 years old	Hindu, 28 years old

Figure 1

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Political and Legal Developments in the EU Law: The Migration Crisis and COVID-19

Mahi Singh

The European Union (EU) is a remarkable example of a supranational organisation in the 21st century political world, where its 27 Member States share power and resources to pursue common economic, environmental, political, and social goals. However, in recent years, it has encountered a myriad of challenges that fracture its structure and competency. This paper examines two such momentous case studies, the Migration Crisis and COVID-19, through a legal and political lens. The research, consisting of legislation and case law, finds systemic flaws within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and inefficiency caused by bureaucracy that sometimes causes a stalemate. On the other hand, the initial response to COVID-19 discloses unknown weaknesses in the EU's ability to act as a collective union towards human health.

The paper evaluates the successes and limitations of specific developments to EU law, including directives, economic mechanisms, and financial agreements, showcasing the workings of EU policy making and its impact on Member States. Then, the paper discusses the political implications of these legal developments and their role in redefining human rights for the EU in the 21st century. The paper concludes that the EU's future relies on addressing the political implications of EU law that are essential to reinforce the EU's role in crisis management and to better equip it to promote human development.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is a supranational organisation comprising 27 Member States sharing common economic, environmental, political, and social goals derived from EU law. The European Commission is the principal legislative body for proposing and passing laws on common interests of the EU and its people.¹ These laws then pass on

1 James McBride 'How Does the European Union Work?', (Council on Foreign Relations, 11 March 2022) <<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-european-union-work#chapter-title-0-4>> Accessed 19 December 2023.

to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union for approval or rejection. Finally, the implementation, legitimacy, and justifiability of the approved law come under the oversight of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

Within the hierarchical structure of EU law are competences that direct the power and authority the EU has over Member States:² 1) *exclusive competences* passed exclusively by the EU, such as trade rules 2) *shared competences* involving both the EU and member states in law legislation, such as migration policy, and 3) *supporting competences* acted upon by member state and supported by the EU without interference. The varied competences preserve the EU's role as an international organisation designed to assist Member States while protecting state sovereignty. However, these competences present both obstacles and benefits for EU legislation, sometimes resulting in crucial political victories like the Schengen agreement, and other times a deadlock.

The creation of and amendments to EU law undergo a scrupulous, multi-channel procedure, reflecting EU's commitment to creating comprehensive laws. However, events like Brexit, rising cost of living, the rise of populist and anti-democratic states, and the Russia-Ukraine War create a tense, volatile stage for the EU.

This paper analyses recent legal and political developments to EU law by examining two momentous case studies: the Migration Crisis and COVID-19. The paper aims to provide an overview of the EU's responses, successes, and shortcomings in these cases through a legal and political lens. The paper evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of specific EU legal instruments including directives and economic mechanisms, revealing the workings of EU policy making and its impact on Member States. Finally, the conclusion discusses the political implications of these legal developments and their role in redefining human rights for the EU in the 21st century.

2 European Commission, 'Areas of EU action' <https://commission.europa.eu/about-european-commission/what-european-commission-does/law/areas-eu-action_en> Accessed 19 December 2023.

Case 1: Migration Crisis

The EU's Unresolved Challenge

2015 marked the beginning of an unprecedented increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers entering the EU, primarily due to the political chaos in the Middle East such as the civil wars in Libya and Syria. In 2022 among Member States, Germany had the largest numbers with over 2 million refugees and 260,000+ asylum-seekers, followed by France with over 600,000 refugees and 75,000 asylum-seekers.³

Protecting and advancing human rights, including free movement, are among the EU's core values that are in reality overlooked or put on the back burner within EU law. Zanfrini argues that the migration crisis showcases the clash between the EU's inclusive principles of peace, and the Member State's tendency to exclude 'undesirables,' a euphemism for refugees.⁴

For instance, Member States like Hungary and Denmark deliberately neglect their responsibility of immigrants through anti-immigration policies such as forced deportation.⁵ Sometimes, EU values are simply incompatible with the frameworks of Member States. Greece and Italy were hit more negatively by the financial crisis than other states and were incapable of welcoming the large influx of refugees because of their overburdened economy.⁶ Although the EU law is a paragon of human development, these inconsistencies often arise from the EU's inability to consider and provide for individual states' circumstances.

3 Ibid.

4 Laura Zanfrini, 'Europe and the Refugee Crisis: A Challenge to Our Civilization' *United Nations* (September 2023). <<https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/europe-and-refugee-crisis-challenge-our-civilization>>

5 Andres Kluth, 'Why Europe can't solve its mass migration problem' (*The Japan Times*, 4 May 2023) <<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/05/04/commentary/world-commentary/europe-migration-problem>> Accessed 26 December 2024.

6 Graham Butler, 'Legal Responses to the European Union's Migration Crisis' (2018) 19 (2) *San Diego International Law Journal*, 278. <<https://digital.sandiego.edu/ilj/vol19/iss2/4>>

Further, the EU notoriously externalises its migration crisis to states beyond its borders. Externalisation, poorly disguised as border protection, has worsened the migration crisis by misusing funds and resources.⁷ Akkerman criticises the EU's 'empty rhetoric' to uphold human rights while funding detention centres in states like Libya that subject immigrants to gross systematic human rights violations including sexual violence, enslavement, and torture.⁸ This undermines the EU's responsibility to protect migrants by implementing laws on its Member States.

This is partly due to the EU's limited control over *external borders*, or borders between an EU Member State and a non-Member State, such as Greece-Turkey. As enshrined in Article 67(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU,⁹ the EU can establish a 'common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control.' However, Protocol No. 23 clarifies that the authority over external borders remains within Member States.¹⁰ To demonstrate, Greece exercises sovereignty over its external border with Turkey, implementing brutal measures such as steel fences to curb illegal immigration from Turkey.¹¹ This legislative power over external borders bestowed upon Member States, rather than an EU body, can render the EU's multi-institutional structure and border management superfluous.

7 Lorena Stella Martini and Tarek Megerisi, 'Road to nowhere: Why Europe's border externalisation is a dead end' (*European Council on Foreign Relations*, 14 December 2023) <<https://ecfr.eu/publication/road-to-nowhere-why-europes-border-externalisation-is-a-dead-end/>> Accessed 29 January 2024.

8 Mark Akkerman, '*Outsourcing Oppression: How Europe externalises migrant detention beyond its shores*' (2021) ResearchGate, 4. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351634385_Outsourcing_Oppression_How_Europe_externalises_migrant_detention_beyond_its_shores> Accessed 29 January 2024.

9 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU 2008] OJ C115/13. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/tfeu_2012/oj> Accessed 25 January 2024.

10 Ibid.

11 'Greece expands fence along border with Turkey' (*DW News*, 21 January 2023) <<https://www.dw.com/en/greece-expands-fence-along-border-with-turkey/a-64477858>> Accessed 10 April 2024.

Developments to EU Law

1. Reception Conditions Directive Recast (RCDr) proposed in 2016 and agreed in 2017 aims to administer safe reception of asylum seekers across the Member State.¹² It is a recast of the 2013 Directive 2013/33 that serves as one of the cornerstone sources of the EU asylum system and sets out the minimum reception conditions of migrants upon their arrival in a Member State.¹³

The 2016 recast fills the gaps in the 2013 Directive to address the EU's inconsistency and failure to harmonise with the different Member States in determining reception conditions. Additionally, it requires Member States to guarantee a dignified standard of living to increase applicants' self-reliance and integration through education, residence, and access to the labour market.¹⁴ The recast also emphasises transparency with applicants on their rights and privileges when migrating to another state, fostering an understanding between institutions and individuals. This is complemented by a fair judicial procedure to determine the legality and eligibility of immigrants arriving in a Member State.

However, there are two major challenges to the RCDr. Firstly, any EU directive is transposed depending on Member States' judgement of when and how to achieve a certain result.¹⁵ By granting Member States freedom in the way they interpret, implement, and define the

12 European Commission, 'Reception conditions' (*Migration and Home Affairs*, 2016) <https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system/reception-conditions_en> Accessed 4 January 2024.

13 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) [2013] OJ L180/96 Art. 1. <<http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/33/oj>>

14 Commission, 'Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast)' COM(2016) 465 final. <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016PC0465>>

15 European Commission, 'Types of EU Law' <https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/types-eu-law_en#:~:text=Regulations%20are%20legal%20acts%20that,entirety%20on%20all%20EU%20countries> Accessed 27 January 2024.

conditions of the RCDr, the fate of the EU asylum system remains ambiguous.

This was recently observed in the C-808/18 *Commission v. Hungary* (2020) case when the European Commission brought legal action against Hungary for violating various articles of crucial EU law pieces including Directive 2013/33 and the EU Charter. Hungary had set up transit zones at the Serbian-Hungarian border and adapted its legislation on the right to asylum to allow derogations from certain EU asylum law rules.¹⁶ The commission cited Hungary's failure - or denial - to provide adequate, necessary conditions for asylum seekers, as well as restricting applications and allowing detention. Hungary regularly cited the incompatibility of its national legislation with EU law, but the Commission reinstated the primacy of EU law over national law.¹⁷ In 2020, the CJEU judgement ruled that Hungary had failed in fulfilling its obligations under EU law and called for immediate action to comply with the EU laws and fundamental values enshrined in the Charter.¹⁸

However, Hungary has still not addressed many aspects of the CJEU judgement. This case law is an example of EU directives regarding asylum law failing to be implemented into the legislation of Member States, giving them the freedom to customise their criteria of who enters their territory and what rights the entrants are entitled to.¹⁹

Secondly, the RCDr has been overpowered by other recent legal developments in the EU, namely the *Instrumentalisation Regulations*.

16 European Commission, 'Migration: Commission refers HUNGARY to the Court of Justice of the European Union over its failure to comply with Court judgement' (2021) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5801> Accessed 3 April 2024.

17 EUR-Lex, 'Primacy of EU law (precedence, supremacy)' (EUR-Lex) <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/primacy-of-eu-law-precedence-supremacy.html#:~:text=The%20principle%20of%20the%20primacy>> accessed 6 April 2024.

18 Case C-808/18 *European Commission v Hungary* (2020).

19 Samantha Velluti, 'The revised Reception Conditions Directive and adequate and dignified material reception conditions for those seeking international protection' (2016) 2(3) *International Journal of Migration and Border Studies* <<https://www.inderscience.com/offers.php?id=77640>>

In 2021, Belarus was accused of instrumentalised migration that facilitates the illegal passage of migrants to the neighbouring countries of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland as a means of political manipulation. Identifying this as an “emergency situation of a sudden inflow of third country nationals” under Article 73(8) of the TFEU, the European Commission proposed provisional protection measures that have since been codified.²⁰ These new regulations restrain other states from posing similar threats as Belarus to the security of the EU,²¹ but they also undermine existing legal frameworks like the RCDr by allowing derogations. Moreover, an emergency becomes a “daily reality” and states now have the incentive to limit the entry of refugees into their territory and increase hostility towards them through actions such as delayed application processing.²²

Therefore, although the EU aims to harmonise reception conditions for asylum seekers, the 2016 recast and novel EU legal developments fragment and impede state response to the entry and accommodation of immigrants.

2. The *EU Asylum Agency* (EUAA) was renamed in 2022 to replace the former European Asylum Support Office.²³ The purpose of the rebranding is to increase the powers of the EU asylum system and to eliminate most divergences between Member States for smoother integration processes of asylum seekers.²⁴ It also serves as a portal to

20 TFEU 2008 (n 11) Art. 78(3).

21 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision on provisional emergency measures for the benefit of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland’ COM (2021) 752 final. <<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0752>> Accessed 3 April 2024.

22 Mirko Forti, ‘Weaponisation of Migrants? Migrants as a (Political) Weapon and the EU Regulatory Response: What to Expect Now’ (EJIL: *Talk!*, 10 March 2022) <<https://www.ejiltalk.org/weaponisation-of-migrants-migrants-as-a-political-weapon-and-the-eu-regulatory-resp-onse-what-to-expect-now/>> Accessed 3 April 2024.

23 European Commission, ‘Common European Asylum System’ (*Migration and Home Affairs*) <https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system_en> Accessed 26 December 2023.

24 Steeve Peers and Catherine Barnard, *European Union Law* (4th Edn, Oxford University Press 2023), 801. <<https://www.oxfordlawtrove.com/display/10.1093/he/9780192863836.001.0001/he-9780192863836-chapter-25>>

information and data about migration in the EU, training for asylum officials, and coordinates emergency responses.²⁵

The issue with the EUAA emerges from a lack of power and control over specific tasks as the EUAA merely supports and assists Member States,²⁶ preserving important powers such as reinforcement and supervision of immigrants for the Member States themselves. Accordingly, although the EUAA may give operational suggestions or propose ways to support the EU asylum system, the implementation is up to the Member States' decisions. The disbalance and division of power within the EU thus poses challenges and leads to inefficiency. Vimont similarly argues that some political leaders lacking 'political will' are more interested in using the migration crisis as a political agenda to further their own interests.²⁷

Lastly, the bureaucratic and institutional nature of the EUAA makes it difficult to diversify policy implementation.²⁸ At its core, the EUAA remains unchanged and still follows the same foundational principles laid out in the EASO - a name change and minor tweaks has not produced any new provisions or sources to help the EU solve its migration crisis. Despite having institutions and mechanisms to deal with migration, the EU fails to capitalise on their potential.

3. *The New Pact on Migration and Asylum* is the most recent EU development agreed by the EU Parliament and the European Commission in December 2023. Expected to be adopted by April 2024, it extends the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which gives [?rskey=EnuW0G&result=2#ref_he-9780192863836-chapter-25-note-106](https://doi.org/10.4337/9781789905427.00018) Accessed 3 April 2024.

25 Salvatore F. Nicolosi and David Fernandez-Rojo, 'Out of control? The case of the European Asylum Support Office' (2020) *Controlling EU Agencies*, 177-195. <<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781789905427.00018>>

26 *Ibid.*, 186.

27 Pierre Vimont, 'Judy Asks: Is Migration Europe's Achilles Heel?' *Carnegie Europe* (24 November 2022) <<https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/88486>> Accessed 6 January 2024.

28 Johan Ekstedt, 'Bureaucratic configuration and discretion in asylum case processing: the case of the EUAA in Greece' (2023) 11(22) *Comparative Migration Studies*, 10. <<https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-023-00345-0>>

EU Member States flexibility on determining the eligibility of migrants in their countries.²⁹

The agreement came under fire from human rights groups in the form of a remarkable open letter from Caritas Europa, consisting of 57 organisations such as Amnesty International, EuroMed Rights, and Oxfam. Together, they argue that the agreement will lead to harmful practices such as child detention and possible discrimination and instead called for ‘human solutions’ and ‘fair responsibility’,³⁰ terms constantly repeated in the real, of EU migration laws. The agreement represents an overall lack of actual reformation of the EU asylum system.

EU lawmakers have defended the agreement and emphasised the safety it brings to Member States, advertising it to the public as a tool for migration management. Under improved border procedure, asylum seekers who may pose a security threat to the accepting state will be rejected.³¹ However, this procedure is susceptible to unfair treatment as an individual may be unjustly deemed to be a threat or to be an illegal applicant.

Arguments from human rights groups similarly suggest otherwise. Amnesty International censured the EU for externalising border control and outsourcing refugee protection to non-EU states such as Albania and Turkey.³² This exemplifies the EU’s failure to invest in fair

29 Ashifa Kassam, ‘Campaigners call on EU leaders to veto ‘costly and cruel’ changes to migration law’ (*The Guardian*, 19 December 2023) <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/19/campaigners-call-on-eu-leaders-to-veto-costly-and-cruel-changes-to-migration-law>> Accessed 4 January 2024.

30 Caritas Europa, ‘Open letter for better migration policies’ (Caritas.eu, 19 December 2023). <<https://www.caritas.eu/open-letter-for-better-migration-policies/>> Accessed 4 January 2024.

31 Council of the EU, ‘The Council and the European Parliament reach breakthrough in reform of EU asylum and migration system’ (20 December 2023) <<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/20/the-council-and-the-european-parliament-reach-breakthrough-in-reform-of-eu-asylum-and-migration-system/>> Accessed 6 January 2024.

32 Amnesty International, ‘EU: Migration Pact agreement will lead to a surge in suffering’ (20 December 2023) <<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/12/eu-migration-pact-agreement-will-lead-to-a-surge-in-suffering/>> Accessed 4 January

and consistent asylum systems to protect immigrants and a negligence to regulate its borders by diverging to other channels and states to solve EU matters.

On the other hand, a beacon of hope emerging from this agreement is the solidarity shown by the EU Member States as they overcome their previous differences over migration policies. Another positive of the agreement is its aim to reduce the burden and load on those Member States that receive the highest number of asylum applications. The new agreement will introduce tools like relocation and financial contributions from other Member States to support a receiving state that may not have the complete ability to support incoming asylum seekers.³³

Case 2: COVID-19

COVID-19 introduced new challenges by reducing individuals' mobility and complicated the migration crisis by increasing the risk and difficulty of refugees and asylum seekers to cross borders. Border closures and strict travel restrictions particularly limited the safety of individuals fleeing political chaos, violence, or danger who were then prevented from entering safer territories during the spread of the virus.

The involvement of the EU to mitigate disasters and emergencies involving multiple states has become increasingly crucial. Hecke et. al. refer to crisis management as being part of the EU's DNA.³⁴ COVID-19 was an exemplary global situation that upended and reformed institutions and put EU solidarity to the test. It strengthened and rebranded the role of the EU as a 'crisis manager'³⁵ as it toiled to

2024.

33 Council of the EU (n 30).

34 Steven Van Hecke, Toine Paulissen and Britt Vande Walle, 'How Covid-19 Hit Brussels and Beyond: The EU's Crisis Management Tested by a Pandemic' in Olivier Costa and Steven Van Hecke (eds), *The EU Political System After the 2019 European Elections* (1st Edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2023), 382. <<https://link.springer.com.ezproxy1.lib.gla.ac.uk/book/10.1007/978-3-031-12338-2>>

35 Susanna Villani, 'Perspectives of Solidarity within the EU Legal Order in the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic' (2023) 4(1) *Yearbook of International Disaster Law Online*, 72. <https://doi.org/10.1163/26662531_00401_006>

coordinate and manage dialogue between Member States to deal with the pandemic.

The EU's COVID-19 Failure

The EU's delayed response was met with strong criticism in the early days for being unable to tackle the pandemic as a collective unit. Notably is EU's denial of Italy's appeal for the immediate provision of health equipment in the wake of a national depleting source of masks and gloves.³⁶ The EU's embarrassing blunder during this critical time called for stronger law and propositions to better navigate through the pandemic.

During this period, the EU updated existing programs and created new health bodies like the Stability and Growth Pact to deal with the crisis.³⁷ However, there was a lack of solidarity in the EU's response as a whole to the pandemic. Member States dealt with the pandemic within the frameworks of their own government and laws, which to the rest of the world seemed amiss given the resources available to EU Member States.

A closer inspection of the comparatively brief Article 168 of the TFEU reveals the Union's restricted role in the health domain.³⁸ Health falls under the EU's *supporting competences*, whereby the EU can only support Member States in implementing decisions derived from national policies and the general population of the Member State. The EU lacks the legal capacity to enact its own binding laws upon Member States.

Finally, the unforeseen global collapse caused by the onset of COVID-19 proved to be a herculean task transgressing the European borders. The EU's initial confusion thus was not abnormal or

36 Daniel Boffey and others, 'Revealed: Italy's call for urgent help was ignored as coronavirus swept through Europe' (*The Guardian*, 15 July 2020) <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/15/revealed-the-inside-story-of-europes-divided-coronavirus-response>>

37 Van Hecke (n 29), 387-88.

38 TFEU 2008 (n 11).

unjustified, and criticism only arose a few months into the pandemic when signs of flaws within the EU system threatening people's health emerged.

Developments to EU Law

1. The *Recovery and Resilience Facility* (RRF) is the centrepiece of the *Next Generation EU* (NGEU) plan, a major EU project undertaken during the pandemic to support EU Member States.

It is an economic recovery plan worth 800 billion euros taking two primary forms - loans that will be repaid by Member States, and grants repaid by the EU budget.³⁹ Interestingly, RRF funds are not reserved merely for COVID-19 recovery such as creating jobs or improving health facilities. The funds are also utilised for investments in digitalisation and supporting gender equality, indicative of EU's commitment to long-term visions and goals.

The acceptance and success of RRF is impressive given the initial opposition from EU Member States. Nine states, including France, Italy, and Spain backed common debt called 'coronabonds' as a means of providing economic recovery.⁴⁰ However, the idea was shot down by Germany, Netherlands, Austria, and Finland, refusing to engage in 'debt sharing'.⁴¹

The back and forth between the two groups of states during a critical time where people were losing lives everyday was regarded as a shame by the media and the public. Perhaps it was the embarrassment and pending responsibility of the EU that it owed to the world that pushed the RRF forward, or perhaps it was the natural urgency of the pandemic, but in the end, the EU Commission was able to go ahead

³⁹ European Commission, '*NextGenerationEU*' (2020) <https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/nextgenerationeu_en> Accessed 7 January 2024.

⁴⁰ Euronews, 'What are 'corona bonds' and how can they help revive the EU's economy?' (Euronews.business, 26 March 2020) <<https://www.euronews.com/business/2020/03/26/what-are-corona-bonds-and-how-can-they-help-revive-the-eu-s-economy>> Accessed 7 January 2024.

⁴¹ Ibid.

with its plan.

2. The EU Joint Procurement Agreement (JPA) existed before the spread of COVID-19, but its role as a vital solution in 2020 led to its further development.

The lack of EU's competences in the health sector was evident through the confusion and complications faced by the Union during COVID-19. With this joint agreement, the EU becomes more involved in the provision of medical supplies to Member States in an economical and timely manner.⁴² Reasonable prices, reduced costs, and equitable access provided under the JPA reduce EU fragmentation to develop a 'European Health Union'.⁴³

Improving and expanding JPA will further add to the EU's portfolio as a crisis manager by being better replete with the appropriate measures for dealing with future emergencies. The JPA's success is also reflected in the increased number of signatory Member States, rising from six to 37, in a transition from nationalistic behaviour to solidarity.⁴⁴ Other Member States, realising the potential and merit of the JPA, have started leaning towards this mechanism after seeing its positive benefits and management to the terrors of the pandemic.

The flexibility of JPA, however, is a double-edged sword.⁴⁵ Member States are allowed to opt in or out of the agreement when they want. This tempts Member States to join the agreement in crucial times

42 Emma McEvoy and Delia Ferri, 'The Role of the Joint Procurement Agreement during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Assessing Its Usefulness and Discussing Its Potential to Support a European Health Union,' (2020) 11(4) *European journal of Risk Regulation*, 851-863. <<https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2020.91>>

43 Eoin Ryan, 'New dawn for the EU's joint procurement crisis response' (*Pharmaceutical Technology*, 19 October 2022) <<https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/pricing-and-market-access/eu-joint-procurement/>> Accessed 9 January 2024.

44 McEvoy (n 39), 859-60.

45 Natasha Azzopardi-Muscat, Peter Schroder-Bäck and Helmut Brand, 'The European Union Joint Procurement Agreement for cross-border health threats: what is the potential for this new mechanism of health system collaboration?' (2017) 12(1) *Health Economics, Policy, and Law*, 53. <<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133116000219>>

(such as COVID-19) when they need urgent medical care, but also makes it possible for them to leave the agreement. This raises concerns over how easy it is to create political division in the JPA, which could threaten the EU's solidarity and the power of EU law. Fortunately, for the most part, the JPA was the EU's saviour during the pandemic and is expected to continue fostering cooperation between the Member States rather than dividing them.

3. *The Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency* (SURE) was a scheme introduced as a financial support system to mitigate unemployment risks during the pandemic. Together, the EU provided €98.4 billion to 19 Member States to cover unemployed individuals, enterprises, and sectors such as food and manufacturing.⁴⁶

According to Claeys,⁴⁷ SURE has a 'lighter' and 'more agile' framework as compared to other EU financial programs. This facilitates the disbursement to Member States, especially severely impacted states like Italy and Spain that received the largest amount of crucial loans to bolster their crumbling economy. This EU provision additionally introduced the concept of short-term work schemes to Member States like Cyprus and Greece which lacked such reinforcements when the pandemic hit as opposed to pre-conditioned states like Belgium and Germany.⁴⁸ This aligns with the EU's vision to integrate more states not just politically and geographically, but also to accommodate existing Member States to adopt common measures and frameworks, helping unify EU policy.

However, the NGEU and SURE plans significantly increased the EU's

46 European Commission, 'SURE' (*Economy and Finance*, 2023) <https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-financial-assistance/sure_en> Accessed 27 January 2024.

47 Grégory Claeys, 'The European Union's SURE plan to safeguard employment: a small step forward' (*Bruegel*, 20 May 2020) <<https://www.bruegel.org/blog-post/european-unions-sure-plan-safeguard-employment-small-step-forward>> Accessed 26 January 2024.

48 Grégory Claeys, Conor McCaffrey and Lennard Welslau, 'What will it cost the European Union to pay its economic recovery debt?' (*Bruegel*, 9 October 2023) <<https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/what-will-it-cost-european-union-pay-its-economic-recovery-debt>> Accessed 26 January 2024.

scale of borrowing and debt.⁴⁹ Economists have expressed concern about how and when these loans will be repaid, possibly requiring new EU budget resources or increasing Member States' contribution to the budget. This will affect people as the repayment effect trickles down to households and their consumption decisions.

Redefining Human Rights

The evaluation of developments in EU law introduced by the migration crisis and COVID-19 have a profound effect on human rights. The EU remains a dynamic force committed to protect and uphold human rights through regular negotiations and amendments of law, alongside the creation of new legislation, to respond to unfamiliar challenges arising in the world.

The collaborative endeavour of the EU body and its Member States to protect their people - and the global community by extension - from COVID-19 is one such example of a rebound from near-collapse. The provision of vaccines, stronger healthcare systems, and initiatives like the NGEU plan and the RRF positioned the EU as a strong symbol of political and social solidarity. The EU further protected people's economic human rights by increasing social cohesion and reducing poverty.⁵⁰ Additionally, the revision of the 2016 RCDr reflects the EU's robust willingness to constantly evolve and adapt laws to protect individuals, such as Article 25 demanding special and necessary protection of individuals victim to torture, harassment, or rape.⁵¹

On the other hand, although founded on principles of integration and international cooperation, the EU faces internal fractures, casting doubt on its functioning. The EU is far from resolving the permacrisis of migration and struggles with its dysfunctional *Common European Asylum System* (CEAS), raising serious concerns of human rights violation. Divergent and polarising responses from EU states

49 Ibid.

50 European Commission, 'Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard' (2024) <https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-resilience-scoreboard/index.html?lang=en> Accessed 7 January 2024.

51 Directive 2013/33/EU (n 13) Art 25

to the migration crisis further give rise to complicated perspectives and dissidence. Discrimination, harassment, and abuse faced by immigrants prevail worldwide, exacerbated by the rise of populist and far-right sentiment in some states. Concerningly, the misanthropist views and actions of state governments pose a danger to European politics and vilify the migration crisis.

Despite the 2016 RCDr designed to elicit non-discrimination and safety of asylum seekers, unlawful practices such as forced detention continue. Additionally, there is a discrepancy between Member States proclaiming solidarity to protect immigrants at the EU-level, and abiding to obligations and their national implementation. In 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron directed his appeal to Member States who bear the responsibility to facilitate immigrants' lives and integration.⁵² However, in 2023 France adopted a regressive immigration bill that attacks both foreign nationals and asylum seekers,⁵³ revealing inconsistent state behaviour.

Together, the six developments to the EU law redefine and reinforce human rights through legal revisions, collaboration among Member States, and creating better frameworks to oversee the implementation of EU law. Although the EU showcases an awareness of the challenges faced by people, involvement in tackling the challenges is slow, hampered, and omnipresent.

Conclusion

In the past decade, EU law has transcended standard norms of international law, transforming into a convoluted network of international dialogue and cooperation. This paper has analysed two among a myriad of challenges the EU faces in the 21st century and how polarisation and diverging opinions within the EU persistently

52 'French President Emmanuel Macron on the European Migration Crisis and the Future of the European Union' (2017) 43(4) *Population and Development Review*, 759-763. <<https://doi-org.ezproxy1.lib.gla.ac.uk/10.1111/padr.12116>>

53 53 Eva Cossé, 'French Lawmakers Adopt Regressive Immigration Bill' (Human Rights Watch, 20 December 2023) <<https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/20/french-lawmakers-adopt-regressive-immigration-bill>>

render it difficult to create effective laws.

The migration crisis plagues the EU and its policymakers and continues to remain a point of debate among its Member States. As some Member States outrightly discourage asylum seekers into their territory, it disrupts the CEAS and the laws enshrined within that govern and protect asylum seekers. The EUAA has been integral in generating reports and ancillary data to assist policymakers and governments create and reform laws. However, the merit of RCDr and the 2023 pact are weighed down by the freedom granted to Member States to individualistically adopt EU legal acts. It opens a gap for Member States to agree to EU laws on paper, but bypass actual implementation and regular surveillance to ensure human rights compliance.

The EU's lack of solidarity and cohesion was also observed in its initial dealing of COVID-19 when signs of flaws within the EU system threatened people's health. Member States juggled between personal, national responsibilities and international obligations in a narrow timeframe. Eventually, the Member States arrived on the same page through diligence from the EU's principal organs such as the Commission and the Parliament. Necessary legal developments enacted to combat the pandemic consisted of instruments providing financial support, medical supplies, and issuing guidelines. This is evidently why the JPA and RRF received widespread appreciation for convincing even reluctant Member States to get onboard the joint mission.

While the migration crisis highlights systemic flaws in the EU, the advocacy of the media, human rights organisations, and the general public becomes increasingly important in challenging the EU to uphold integrity. The resolution of the pandemic and lessons learned from it keep hope alive for future potential of the EU and Member States. The ever-changing political landscape of the international system and spewing conflicts, combined with changing priorities, complicate the process to create a holistic EU law. Still, crisis management remains essential to the survival of the EU and has in fact strengthened the system by fostering cooperation and peaceful resolutions. The EU

law continues to transform and extend the betterment of people, their rights, and their development. Moving forward, the EU needs to find a balance between the legal and political implications of its laws to deliver its promises and future achievements.

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War of Narratives: A Concentric Dissection of China's Taiwan Policy

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This paper explores the intricate strategic narratives that China employs in its policy towards Taiwan. Through concentric analyses, it dissects China's narratives towards Taiwan at three levels: system-level narratives, identity narratives and issue narratives. At the systemic level, China's narrative aims to position Taiwan's status under the broader goal of national unity and territorial integrity, emphasising the one-China policy and opposing external intervention. Identity narratives delve into shared history, culture, and nationalism to reinforce claims to Taiwan as part of China's inherent identity and destiny. Issue narratives, on the other hand, focus on interpreting specific events, portraying reunification with Taiwan as legitimate, inevitable and a matter of national pride. This paper also mentions counter-narratives in Taiwan that emphasise Taiwan's democratic values, unique identity and the challenges posed by China's hard-line policies. The analysis reveals how these narratives contribute to increasing China's international influence, undermining Taiwan's legitimacy, and fuelling domestic nationalism, while also potentially influencing strategic responses across the region and around the world.

Introduction

Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), represents a complex and enduring issue in the geopolitics of East Asia. Established by the Kuomintang (KMT) following their retreat in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan has stood as a symbol of resistance and a challenge to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) claims of sovereignty. The historical and strategic significance of Taiwan has placed it at the centre of a longstanding diplomatic and ideological struggle between the PRC and the ROC, which continues to impact regional stability and international relations.

The question of Taiwan's status has persisted as a thorny issue for successive generations of Chinese leadership, the widening power

gap between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait only serves to complicate the matter further. For decades, Chinese leaders have oscillated between strategies of peaceful reunification and forceful annexation, deploying a range of strategic narratives to assert their claims over Taiwan. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, there has been a noticeable shift in Beijing's approach, marked by an apparent loss of patience and an intensification of efforts to assert sovereignty over Taiwan.¹ This paper delves into the multifaceted nature of China's strategic narratives towards Taiwan, dissecting them across three distinct levels: system-level narratives, identity narratives, and issue narratives. These narratives serve multiple purposes: bolstering the PRC's international standing, undermining the legitimacy of the ROC, negating Taiwanese identity in favour of a unified Chinese identity, portraying Taiwan negatively, and fuelling domestic nationalism in the PRC. It will also mention Taiwan's counter-narrative, as reflected in the promotion of democratic values, the construction of its unique identity, and its response to the mainland's economic and military-diplomatic offensive. Due to Taiwan's important strategic position, the strategic narratives across the Taiwan Strait have had a great impact on the East Asia-Pacific strategies of countries around the world, and it is worthwhile to analyse these strategic narratives in detail.

The Geopolitical Intricacies and Post-Civil War History of the Taiwan Issue

After the defeat of the Kuomintang in Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait became a natural barrier, as the People's Republic of China, lacking a navy, was unable to defeat Taiwan, which was then a relatively strong maritime power, at sea. And, due to the island's strategic importance, Taiwan, which has been called "the second unsinkable aircraft carrier", played a vital role in protecting US assets in the Western Pacific.²

1 Suisheng Zhao, "Is Beijing's Long Game on Taiwan About to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinkmanship, and Military Takeover," *Journal of Contemporary China* 32, no.143(2023): 706.

2 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, "*Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge Studies in International Relations*", (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 138-140; Sheryn Lee, "The Defining Divide: Cross-Strait Relations and US, Taiwan, China Strategic Dynamics," *Security*

As a result, the US-Taiwan alliance shaped the regional landscape in the early post-war period, and Taiwan existed in the world as a legitimate China. This state of affairs lasted until 1971, when the United Nations recognised the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate representative of China and the Republic of China was expelled from the UN.³ Taiwan's declining international status led to a growing number of countries establishing formal diplomatic relations with China and severing formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, leaving it in diplomatic isolation.⁴ With the election of pro-independence Lee Teng-hui as president in the late 20th century and the victories of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2000 and 2004, Taiwan demonstrated a growing tendency towards independence, in response to which China introduced an anti-separation law in 2005, confirming that force would be used if Taiwan became independent.⁵ This tense situation has continued to the present day, with China's patience running thin and Taiwan's independent tendencies growing stronger, as mentioned before.

The Definition of Strategic Narratives

Before moving on to the three main sections of the article, a definition and explanation of strategic narratives is necessary to help with the specific analyses that follow. According to Miskimmon et al., strategic narratives are representations of a series of events and identities, as well as the government's efforts to achieve its goals by assigning defined meanings to the past, present, and future.⁶ Simply put, strategic narratives aim to influence other actors' responses to events, shaping their identities as well as their thinking, in the short and long term.⁷ It has been categorised into three chief concentric levels, with system-

Challenges 7, no.1(2011): 88.

3 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). *Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations* 2758:XXVI (1971): 2.

4 Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, 149-151.

5 Sheryn Lee, *The Defining Divide*, 80.

6 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, "*Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*", (New York: Routledge, 2013), 57-58.

7 Lawrence Freedman, "Strategic Communication," *Adelphi Paper* 45, (no.379, 2006): 78.

level narratives on the outermost layer, identity narratives on the middle layer, and issue narratives at the innermost core. First, system-level narratives explain how the international structure has changed over time and are the cornerstone of other strategic narratives. Identity narratives define how states, organisations and other actors perceive themselves and how they are perceived by others in the international arena. Issue narratives influence how specific international issues are understood and debated, often mono-thematic.⁸ These theories can be applied to China's strategic narratives on the issue of Taiwan, and their use has gradually increased in frequency and taken on a radicalising character since Xi Jinping's rise to power, which is also closely related to the power contrast between China and Taiwan.⁹

The system-level of strategic narratives

The system-level dimension of strategic narratives, which is a larger framework out of the three, occurs at the national level and takes the form of a grand strategy. At this level, China's strategic narrative depicts the Taiwan issue as one of national unity and territorial integrity, rather than one of legitimacy between two equal regimes. China emphasises that Taiwan is an integral part of its territory, a renegade province that must eventually be brought back under its control, and that any attempts at Taiwan independence are a violation of its sovereignty.¹⁰ Moreover, China places the one-China policy under its own strategic narratives, describing the Taiwan issue as its question of own national security, and that "the resolution of the Taiwan issue is an internal affair of China and should be resolved by the Chinese people themselves without resorting to foreign forces".¹¹

8 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, "*Strategic Narratives*", 10-11.

9 Yi Edward Yang, "China's Strategic Narratives in Global Governance Reform under Xi Jinping," *Journal of Contemporary China* 30, no.128(2021), 300-301.

10 Mingfu Liu, "*The China dream: great power thinking & strategic posture in the post-American era*", (New York: CN Times Books, 2015), 227, 323-324.

11 State Council of PRC. "The one-China principle and the issue of Taiwan", 2000, accessed 4 Jan 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/twwt/twwtbps/202206/t20220606_10699030.html.

It is not sufficient to achieve the strategic narratives described above, but rather to build on a larger system-level strategic narrative in which China seeks to establish a balanced, multipolar world order. For example, it has emphasised in the past Zhou Enlai's elegant diplomatic gestures and his Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, demonstrating that China maintains a friendly position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.¹² Furthermore, China's foreign policy has often displayed counter-hegemonic tendencies, opposing the dominant influence of both the Soviet Union and the United States during and after the Cold War.¹³ This stance is partly a response to the "century of humiliation" China endured, where it suffered under foreign domination and intervention. This has shaped China's current approach to international relations, where it positions itself as a champion of national sovereignty and an opponent of hegemonic practice. The narrative of China's "peaceful rise" is another critical component of this strategy, designed to counter fears of China's emergence as a global power and to reassure the international community of its peaceful intentions.¹⁴ This narrative has helped China cultivate a friendlier international image and bolster its credibility as a nation that respects the sovereignty of other countries and opposes interventionism.¹⁵ The peaceful rise narrative is a strategic tool in China's diplomatic arsenal, intended to assuage concerns about its growing power while advancing its interests and influence on the global stage.

However, China's internationalised portrayal of the one-China policy is to some extent its own side of the narrative, and although China claims that its principles are the general consensus of the 181 countries or territories with which it has diplomatic relations, only 51 have actually maintained a position on the one-China principle that is

12 Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, "The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary China* 17, no.56(2008): 429.

13 Mingfu Liu, "The China dream", 80-81.

14 Yiwei Wang, "Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no.1(2008), 263.

15 Mingfu Liu, "The China dream", 50-54.

consistent with that of China.¹⁶ In response, Taiwan's counter-narrative emphasises its commitment to democratic values in the context of global democracy, and claims that its allies - Europe and the United States - have their own, one-China policies that are at odds with China. But China's rapid rise has made the option of economic diplomacy more effective, and in other cases even forcing countries to back down through power politics.¹⁷ As China's economic diplomacy expands its rhetoric beyond the economic sphere to shape international opinion about Taiwan, Taiwan's counter-narrative has become increasingly difficult and its voice is diminishing in the international community.

China's system-level strategic narratives on Taiwan thus form part of a larger story about China and the international order that unfolds in terms of China's role as a peacefully rising global power, a defender of a world order in which national sovereignty is inviolable, opposes the hegemonic and interventionist rhetoric of the Global North and advocates the establishment of a multipolar, balanced and harmonious world order. In this narrative, Taiwan is portrayed as an integral part of China's territory, divided by historical eras such as colonialism and the Cold War. The story also underscores the notion of the "one-China" policy, which is positioned as the basis for maintaining global stability and respect for international norms, as an increasingly powerful China sees it as the key to establishing diplomatic relations. Through such logically self-referential strategic narratives, China can thwart external interference as an expression of its internal affairs and its defence of the world at large, which enhances the legitimacy of its claim on Taiwan.

The Identity Narratives

Within the larger framework of system-level narratives, the legitimacy

16 Wei-Feng Tzeng, "China's Comprehensive Approach to Shaping the Narrative on Taiwan," in *Unpacking Beijing's Narrative on Taiwan*, ed. Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy (Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2023), 15.

17 Chong Ja Jan, "The Many "One Chinas": Multiple Approaches to Taiwan and China," *Carnegie China*. 2023, accessed Jan 5, 2024, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/09/many-one-chinasmultiple-approaches-to-taiwan-and-china-pub-89003>.

of China's claim to Taiwan is strengthened, but there is still a need for strategic narratives from the social, individual perspective, that is, the creation of identity narratives. This strategic narrative consists of three main components: history, culture, and nationalism. There are strong links between the three, as Chinese nationalism easily draws strength from its history and culture due to the country's long history and, as will be mentioned below, its cultural continuity, and the founding of the People's Republic of China relied heavily on domestic nationalism, with its founding father, Mao Zedong, for example, being a staunch nationalist.¹⁸ Firstly, Chinese diplomats happily refer to their 5,000 years of imperial history, although the first 1,000 years are to some extent untested, while Taiwan was discovered by the Chinese regime in 230 AD and incorporated during the Qing Dynasty, which reinforced the historical unity between the two sides.¹⁹ Its subsequent occupation and colonisation by Japan in 1895 for 50 years and then by the Kuomintang regime after 1945 has been described as a bitter, unnatural division, and one that will inevitably lead to the reunification of China as a matter of historical necessity.²⁰

The enduring legacy of China's long history is deeply intertwined with its rich cultural heritage and the use of ideographs, a distinctive aspect of Chinese civilisation.²¹ The official narrative propagated by the Chinese government emphasises the shared linguistic, cultural, and historical connections that span the Taiwan Strait, with a particular focus on traditional Confucian values. This narrative is not just a mainland phenomenon but is also echoed in Taiwan's strategic narratives. Taiwan, through its use of traditional Chinese characters and its promotion of traditional Chinese culture, positions itself as the authentic custodian of these ancient traditions.²² This cultural alignment serves as a bridge between the two territories, reinforcing

18 Henry Kissinger, *On China* (Beijing: China CITIC Press: 2012), 97.

19 Consulate General of PRC in Busan, "Taiwan has been part of China since ancient times," 2010, accessed 30 Dec 2023, http://busan.china-consulate.gov.cn/zt/zgtw/201004/t20100428_5781266.htm.

20 Suisheng Zhao, "Is Beijing's Long Game on Taiwan About to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinkmanship, and Military Takeover", 706.

21 Neil Munro, "China's Identity through a Historical Lens," *Journal of Advanced Military Studies Strategic Culture*. (2022), 37.

22 Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, "The Conception of Soft Power", 433.

a sense of shared heritage. However, in recent decades, leaders from Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have made concerted efforts to cultivate a distinct Taiwanese identity, distinct from the traditional Republic of China (ROC) identity. This move is seen as an attempt to differentiate Taiwan from the overarching one-China strategic narratives that Beijing espouses. Despite these efforts, the Chinese identity narrative, deeply rooted in thousands of years of shared history and culture, persists as a form of resistance to the Taiwanese push for a unique identity, although its influence appears to be waning in the face of Taiwan's evolving national consciousness.²³

The identity narratives about history mentioned above also contribute greatly to nationalist identity narratives in China, these narratives often juxtapose the past glory of China's imperial era with the tumultuous and painful period known as the "century of humiliation," during which China experienced significant external aggression and internal turmoil.²⁴ This historical framing plays a critical role in shaping contemporary Chinese nationalism, particularly in the context of the Communist Party's leadership, which is often credited with enabling the Chinese people to 'stand up' and reclaim their national dignity. Especially after Xi Jinping's rise to power, China's official 'Chinese Dream' narrative has gradually emerged, the concept of the 'Chinese Dream,' a central theme in Xi's vision for the country, encapsulates this resurgence of national pride and ambition. The perceived incomplete reunification of China, with Taiwan remaining outside of PRC control, is often portrayed as a glaring obstacle to the fulfilment of the Chinese Dream. As study notes, the recovery of Taiwan is thus not merely a territorial concern for China but is imbued with deep symbolic significance, it is seen as a critical step towards erasing the lingering scars of the past and achieving the comprehensive national rejuvenation that is at the heart of the Chinese Dream²⁵. This narrative intertwines historical, nationalistic, and political elements, highlighting the complexity of the Taiwan issue in China's domestic and foreign policy.

23 Ibid., 434, 437

24 Neil Munro, "China's Identity through a Historical Lens", 36.

25 Mingfu Liu, "*The China dream*", 227, 340.

Thus, the identity strategic narratives of China towards Taiwan begin with the story of a glorious civilisation torn apart by internal conflict and external aggression, symbolising a period of weakness and division in China known as the Century of Humiliation. The story then shifts to the present, where a revived and powerful China is striving to right the wrongs of history and realise its long-cherished dream of national reunification. Taiwan is portrayed as a lost sibling, separated by the waves of history but destined to be reunited with the mainland. This narrative aims to resonate with the Chinese people's sense of national pride and historical mission. It helps to create a strong identity link between the Chinese people and the Taiwan question, viewing reunification not only as a political end but also as a moral imperative and a crucial means towards restoring China's rightful place in the world.

The Issue Narratives

After the system-level narratives as well as the identity narratives in the larger framework, issue narratives can function by explaining particular events and combining them with the first two strategic narratives. On the one hand, China's issue narratives are largely aimed at convincing international community that the recovery of Taiwan is legitimate. For example, after the outbreak of COVID-19, the Taiwanese authorities attempted to leverage COVID-19 to make themselves a member of the WHO as a sovereign state, because Taiwan is unable to participate in the international system by establishing diplomatic relations with other countries and joining international organisations, this ability is severely limited by China's use of international influence.²⁶ But this does not mean that Taiwan is excluded from WHO, they are just not a sovereign participant.²⁷ China claimed to have been cooperating with Taiwanese experts and helping Taiwan fight the pandemic since the outbreak, a move that could be considered "ungrateful" by China,

26 Richard C Bush, *Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 6.

27 Yonghong Tang, "Tsai unscrupulously exploiting epidemic". *China Daily*. (2020), accessed 5 Jan 2024, <https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/14/WS5e45d5cea3101282172776ad.html>.

not to mention ‘blood brotherhood’.²⁸ Taiwan has not only leveraged this incident as an opportunity to seek independence, but elsewhere, such as in the manufacturing sector, it has also printed the ‘Made in Taiwan’ label on its products, a practice that is not uncommon, Taiwan is not only using this event as an opportunity to seek independence, but elsewhere, such as in international arena, it is also using the name *Taiwan*, rather than *Taiwan, China*.²⁹ Through such narratives, China combines them with domestic nationalism to incite public anger at home and utilise them as its own weapon; at the same time, at the international level, because China’s system-level narratives package the Taiwan issue as its own internal issue under the one-China policy, it can make the international community less supportive of the Taiwan independence by using its soft power. In addition, China is reducing the legitimacy of the Taiwanese government by spreading information that reduces the credibility of the government and is tinged with conspiracy theories.³⁰ Research shows that during Taiwan’s local and presidential elections from 2020 to 2022, China, through its proxies, disseminated news and images of ‘democratic failure’ in Taiwan, mainly in terms of the ruling party’s loss of credibility, the government’s incompetence in governance, and including that ‘Taiwan is just a tool of the US’, ‘the US hollowed out TSMC’ and other statements.³¹ It has created division and distrust among the Taiwanese people and increased the legitimacy of China’s recovery of Taiwan.

On the other hand, China can also make the international community believe that the recovery of Taiwan is inevitable by explaining certain news and events. Firstly, China has always suppressed Taiwan’s international space through economic inducement and diplomatic coercion. For example, the number of countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic recognition has been reduced to 14 by 2021, with the

28 Ibid.

29 Xing Dong, “First pineapples, now sugar apples: Taiwan threatens to take China to WTO over new fruit import ban”. ABC News, (2021) accessed 5 Jan 2024. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-21/china-taiwan-fruit-ban-may-jeopardise-application/100479612>.

30 Poyu Tseng, “Taiwan-China and the ‘Battle of Narratives’” in *Unpacking Beijing’s Narrative on Taiwan*, ed. Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy (Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2023), 41-42.

31 Ibid., 46.

vast majority of countries recognising the One China policy, and China has spared no effort to prevent Taiwan from attending international organisations as a sovereign state.³² Such issue narratives can create a sense that Taiwan has no allies internationally and that re-joining China is only a matter of time. Secondly, China has worked hard to describe Taiwan's dependence on itself, especially economically; China has always been Taiwan's largest, major trading partner, and despite Tsai's efforts to shed her dependence on China since she came to power, exports to China have continued unabated.³³ China has weaponised this dependence and applied it to soft power, hitting Taiwan's tourism industry by restricting mainland tourists, and coercing Taiwan through economic sanctions like raising tariffs, Xinhua propagated this as Taiwan's inability to leave the mainland and the futility of independence.³⁴ Thirdly, the issue narratives of China's recent frequent military manoeuvres in the vicinity of Taiwan and its much-talked-about forceful reunification of Taiwan, as well as the tepid reaction of the United States, can create a sense of powerlessness among the Taiwanese people and use both the hard and soft power to make the world believe that if China is determined to attack Taiwan, no country will be able to protect it, and that its reunification cause is unstoppable.³⁵ By interpreting and publicising certain events in a particular way as described above, China is attempting to make the re-annexation of Taiwan sufficiently recognisable in the world and to reduce the level of reaction from the populations of other countries.

In response to the challenges from China in issue narratives, Taiwan has also achieved a lot of counter-narratives. Firstly, Taiwan vigorously promotes its soft power, such as good governance, good economic

32 Suisheng Zhao, "Is Beijing's Long Game on Taiwan About to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinkmanship, and Military Takeover", 709.

33 Ibid., 710.

34 Reuters, "China threatens more trade sanctions on Taiwan as election nears," (2023), accessed 6 Jan 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-threatens-more-trade-sanctions-taiwan-election-nears-2023-12-27/>; Xinhua, "Taiwan Affairs Office: Facts prove Taiwan's economic development can't be separated from mainland China" (2020), accessed 6 Jan 2024, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-12/30/content_5575440.htm.

35 Suisheng Zhao, "Is Beijing's Long Game on Taiwan About to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinkmanship, and Military Takeover", 714-721.

development and stable social environment, especially for the nascent democracies in South-East Asia, which can increase their goodwill and political support for Taiwan.³⁶ Secondly, Taiwan's well-developed information industry can also be a major pillar against China's economic pressure, and through cooperation with other countries in the era of globalisation, Taiwan can set an example of economic development. Third, in the face of China's military pressure, Taiwan has held frequent military exercises, such as the Hankwang-33 military drills, and has increased military cooperation with traditional allies such as the United States and Japan, in order to advertise to the world its determination to counter China's forceful attack on Taiwan.³⁷

Conclusion

In conclusion, the strategic narrative of China regarding Taiwan is a complex and multi-faceted construct, shaped by a confluence of historical, cultural, and political factors. At its core, it encompasses system-level narratives that touch upon the norms of international sovereignty and the widely debated one-China policy, along with a strong stance against hegemony and interventionism. These system-level narratives are intricately linked with identity narratives, which emphasise historical and cultural unity, as well as the theme of national rejuvenation. In parallel, issue narratives justify the rationality and inevitability of China's policies and actions towards Taiwan, painting them as natural and necessary steps in the pursuit of national integrity and unity. On the other side of the strait, Taiwan's counter-narratives strive to establish its distinct identity, sovereignty, and democratic values. However, the effectiveness of these narratives faces challenges due to the significant power disparity between China and Taiwan. Despite the increasing international recognition of Taiwan's democratic achievements and its significant role in global

36 Wang, Hongying, and Yeh-Chung Lu. "The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: a comparative study of China and Taiwan." *Journal of Contemporary China* 17, no.56 (2008): 425-447.

37 Patrick Porter and Michael Mazarr, "Countering China's Adventurism over Taiwan: A Third Way," *Lowy Institute* (2021), accessed 30 Dec 2023, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way-0>.

affairs, the island's diplomatic space remains constrained by China's growing influence and assertive foreign policy.

This dynamic interplay of narratives reflects the ongoing tension and complexity of the Taiwan issue. It underscores the need for patience, strategic thinking, and comprehensive understanding from the Chinese leadership. The Taiwan question is not just a matter of territorial sovereignty; it is also a test of China's approach to international relations, its adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence, and its ability to manage complex cross-strait relations in a rapidly changing world.

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Investigating the Influence of Commedia Dell'Arte on Punch and Judy Shows and the Development of its Educational Aspect

Anna Chiara Savi

Punch and Judy is a British puppet show known for its comic use of violence, but is this the only factor that contributed to this show's durability? Looking at its socio-historical context, its influence from *commedia dell'arte*, and drawing on multiple theories, this paper explores Punch and Judy's development from a form of pure entertainment to educational entertainment. However, it also argues that while it contributed to the entertainment and educational landscapes of its period, its educational value is condemned in light of contemporary moral standards.

Introduction

Research into *commedia dell'arte* has frequently focused on its origins as an art form and on its characters, its development in the Italian context but also abroad with different practitioners borrowing and adapting characters and aspects of the *commedia dell'arte*. This paper will build on existing research focusing on the educational value of *commedia dell'arte* and its influence in the context of Punch and Judy, a traditional British puppet show featuring Punch and his wife Judy in scenes from their daily life. Through an analysis of the *commedia dell'arte* and Punch and Judy contexts, characters, and audience, this paper will discuss how, even if education was not the primary purpose of Punch and Judy shows, this aspect evolved in 19th century Britain.

Until the 1600s, *commedia dell'arte* was one of the predominant forms of theatre in Europe. However, in 1784, Friedrich Schiller delivered, and later published, an essay where he explores the moral and educational potential of theatre. This essay was influential in forging the concept of theatre as a moral institution and what constitutes "proper theatre", which is theatre that serves a vital moral function by allowing audiences to experience intense emotions such as pity

and fear, thereby achieving a cathartic release, while educating its audience's aesthetic taste.¹ *Commedia dell'arte* however, did not fit into that landscape, because the theatre reformers of the time believed that it had no moral or educational value. Therefore, some argued for its complete abolishment, while others believed that it could be 'reformed' to constitute new types of theatre, for example, Carlo Goldoni's or Carlo Gozzi's plays.

Theatre, in Western culture, is regarded as media that should both educate as well as entertain. This could originate directly from Greek theatre, where catharsis, the purging of passions, through the representation of *hybris*, any form of excess, was key; or it could be influenced by Horace's argument that all literature should instruct and delight. This tradition of associating theatre and education has been most explicit through applied theatre practices such as Theatre in Education, originating in 1965, specifically targeted to children. However, in my opinion, theatre can be considered inherently educational in the way in which it always looks at society through a critical eye, depicting it, praising or criticising it, and always having a message to communicate. This makes theatre intentionally educational in its creation and delivery, teaching the audience about morals and social behaviours to adopt or reject, as well as culture and history.

Commedia dell'arte, I would argue, is not so different from instructional theatre. Though it is commonly seen simply as a form of entertainment, the form it was born and developed as, looking back at it, its potential educational value is uncovered. Its teaching is still part of actors' training (exploring the use of masks, movement, and voice) or drama-therapy courses (at least in Italy), meaning that *commedia dell'arte* is retained to have educational value but only in practice-based disciplines. As a result, studying *commedia dell'arte* through an educational lens is largely uncommon as its primary function has been entertainment. However, by reflecting on carnivalesque, as well as this dissertation's case study, we will see how *commedia dell'arte* can be retained to have an educative purpose and how subsequent

1 Friedrich Schiller, *Theater Considered as A Moral Institution*, Schiller Institute, accessed March 19, 2024, https://archive.schillerinstitute.com/transl/schil_theatremoral.html.

practitioners, even if they did not borrow every aspect of commedia, have all retained an educative purpose alongside the entertaining purpose.

Uncovering Commedia Dell'Arte's Educational Aspect

To contextualise this approach, I would like to start by providing an overview of commedia dell'arte, an art form that originated in the 16th century in what is now Italy. It was a form of street theatre heavily reliant on improvisation, the use of masks, and stock characters (also referred to as "Masks"). The stock characters, for which commedia dell'arte is most known, were caricatures of certain types of people or vices (for example Pantalone represented the avaricious Venetian merchant) and were easily recognisable by their speech (dialects), costumes, masks, and attributes. Basing a Mask on specific stereotypes and clichés allowed the actor of this Mask to specialise in their character, and develop a specific skill set (jokes, gestures, stock comedic routines) becoming easily recognisable to the audience. By seeing a character the audience knew who they represented and their role in the plot even without understanding the text, as the languages used, the Italian of the Lovers or the different dialects, were not necessarily spoken and understood by lower class people everywhere in current Italy.

Being based on stereotypes also meant that these characters never evolved and would have the same roles in intrigues, typically revolving around the Zanni (servants) helping the Lovers persuade their fathers to approve of their union. The Zanni's persuasion process was subversive in nature, as they would deceive their masters. Looking at this subversion through the lens of Bakhtin's carnivalesque, it can be seen as an educational tool insofar as it acts as a catharsis for the audience. Bakhtin contends that the presence of a Carnival allowed the authorities to maintain control over the masses by allowing them to dress up as figures of power and mock them. One of its aspects, which he calls "eccentricity", refers to the encouragement and acceptance of people dressing up and performing in strange manners and expressing themselves in any way, especially transgressive.² This

acquires a cathartic effect since people are allowed to let out their dissatisfaction with the authorities. In this way, commedia dell'arte performances become a form of perpetual Carnival where the Zanni's subversion of authority purges people of their frustrations against any form of authority.

However, I believe it is important to highlight that commedia dell'arte's primary purpose was entertainment and no text or testimony that has reached our time demonstrates an intentional educational objective, neither in its creation nor its development. This aspect is uncovered nowadays when looking back at the format of the plays, but also at the structure of a commedia company. One of the distinct characteristics of the commedia dell'arte company was the absence of a full script which subsequently led to the actors and actresses actively honing their creative abilities to generate new content and deliver an excellent performance. This, in turn, produced a strong need for cooperation among actors, eliminating any potential hierarchies between them as everyone's innovative ideas were acknowledged and embraced. In fact, creativity is an important skill from an educational point of view as it focuses on the development of alternative thinking and involves making mistakes.³ As a result, the structure and management of a commedia company and the importance of teamwork in a fully improvised setting, allowed actors to be treated with human-dignity and thus acknowledged as fully human.

Contextualising commedia dell'arte, identifying the lens of carnivalesque, and focusing on its structure allows us to read commedia dell'arte as educational for both audiences and actors. It will also provide a reading for our case study as similar elements allowed Punch and Judy puppeteers to vehicle their educational message to their audiences. While Punch and Judy are clearly related to commedia dell'arte characters and retain their carnivalesque subversion of authority and morals, their shows are also a product of 18th-century theatre reforms. Through the investigation of the

of Minnesota Press, 1984), 123.

3 "The Role of Creativity in Learning and Education", *TigerCampus*, 2023, accessed Jan 22 2024, <https://www.tigercampus.hk/role-of-creativity-in-learning-and-education/>.

commedia dell'arte's influence on Punch and Judy, as well as Britain's socio-historical context, this paper thus looks at how Punch and Judy shows gained their educational value.

Contextualising Punch and Judy

Punch and Judy is a traditional British puppet show featuring Punch and his wife Judy in a series of short scenes each depicting an interaction between Punch and another character who usually falls victim to his violence, but despite its violence, this show is still seen as comedy. Looking at this show, I will focus on the period from the Regency Era to the Victorian Era in Britain. The change of monarch in 1837 led to a change in morals, from looser morals (including gambling, the presence of obscene theatre, and street performances) to stricter morals dictated by the Evangelical faction of the Church of England. One of the changes implemented by the Evangelists was banning street performances, which caused Punch and Judy shows to move from a public to a private form of entertainment, from addressing a predominantly adult audience to addressing a children's audience, significantly changing the meaning of the violence they portrayed in their dynamic. Looking at the morals of both the Regency and Victorian eras, this case study investigates the puppet's change of sphere and how the role of the audience changed the use of violence in Punch and Judy.

Western puppets represent commedia dell'arte characters in miniature form. This has stemmed from the need to modify commedia performances to weather or actors' physical conditions in order for a company to still be able to put on a performance and earn their wages. The fact that they were easier to transport and put up for an audience, as a puppet stage is smaller than an actor one, may explain why this form spread more easily and widely than commedia dell'arte. Pulcinella for example is a commedia dell'arte Zanni and puppet whose popularity has perhaps grown the most, having many counterparts in Europe such as Polichinelle (France), Petrushka (Russia) or Punch (Britain), the last one being the focus of this chapter. Pulcinella embodies the figure of the trickster who rebels against all forms of authority, traits that Punch has

inherited. In his shows, he kills the Doctor, challenges state authorities and the Devil — the ultimate form of evil in Christianity — but also beats and kills his wife, which could be interpreted as a challenge to the institution of marriage. In *commedia dell'arte*, Pulcinella defies his master's authority by assisting the *Innamorati*. Similarly, Punch defies authority and morality by murdering characters and portraying a violent marriage. Although their goals are different, they both rely on the carnivalesque's reversal of roles to deceive authorities, defying their position as more powerful and intelligent than lower-class people. In both *Punch and Judy* and *commedia dell'arte*, these reversals are based on ridiculing the authority through verbal or physical wit and trickery. For example, Punch in Act II of *The Tragical Comedy, or the Comical Tragedy of Punch and Judy* (the only full play text remaining of their shows), tricks the Doctor into believing he is badly hurt from his fall off a horse and later kills him, or in Act III a Constable and an Officer come to arrest him for the murders of Scaramouche, Judy, and their child but Punch ends up beating them until they finally arrest him. It is interesting to note that figures from the police are not killed compared to the other characters, showing that although *Punch and Judy* acted as a form of catharsis for the audience, puppeteers did not want to encourage rebellion against real life state authorities, which could have negative consequences in a period leading to (and later threatened by) the French Revolution.

Punch and Judy as Social Commentators of Regency Era Britain

In relation to the portrayal of a violent marriage, *Punch and Judy* evolve in a changing Britain where women started to work and earn wages, altering the patriarchal order. Prior to this evolution, men worked while women were confined to domestic duties. Working women gaining a form of financial freedom brought about a new family dynamic that seems to have given these women more confidence to stand up to their husbands instead of dutifully accepting their place in society. Rosalind Crone writes that literary men of the time observed that this new dynamic led to an “inevitable clash between sexes”,⁴ an elegant

4 Rosalind Crone, “Mr and Mrs Punch in Nineteenth-Century England,”

way to say that husbands were beating their wives in order to subdue them. Therefore, although the domestic violence depicted in *Punch and Judy* has comedic purposes due to it being exaggerated, it also takes on an anthropological role depicting working family norms of the time. It could be argued that using violence as a comedic tool is a lowbrow form of comedy, thus appealing to lower classes, while for higher classes, this lowbrow comedy could have cathartic purposes. While high-class men may have enjoyed *Punch's* violence, in line with ideas of misogyny, it could have encouraged them not to reproduce this domestic violence, as reproducing low-class customs would not be acceptable for their status.

During the Regency era, even though the Evangelist faction of the Church of England grew in power, it was not strong enough to control the habits of gambling and debauchery of the time. During this period, puppet shows were still street performances, which were much more common and less regulated, their audience consisting mostly of adults so their violence was more easily tolerated. Moreover, puppetry allowed for less criticism from society and authorities as the characters were wooden or glove figures that were not alive, thus no matter what they represented, it would still be considered a play. This ultimately allowed freer discussion of private matters in public. *Punch's* violence was also appreciated by his audiences as it allowed him to defy the morality of melodramas, a popular genre of the time, where the balance of good and evil or good triumphing over evil was portrayed. Instead, in *Punch and Judy* shows, the audience could celebrate *Punch* as an anti-hero prevailing over the positive figures (the Doctor and Constable for example). However, during the Victorian era, this violence was condemned and censored as it was deemed disrespectful. Indeed, during this period, the Evangelist faction gained significant power, allowing them to monitor society and morality. They advocated for various social changes such as the abolition of slavery and legislation against child labour for example, as well as control over one's sexuality, despite the fact that standards of proper sexual behavior varied between men and women, and a need

for cultivation for all classes of society.⁵ These new codes of conduct led to a decline in gambling, horse races, and obscene theatres, and although Punch and Judy were not obscene, they presented a violence that was now condemned by Evangelical morality. Therefore, puppet shows evolved from a public to a private form of entertainment, taking place mostly inside middle-class homes, the new and ever-growing class of Victorian society. Being moved to homes, they gained a new audience — children.

Punch and Judy as Children’s Entertainment and Educator

From the 18th century onward emerged, especially in high and middle classes, the concept of “childhood” and thus the need to provide entertainment for children. Punch and Judy, who were already well known, became the perfect candidates for this new specialisation. This is how Punch and Judy puppeteers modified and moralised their shows. Indeed, although Punch’s violence remained, it acquired a new moral and educational dimension. Punch would not beat his wife and other puppets to death, his child, although thrown off stage, would be later found alive, and in the end, Punch and Judy left the audience with an image of a happily married couple. Victorian society also placed great importance on marriage, family, and domesticity so “their conjugal life became a moral tale, designed to promote the ideals of compassionate marriage and prepare boys and girls for their future roles as men and women”.⁶ These shows would teach them about the respectability of marriage, the concept of separate spheres, and the necessary passivity of a wife. It would also teach boys to control their anger and grow to be caring fathers and compassionate husbands. During this period which placed a new focus on childhood and the development of toy manufacturing in Britain, Punch and Judy became commercial figures who were even turned into toys and protagonists of nursery literature. The authors of these nurseries decided that rather than portraying Punch’s violence, presented as rare, they would emphasise on the

5 “Conflict and Consensus: Morality and Ethics in the Victorian Period,” *Brewminate: A Bold Blend of News and Ideas*, 29 Aug. 2023, accessed 21 Dec. 2023 <https://brewminate.com/conflict-and-consensus-morality-and-ethics-in-the-victorian-period>

6 Crone, “Mr and Mrs Punch”, 1074.

portrayal of a happy marriage between the couple. Judy's character was also modified to portray her as a good and faithful wife who can easily control Punch's temper. However, these new traits implied a total submission to his violence, as evidenced by Frederic Weatherly's nursery: "After the show they perform together, Judy '[...] did not bear any malice for the blows. In fact, she had not felt them, and that is a great matter when you have to be beaten continually.'" ⁷ Thus, it could be said that in this way, the author teaches young girls that as wives they should be patient with their husbands and forgive their violence, even endure it, as it will hurt less and less as time goes, therefore giving the idea that a violent husband is a normal husband.

Regardless of this newfound morality, the shows maintained their comedic aspect as they still looked to be enjoyable both for children and adults. Indeed, the domestic violence was satirically depicted, with Punch wearing a jester costume and his beatings being exaggerated enough to encourage the audience to laugh. However, this goal was not always successful as it fed from and into the anxieties of married couples, such as a wife's negligence of her wifely duties, and there was a backlash from male audience members who failed to see this comedy. Indeed, they did not see Punch's violence as something to be reprimanded, rather something that is justified, accusing Judy of being the instigator of the conflict as she fails to fulfil her wifely duties, such as caring for and loving her husband. Throughout act I, scene 1, Punch calls for her: "Judy, my dear! Judy!" ⁸ multiple times while battling different characters until he finally asks "Judy can't you answer my dear?" ⁹ Her response "Well! What do you want Mr. Punch?" is harsh and distant, both because she replies from within the box and because she refers to her husband as "Mister", whereas Punch addresses her by her first name. When she enters the stage, Punch kisses her and she slaps him, presenting her as an unloving wife as she rejects his affection and later on beats Punch (although this is justified because he killed their baby by throwing him out of the window). I would

⁷ Ibid., 1077.

⁸ *Punch and Judy with twenty-four illustrations* (London: Bell & Daldy, York Street, Covent Garden, 1870), 66-69. <https://archive.org/details/punchjudy00colluoft/page/64/mode/2up>

⁹ Ibid., 69

argue that her defiance and beating could be read in line with the carnivalesque's defiance of authority - here defying the authority of the husband or patriarchy more generally - but as mentioned previously, the new position women acquired in the working class family led to a violent backlash from their husbands, so defiance of authority seems to be allowed only to Punch. Indeed, Judy's defiance leads him to sing a complaint ending with "For this [her unruliness], by and by, she shall pay, sirs.",¹⁰ that is to beat and kill her, which happens later on, without being criticised by the audience. On the contrary, he received praise for his character.

As a result, Punch and Judy shows would have been good educators for children as they portrayed misogyny, the acceptance of domestic violence and the patriarchal system, values that were very much ingrained and acceptable in Victorian society. However, although Rosalind Crone provides an objective evolution of the shows, their message and influence, constantly pointing out the comical purpose behind every element of the shows; seeing that some adult members of the audience misinterpreted their comical intention, I cannot help but wonder whether these shows not only sustained these values but perhaps even encouraged them, notably domestic violence. On the one hand, children were exposed to the portrayal of domestic violence presented as justified in some performances and even accepted by Judy in others. On the other hand, the absence of records around domestic violence (general opinion, frequency, harshness), especially from women, I cannot help but wonder whether Punch and Judy perhaps failed in their full comedic intent and instead promoted misogyny, women's passiveness and men's violence on their wives. Overall, from an educational standpoint, while Punch and Judy shows successfully sustained Victorian society values, from today's point of view, we can only condemn them as they portray values which are actively denounced and fought against.

10 Ibid., 70.

Conclusion

To conclude, *commedia dell'arte*'s primary purpose was entertainment and not education. However, when looking back at it through Bakhtin's theory of carnivalesque, as well as the structure of a *commedia* company, we uncover this educative aspect. That is how through the constant portrayal of reversal of roles, *commedia dell'arte* would create a perpetual Carnival on stage and allow catharsis for their lower-class audiences, and how through the absence of director and the equality between all members of the company, the actors' creativity was valued. *Commedia dell'arte* spread to different countries and evolved under the influence of different cultures, for example how Pulcinella evolved into Punch in Britain. Punch and Judy have inherited the *commedia*'s use of carnivalesque, challenging different forms of authorities but has also taken an anthropological role, depicting working class family habits, that is, domestic violence. Violence against authorities in Punch and Judy shows could provide a cathartic effect on lower class audiences and domestic violence may have provided a cathartic effect on higher class audiences since this habit was associated with working class families, a class they could not resemble. However, with Queen Victoria's ascension to the throne, Punch and Judy moved to be a private form of entertainment, thus gaining its educational purpose as children became their main audience. Violence - domestic and not - retained its comedic aspect but also became a means to educate children promoting ideas of the time: misogyny, women's passiveness, men's violence on their wives. While Punch and Judy shows successfully sustained and promoted these values, from today's point of view, we can only condemn them as they portray values which are actively denounced and fought against.

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Anti-Abortion Discourse in Canada after the Overturning of Roe v. Wade

Carys Thomson

This study investigates the current (November 2023) discourse of anti-abortion activists in Canada to see if the overturning of Roe v. Wade in 2022 has changed the prevalent themes. A literature review was conducted, and four key themes were inductively derived: Fetal-Personhood Framing, Pro-Women Framing, Religious Downplaying and Legal-Based Arguments. Upon further thematic analysis of six protest sites (July 2022 – November 2023) in Canada, there appeared to be five key themes: Fetal Personhood Framing, Pro-Women Framing, Legal-Based Arguments, Religion-Based Framing and Ascribing Negative Emotions to Women with Abortions. This differed from the findings of Lowe and Page's 2019 study which found the downplaying of religion to be a key theme. The literature stressed finding Pro-Women Framing in discourses but in this analysis, multiple instances of Ascribing Negative Emotions to Women who had Abortions appeared. As was expected, more arguments seemed to be backed by the overturning of Roe v. Wade, as shown by the observation of Legal Based Arguments in protests. This analysis suggests that the reversal of Roe v. Wade has emboldened religious activists by giving them legal backing to no longer downplay religious motivations as their beliefs have been rationalised by law. This can be backed by the lack of Religious Downplaying but relatively frequent Religion-Based Framing and Legal-Based Arguments. Additionally, a minority of signs seemed to be anti-woman which perhaps suggests that the reversal of Roe v. Wade has encouraged activists to vocalise their traditional views more.

Introduction

This study aims to investigate the current discourse among anti-abortion activists in Canada and if the overturning of Roe v. Wade in 2022 has influenced the language used in anti-abortion protests and if so, how. Understanding how the current pro-life movement in Canada utilises language is important as it allows an unpacking of what motivates the group's mobilisation and what they aim to achieve

by this mobilisation. Expanding the literature on this area could be further used to understand how activist framing might impact those seeking abortion and inform their decisions. There is a distinct lack of research into the discourse of anti-abortion groups in Canada, with the bulk of the literature focusing on the United States. This study wants to see if the overturning of *Roe v. Wade* has had larger impacts beyond the US border, considering how influential the US can be in global politics. *Roe v. Wade* (1973) was a landmark legislative decision in the US in which the Supreme Court ruled that state control over access to abortion was unconstitutional. This was seen as a keystone moment in feminist history and reproductive rights, but it also motivated proliferators, especially evangelical Christians, to mobilise radically.¹ Many adopted a pro-women frame to attract greater support. The overturning of *Roe v. Wade* (2022) has been theorised to have devastating repercussions on the reproductive health of Americans and the wider globe, especially for those already suffering from systemic racism.² The literature reviewed suggests that current pro-life discourse centres on themes of fetal-personhood framing, pro-women framing, legal-based arguments and downplaying religion. This research will test whether these themes are present in recent Canadian pro-life discourse. It will also seek to see if any themes have arisen that have not been previously identified in other studies on pro-life discourse. As the research will include small protest settings, like Kelowna (a relatively small city in British Columbia), it will hopefully test the generalisability of the themes established by previous research that focused on major urban areas.

Existing Research

The pro-life movement has maintained relatively strong support throughout the decades, especially in Western countries where there

1 Jennifer Holland, “*Abolishing Abortion: The History of the Pro-Life Movement in America - Organization of American Historians*,” Organization of American Historians (Organization of American Historians, August 23, 2019), <https://www.oah.org/tah/november-3/abolishing-abortion-the-history-of-the-pro-life-movement-in-america/>.

2 Karine Coen-Sanchez et al., “Repercussions of Overturning *Roe v. Wade* for Women across Systems and beyond Borders,” *Reproductive Health* 19, no. 1 (August 24, 2022), 1–5. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12978-022-01490-y>.

is still contention between the legislature and citizens on the issue.³ Abortion has been particularly contentious in North America for the last 40 years - scholars point to the increasing polarisation of politics into left and right as a potential influencing factor. Although they share a border and many cultural features, there are vast differences in their approaches to pro-life mobilisation and the resulting legislation. Despite America being the first of the two to implement national abortion protection, Canada has managed to protect it better in the face of opposition.⁴ However, outspoken American conservatives may skew the consensus about abortion in America: Hartig (2022) found that most Americans think abortion should be legal in all cases (61%).⁵

Much of the literature regarding reproductive rights focuses on the case study of the United States and fails to address the discourse used by anti-abortion activists in other countries like Canada. This is likely due to the high level of contention surrounding abortion in America which gains a lot of attention internationally. A study by Saurette and Gordon, in 2013, examines various anti-abortion discourse platforms to fill the existing gap in Canada-based literature. The authors gather information from a Canadian pro-life blog site, organisational websites, and the discourse of MPs with anti-abortion attitudes. Through an examination of this information, they conclude that contemporary Canadian anti-abortion discourse concerns itself with four main aims: the driving of broad cultural change, pro-women framing, the avoidance of religious references and promoting the idea that abortion is harmful to women.

Since the early 1980s, anti-abortion advocates have increasingly

3 Alexa J. Trumpy, "Woman vs. Fetus: Frame Transformation and Intramovement Dynamics in the Pro-Life Movement," *Sociological Spectrum* 34, no. 2 (February 28, 2014), 163–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02732173.2014.878624>.

4 Mugambi Jouet, "A History of Post-Roe America and Canada: From Intertwined Abortion Battles to American Exceptionalism," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2023, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4430602>.

5 Hannah Hartig, "About Six-In-Ten Americans Say Abortion Should Be Legal in All or Most Cases," Pew Research Center, June 13, 2022, <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/06/13/about-six-in-ten-americans-say-abortion-should-be-legal-in-all-or-most-cases-2/>.

adopted a pro-woman framing to their messages.⁶ This framing involves arguing that abortion is harmful to women and that banning or regulating abortion is in the woman's best interests.⁷ The pro-woman frame contrasts with the earlier demonisation of women who sought abortions were unmotherly and thus evil.⁸

This earlier demonisation is detailed in "The Traditional Portrait" of abortion sentiments which Saurette and Gordon outline. In contrast to the findings of Saurette and Gordon's 2013 study, "The Traditional Portrait" of abortion, a) aims to change laws through legal and political pressure, b) holds a critical anti-women tone, c) references its religious principles and d) employs a fetal-centric position.⁹ This portrait has been understood as inherently anti-feminist and as holding values which the feminist movement has been fighting against.

Scholars often refer to "Frame Theory" when explaining the motivations driving social mobilisations. Frames are mental schemata which detail how individuals interpret and identify personal experiences in their lives within broader societal contexts.¹⁰ Those with a fetal-centric frame, identify the fetus as a living person who is "killed" by abortion. They may align themselves with organisations which share this framing, such as March For Life. Frame extension involves extending the primary boundaries of the frame to encompass other salient

6 Jennifer Holland, "Abolishing Abortion"; Amanda Roberti, "'Women Deserve Better': the Use of the Pro-Woman Frame in Anti-Abortion Policies in U.S. States," *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2021), 207–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.2021.1925478>.

7 Jennifer Holland, "Abolishing Abortion"; Reva B. Siegel, "The New Politics of Abortion: An Quality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions," *University of Illinois Law Review* 2007 (2007), 991. <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/unillr2007&div=36&id=&page=>.

8 Paul Saurette and Kelly Gordon, "Arguing Abortion: The New Anti-Abortion Discourse in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 46, no. 1 (2013), 157–85. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43298127>.

9 Susan Faludi, *Backlash : The Undeclared War against American Women* (New York: Anchor Books, 1992).

10 Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis : An Essay on the Organisation of Experience* (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1975).

perspectives, attracting a wider range of followers.¹¹ The pro-life movement has undergone a frame extension in the last few decades. In the US, fetal-centric framing (also known as fetal personhood framing) has been the central frame used by the pro-life movement, at least since the instalment of *Roe v. Wade* in 1973.¹² However, since the late 1990s, fetal-personhood framing has been shown to have had little significant impact on US abortion rates and public opinion, this has led to activists also adopting a pro-woman frame in the hope of gaining greater support.¹³ ‘Pro-Women Pro-Life’ (PWPL) activists argue that organisations pressure women into abortions, especially medical companies driven by profit, despite the potential mental and physical health effects.¹⁴ PWPL activists advocate for providing women with alternatives to abortion such as exploring adoption options.

A study conducted in the UK by Lowe and Page found themes in anti-abortion discourse similar to those found by Saurette and Gordon. Lowe and Page (2019) conducted an ethnographic study that included thirty abortion campaigns, taking notes of the geography, signs and language displayed at the sites.¹⁵ They identified four key themes. Firstly, ‘it’s not just about religion’, many protestors stated that religion was not their main motivation. Secondly, ‘unique losses’, arguing that a fetus is a human and deserves equality. Thirdly, ‘Missing People’, argues that the legal system has failed millions of lives by allowing them to be ‘murdered’. Lastly, the reworking of women’s rights argues there is an intrinsic link between womanhood and motherhood, meaning that no woman would naturally want to undergo abortion and it is the result of other pressures. Lowe and Page, and Saurette and Gordon all identify key themes as downplaying religion, pro-women framing and fetal-personhood framing. The paper by Lowe and Page (2019)

11 David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation”, *American Sociological Review* 51, no. 4 (August 1986): 464, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581>.

12 Alexa J. Trumpy, “Woman vs. Fetus”, 163-84.

13 Amanda Roberti, “Women Deserve Better”, 207-24.

14 Victoria Greenwood and Jock Young, *Abortion in Demand* (London: Pluto Press, 1976).

15 Pam Lowe and Sarah-Jane Page, *ANTI-ABORTION ACTIVISM in the UK : Ultra -Sacrificial Motherhood, Religion And... Reproductive Rights in the Public Sphere*. (S.L.: Emerald Group Publ., 2022).

is concerned with reproductive rights in the UK which is not directly applicable to this case study. However, due to a lack of Canada-specific literature and the similar abortion laws in the UK and Canada, the paper is suitable as a base for thematic comparisons along with the Saurette and Gordon paper.

Considering Canada's vast religious diversity, it could be hypothesised a key theme in the data will be the downplaying of religion as a motivator, to appeal to as many supporters as possible. The fetal-personhood framing is a consistent theme across studies, both in Canada in 2013 and the UK in 2019, and so it is hypothesised this theme will appear in recent Canadian pro-life discourse. Furthermore, as a frame extension to the fetal-personhood frame, pro-women framing emerged as a frequent theme across the studies, and it is hypothesised that this will also appear as a key theme in recent Canadian pro-life discourse. Finally, it is hypothesised that the overturning of *Roe v. Wade* will have emboldened Canadian pro-life activists in their claims to illegalise abortion.

Methodology

An inductive analysis of anti-abortion protest language was conducted by collating quotes used by anti-abortion activists in their signs used in protests. These quotes were gathered from a range of sources, including in-person observation and online media reports. A variety of online media sources were used, including, pro-life websites, social media accounts, YouTube videos and news reports. Only protests post-dating the reversal of *Roe v. Wade* (after June 24th, 2022) were analysed to investigate the impact of the legislative change.

A range of online media sources which covered anti-abortion protest events were examined. Information was gathered from the following protests: Kelowna on the 26th of July 2022, the 1st of October 2023 and the 21st of November 2023, Ottawa, Toronto and Victoria all on the 11th of May 2023. The three events which occurred on the 11th of May 2023 were all a part of the March for Life campaign which involved protests all over Canada, however, only sufficient data for

the cities listed was found. On the 21st of November, 2023, a ‘peaceful vigil’ was held by the Kelowna Right to Life Society outside Kelowna General Hospital. The signs of the four women in attendance were included in the analysis.

Using the software system MAXQDAAnalytics Pro a thematic analysis of the collected data was conducted.¹⁶ The quotes were organised by location and date, for example, ‘Kelowna 26/07/23’ and coded based on recurring messages. Codes were then grouped into potential themes which were then refined to those pertinent to the research question and ascribed titles as well as explanations.

Ethical Statement

As most data was gathered through secondary sources, it is unclear as to whether participants in videos had given explicit consent to be recorded but due to the public nature of the protests, and that the data is already public, it can be argued that they would be comfortable with this. Additionally, no personally identifiable details were included in the analysis to maximise anonymity. Given that abortion is a deeply sensitive and controversial topic, sensitivity has been used throughout this paper. However, the use of direct quotes from the protests might be distressing to some readers and so a content advisory is recommended. Notably, this paper comes from a pro-choice background, but impartiality has been strived for throughout.

Findings

Data was collected from a total of six protest events which met the appropriate criteria of occurring in Canada after the 24th of June 2022, being a pro-life mobilisation and including physical signs which could be analysed. Across the protests, five significant themes were prevalent: ‘Fetal-Personhood Framing’, ‘Pro-Women Framing’, ‘Legal Based Arguments’, ‘Religious Based Framing’ and ‘Ascribing Negative Emotions to Women who Had Abortions’. A total of 100 sign quotes were collected and coded for, some quotes were assigned

¹⁶ VERBI Software, *MAXQDA 2022*, software, 2021, maxqda.com.

to multiple codes.

Theme One: Fetal-Personhood Framing

All the protests recorded included signs with fetal-personhood framing discourse. This theme included sub-codes of ‘fetus as human’(48% of all quotes), ‘missing people’(3%), activists ‘speaking on behalf of the fetus (6%)’, ‘fetus as a separate body to woman’s’(2%). The theme in total included 61% of all quotes. ‘Fetus as human’ included quotes which distinctly identified fetuses as being human and referred to abortion as killing or murder. A key quote which summarises this sentiment is ‘abortion kills a human being’ from a Toronto protest (11/05/23). The sub-code of ‘missing people’ referred to society’s missing persons due to their ‘killing’ by abortion. A key quote which summarises this sentiment is ‘ABORTION: 1/3 of our Generation is MISSING’ from a protest in Toronto (11/05/23). The sub-code of ‘fetus as a separate body to woman’s’ refers to the fetus having a distinct entity from the mother, suggesting that therefore the woman should not have control over the decisions concerning the fetus’ body. A key quote which summarises this is ‘A BABYS BODY IS NOT YOUR BODY’ from a Victoria protest (11/05/23). Regarding a fetus as a human body forces the audience to consider their own sense of personhood. Murder is universally considered morally wrong and by establishing a persona for a fetus, pro-life activists force onlookers to question the morality of abortion.

Theme Two: Pro-Women Framing

Five out of the six protests included signs with pro-women framing discourse. This theme had only a single code of pro-women which made up 20% of all quotes. Quotes included in the theme were identified as advocating for women and their well-being which abortion places at risk. Some of the quotes provided support and resources for those who might be contemplating abortion, such as ‘PREGNANT? Need Help?’ followed by a phone number (Kelowna 01/10/23). Other quotes argued that abortion was anti-feminist, stating that it was ‘THE ULTIMATE EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN’ (Victoria 11/05/23). Quotes like these

directly challenge feminist ideologies and argue that abortion does not help to liberate women. Discourse of this theme includes claims that abortion is a result of women being coerced by ‘corrupt’ doctors who are motivated by profit (Greenwood and Young, 1976). A few quotes seemed to be advocating for both the fetus and the women, illustrating concern for both parties. ‘1 CRIME 2 LIVES’ from a Toronto protest (11/05/23) frames abortion as a criminal activity which is inflicted upon both the pregnant woman and the fetus. This dual advocacy clearly illustrates the pro-woman frame extension which has developed by PWPL activists in recent decades.

Theme Three: Legal Based Arguments:

All the protests recorded included signs with legal-based arguments. This theme included ‘laws and legalities’ (6%), ‘success of Roe v. Wade’ (3%) and ‘rights-based language’ (8%). In total, the theme included 17% of all quotes. The ‘laws and legalities’ quotes refer directly to existing legislation and also urge for abortion laws to be introduced. Quotes like ‘Abortion is legal in all 9 months of pregnancy’, which appeared at a protest in Kelowna (21/11/23), intend to inform onlookers and provoke shock. The sub-code of ‘Roe v. Wade’ refers directly to the legislative reversal with all the quotes in this sub-code celebrating this change. A quote which summarises this sentiment is from a protest in Kelowna the day after the reversal: ‘BRAVO USA for LIFE We’re NEXT CANADA’ (26/07/22). ‘Rights-based language’ is a type of legal-based anti-abortion discourse which intends to empower onlookers and institutions to fight for the rights of the fetus. Quotes like ‘Abortion is a Human Rights Violation’ from Ottawa (11/05/23) try to provoke a sense of responsibility from the public. This argument is weakened by the fact that the United Nations recognises access to safe and legal abortion as a fundamental human right (Article 6, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2018). Legal language is used to help strengthen the legitimacy of the argument. Its use is rooted in the belief that the law is built to protect you, and in this case, it is not protecting a ‘member of society’. Having faith that the law is working in your best interest is not a privilege that all social groups have but as a consensus does, it seems smart to

outline the law's failings as this violates a core tenant of standing up for injustice. This stands to evoke anger and support for your cause.

Theme Four: Religiously Motivated Discourse

Four out of the six protests included signs with religiously motivated discourse. In total, the theme included 8% of all quotes. A key quote which summarises this sentiment is 'PRAY TO END ABORTION' which appeared on signs in both Victoria (11/05/23) and Ottawa (11/05/23) as part of the 'March for Life'. Asserting a religious background in a protest can both disengage and attract citizens. As Christianity is the most common religion in Canada, attaching Christian values to anti-abortion may help pro-lifers gain more support as they may help garner the perception of abortion as a religious violation.¹⁷ Whilst this theme only appears a relatively small number of times, it appears in over half of the protests.

Theme Five: Ascribing Negative Emotions to Women Who Had Abortions

A few quotes stood out as possibly being hurtful to anyone who had had an abortion, insisting that they must feel guilt or regret. Three out of the six protests included signs and 7% of all quotes were included in this theme. A quote which aptly summarises this theme is 'Mom, please let me live!' with a picture of a fetus from a protest in Kelowna (21/11/23). Signs like these are meant to ascribe negative emotions like guilt to women who had abortions, despite many women often expressing positive feelings, such as relief, afterwards.¹⁸ This conflicts with the pro-women frame which was also seen in a lot of protests.

Conclusion

17 Statistics Canada, "Profile Table, Census Profile, 2021 Census of Population - Canada [Country]," www12.statcan.gc.ca, February 9, 2022, <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2021/dp-pd/prof/details/page.cfm?LANG=E&GENDERlist=1>.

18 Corinne H. Rocca et al., "Emotions and Decision Rightness over Five Years Following an Abortion: An Examination of Decision Difficulty and Abortion Stigma," *Social Science & Medicine* 248 (March 1, 2020): 112704, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.112704>.

In conclusion, the current anti-abortion discourse among Canadians seems to be primarily concerned with fetal-personhood framing, pro-women framing, legal-based arguments and religious motivations. As hypothesised, the fetal-personhood frame was the most prevalent theme at protests, with 61% of signs referring to the fetus as having a separate body from the woman and inferring that abortion was immoral and murderous. This supported the studies of Lowe and Page (2019) and Saurette and Gordon (2013) who found fetal-personhood framing to be a prevalent theme in anti-abortion discourse. Providing some consensus on this theme in both UK and Canada both before and after *Roe v. Wade* means that it remains a key idea in anti-abortion discourse.

It was also hypothesised that pro-women framing would be a prevalent theme in post-*Roe v. Wade* anti-abortion discourse, and this was evident by pro-woman framing language appearing in a majority of protests. Some signs argued that abortion was inherently anti-feminist and un-liberating. Other signs stated resources for available help for pregnant women, which offers a concerned perspective. This also supports the findings from the study by Lowe and Page (2019) and Saurette and Gordon (2013) which stated that pro-women framing is prevalent in anti-abortion discourse, arguing that it remains a key theme.

Additionally, some protests included language which advocated for both women and the fetus, further emphasising the impact of the frame extension into the discourse. The research suggests that *Roe v. Wade* may have emboldened pro-life protesters in their argument due to the mention of the legislative decision and rights-based arguments in the discourse. However, it is hard to discern whether the overturning has had a negative or positive influence on fetus-personhood framing, pro-women framing and religious motivations in anti-abortion discourse as while they are dominant in the current research, it is hard to quantify if there has been an increase since there are no numbers to compare to. Further quantitative research is necessary to explore the relationship between the *Roe v. Wade* overturning and wider social shifts concerning science, feminism, and religion.

A theme which was raised in the data which was not hypothesised was the theme of ‘Ascribing Negative Emotions to Women Who Had Abortions’. This included discourse which seemed to want to provoke feelings of regret and guilt from women who had experienced abortions. This subtracts from the pro-women frame which seemed to be heavily reinforced as being adopted in the literature review. Instead, this voices an anti-woman frame which resembles the ‘Traditional Portrait’ of abortion discourse that scholars like Faludi detail. This perhaps shows that the pro-life movement has not progressed past the outdated values it might have thought it had with the adoption of pro-women framing. Guilt and regret are common emotions felt after abortions, alongside relief.¹⁹ By reinforcing the idea that women should be feeling guilty or regretful they are contributing to the mental damage of women which modern pro-lifer activists tend to be advocating against.

It was hypothesised that the downplaying of religion would be prevalent in the anti-abortion discourse however no signs evidenced this. This is surprising as this theme has been found predominantly in the UK, which despite the largest religion being Christianity, it is relatively religiously diverse like Canada.²⁰ Perhaps, Canadian pro-life advocacy has stronger ties to Christianity than UK pro-life organisations meaning their arguments are deeper enforced by religion. Further research should be conducted to examine the connection between Canadian pro-life arguments and Christianity. Potentially, the downplaying of religion was more prevalent in Canada prior to the Roe v. Wade reversal but as a result of increased confidence from legal backing, protestors may feel less of a need now to downplay their religious motivations. This, though, cannot be tested with this research which only focuses on recent protests.

19 Corinne H. Rocca et al., “Emotions and Decision Rightness over Five Years Following an Abortion: An Examination of Decision Difficulty and Abortion Stigma,” *Social Science & Medicine* 248 (March 1, 2020): 112704, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2019.112704>.

20 Office of National Statistics, “Religion, England and Wales - Office for National Statistics,” www.ons.gov.uk, November 29, 2022, <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/bulletins/religionenglandandwales/census2021>.

A limitation of this research is the lack of reports on pro-life protests available online. This limited the number of protest events able to be examined. It is not clear whether this lack of reports is due to a lack of protests or a lack of reporting. Considering there are weekly protests in a city as relatively small as Kelowna, it can be inferred that weekly protests will occur elsewhere in Canada but finding evidence of this proved difficult. An alternate theory may be that due to the pro-choice stance of the Canadian government and the general public, news reporting might be less likely to amplify pro-life voices.²¹ Of the protest sources that were found, camera quality and angles did mean some data was excluded. Additionally, the quantity of protest signs was not accounted for by this research. For example, at the Ottawa protest, there was multiple signs which stated ‘PRAY TO END ABORTION’ but the number of these signs were not recorded. Future quantitative research could further explore this to see what quotes are most frequent in protests.

Research was limited to protests which spoke in English, despite some protests being in French due to Canada’s official bilingualism. Pro-life protests were found to occur in Montréal and Québec city which would have contributed more quotes to examine and likely enriched the data, but translation risked losing important sentiments and so French quotes were decidedly not included. This could be improved by cooperating with a translator to help ensure English translations of the signs are accurate, however, this goes beyond the resources available to this project.

Despite these limitations, this research contributes data to a relatively under-researched area of literature and has highlighted a few key areas for future research. This research has established what themes are prevalent in anti-abortion discourse, as well as what themes seem to be less prevalent post-Roe v. Wade, with the hopes this can be used by scholars to better understand pro-life motivations and therefore predict how they might utilise language to advocate for abortion law reforms in Canada.

21 Statistics Canada, “Profile Table, Census Profile, 2021 Census of Population - Canada [Country]”

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Greenberg, The Cold War, and French Existentialism: How Abstract Expressionism became Constructed as Inherently Masculine

Iana Dzhakupova

This paper investigates the development of Abstract Expressionism in 1940-1950s America, focusing on ways it has been constructed as a masculine form of expression. Emerging after the end of WW2 when the American national identity was being re-defined, the art movement became a site for the interplay of multiple socio-political and cultural tensions. The imposition of qualities traditionally associated with masculinity became a key aspect in the reception of the movement, reflecting the interests of multiple institutions. This paper deconstructs the amalgamation of factors that formed the masculine image of Abstract Expressionism. These factors range from the masculinising language of art critics such as Clement Greenberg to America's Cold War agenda to male artists' own internalisation of philosophical ideas that projected the movement's masculine aura. In the last section of my investigation, I will expose the gendered imbalance within Abstract Expressionism by analysing the contrast in the occupation of space by male and female artists in period photographs.

Introduction

Abstract Expressionism's signature large scale, rapidly handled, bold gestural paintings are associated with a strong masculine energy – this is a deeply ingrained conception that emerged as the movement started gaining recognition and is still very much prevalent today; as is the legend of the tough male heroes of Abstract Expressionism. Gwen F. Chanzit, the curator of the 2016 *Women of Abstract Expressionism* exhibition at the Denver Art Museum, posits that not only did abstract expressionists go down in the canon of art history as predominantly male, but 'their maleness, their heroic *machismo* spirit, has become a defining characteristic of the expansive, gestural paintings of Abstract Expressionism'.¹ But what formed this conception? It is my aim to identify and analyse the ways in which the movement was constructed

1 Gwen F. Chanzit in Joan Marter, *Women of Abstract Expressionism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 10.

as inherently masculine. I suggest that there are four main dimensions which collaboratively worked to render Abstract Expressionism as masculine: firstly, the masculinising language of critics such as Clement Greenberg concerning the paintings' formal qualities; secondly, the institutional response towards the movement and its prioritisation of work by male artists; thirdly, the implicit association of the movement with core American values amplified for bravado during the Cold War; and finally, the male abstract expressionists' own internalisation of a tortured, heroic masculinity influenced by French Existentialism and the Modern Man discourse. The first three categories will be concerned with the reception of abstract expressionist art, and in the last section I will discuss the production of abstract expressionist art.

Masculinising Language

I posit that contemporary art criticism has played an important role in the construction of Abstract Expressionism as a “macho” movement. An examination of Clement Greenberg's criticism provides copious examples of him ascribing masculine qualities to an abstract expressionist painting and promoting them as the work's strength. In various reviews of Pollock's shows Greenberg praises his work for its force and uncastrated emotion,² compliments it for being unafraid ‘to look ugly’,³ as well as lauds Pollock's ability to ‘create a genuinely violent and extravagant art without losing stylistic control’.⁴ James Johnson Sweeney, similarly, admires Pollock's talent, describing it as ‘volcanic’ and ‘undisciplined’, as well as ‘lavish, explosive, untidy’.⁵ Harold Rosenberg terms Abstract Expressionism ‘action painting’, describing the abstract expressionist canvas as ‘an arena on which to act’.⁶ Therefore, the language of contemporary art critics attributed qualities traditionally associated with masculinity to abstract expressionist art, using masculine adjectives to commend the

2 Clement Greenberg, *The Collected Essays and Criticism*, Vol. 2 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 75.

3 Ibid., 17.

4 Ibid., 75.

5 James Johnson Sweeney in Irving Sandler, *The Triumph of American Painting* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 88.

6 Harold Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” *ARTNews* (December 1952): 76.

movement and solidify its authority. On the other hand, in reviewing what he deems to be Pollock's weaker canvases, Greenberg notes that the use of aluminium renders the pictures 'startlingly close to prettiness', implicitly suggesting that decorativeness or effeminacy are undesirable qualities in a serious abstract expressionist work.⁷ Moreover, Greenberg patronises female painters for their supposed inability to exhibit overtly masculine qualities in their art – in his review of Gertrude Barrer's show in 1947 he notes that despite being a promising artist she 'is not a large and heroic talent' calling her effects 'minor at best and somewhat restricted'.⁸ Hence, the language of critics such as Greenberg served to construct Abstract Expressionism as a primarily masculine prerogative, associating femininity in art with vapidity and weakness. Unsurprisingly, Greenberg was not the only critic to valorise formal qualities that he perceived to be masculine, treating feminine properties as inferior and allocating them to the work of female artists: Gretchen T. Munson's patronising review of the "Man and Wife" 1949 exhibition, which featured work by abstract expressionist couples, identified a tendency among the female artists to 'tidy up their husband's styles', claiming that Lee Krasner's paintings converted Pollock's 'unrestrained, sweeping lines' into 'neat little squares and triangles'.⁹ This gendered reception of abstract expressionist art, steeped in stereotypes and biases, illustrates how the celebratory critical response to the movement constructed it as a masculine form of expression, thus tacitly propagating the notion that women painters could only ever assume a secondary role in it.

Institutional Bias

The institutional response was also complicit in establishing Abstract Expressionism as a masculine form of expression. As the movement proceeded to gain wider cultural recognition and abstract expressionist paintings started being exhibited by big museums such as MoMA, works by male artists were suddenly in much higher demand to those by their female counterparts, and the qualities associated with

7 Greenberg, *The Collected Essays and Criticism*, 202.

8 *Ibid.*, 132.

9 Gretchen T. Munson in Anne M. Wagner, "Lee Krasner as L.K.," *Representations*, no. 25 (Winter 1989), 45.

maleness assumed priority. Moreover, the first important articles and books written on Abstract Expressionism focused almost exclusively on works by men.¹⁰ Kathleen Housley posits that once the public acclaim of the movement started to acquire momentum, the gender of the artist became important: if an abstract expressionist artist was to be presented as influential, ‘maleness mattered’ and ‘aggressive artistic characteristics that were perceived to be masculine became valorised’.¹¹ The masculine characteristics typically praised in a Jackson Pollock or a Willem de Kooning are their unrestrained sweeping lines, their sense of violence, dynamism, impulsivity, and an underlying spirit of heroic antagonism. However, these attributes were not exclusive to work by men: the art of some female abstract expressionists exhibited those same qualities but did not reach a comparable level of recognition during their lifetime or posthumously.

An example of this is the paintings of Corinne West. West adopted the pseudonym of Michael for artistic purposes – this masking of her gender is in itself revealing – and many of her paintings exhibit the same level of intensity, violence, dynamism, and angst as those of her male contemporaries. Her works *Nihilism* (Fig. 1) and *Dagger of Light* (Fig. 2) can only be described as unrestrained, messy, textured, chaotic, and profoundly existential. They expressed West’s anxiety in response to the invention of the atomic bomb and the threat of global annihilation, which is reflected in their explosive, anarchic composition, violent application of paint, and heavily layered texture. It is important to note that West’s nuclear anxiety stemmed from the same intellectual concerns expressed by many celebrated male abstract expressionists, rendering her works as pieces of ‘serious’ art.¹² One could compare *Nihilism* to de Kooning’s *Woman and Bicycle* (Fig. 3), drawing analogies between their visceral colours and the presence of a chaotic, preoccupied, shape-shifting subject. I would even posit that *Nihilism* and *Dagger of Light* possess the same vital, desperate energy

10 Joan Marter, *Women of Abstract Expressionism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 21.

11 Kathleen L. Housley in Joan Marter, *Women of Abstract Expressionism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 24.

12 Joan Marter, *Women of Abstract Expressionism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 23.

as Pollock's *Convergence* (Fig. 4), sharing similarities with his bold, impulsive, splattering lines and overall sense of unchained, disordered movement. Therefore, West's paintings possess that brutal, existential, masculine quality that was so prized in works by male abstract expressionists whilst still managing to retain their own distinctive identity. However, Corinne West never came close to the level of institutional recognition as those male figures, nor did she go down in the canon of art history.¹³ This indicates that as much as Abstract Expressionism was rendered masculine for its formal qualities, the institutional bias favoured works by male artists over those by female ones, even when the paintings by female abstract expressionists carried similar formal properties to those by their male counterparts.

The Cold War Agenda

A consideration of the geopolitical context behind the movement's success reveals another crucial way in which Abstract Expressionism was constructed as masculine. In his seminal essay "American Painting During the Cold War", Max Kozloff illuminates the underlying connection between the rise of Abstract Expressionism in the late 1940s, and the United States government's desire to exhibit its international influence during the Cold War. According to Kozloff, the US government used Abstract Expressionism as 'benevolent propaganda for foreign intelligentsia' to transmit to the world America's position as the new cultural empire.¹⁴ As the US wished to display its own favourable post-World War II position to the countries that were devastated by the results of the war, Abstract Expressionism conveniently and subtly reflected America's core values, such as modernity, freedom of expression, individualism, and power. To aid this narrative Jackson Pollock, arguably the face of the movement, was cast as an 'American masculine cultural hero', a tough, tortured soul, a macho figure whose image served to dramatise the American search for freedom of expression against the restrictions of the totalitarian Soviet Union with Socialist Realism as its official national

13 Ibid., 24.

14 Max Kozloff, "American Painting During the Cold War," *Artforum* (May 1973): 2.

style.¹⁵ The qualities of Pollock's art also began to be promoted as 'quintessentially American', such as their great scale, expansiveness, dynamism, ambition, confidence, and violence – again, all qualities traditionally associated with masculinity.¹⁶

The political climate of the late 1940s and its agendas can be detected in contemporary criticism, too. Returning to Greenberg, his joint review of Jean Dubuffet and Jackson Pollock's exhibitions in 1947 quite clearly juxtaposes the two artists, positioning the American one as the more noteworthy. While Greenberg acknowledges Dubuffet's work as sophisticated, charming, and pleasingly packaged, the critic establishes Pollock as 'rougher and more brutal', 'capable of more variety', 'riskier', exhibiting 'astounding force' and ultimately having 'more to say in the end', being 'completer', and 'more original'.¹⁷ By doing this, Greenberg not only implies the desirability of masculine formal qualities over feminine ones in modern art, but he also proclaims the superiority of the American artist over the French one, thus announcing the triumph of innovative, virile American art over the by then outdated, effeminate European tradition. Thus, maleness and Americanness become intertwined according to this narrative, constructing Abstract Expressionism as a masculine form of expression with a covert political agenda which signals American dominance on the global scene. This rhetoric serves to simultaneously reinforce the fact that the art capital of the West had switched from Paris to New York, and to validate the United States as the most powerful country in the world.¹⁸ It makes sense that the promotion of masculinity as a key feature of abstract expressionist art was necessary for the transmission of its country's image of economic, military, and cultural power.

French Existentialism and the Modern Man

So far, I have argued that Abstract Expressionism was constructed as

15 Gregory Minissale, "The Invisible Within: Dispersing Masculinity in Art," *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities* 20, no. 1 (March 2015): 74.

16 Kirk Varnedoe and Pepe Karmel, *Jackson Pollock* (London: Tate Gallery Publishing, 1998), 74

17 Clement Greenberg, *The Collected Essays and Criticism*, 125.

18 Max Kozloff, "American Painting During the Cold War", 2.

masculine through the critical language, the institutional response, and the rhetoric of the Cold War. All of these dimensions relate to the reception of abstract expressionist art, and I will now consider its production, specifically focusing on the abstract expressionists' own involvement in the construction of the movement's masculine aura. Michael Leja argues that the primary reason for the New York School's construction of masculinity in their work was their susceptibility to the strong cultural and philosophic influences of their environment, specifically French Existentialism and the Modern Man discourse, which sought to make sense of the human mind in light of recent historical tragedies and turmoil. This existentialist anxiety was also seen as the product of a free society, the result of freedom of thought so to speak. Leja argues that a kind of Modern Man subjectivity was at the core of abstract expressionists' identities, influencing their artistic practices and manifesting in their personal behaviour and '*film noir* personas'.¹⁹ This new emphasis on subjectivity made the artist see himself as a site for a heroic battle between reason and unreason, cultivated thoughts and primitive urges. This subjectivity was, unsurprisingly, gendered: it was the specifically male subject that became the site of complex internal tensions reflecting the struggles in the face of modernity.²⁰ The structural constitution of the Modern Man's subjectivity made it highly difficult for women to identify with the heroic, tortured subject. Within the internal tension between the conscious and the unconscious of the Modern Man, the unconscious was often personified as a woman – this can be seen in much of the in popular psychology, philosophy, *film noir*, and literature of the time.²¹

Male abstract expressionists, too, used women as personifications of their unconscious, primitive, violent, self-destructive impulses, as an irrational female *other* within a complex, anguished man. Willem de Kooning's 'Woman' series serves as perhaps the most obvious example of this, the unhinged women in his paintings reflecting his

19 Michael Leja, *Reframing Abstract Expressionism: Subjectivity and Painting in the 1940s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 16. For a more detailed discussion of the influence of French Existentialism on abstract expressionists, see Chapter 6 "The Gesture Painters" in Irving Sandler, *The Triumph of American Painting* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970).

20 Ibid., 258.

21 Ibid.

own frenzied existential condition.²² Thus, by casting the woman as an inner *other*, male abstract expressionists marginalised female artists within the movement by making it nearly impossible for them to identify with the Modern Man subject. Most crucially, this meant that men were afforded greater complexity and capacity for internal angst than women. Within the paradigm of Modern Man subjectivity, women were ‘denied the same capacity for internal conflict’ and robbed of the opportunity to explore their own tragic, fragmented identities within the realm of abstract expressionist art.²³ Existentialist musings on the disturbing realities of post-war life were ‘reserved for men only’, leaving female artists to assume the role of muse.²⁴ Anne Wagner explores the difficulties in reconciling the identity of being both an abstract expressionist artist and a woman in “Lee Krasner as L.K”. She posits that Lee Krasner, Pollock’s wife, struggled to ‘establish an otherness to Pollock that would not be seen as an otherness of Woman’, which resulted in her refusal to produce a self in her painting.²⁵ This tension would have been the case for most female abstractionists, regardless of their relationships to other male artists. Therefore, being influenced by existentialist ideas and the Modern Man discourse, male abstract expressionists constructed the movement as an archetypally masculine form of expression, perhaps unintentionally excluding their female counterparts from being able to fully participate in the movement.

Although it is unlikely that male artists intended to exclude women from the production of abstract expressionist art, it is evident that male abstract expressionists did intentionally exclude women from the movement more broadly. They constructed an aura of masculinity not only in their art, but also in their behaviour. Real-life accounts of male abstract expressionists confirm this notion of a cultivated masculinity: Andy Warhol noted that the social milieu of Abstract Expressionism ‘was very macho’, and the painters ‘were all hard-driving, two-fisted types who’d grab each other and say things like “I’ll knock your

22 Irving Sandler, *The Triumph of American Painting*, 133.

23 Ibid., 259.

24 Marter, *Women of Abstract Expressionism*, 22.

25 Anne M. Wagner, “Lee Krasner as L.K.,” *Representations*, no. 25 (Winter 1989): 51.

fucking teeth out” and “I’ll steal your girl!”²⁶ According to Warhol, the machismo was part of the abstract expressionists’ public image, and it accompanied their tortured, tormented art. On top of this, there are accounts of women being mistreated at the Cedar Bar, a popular hub for the bohemian milieu the artists frequented, and excluded from the Eighth Street Club, another meeting place for artists and intellectuals whose membership was initially restricted to men only.²⁷ The fact that some of the popular clubs amongst abstract expressionists were intended to exclude female members confirms the social marginalisation that women artists faced, which no doubt limited their engagement with the movement; evidently, this predictable misogyny was a factor in the process of constructing the movement’s masculine image. Therefore, by cultivating macho personas and imposing an element of gendered cliquishness, male abstract expressionists intentionally solidified the movement’s masculine aura.

A Male Iconography

In light of what I have discussed above, it is worth considering the famous *Irascibles* photo taken by Nina Leen in 1950 (Fig. 5), which features a single female artist who immediately stands out in her long black overcoat, surrounded by an imposing crowd of male abstract expressionists dressed in grey suits. As much as the original purpose of this photograph was merely practical – to protest the selection of juries at the Metropolitan Museum of Art rather than promote an image of the set abstract expressionist group – the gender ratio is still indicative of the movement’s masculine hegemony, and the photograph now poses as a mythologised commemoration of Abstract Expressionism’s gender bias. Hans Namuth’s photographs of two famous abstract expressionist couples – Elaine and Willem de Kooning in 1953 (Fig. 6) and Jackson Pollock and Lee Krasner in 1950 (Fig. 7) – also reveal the underlying gender dynamics within the realm of Abstract Expressionism. In both photographs, the male artists are positioned at the forefront of the composition, de Kooning standing upright and confidently staring into the camera while presenting his canvas, and Pollock deeply immersed in the action of his work. The female

26 Andy Warhol in Gregory Minissale, “The Invisible Within”, 74.

27 Marter, *Women of Abstract Expressionism*, 21.

artists, on the other hand, are passively perching in the background – Elaine looking away from the viewer and Lee fixedly observing her husband’s process. Both photographs display a gendered occupation of space: the female abstract expressionists in these compositions do not act as independent artists of merit, but rather as passive accessories to their genius husbands, demonstrating their support for the men’s talent and serving as fashionable appendages to elevate their spouses’ status. What was intended to illustrate the unity of these artist couples on closer inspection reveals the imbalance in their positions as artists. According to the seminal feminist theorist Simone de Beauvoir, ‘the representation of the world as the world itself is the work of men; they describe it from a point of view that is their own and that they confound with absolute truth’.²⁸ In this light, Namuth’s photographs of the artist couples not only reveal the gendered dynamics that were present between the spouses, but also indicate what the world wished female abstract expressionists to be: decorative additions to the tortured macho heroes, but not heroes in their own right. Although the *Irascibles* photograph was taken by a woman, the interpretation of its message still fell within the realm of broader masculine control. Leen’s and Namuth’s 1950s photographs can therefore be seen through a masculine hegemonic lens: acting as a powerful tool of forming the public perception of the movement and constructing its patriarchal cultural legacy. Ultimately, these representations produce a male iconography of Abstract Expressionism. All three photographs point to the secondary role of women in the movement, outnumbered and overshadowed by male artists who helped cultivate its gendered nature.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have established four concrete ways in which Abstract Expressionism was constructed as a masculine form of expression. Firstly, in the language of the critics, who glorified those formal properties of abstract expressionist art that they perceived as masculine. Secondly, in the bias of art institutions, which offered exposure to predominantly male artists and prized aggressive artistic properties.

Thirdly, in the political rhetoric of the Cold War, which covertly promoted Abstract Expressionism as a quintessentially American style, emphasising its masculinity as a way of displaying power. Finally, in the male artists' internalisation of the fragmented Modern Man subjectivity and their cultivation of a macho image in public, which made a full participation in the movement inaccessible to female abstract expressionists. All of these aspects worked collaboratively to construct the movement's image as distinctly masculine, as well as to diminish the influence of female artists within the movement. The complex interplay between these dimensions is responsible for the persistent masculine aura of Abstract Expressionism.

Appendix



Figure 1 (above): Michael (Corinne) West, *Nihilism*, 1949. Oil, enamel, and sand on canvas, 53 1/8 x 40 1/4 in. Michael Borghi Fine Art, New Jersey. Figure 2 (below): Michael (Corinne) West, *Dagger of Light*, 1951. Oil, enamel, and sand on canvas, 55 x 35 in. Michael Borghi Fine Art, New Jersey.






Figure 3: Willem de Kooning, *Woman and Bicycle*, 1952-1953. Oil, enamel, and charcoal on linen, 76 ½ x 49 1/8 in. Whitney Museum of American Art, New York.



Figure 4: Jackson Pollock, *Convergence*, 1952. Oil on canvas, 93 ½ x 155 in. Buffalo AKG Art Museum, Buffalo.



Figure 5: Nina Leen, *The Irascibles*, 1950. Gelatin silver print, 13 15/16 x 11 1/8 in. MoMA, New York.



Figure 6: Hans Namuth, *Elaine and Willem de Kooning*, 1953. Gelatin silver print, 12 3/8 x 10 3/4 in. National Portrait Gallery, Washington, D.C.



Figure 7: Hans Namuth, *Jackson Pollock and Lee Krasner*, 1950. Gelatin silver print, 11 x 10 $\frac{3}{4}$ in. Buffalo AKG Art Museum, Buffalo.

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Polysemous Tradition as a Common Basis for Ideological Resistance in *Windsor Forest* and *The Communist Manifesto*

Rory Mullen

This paper delves into the nuanced use of tradition as a foundation for ideological resistance in Alexander Pope's "Windsor Forest" and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' "The Communist Manifesto." Despite their divergent contexts—Pope's text emerging from early 18th-century England and the Manifesto from mid-19th-century industrializing Europe—both works leverage historical and literary traditions to critique and resist dominant ideologies of their times. "Windsor Forest" subtly confronts ideologies of Protestant ascendancy and anti-Catholic sentiment prevalent in England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, promoting peace and the unity of Great Britain under Queen Anne's Stuart monarchy as alternatives to war and division. Through literary devices such as allegory and panegyric, Pope employs tradition not only to question the contemporary political and social landscape but to posit the Stuart dynasty as a symbol of national prosperity and harmony.

Contrastingly, "The Communist Manifesto" openly challenges the capitalist ideology that Marx and Engels argue perpetuates class struggle and exploitation of the proletariat. The Manifesto calls for a revolutionary overhaul of the social order, drawing on traditions of socialist thought and the historical precedent of class struggle to justify its radical aims. Despite its revolutionary stance, the Manifesto similarly relies on the manipulation of tradition—both embracing and rejecting it—to articulate a vision of communist society.

Both texts, therefore, are situated at the intersection of literary expression and ideological conflict, illustrating how tradition can serve as a versatile tool in the articulation of resistance. Whether through the invocation of historical continuity and national identity in "Windsor Forest" or the revolutionary call to arms in "The Communist Manifesto," tradition is employed to critique existing social and political orders. The abstract underscores the complexity of these texts' engagement with tradition, highlighting their shared emphasis on the transformative potential of ideological resistance. This comparison illuminates the rich dialogues between literature and politics, demonstrating how textual analysis can reveal deeper insights into the mechanisms of ideological critique and resistance.

Alexander Pope's *Windsor Forest* and Marx and Engels' *Communist Manifesto* are two texts whose grounds for comparison can from the outset appear uneven. *Windsor Forest* covertly resists the prevailing ideologies of Protestant ascendancy empowered by anti-Catholicism and parliamentarianism which reviled monarchy. The tumultuous events of the 17th century had damaged the institution of monarchy irrevocably. The Whigs- the political appendage of the ideologies which Pope resists- were inclined to continental war to weaken Catholic enemies.¹ What is more, the balance of power was shifting in their favour: the emergence of the military-fiscal state, the decline of traditional agrarian relations and the virulent hostility towards Catholicism stoked religious, social, political, cultural and class enmities in England. For Pope, peace alone fostered prosperity and no war, civil or continental, was conducive to this; Anne of Great Britain, the last of the Stuart dynasty, was the only one who could achieve this, uniting a bitterly divided nation. Both texts are perhaps most profoundly connected by their use of tradition as a basis for ideological resistance, although the precise traditions with which they deal and the ideologies which they fervently resist differ.

Alexander Pope subtly resists contemporary ideologies in *Windsor Forest* by leveraging literary and national traditions. He paints the Stuart dynasty in a positive light, praises their achievements, and criticizes the political turmoil that disrupted their reign. His critique sometimes carries Jacobite and Tory implications, showing his opposition to the dominant political views of his time. Furthermore, it celebrates the peace brought about by the treaty of Utrecht as opposed to the spoils of the war.² Envisioning a prosperous future of Stuart governance, Pope portrays Anne as a 'via media' whose shrewd stewardship holds the promise of a glorious, fruitful future for newly unified Great Britain, reconciling civil and continental divides. Pope enlists and revives literary traditions of panegyric, iconography,

1 Brian Young, 'Pope and Ideology', in *The Cambridge Companion to Alexander Pope*, ed. Pat Rogers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 125-126.

2 David Wheeler, "The Personal and Political Economy of Alexander Pope's "Windsor-Forest"". *South Atlantic Review*, 75(4) (2010): 1-20. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/stable/41635650>

allegory and topographical poetry organised in heroic verse to resist this prevailing ideology.

Contrastingly, *The Communist Manifesto* makes no secret of its intention to inspire resistance to capitalistic ideologies which have kept the proletariat in check throughout history, and now aggravate class relations beyond measure such that only revolution will suffice. Its very appellation is a call to arms and declaration of its resistance, an alternative to a hegemonic ideology which, for Marx and Engels, must be upended. It engages with literary as well as traditions of socialist thought in order to reform a social order that sees workers as means of production only.

Perhaps the most salient illustration of this binding force of ideological resistance in the texts is offered by defining how texts interact with ideology:

*“Literary texts do not simply or passively ‘express’ or reflect the ideology of their particular time and place. Rather, they are sites of conflict and difference, places where values and preconceptions, beliefs and prejudices, knowledge and social structures are represented and, in the process, opened to transformation.”*³

In defining ideology, Bennett and Royle capture the essence of ideologies in opposition. It is apparent how this applies to *the Manifesto*. It is a bold, emphatic denunciation of an ideology which it seeks to utterly transform, resisting it at all costs rather than just representing it. Similarly, *Windsor Forest* is a site of ideological conflict, but it is less inclined towards revolution; instead, Pope wishes to interrogate the zeitgeist and its characterisation of recent history and Monarchy, offering alternative renderings which challenge ideological primacy. In any case, both texts do more than simply express ideology; they resist, using tradition to support their ideological resistance.

Born in the year of England’s ‘Glorious’ Revolution which saw the deposition of James II and William of Orange’s accession, Alexander

³ Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle, *An Introduction to literature criticism and theory*. 4th edn. (Harlow, UK: Pearson/Longman, 2009), 177.

Pope inherited his father's faith and its concomitant social caveats. Some viewed the events of 1688 invasion and as a usurpation; many others viewed it as liberation from Catholic absolutism- no one disputes the ramifications.⁴ William III of England may have been dead when Pope wrote this, but his ideological mark remained indelible.

The events of 1688 saw anti-Catholicism, which was already a popular sentiment in a largely Protestant England, stoked further by its codification; Catholic rights were stripped away and government fomented violence towards them. The Act of Settlement passed, prohibiting Catholics from inheriting the throne. It was the Whig ideology, the mistrust of Catholics from whose Popery England must seek deliverance, which justified the domestic persecution of Catholics and deliberate attempts to weaken England's Catholic rivals on the continent and, for Pope, the interruption of a grand Stuart line. Pope interrogates an ideology of Protestant ascendancy in his allusion to William the Conqueror's usurpation of the English throne in 1066:

“Proud Nimrod first the bloody chace began,
A mighty hunter, and his prey was man:
Our haughty Norman boasts that barbarous name,
And makes his trembling slaves the royal game...
The fields are ravish'd from th' industrious swains,
From men their cities, and from Gods their fanes”⁵

The hunter of mankind's tyranny abounds in the forest; subjects are persecuted as Nimrod, William I, rules with an iron fist. Rogers suggests the allusion to William I's easily merits comparison with William III, hence 'barbarous name'; the name itself is charged. Both Williams, for Pope, are invaders- they are illegitimate claimants and stand in the way of peace. Pope is alerting us to analogousness of

4 Jonathan Israel, *The Anglo Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its Impact*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 105.

5 Alexander Pope, Windsor Forest, in *The Poems of Alexander Pope*, ed. John Butt, (London: Methuen, 1968), lines 61-65.

1066 and 1688; both constitute usurpation and invasion. Nonetheless, he is careful not to invoke William directly, most viewed the events of 1688 positively; he must encode his resistance through allegory and allusion. Ideology and its political progeny- propaganda- helped played down 1688 as bloodless liberation. It was, of course, anything but that.⁶

“In ecological terms, William disrupts the harmony of the forest ecology”.⁷ The forest itself is a nuanced allegory for an England, abused by foreign usurpers and despotic governance. The forest could also be construed as a royal lineage which flourishes not whilst the throne is occupied by illegitimate monarchs. For Pope, only a legitimate Stuart monarch can restore the forest through shrewd governance and pursuit of peace:

“Rich Industry sits smiling on the plains,
And peace and plenty tell, a Stuart reigns.”⁸

This is more than a panegyric for Queen Anne; it is one for her dynasty. Tradition is being deployed as an illustrious precedent here-Stuart kingship. There is a return to the Jacobean ideal her father was denied. The iconography and allegory of ‘peace and plenty’ link Anne to the great Ruben’s painting, “The apotheosis of James I”, asserting her divine right. Under James, England and Scotland flourished architecturally, artistically and literarily- largely free from conflict. Further, dynastic precedent recalls James’ address to parliament in which ‘peace, plenty and love’ in uniting two kingdoms are the given as his ultimate aims.⁹ Anne is the inheritor of a tradition of Stuart peace through consanguinity, fulfilling an ambition of uniting the kingdoms

6 Jonathan Israel, *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, 185.

7 Wes Hamrick, “Trees in Anne Finch’s Jacobite poems of retreat.” *Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900*, vol. 53, no. 3, (2013), Gale Literature Resource Center, 541.

8 Alexander Pope, *Windsor Forest*, lines 41-42.

9 Pat Rogers, *The Symbolic Design of Windsor-Forest: Iconography, Pageant, and Prophecy in Pope’s Early Work*. (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2004), 107.

which James had at the beginning of his reign and presiding over the peace of Utrecht.

Pope is also drawing on his recent literary forebears such as John Dryden who enlists it in his own royal panegyrics for Stuarts, paralleling Claudian who venerated Roman emperors, heralding a Pax Romana as Anne heralds a Pax Britannia.¹⁰ Pope is using tradition to resist ideology which held the Stuarts and the very notion of monarchy in contempt. He is recasting them as capable and shrewd stewards, legitimising Stuart reign and appealing to continuity and tradition. In other words, tradition is his basis for resisting ideologies.

Correspondingly, Marx's use of tradition still forms the basis for his resistance; however, some traditions are consciously departed from. Tradition is polysemic: tradition in a critical and literary sense is something to which he- like Pope- owes a great debt, allowing him to synthesise and signal the communist ideological resistance:

*“The Manifesto synthesized generations of reflection on the root causes of social injustice and conflict”.*¹¹

Throughout history the means of production have reformed, but one constant tradition and end has prevailed: the class struggle. The manifesto presents: ““The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”¹²

It is this tradition of struggle which begat hegemonic capitalistic ideology upheld by bourgeoisie, we are implored to resist. Tradition in this sense still forms part of the basis for ideological resistance.

It is, however, critical and artistic tradition as a basis for resistance which chiefly binds the two texts. *The Manifesto* emerges from a

10 Ibid., 194-195.

11 Murray Bookchin ‘The Communist Manifesto: Insights and Problems’, *New Politics* 6 (1998).

12 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, (1992). *The Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Oxford World's Classics), Ed. David McLellan. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1.

period of radical reformation and revolution. Its form is inherently ideological. Formalistically, it is a way of setting out opposition, resistance to ideological models of social relations and production. In titling this a manifesto, Marx makes it abundantly clear that this is programme of an oppositional party:

*“The immediate aim of the Communists is... formation of the proletariat into a class overthrow of bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power...”*¹³

The Manifesto, the locomotive of history’s social revolutions is being used to signal resistance. The ruling ideas, Marx opines, are those of the ruling class.¹⁴ To alter those ruling ideas, we must revolt against the ruling class; only a full revolution can fully resist capitalistic forces:

*“the manifesto marks the point of impact where the idea of radical egalitarianism runs up against the entrenchment of an ancien regime”*¹⁵

The Manifesto’s genre alone represents a challenge to ideological primacy of the ancient regime’s successor- the capitalistic bourgeoisie epoch. It owes itself to the tradition of the manifesto encapsulated in the revolutionary pamphlets of the French and American revolutions.¹⁶ Revolution begins with the presentation of an alternative. This tradition provides the basis for ideological resistance. *The Manifesto* is this alternative: a potent political tradition to signal ideological resistance; it is, as Anne is, emboldened, legitimised by tradition, a basis for resisting prevailing ideology. It is the ultimate, traditional genre of ideological resistance.

Similarly, there is a critical heritage in other attempts to articulate the communist vision. However, Marx altogether rejects these. This tradition of socialist thought upholds many of the social conditions of

13 Ibid., 17.

14 Ibid., 24.

15 Janet Lyon, *Manifestoes: Provocations of the Modern*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 1.

16 *The Declaration of Independence and The Declaration of the Rights of Man.*

capitalism. *The Manifesto* is:

*“the distillation of... confrontations with the thinkers most influential in the Germany of his times: Hegel, Feuerbach, Proudhon”*¹⁷

For Marx, these are reactionary and utopian socialists. Their failure to address class struggles and to resist capitalism is a basis for his own attempt. This tradition of socialist thought is one he must decry:

*“They hold fast by the original views of their masters, in opposition to the historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile the class antagonisms”*¹⁸

Pre-Marxist communist tradition does not recognise the need for revolution; they are reactionaries, railing, not revolting against an oppressive social condition. If the ruling ideas are those of the ruling class, *the Manifesto* must go much further, aiming to make the proletariat the ruling class.¹⁹ This tradition is, nonetheless, the basis for his ideological resistance, it fails, much like the ideology itself, to properly address the class struggle.²⁰

Tradition is used as a meaningful precedent, as in Pope, to parallel events, but it is also recognised as something from which Marx must break, socialist thinking of the epoch and the tradition of class struggle itself, if he is to achieve revolution. Marx may reject some tradition, but this does not compromise its basis for ideological resistance. Moreover, it is not entirely divorced from *Windsor Forest*.

Both texts resist ideologies gaining ascendancy, becoming more severe. As we have seen, anti-Catholicism and contempt for the Stuart monarchy intensifies in Pope’s England. Similarly, Marx resists a

17 Aijaz Ahmad, “The Communist Manifesto in Its Own Time, And in Ours.” *Nineteenth-Century Literature Criticism*, edited by Lynn M. Zott, vol. 114, (Gale, 2003). Literature Resource Center.

18 Marx and Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 36.

19 Ibid., 24.

20 Ibid., 36.

predomination of capitalistic ideology. That is, class cleavage, which has always been an oppressive force, reaching a point in capitalistic ideology where it can no longer be controlled, dominating its subjects.²¹ These texts demonstrate that enlisting, as well as consciously departing from tradition, both constitute its basis for ideological resistance.

Form and prosody similarly reveal a route to ideological resistance in *Windsor Forest*, striving for perfection in its metrical composition and in its rhyme:

*“Blank verse had become associated with high Miltonic aspirations. [...] But couplets were quite another thing. They were well-bred, gentlemanly, elegant.”*²²

Pope is consciously departing from Miltonic tradition; Milton had aligned himself with republicans during the interregnum. This parliamentarian, republican, puritan ideology, which still held sway, for Pope, promotes disharmony and is associated with blank verse. Eschewing such a verse form strengthens Pope’s efforts to present a peace achieved by a royal Stuart, reflecting the apotheosis of peace-Pax Britannia- which Anne’s stewardship has enabled:

“At length great Anna said “Let Discord cease!
She said, the World obey’d, and all was Peace!”²³

Pope aligns the Stuarts with concord rather than discord, contrary to the ideology which prevailed in England- ideological resistance is encoded in the abjuration of Miltonic tradition. Formalistic harmony, the perfect heroic couplets, in turn, are the harmony of the nation under Anne. Traditions, as in Marx, are both upheld and upended; in each instance, they are the very basis for ideological resistance.

21 Marshall Berman, ‘Tearing Away the Veils: The Communist Manifesto,’ *Dissent: A Quarterly of Politics and Culture* (2011).

22 Pat Rogers, “The Politics of Style”, published in *Essays on Pope*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 96.

23 Alexander Pope, *Windsor Forest*, lines 325-326.

Ultimately, it is the engagement with and departure from complex political, cultural and artistic tradition that forms the basis of ideological resistance in these texts, recognising how what tradition constitutes is as salient as what it excludes. Pope resists anti-Catholic and anti-monarchy ideologies, appealing to manifold traditions to rehabilitate the House of Stuart's prestige and virtue. He implores us to see the Stuarts as the architects of providence, prosperity and peace. Similarly, Marx resists the bourgeoisie capitalistic ideology, an altogether more exploitative successor of the traditional class antagonisms, engaging with revolutionary tradition, but condemning Utopian socialism that is incapable of full resistance. Whether they are resolved to engage with it or depart from it, both texts compellingly utilise tradition as a basis for ideological resistance.

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Turgid Bombast or Economic Reason: Two Contrasting Interpretations of the Muse through the work of Mary Wollstonecraft and William Wordsworth

Zola Rowlatt

This research paper delves into the contrasting interpretations of the muse by Mary Wollstonecraft and William Wordsworth, as evidenced in their seminal works *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* and the *Preface to Lyrical Ballads*, respectively. The paper critically evaluates how each interpretation shapes contrasting truths about the production and consumption of literature. Wollstonecraft, advocating for reason as her muse, challenges societal norms and seeks to empower women through education. In contrast, Wordsworth embraces feeling as his muse, aiming to directly communicate with the heart of his reader. Through a comparative analysis, this paper explores how these distinct muses inform the authors' approaches to subjects such as education, uniformity, and gender. Furthermore, it examines the Rousseauvian influences on their views, and how each author's position of power shapes their narrative. Ultimately, it highlights the radical nature of both texts in the democratisation of poetry and the elevation of the female sex.

This research paper will evaluate different interpretations of the muse and the impact this has on the production of literature through a comparative critical assessment of Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* and William Wordsworth's *Preface to Lyrical Ballads*. Chris Baldick defines the muse as 'a source of inspiration to a poet or other writer'.¹ The concept of the muse is paradoxical in that it is a literary creation which substitutes for creative generativity. In line with Baldick's definition, Wollstonecraft's source of inspiration is reason, reinforced by her writing in political prose as she 'address[es] the head [rather] than the heart'.² Wordsworth's muse, on the other

1 Chris Baldick. *The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

2 Mary Wollstonecraft. *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, ed. Miriam Brody (London: Penguin Books, 2004).

hand, is feeling. In particular, ‘elementary feelings’³ to be interpreted as the emotional response to human experience, through which he intends to communicate directly with the heart of his readers. Such contrastingly objective and subjective muses create distinct approaches to subjects such as education, uniformity, and gender. Both reinforce M. H. Abrams’ metaphor of ‘the prevailing Romantic conception of the poetic mind’⁴ as ‘a radiant projector which makes a contribution to the objects it perceives’.⁵ Neither author writes to simply reflect the exterior world; they seek to incite change.

The contrasting muses of these two authors are employed to achieve contrasting ends. Both Wollstonecraft and Wordsworth, writing in the first person, explicitly declare what the intention of their writing is. In his *Preface to Lyrical Ballads*, Wordsworth declares his ‘principal object’⁶ to be to ‘make the incidents of common life interesting by tracing in them [...] our elementary feelings’.⁷ In *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, Wollstonecraft declares that she intends, through reason, to reverse the effects of the ‘cramping of [female] understanding’,⁸ and to ‘sharpen’ reason rather than ‘senses’.⁹ Wollstonecraft employs ‘senses’ to mean sensibility. She believes that for women to be liberated from inequality, reason must govern emotions. Wordsworth sees emotion as a driving force: an action, rather than a reaction, that assigns meaning to experiences. The discordance between the two authors can be found in a sentence of Wollstonecraft’s: ‘when we are gathering the flowers of the day, and revelling in pleasure, the solid fruit of toil and wisdom should not be caught at the same time’.¹⁰ Wordsworth believes that such fruits of wisdom are produced only when surrounded by nature and engulfed in a state of pleasure.

3 William Wordsworth, “Preface to Lyrical Ballads” in *Romanticism: An Anthology*, ed. Duncan Wu (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012): 506-518.

4 M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition* (New York: The Norton Library, 1958), v-103.

5 Abrams, *The Mirror*, v.

6 Wordsworth, Preface, 506-518.

7 Ibid., 507.

8 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*.

9 Ibid., 14.

10 Ibid., 27.

Wordsworth's *Lyrical Ballads* was published in three stages. In order to properly examine his source of inspiration, it is crucial to evaluate each of the parts that blossomed into the final whole. Wordsworth was 'the first great romantic poet',¹¹ and his writing was 'charged with a strong desire to communicate directly to [his] readership now and in the future'.¹² Consequently, he was sensitive to the reactions of his readers. The *Advertisement* accompanied the first publication of *Lyrical Ballads* in 1798, the second was a considerably longer *Preface*, published in 1800, and a more detailed, revised *Preface* was published two years later accompanying the final edition of *Lyrical Ballads*. Such an evolution of production demonstrates an acute self-consciousness of writing. Wordsworth would adapt each new publication based on how it was received. His work was active, fluid, and in it we can see an example of text as 'a thing whose modulated surfaces betray the consciousness it contains'.¹³ In his 1800 *Preface*, Wordsworth explicitly refers to the 'Reader' thirty-two times. He employs a sympathetic muse by directly communicating with the reader through fulsome comments such as: 'I hope therefore the Reader will not censure me';¹⁴ 'I will not abuse the indulgence of my Reader';¹⁵ and more than once he 'request[s] the Reader's permission'¹⁶ to present his argument in a certain way. For Wordsworth to successfully 'imitate' the 'language of men',¹⁷ he eliminates the distance between author and reader by opening up a personal dialogue between the two. In facilitating 'the nature of reception' and engaging directly with his readership, Wordsworth stimulates the feelings of the reader. Over the course of the three-fold process of publication, Wordsworth's muse 'breathe[s] life [...] in or into' his text,¹⁸ rendering it an example of a

11 M. H. Abrams, *The Mirror*, 103.

12 Sally Bushell, "Wordsworth's 'Preface': A Manifesto for British Romanticism" in *The Cambridge Companion to Lyrical Ballads*, ed. Sally Bushell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 44 paras.

13 William H. Gass, "The Death of the Author", *Salmagundi*, no.65 (1984): 3-26, <https://salmagundi.skidmore.edu/articles/12-the-death-of-the-author>.

14 Wordsworth, *Preface*.

15 *Ibid.*, 509.

16 *Ibid.*, 510 & 515.

17 *Ibid.*, 511.

18 *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, accessed November 19, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/2201700710>.

‘living text’.¹⁹

In the 1798 *Advertisement*, Wordsworth declares the subject of his writing to be ‘the language of conversation in the middle and lower classes of society’.²⁰ Yet, in the ensuing 1800 *Preface*, this subject concentrates on ‘low and rustic life’ more generally, because ‘in that condition the passions of men are incorporated with the beautiful and permanent forms of nature’.²¹ Through focussing on ‘the manners of rural life’, Wordsworth is employing an egalitarian subject in a radical departure from the exclusive ‘poetic diction’²² which he so scorns. Wollstonecraft also addresses what she views as the most ‘natural’²³ social division. She intends to ‘pay particular attention to those in the middle class’, arguing that such a class is composed of ‘weak, artificial beings’ who, through their lack of education, ‘spread corruption through the whole mass of society’. Both authors depart from the conservative assumption that readers belong only to the educated upper class, and instead address a more representative audience. Wollstonecraft’s attention to the middle class is rooted in her broader critique of societal norms that perpetuate the subjugation of women and the production of artificial beings. Through their chosen subjects, disparate ideas of how to break free from societal corruption become apparent: Wordsworth argues that societal corruption can be escaped through a return to rural life, and Wollstonecraft argues through education and empowerment. Their distinct muses propose distinct lessons: Wordsworth’s muse of feeling encourages an exploration of the innate human emotions that are inherent in rustic life, while Wollstonecraft uses reason to advocate for freedom through education.

In the 1802 publication, Wordsworth elaborates on his meaning behind the phrase ‘poetic diction’.²⁴ He critiques the ‘poets and men’ who

19 Marilyn Butler, “Introduction” in *Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries: English Literature and its Background 1760-1830* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 1-10.

20 William Wordsworth, *Lyrical Ballads*, ed. R.L. Brett. et. al. (London: Routledge Classics, 2005), 49-303.

21 Wordsworth, *Preface*, 508.

22 *Ibid.*, 511.

23 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, 4.

24 Wordsworth, *Preface*, 534.

attempt to recreate the canonical work of the earliest poets through a ‘mechanical adoption’ of their ‘figures of speech’, and denounces such false replication as having ‘no natural connection’ neither to content nor reader. He instead believes that to allow his muse of feeling to breathe life into his writing ‘the Poet must descend from [a] supposed height’ to converse with humankind. He declares himself to ‘have taken as much pains to avoid [poetic diction] as others ordinarily take to produce it’,²⁵ in order to eliminate the gap between poet and reader and ‘bring [his] language near to the language of men’. Through his evasion of poetic diction, Wordsworth attempts to remove the poet from a pedestal.

The distinct muses reveal much about the varying positions of power from which each author writes, and each proposes a different lesson. Where Wordsworth discredits the ‘false refinement’²⁶ of language ‘under the influence of social vanity’, Wollstonecraft discredits the ‘false refinement’²⁷ under which ‘the minds of women’ have been ‘enfeebled’. Wordsworth speaks from a position of privilege. He preaches that pleasure is easily obtained, and that ‘if a [...] mind be sound and vigorous, [it] should always be accompanied with an overbalance of pleasure’.²⁸ However, for the majority, pleasure is a luxury that is moved to the peripherals as greater concerns, such as the equality of the sexes, occupy the primary focus. Wollstonecraft proves, through her muse, that while her mind is sound and vigorous, it cannot indulge in pleasure due to the degradation of women to ‘a kind of subordinate beings’.²⁹ In many of Wordsworth’s poems, such as ‘Tintern Abbey’, he declares nature to be ‘the anchor of [his] purest thoughts’.³⁰ However, to spend days surrounded by nature in the context of leisure is an activity achievable only by those with an adequate income, thus re-establishing Wordsworth’s position of privilege. Meanwhile, Wollstonecraft concerns herself with raising one half of the human race above the ‘state of perpetual childhood’³¹

25 Ibid., 511.

26 Ibid., 508.

27 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, 2.

28 Wordsworth, Preface, 151.

29 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, 2.

30 Wordsworth, Preface, 159.

31 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, 4.

to which they have been subjected, where they are ‘unable to stand alone’, regardless of their positioning in an urban or rural environment. Wollstonecraft’s position of power is made apparent by her decision to employ a muse of reason lest her writing be discarded as no more than ‘weak elegance of mind [and] exquisite sensibility’.³² It is through rationality that she strips away the ‘sickly delicacy’³³ of women. She argues for a redistribution of power, and the removal of the ‘natural spectre’ from the ‘feeble hand’ in which it has been placed.

Both texts succumb to a Rousseauvian influence which can be examined through the authors’ contrasting views on education. Jean Jacques Rousseau was one of the founding figures of the Romantic movement and his writing galvanised political revolutions in France and across Europe. His book *Émile* is a pioneering treatise on education in which Rousseau, in accordance with Romantic principles of individuality and nature-centric learning, argues that human beings are by nature good, yet they become tainted by the corrupting influences of society. He wrote: ‘God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil’.³⁴ A belief in societal contamination is precisely why Wordsworth chos to focus *Lyrical Ballads* on ‘low and rustic life’.³⁵ He believes urban civilisation ‘blunt[s] the discriminating powers of the mind’³⁶ and ‘produces a craving for extraordinary incident’. Wordsworth and Rousseau fear for a dampening of the senses as a consequence of the uniformity of society. Francis Jeffery, the editor of *The Edinburgh Review* draws a comparison between Wordsworth and the ‘distempered sensibility of Rousseau’.³⁷ Evidently, some believe that their sensibility has led them into the realms of the unsound.

Wollstonecraft is one example. She contradicts such beliefs by arguing that ‘sound politics’³⁸ is the most liberating form of education. In order

32 Ibid., 5.

33 Ibid., 24.

34 Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Émile*, trans. Barbara Foxley (New York: J.M. Dent, 1974), 5.

35 Wordsworth, Preface, 507.

36 Ibid., 510.

37 Sally Bushell, “Wordsworth’s ‘Preface’: A Manifesto for British Romanticism”, para 22 of 44.

38 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, 38.

to avoid the corrupting influences of society that Rousseau fears, Wollstonecraft argues instead for an education system that allows everyone to ‘participate in the inherent rights of mankind’³⁹ because if this is not achieved, ‘the virtue of man will be worm-eaten by the insect [(woman)] whom he keeps under his feet’.⁴⁰ She argues that ‘the most perfect education [...] is to enable the individual to attain such habits of virtue as will render it independent’.⁴¹ Therefore, she employs reason when presenting her arguments to ensure that she is at once educating and liberating her readers. She bestows upon her readers the ability to form their own rational arguments and opinions. Like Wordsworth, Wollstonecraft was also offended by a ‘blunt[ing]’⁴² of ‘the discriminating powers of the mind’, but particularly of the minds of women. She employs caustic sarcasm when drawing on Rousseau’s arguments, remarking how he, along with ‘most of the male writers who have followed his steps’,⁴³ have ‘warmly inculcated that the whole tendency of female education ought to be directed to one point: - to render them pleasing’. Wollstonecraft employs a muse of reason to present herself as an example of a woman’s ability to discriminate and analyse. In *Mary Wollstonecraft*, Sylvana Tomaselli notes that Rousseau’s presentation of ‘the education of [Emile’s] wife-to-be’ is based ‘entirely on opposite principles’ to that of Emile.⁴⁴ Despite ‘otherwise admir[ing] Rousseau’, Wollstonecraft identifies the dangerous irrationality of such a depiction of women. Wollstonecraft rejected Rousseau’s belief ‘that a woman should never for a moment feel herself independent’,⁴⁵ and instead bridges the gap in gender representation in the eighteenth century. ‘It is a farce’ she declares, ‘to call any being virtuous whose virtues do not result from the exercise of its own reason’.⁴⁶ To achieve equality of the sexes, Wollstonecraft demands that children ‘be sent to school to mix with a number of

39 Ibid., 108.

40 Ibid., 109.

41 Ibid., 12.

42 Wordsworth, Preface, 510.

43 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, 21.

44 Sylvana Tomaselli, *Mary Wollstonecraft: A Vindication of the Rights of Men and a Vindication of the Rights of Woman and Hints* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 318.

45 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, 19.

46 Ibid., 12.

equals'.⁴⁷ She argues in favour of uniformity and demonstrates that it is those who benefit from systems of uniformity who are able to condemn it, whereas for marginalised people, uniformity of education is a starting point in the establishment of uniformity of human rights.

Alan Richardson crucially notes how the 'gendered division of reason and passion [...] serves as a target for Mary Wollstonecraft'.⁴⁸ She was 'fundamentally [...] opposed to the very distinction between [the] rational male and [the] sensible female',⁴⁹ and therefore chose to affect a revolution in the perception of women through the implementation of a muse of reason. Wordsworth conforms to this division by suggesting that emotions are inherently female through his declaration of 'maternal passions'.⁵⁰ He also presents the arts as female: 'poetry and painting [...] we call them sisters'.⁵¹ In his portrayal of a feminine muse, the prevailing cultural tendency to associate women with emotions and sensibility is reinstated. Wollstonecraft, however, disrupts this categorisation as her muse of reason is feminised: 'Reason offers her sober light'.⁵² Consequently, Wollstonecraft actively avoids the 'turgid bombast of artificial feeling'⁵³ while Wordsworth relishes in it, as seen in his affected flattery of the reader. Wollstonecraft scorns writers' use of 'flowery diction' and 'pretty superlatives',⁵⁴ while Wordsworth posits that 'organic sensibility'⁵⁵ is imperative for the production of 'poems to which any value can be attached'.

Both Wordsworth's 'manifesto'⁵⁶ and Wollstonecraft's treatise are prosaic; both present their muses as female; and both are radical texts that attempt to reform either the perception of the rights of women or

47 Ibid., 105.

48 Allan Richardson, "Romanticism and the Colonisation of the Feminine" in *Romanticism and Feminism*, ed. Anne Mellor (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988), 14.

49 Ibid., 21.

50 Wordsworth, Preface, 509.

51 Ibid., 512.

52 Wollstonecraft, *Vindication*, 35.

53 Ibid., 5.

54 Ibid., 6.

55 Wordsworth, Preface, 508.

56 Sally Bushell, "Wordsworth's 'Preface': A Manifesto for British Romanticism", para 26 of 44.

that of the subject matter of poetry. Wordsworth's *Preface to Lyrical Ballads* is radical in its democratic view of poetry. By using accessible language and focusing on everyday life, he breaks away from the elitist belief that poetry was reserved only for the educated upper class. His work serves as a reminder that the joys of literature can be enjoyed by all because 'human blood circulates through [poetry's] veins'.⁵⁷ Wollstonecraft, on the other hand, emerges as a pioneer of feminist literature through her assertion of the rational capabilities of women. Her work saw ripples of impact spread across the world as it 'had significant influence on the women's rights movements in Great Britain and the United States'.⁵⁸ Through a radical choice in pronoun and subsequent presentation of reason as feminine, Wollstonecraft challenges the societal norms that limit women to the domestic sphere and deny them intellectual and rational capabilities. She argues that if equality of the sexes is not achieved, men will become virtuous humans while women are sentenced to reach no further than the status of virtuous wife.

57 Wordsworth, Preface, 512.

58 Karen Sottosanti, "Mary Wollstonecraft", *Britannica* (2023), <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mary-Wollstonecraft>.

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Resistance Through Repurposing: An Analysis of Xenofeminism and the Evolution of Feminist Technologies

Maia Appleby Melamed

This paper provides a historical overview of the contemporary philosophy of Xenofeminism, and assesses how it theorises the intersections between feminism, technology, and futurity. By approaching 21st century feminist theory through the central tool of ‘repurposing’, Xenofeminism is established through its ability to adapt past feminist ideology for use in the present day. This paper will firstly evaluate how technologies developed as part of second wave feminism and ideologies of 1990’s cyberfeminism can be seen as key precursors to Xenofeminism; the paper will also consider the value and adaptability of past movements for contemporary notions of feminism as an intersectional practice. An overview of the three central lines of enquiry of Xenofeminism – ‘techno-materialism’, ‘anti-naturalism’ and ‘gender abolition’ – shall be situated within Helen Hester’s indispensable and explanatory text, *Xenofeminism* (2018). Ultimately this paper will contribute to the slowly emerging academic enquiry into Xenofeminism, identifying it as a productive and inclusive philosophy which remains grounded to the prevailing enquiry into the potential technology has to liberate women from systems of oppression.

Introduction

Although historically excluded from narratives of technological development, feminists have for decades understood that a recognition and implementation of the connections between women and technology aids the production of a liberated feminist future. Xenofeminism, a 21st century gender abolitionist philosophy, is the most current ideology that theorises the intersections between feminism, technology, and futurity. The ethos of repurposing is a central tool of this philosophy, by which ideologies from the second wave feminist movement of the 1970’s and cyberfeminist ideologies of the 1990’s are redefined to develop the evolving connections between feminism, technology,

and futurity. Xenofeminism has been regarded by Paul B. Preciado as ‘the missing link between radical feminism from the 1970s and the contemporary cyborg’.¹ This contemporary philosophy fully realises the potential of technological development to abolish essentialist ideas of the human by repurposing existing ideology and technology, utilising ‘old means for new ends,’ in the words of its founder, Helen Hester.²

As feminist ideologies of technology adapt to become more inclusive, this paper shall analyse this predominantly Western trend by providing a historical overview of how Xenofeminism came to be. Firstly, by examining how feminist technologies in the 1970’s increased bodily autonomy and then continuing to address how the birth of the internet allowed female emancipation in transgressive cyber spaces. This historical progress has been enabled through repurposing, a Xenofeminist tool which seeks to prevent exclusionary feminist contexts from negating the use of the liberatory practices that evolved from these outdated frameworks. By appropriating past ideologies for contemporary understandings, Xenofeminism progresses past exclusionary structures and instead enable an emancipatory future for all by reevaluating existing practices.

Beginnings of Xenofeminism

It is the ability to repurpose ideologies from previous eras to enable their application in a current context that leads this paper to advocate for Xenofeminism as a framework that is able to provide a durable and critical analysis of how feminism may utilise technology as a tool for liberation, for the present day. Established in 2014 by the collective Laboria Cuboniks, Xenofeminism is the embodiment of a ‘post-third-wave trans-feminist school of thought,’³ assembled through its

1 Paul B. Preciado, referenced in Laboria Cuboniks, *Xenofeminism*, accessed November 30, 2023, <https://laboriacuboniks.net/books/xenofeminism-helen-hester/>.

2 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), 98.

3 Saskia Huc-Hepher, “Queering the web archive: A xenofeminist approach to gender, function, language and culture in the London French Special Collection,” *Humanit Soc Sci Commun* 8, no. 298 (2021), 2.

central focus on repurposing the ideology of a ‘litany of influences,’⁴ such as the second wave feminist movement, and the philosophies of cyberfeminism. The core aims and beliefs of this ‘polymorphous’⁵ collective are outlined by one of the founding members, Helen Hester, in a short book titled *Xenofeminism* (2018) in which she critically engages with how technology of second wave feminism and ideologies of the cyberfeminism of the 1990’s directly influenced the evolution of Xenofeminism. Hester further describes how Xenofeminism works to forge an ideology conducive to ‘contemporary political conditions,’ whatever they may be, and inclusive of all who feel ‘alien’ in the present social formation, whoever they may be.⁶ This commitment to a permanent usability and universality reduces the likelihood of Xenofeminism becoming obsolete in a present-day context, as Hester instead grants it the ability to evolve alongside changing perspectives, a feature that previous ideologies have failed to account for. The success of Xenofeminism’s evolutionary quality hinges on a central strategy which celebrates ‘resistance through repurposing’.⁷ This guarantees ‘more durable forms of transformation,’⁸ for a futurity which is influenced by those who came before and seeks to fit those who come after. The outlines of this Xenofeminist analysis are defined by three lines of enquiry, central to an enduring contemporary presentation of futurity in relation to feminism and technology. These are described as, ‘techno-materialism,’ ‘anti-naturalism’ and ‘gender abolition’.⁹ This framework challenges the common narrative of reproductive futurism, a concept which has been heavily criticised in queer theory for the exclusive emphasis placed on having children as an essential component to an optimistic future.¹⁰ Instead Xenofeminism theorises how technology may be used as an ‘activist tool’ to disrupt these inherently naturalistic concepts of futurity.¹¹ Xenofeminists argue

4 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 1.

5 Macon Holt, “What is Xenofeminism?”, *Ark Books*, (February 13 2018) <http://arkbooks.dk/what-is-xenofeminism/>.

6 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 1, 66.

7 *Ibid.*, 148.

8 *Ibid.*, 149.

9 *Ibid.*, 3.

10 Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2004).

11 *Ibid.*, 7.

that repurposing existing technology will extend human freedoms and reject the ‘glorification of nature,’¹² with the ultimate aim of overthrowing the ‘oppressive socio-biological condition’ of gender.¹³ Hester emphasises Xenofeminism’s critical understanding of the simultaneity of gender, technology, race, and sexuality and develops a narrative that seeks to ‘strategically deploy existing technologies to re-engineer the world,’¹⁴ with an understanding of how a socially constructed bias may impact technology.

Feminist Repurposing

Looking to the influences of Xenofeminism and the technology it now seeks to repurpose, an early influence on Xenofeminism came in the second wave feminist movement with the development of the Del-Em menstruation extraction device by feminist campaigners Lorraine Rothman and Carol Downer in 1971. This device – used to perform abortions – is described by Hester as a crucial influence for Xenofeminist ideology. Hester describes how it physically illustrates the potential of feminist technological futures, as the Del-Em device is a ‘partial, imperfect, but hopeful example of what a Xenofeminist technology might look like.’¹⁵ This iteration of feminism intentionally repurposed scientific knowledge and capitalist commodity to reveal the potential that technology has to liberate women, physically demonstrating what would become a core principle of Xenofeminism.

Rothman and Downer’s device reclaimed female corporeal autonomy, from the ‘highly gendered and deeply unequal’¹⁶ medical context of the 1970’s. Women in this period were denied a right over their own body due to the misogynistic ideologies embedded in medical knowledge.¹⁷ In the US in the 1970’s almost two thirds of women underwent episiotomies in childbirth ‘without need or consent’, often followed

12 Ibid., 20.

13 Ibid., 7.

14 Ibid., 9.

15 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 70.

16 Sage-Femme Collective, *Natural Liberty: Rediscovering Self-Induced Abortion Methods* (Las Vegas: Sage-Femme!, 2008), 13.

17 Elinor Cleghorn, *Unwell Women* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2021), 12.

by an invasive and unnecessary ‘husband stitch’.¹⁸ In contrast, the Del-Em liberated the use of familiar medical technologies from the sexist context within which they were typically used, repurposing them to benefit the same women that these technologies harmed. The Del-Em device creates a manual vacuum aspiration technique for abortion: a thin plastic cannula is connected to a syringe with a valve which is joined via plastic tubing to a mason jar and used to collect the content of the uterine lining.¹⁹ By decreasing the skill level required to perform the extraction – the Del-Em only requires two people to operate it – women had an increased ability to take ownership over their reproductive rights.

The Del-EM device was patented two years before the U.S Supreme Court passed *Roe v. Wade* (1973), a decision which granted a woman’s right to abortion based on her right to personal privacy. The existence of this technology was therefore particularly significant in offering reproductive autonomy before a woman’s right to an abortion was ratified in law. Its use was taught in feminist ‘self-help’ groups which allowed women to perform abortions up to seven weeks of pregnancy.²⁰ These groups existed in opposition to the possible exploitation of women who were forced to terminate their pregnancy through unregulated backstreet abortions. Instead, self-help groups demystified the process of abortion through making knowledge accessibility, therefore increasing a woman’s reproductive agency. The existence of these groups allowed women to ‘seize the technology without buying the ideology’.²¹ Women came together through a technology that was invented to liberate them from a healthcare system which, at the time, functioned to do the opposite. The existence of these groups formed ‘a close community of women who educated each other’.²² The mutually supportive connections fostered in these communities

18 Molly Enking, “Women are being cut during childbirth without need or consent,” *CUNY Academic Works* 12, no 16 (2018).

19 Sage-Femme Collective, *Natural Liberty*, 40.

20 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 73.

21 Barbara Ehrenreich & Deirde English, *Complaints & Disorders: The Sexual Politics of Sickness* (New York: Feminist Press at The City University of New York, 1973), 156.

22 Sage-Femme Collective. *Natural Liberty*, 30.

echo Donna Haraway's calls to make 'kin'²³ connections as an ethical responsibility to create networks of care within a 'world that rips us apart from each other'.²⁴ Whilst Haraway's concept primarily relates to human and non-human expansive concepts of relation, the self-help groups of the 1970's enacted this process by manipulating existing technology for the benefit of those subjugated by society. In fact, the vital need for feminist technology which liberates those when political structures do the opposite has not lost its radical importance. Fifty years since the invention of the Del-EM, in June 2022 the US Supreme Court overturned *Roe v. Wade*, ruling that there is no constitutional right to an abortion. This ruling was described by President Joe Biden as a 'tragic error',²⁵ and the controversial event signals the deep divide that exists in America today on reproductive rights. In this current context of uncertain reproductive rights in the Western world, Downer describes how this practice of menstrual extraction has 'never stopped' with around '50 or 60' self-help groups running across America today.²⁶ Feminist technology therefore remains critical in circumventing the laws that negate their reproductive rights, as women are continually unable to entrust their reproductive autonomy with those who govern them.

The radical use of technology by Rothman and Downer to thwart healthcare systems which deny women autonomy over their bodies has been exceptionally influential to the central Xenofeminist principle of 'active repurposing'.²⁷ This is rooted in the 2nd wave feminist movement which proved that liberating the appropriation of tools is beneficial to those subjugated by technology. Helen Hester

23 Donna J. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2016), 102.

24 Steve Paulson, "Making Kin: An Interview with Donna Haraway," *Los Angeles Review of Books* (2019), <https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/making-kin-an-interview-with-donna-haraway/>.

25 "Remarks By President Joe Biden on the Supreme Court Decision to Overturn *Roe v. Wade*," WH.GOV, June 24, 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/06/24/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-supreme-court-decision-to-overturn-roe-v-wade/>.

26 Carrie N. Baker. "Abortion How-To: The Ms. Q&A on Menstrual Extraction With Carol Downer," *Ms.* (2022) <https://msmagazine.com/2022/07/14/abortion-how-to-carol-downer-menstrual-extraction/>.

27 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 92.

praises Rothman and Downer for giving ‘concrete form to abstract discussions about disobedient tools’.²⁸ Complexities arise, however, from analysing the extent of the influence that the 2nd wave feminism movement had on Xenofeminism. Hester describes that ‘it may seem perverse to contextualise contemporary trans*²⁹ practices and activism in terms of a second-wave feminist movement not known for its hospitality to anybody but cis women’.³⁰ This remains a contemporary criticism of the 1970’s feminist movement. Trans exclusionary narratives amongst lesbian separatist and radical feminist groups were common in this period, appearing in books such as Janice Raymond’s *The Transsexual Empire*,³¹ and organisations such as the Lesbian Organisation of Toronto (LOOT), which voted in 1978 to exclude trans women from becoming members.³²

It is clear that the trans inclusive founding ideals of Xenofeminism are in opposition to the ideologies held by some feminist groups of the 1970’s. It is precisely, however, this opposition in which the essential tool of repurposing allows present ideologies to engage with the successful technologies of the past. Effectively, Xenofeminism is able to separate the successes of second wave feminism from the ideologically exclusive contexts from which they emerge. Therefore, similarly to Rothman and Downer’s seizing of medical technology from sexist medical ideology, Xenofeminism may draw on the successes of the Del-EM device without adopting the ideologically limiting contexts it originated from. In this way, Xenofeminism’s reappropriation of feminist technologies of 2nd wave feminism fortifies the productive uses of technology for contemporary and future feminist movements. It is through an exploration of historical links between differing feminist ideologies that technologies developed for different eras of the feminist movement can be ‘repurposed’ as a

28 Ibid., 98.

29 Trans* added to the OED in 2018, ‘originally used to include explicitly both transsexual and transgender, or (now usually) to indicate the inclusion of gender identities such as gender-fluid, agender, etc., alongside transsexual and transgender’, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/trans_adj-a?tab=meaning_and_use#1223026980.

30 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 92.

31 Janice Raymond, *The Transsexual Empire* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).

32 Other trans exclusionary texts published in this period include Mary Daly, *Gyn/ecology* (London: The Woman’s Press, 1978).

tool for the development of contemporary ideologies of emancipation. This repurposed technology would be more suited to reflect the current needs of populations previously excluded from outdated ideology.

A further instance of past feminist ideology that have influenced the present Xenofeminist principle of repurposing, comes from the 1991 Australian cyberfeminist collective, VNS Matrix. Authors of the *Cyberfeminist Manifesto for the 21st Century*,³³ the collective is a central precursor to Xenofeminist ideology as they emphasise the potential technology that has to propel women into a futurity that seeks to empower their emancipation. Sadie Plant describes the development of cyberfeminism as being rooted in the recognition that ‘women have not merely had a minor part to play in the emergence of the digital machines’,³⁴ which was relevant given the newly established World Wide Web. In this view, the relationship between feminism and technology is underlined by a techno-utopian narrative - machines have the potential to destroy restrictive gender binaries and liberate feminine expression in the transgressive space of the internet. The explicit and viscerally slimy text of the VNS Manifesto reinforces Plant’s understanding and suggests an inherent bodily connection between women and technology within the internet, thereby retaining a much more corporeal association than Xenofeminism’s overt rejection of the ‘oppressive socio-biological condition’ of gender.³⁵ Virginia Barratt, a member of the VNS Matrix, describes the power of their manifesto as a ‘linguistic weapon of mass destruction, the VNS Manifesto struck at the mass erection of the techno patriarchal order’,³⁶ therefore repurposing the exclusively male, sanitised view of technology held at the end of the 20th century. Instead, Barratt appropriates inherently masculine military language with reference to phallic imagery, highlighting the ironically satirical nature to their manifesto which simmers with the possibilities of liberated female sexuality within cyberspace. The bodily text utilises fleshy, sexually

33 VNS Matrix, “The Cyberfeminist Manifesto for the 21st Century,” *VNS Matrix*, accessed 25 November 2023, <https://vnsmatrix.net/projects/the-cyberfeminist-manifesto-for-the-21st-century>.

34 Sadie Plant. *Zeros + Ones*. (New York: Doubleday, 1997), 37.

35 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 7.

36 VNS Matrix, “The Cyberfeminist Manifesto”.

charged language to appropriate pornographic fragmentations of the female body as it is seen online, describing how ‘the clitoris is a direct line to the matrix’.³⁷ The shocking nature of this line observes the common aesthetics of cyberfeminism: the sexually liberated female body is coalesced with technology, due to the potential that the intangible nature of cyberspace has in redefining the socially restrictive norms of the female existence. The use of the word ‘matrix’ also essentialises the connection between the liberated female body and technology, as it translates from Latin to mean ‘womb’, whilst also being defined within mathematics and computer science as a rectangular array of numbers. This double meaning reveals the true possibilities of the virtual world according to VNS Matrix, in which the female body is not bound by the hierarchies or expected reproductive futurity of its physical reality, instead being sexually liberated in the virtual world. The manifesto itself acts as a permanent disruptor to accepted natural hierarchies and therefore this techno-utopian aesthetic and appropriation of the internet constructs a future in which female sexuality is empowered by the emancipatory space of the internet. Acknowledged by Helen Hester as some of Xenofeminism’s ‘most significant predecessors’,³⁸ VNS Matrix’s essential use of sexually charged language, in juxtaposition with sterile and militaristic imagery, overtly repurposes the assumptively male space of the internet. More recently, this has allowed the ideology of Xenofeminism to go further in encompassing not exclusively cisgender women, but all who have been rejected from the historical conception of the cyber-sphere.³⁹

Whilst this techno-utopian vision of female liberation, enabled by the internet, seemed radically liberating within the context of the 1990’s, Francesca da Rimini, a member of the VNS Matrix describes how this was because ‘informational capitalism hadn’t quite taken root. The internet was far less regulated, far less commodified ... There seemed to be endless possibilities’.⁴⁰ The endless possibilities she describes

37 Ibid.

38 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 151.

39 Felice Addeo et al, “The Self-reinforcing effect of digital and social exclusion: The inequality loop,” *Telematics and Informatics* 72 (2022), 1-13.

40 Claire L. Evans, “An Oral History of the First Cyberfeminists,” *Motherboard Tech by Vice*, (2014), <https://www.vice.com/en/article/z4mq8/an-oral-history-of-the-first-cyberfeminists-vns-matrix>.

are removed in the context of the 2020's because, thirty years since the internet's invention, it has become clear that this cyber space virtually reproduces the damaging hierarchies of the AFK (Away from Keyboard) world.⁴¹ In the current context, the anonymity allowed online does not always contain an emancipatory quality for women and instead increases the risk for online abuse such as revenge porn and doxing, with no consequences for unidentifiable offenders.

85% of women globally have witnessed or experienced online violence,⁴² therefore the utopian image conveyed by VNS Matrix must be criticised. Ani Pheobe Hao continues to expose the limitations of cyberfeminism in the current political context describing 'its lack of intersectional focus, its utopian vision of cyberspace ... its whiteness and elite community building'.⁴³ When applied to an analysis of VNS Matrix's manifesto, Hao's critiques become explicit - even the most essential cyberfeminist notion of female liberation via the online space excludes the 37% of women globally who did not use the internet in 2022, the majority of whom were in the Global South.⁴⁴ This suggests a lack of inclusion on the part of the VNS Matrix, their narrow focus only empowering those already socially and economically privileged. The exclusive focus of the VNS Matrix's manifesto diminishes its relevance to contemporary feminist debate, and Xenofeminism's emphasis on intersectionality instead accommodates current feminist thought. What must not be dismissed however is the instrumental part that cyberfeminist thought of the 1990's played in the development of the inclusive framework of Xenofeminism. Hester reinforces this,

41 Devon Delfino, "What is AFK's meaning? The history behind the internet acronym and how to use it in a chat", *Business Insider* (2021), <https://www.businessinsider.com/guides/tech/afk-meaning?r=US&IR=T>.

42 "85% of women have witnessed harassment and online Violence", *The Economist Group*, March 3, 2021, <https://www.economistgroup.com/group-news/economist-impact/85-of-women-have-witnessed-harassment-and-online-violence-finds-new-research>.

43 Ani Pheobe Hao. "INTERNET FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH – CYBERFEMINISTS ARE FIGHTING FOR A NEW REALITY," *GenderIT.org* (2019), <https://genderit.org/articles/internet-freedom-not-enough-cyberfeminists-are-fighting-new-reality>.

44 Zia Muhammad, "37% of Women Still Don't Have Internet Access in 2022," *Digital Information World*, June 12, 2022, <https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2022/12/37-of-women-still-dont-have-internet.html>.

describing how ‘there is still much to gain from engaging with pre-millennial cyberfeminist thought’.⁴⁵ What was ground-breaking and liberating content at the time of VNS Matrix’s conception remains a fundamental precursor for the comprehensive framework of Hester’s Xenofeminist thought. Repurposing is therefore an ongoing process in the continued development of feminist ideology, as demonstrated through the deeply influential impact the VNS Matrix had on the development of techno-utopian futurities. Paradoxically, it is both the influence and the limitations of the VNS Matrix which enable the relationship between feminism, technology, and futurity to be continually adapted and repurposed from the ideals of predecessors to fit the needs of those in the current moment. As a result, these modifications of past thought enable the ‘durable forms of transformation’⁴⁶ which remain essential to Xenofeminist thinking.

Looking to the Future

The Xenofeminist ideology advocates for a radically transformative technological futurity, which repurposes the liberatory technological developments of the 2nd wave feminism movement, and the unparalleled ideology of cyberfeminism, ‘in the spirit of a solidarity that aims for systemic political change’.⁴⁷ This modern philosophy produces a futurity that is situated in both the concerns of present, and the limitations of past ideologies. Xenofeminism remains able to reject the uncritical techno-utopianism of the VNS Matrix manifesto and the 2nd wave feminist movements inability to advance towards intersectionality, whilst maintaining an optimism with an insistence that the relationship between feminism and technology is not static. It can evolve to better facilitate a future that accommodates and is influenced by all those who require it. However, the idiosyncratic universalism which underpins this approach, attempting to encompass all identities past, present and future, has come under criticism as an

45 Helen, Hester, “After the Future: *n* Hypotheses of Post-Cyber Feminism,” *Res* (2017), <http://beingres.org/2017/06/30/afterthefuture-helenhester/>.

46 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 149.

47 Mareile Pfannebecker, “Long Read Review: ‘Repurpose your Desire: Xenofeminism and Millennial Politics,’” *LSE Review of Books Blog* (2018), <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-021-00967-8>.

unrealistic ambition. Annie Goh argues that the use of this technological feminist thought is limited as it ignores the individual and specific needs of marginalised groups. Goh describes Xenofeminism's 'tick-box' attitude to intersectionality which 'uses alienness univocally and performs the marginalised position of "being alienated" whilst it elides the differences implicated in the dynamics of marginalisation'.⁴⁸ Goh's analysis of this ideology suggests that the failure of Xenofeminism lies with its reluctance to appropriately define what, or who, they acknowledge as holding an 'alienated' status. Through the assumption of oppression as equally distributed across society, Xenofeminism is described by Goh to be 'cloaked in whiteness'⁴⁹ highlighting how a universal understanding of the reasons for individual oppressions, leads to ineffective methods of treating those who are oppressed. Goh therefore accurately acknowledges that Hester's book does not capture the full complexity of various experiences within marginalisation. The 'active repurposing'⁵⁰ that is central to Xenofeminist thought does however enable these challenges to be overcome and further develops the thinking on inclusivity in future analyses of how feminism can productively engage with technology. It is clear that Xenofeminism does more at fostering the intersectionality so central to 21st century feminism than its ideological predecessors, meaning that its limitations are potentially necessary glitches, enabling a productive attitude to failure which works at revealing modes of potential repair to go further than Xenofeminism in understanding how vital technology is as a tool to enable a liberatory future for all.

The enquiry into technology through its potential to liberate women from oppression and redefine narratives of the future may be outlined as an ongoing process of revaluation and reinterpretation in response to the increasingly inclusive political ideologies of the present. This allows the appropriation of past feminist ideologies and technologies to become crucial tools for progress towards an emancipatory future. The historical exclusion of women from narratives of technological

48 Goh, Annie, "APPROPRIATING THE ALIEN: A CRITIQUE OF XENOFEMINISM," *Mute*. (2019), <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/appropriating-alien-critique-xenofeminism>.

49 Ibid.

50 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 92.

development has been challenged and reshaped by feminist thinkers, as the connection wrought between women and technology has been revealed by the ground-breaking feminist technologies of the 1970's and the liberatory cyberfeminist principles of the 1990's. This fundamental link has culminated with the contemporary philosophy of Xenofeminism which recognises that it is through the essential notion of 'active repurposing'⁵¹ emphasising the use of 'old means for new ends'⁵² which reflects the adaptability of feminist ideologies to changing historical and social contexts. This adaptability is described by Hester as she illustrates how Xenofeminism works by 'collecting, discarding, and revising existing perspectives – in stripping its myriad influences for parts'.⁵³ The revision of the exclusive and limiting feminist practices of the 1970's and 1990's, which failed to incorporate a transgender or racially conscious perspective, enables Xenofeminism to create a futurity that is not only influenced by past struggles but is also attentive to the complexities of the present. Yet, in the same way that Xenofeminism must remain open to a continued evolution, its own limitations will undoubtedly be exposed through the present and future progression of feminist technological thought.

51 Helen Hester, *Xenofeminism*, 92.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 1.

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Responses of Centralised and Decentralised Countries to COVID-19: the case of France and Sweden

Xinyue Wang

The COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly impacted global public health systems and economic frameworks. Many researchers have delved into these effects and widely discussed the ramifications. Building upon existing literature, this paper comparatively analyses the strategies adopted by France and Sweden in responding to the COVID-19 outbreak, emphasising the effectiveness and implications of the approaches undertaken by countries with centralised versus decentralised political systems to overcome COVID-19. Through comprehensive review of literature, news reports, and other sources, this study reveals psychological resistance and disdain towards COVID-19 vaccination among the populace under France’s centralised government system, alongside significant issues of “Tyranny of Experts” within Sweden’s decentralised governance framework.

1. Introduction

COVID-19, as a global public health emergency, has rigorously tested healthcare systems worldwide and precipitated a critical examination of state governance and response strategies. France and Sweden have been selected for a comparative study, investigating the divergent responses of centralised versus decentralised governments to the pandemic and the underlying reasons for these differences.

The manuscript will embark on a theoretical dissection of the disparities in policy execution between centralised and decentralised nations, with an empirical comparison of the healthcare expenditures and vaccination rollouts during the pandemic, shedding light on resource allocation within the health sector. Subsequent sections will outline the specific strategies employed by France and Sweden, with a focus on evaluating the challenges encountered in outbreak management and the application of learned knowledge and theoretical

constructs to potential solutions. In response to the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy in France, this paper argues that the nudge is a better remedy, while the introduction of some degree of centralisation could effectively address the problem of tyranny of the experts in Sweden. This approach aims to offer a nuanced perspective on crisis management effectiveness across different political frameworks.

2. Review of the Implemented Policies

This section will focus on the response of France and Sweden to the COVID-19 pandemic, aiming to provide readers with a broad framework for further understanding the situation in these two countries regarding their responses to the pandemic.

On March 17, 2020, France initiated a strict nationwide lockdown that lasted about 55 days, necessitating written justification for outings and imposing fines up to 450 euros for non-compliance.¹ The initial vaccine rollout began on December 27, 2020, in nursing homes but faced criticism for its slow pace. By the end of January 2021, over 500 vaccination centres were established across France, aiming to expedite vaccine distribution. Starting in spring 2021, vaccination efforts were expanded to the entire population, significantly accelerating the process.² Additionally, the rapid increase in vaccination rates was partly due to mandatory vaccination policies for healthcare workers (see Fig. 1 for worldwide vaccination rates).

Sweden's strategy for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic relied significantly on citizen autonomy and voluntary behavioural adjustments, thus avoiding the imposition of a nationwide blockade. The Swedish government did not take measures to restrict the free movement of citizens within the country, borders remained open to European countries, and the public transportation system continued

1 FRANCE 24, "In Pictures: A Look Back, One Year after France Went into Lockdown." *France 24*, March 17, 2021. <https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210317-in-pictures-a-look-back-one-year-after-france-went-into-lockdown>.

2 Coralie Gandré and Zeynep Or, "Transition Measures: Planning Services," April 2021. <https://Eurohealthisobservatory.who.int/Monitors/Hsrm/All-Updates/Hsrm/France/Transition-Measures-Planning-Services>.

to function.³ The Public Health Agency of Sweden was given overall responsibility for infectious disease control,⁴ including developing relevant regulations as well as providing advice and guidelines. This approach was designed to ensure effective management of infectious diseases, such as COVID-19, emphasising the central role of scientific expertise in public health policy development. Through this strategy, Sweden tried to find a balance between safeguarding civil liberties and maintaining public health.

3. Data Analysis

The high degree of autonomy of public institutions is a feature specific to the Swedish context, as well as the fact that the constitution does not allow the national government to impose a state of national emergency and thus centralise power in peacetime.⁵ This left Sweden with no sound legal basis to impose blockades and restrict population movement during COVID-19, resulting in public institutions retaining autonomy during the crisis. Importantly, Sweden's ban on ministerial governance meant that ministers and politicians were prevented from interfering in the day-to-day functioning of state institutions, granting a high degree of professional autonomy to the state's public health experts. In addition to this, agencies have limited authorisation to implement policies at the regional and municipal level, unless supported by the parliament. This kind of restriction has made the administration of the various regions more independent and has enabled decentralisation.⁶

3 Sabine Kuhlmann et. al., "Tracing Divergence in Crisis Governance: Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic in France, Germany and Sweden Compared," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 87 (3), 2021. 0020852320979359. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852320979359>.

4 The Public Health Agency of Sweden, "Our Mission - the Public Health Agency of Sweden," March 14, 2023. <https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/about-us/our-mission/>.

5 Evangelia Petridou, "Politics and Administration in Times of Crisis: Explaining the Swedish Response to the COVID-19 Crisis," *European Policy Analysis* 6 (2), 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1095>.

6 Jakob Laage-Thomsen and Søren Lund Frandsen, "Pandemic Preparedness Systems and Diverging COVID-19 Responses within Similar Public Health Regimes: A Comparative Study of Expert Perceptions of Pandemic Response in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden," *Globalization and Health* 18 (1), 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-022-00799-4>.

In contrast, France's centralised approach embeds government regulatory powers within a strong bureaucratic framework, where government regulatory powers and strong bureaucratic structures are deeply embedded in its political culture. The strong centralisation of power gives the central government significant influence and control over local governments.⁷ This theoretically allows decisions to be made quickly and nationally, but it also implies a lack of consultation and transparency in the decision-making process, preventing it from being tailored to a particular region.

However, France, as one of the European countries most affected by COVID-19, has had its centralised health system increasingly criticised for the strategies it has adopted.⁸ Multiple sources suggest that France's economic policy failures have fuelled broader public doubts about the central government's ability to manage the crisis. For example, failed attempts at reflation, the loss of competitiveness in the European integration process and the disintegration of industrial policy instruments, combined with uncontrolled public spending, have adversely affected economic growth.⁹ The structural weaknesses of the French public health system in response to COVID-19 have been pointed out including the high level of bureaucratisation and the lack of effective coordination between the various levels of health agencies.¹⁰ The centralisation of the decision-making process was highlighted, including the neglect of local needs and solutions, which affected the implementation of effective policies, such as slow detection, tracing, and isolation strategies, as well as the criticism of vaccination strategies. However, one could agree that in France, more centralised decision-making may allow for more effective coordination of healthcare resources across the country, thanks to

7 Sabine Kuhlmann et. al., "Tracing Divergence in Crisis Governance".

8 Patrick Hassenteufel, "Handling the COVID-19 Crisis in France: Paradoxes of a Centralised State-Led Health System," *European Policy Analysis* 6 (2), 2020, 170–79. <https://doi.org/10.1002/epa2.1104>.

9 Pierre-André Buigues and Elie Cohen, "The Failure of French Industrial Policy," *Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade* 20 (2), 2020, 249–77. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-019-00325-0>.

10 Zeynep Or et. al., "France's Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," *Health Economics, Policy and Law* 17 (1), 2021, 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744133121000165>.

a more transparent and integrated data policy, again facilitated by a strong central government.¹¹ Nevertheless, from the observed failures of French measures, the opposition to centralisation of power has been supported by empirical evidence.

Two years after the outbreak, healthcare spending in Sweden in 2022 has returned to its pre-pandemic average, while healthcare spending in France remains high (Table 1). This difference may stem from the two countries' different strategies for managing healthcare resources and policy decisions. Sweden may have focused more on inter-regional coordination and cooperation, adjusting healthcare expenditures in a timely manner according to the actual pandemic situation. In contrast, France's case shows that its centralised system can lead to hierarchical crisis management in the face of external shocks. And, in the early stages of the pandemic, local forces continued to follow this model without adapting it to local conditions.¹² France may therefore be more exposed to a higher degree of centralisation, where the president and central government may not be able to observe and respond to the specifics of each region in a nuanced way, leading to continued high healthcare expenditures. In addition, the French government adjusted its spending allocation scheme after the outbreak, realising the long-term health risks posed by the COVID-19. It decided to maintain healthcare spending at a high level to deal with possible future health crises. However, this decision in France may become almost irreversible. In highly centralised systems, once changes are implemented, it is hard to scale back. These changes create jobs and reallocate resources, suggesting that the cancellation of these programs will be very unpopular, not only out of consideration of social dissatisfaction, but also because the government may need a larger budget in the future.

11 Gail Davies, and Jacquelin Burgess, "Challenging the 'View from Nowhere': Citizen Reflections on Specialist Expertise in a Deliberative Process," *Health & Place* 10 (4), 2004, 349–61. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2004.08.005>.

12 Davide Vampa, "COVID-19 and Territorial Policy Dynamics in Western Europe: Comparing France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 51 (4), 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjab017>.

Moreover, this reflects the difference in the two countries' strategies for budget allocation. High healthcare spending may squeeze French investment in other important areas such as defence and education. Although there is a possibility of a rebound from the pandemic, over-concentration of spending in one area may not be an optimal strategy given the limited financial resources of the government. Therefore, France should conduct a more comprehensive profit-and-loss analysis in its future fiscal planning to ensure a balanced development of public services and sectors. For example, the return on money invested in healthcare can be compared to the return on money invested in education, rather than maintaining the same high level of healthcare spending simply because of the risk of a rebound. The returns on health care spending may diminish as COVID-19 is no longer a key issue.

From the available data, it can be observed that under a more centralised system of governance, the COVID-19 vaccination rate in France shows a lead of about 5 to 6 percentage points compared to Sweden (Table 2). The reason for the higher vaccination rate in France may be related to its mandatory vaccination measures. However, the difference between the two countries appears particularly striking when looking at the data on booster vaccinations, where Sweden exceeds France's vaccination rate by a full 23 percentage points. This difference may partly explain why the proportion of total injections is 18 doses per 100 residents higher in Sweden than in France. Booster shots have been highly effective against the rapid increase in new coronavirus infections and deaths resulting from the ongoing emergence of new variants of the virus, particularly the Delta and Omicron. All findings from currently available studies support the effectiveness of booster vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 variants, including Omicron.^{13,14}

Given this situation, and in conjunction with France's centralised system, the country should consider developing and implementing

13 Santenna Chenchula et. al, "Current Evidence on Efficacy of COVID-19 Booster Dose Vaccination against the Omicron Variant: A Systematic Review," *Journal of Medical Virology* 94 (7), 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jmv.27697>.

14 Zichun Wei et. al., "The Importance of Booster Vaccination in the Context of Omicron Wave," *Frontiers in Immunology* 13 (September 2022). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fimmu.2022.977972>.

policies to initiate booster vaccination programs based on current public health needs and realities. A decentralised system allows individuals to adjust their responses according to the evolving environment and types of risks without government intervention.¹⁵ Sweden is at the forefront of booster vaccination, suggesting that residents are more inclined to choose their own booster shots to strengthen personal protection. This reflects the success of the Swedish people who have acted in a decentralised governance system in the fight against COVID-19, thus supporting the longevity and comprehensiveness of the fight against the pandemic.

4. Challenges and Potential Solutions

This section primarily examines the challenges of France and Sweden to the COVID-19 pandemic, with a specific focus on the issue of vaccine resistance and ‘Tyranny of Experts’ respectively. It further illustrates how the nudge can serve as an effective solution in France and argues that the Swedish government, as a decentralised authority, could appropriately introduce centralisation in the face of such events.

4.1 France

There is vaccine hesitancy among the French populace. Despite the availability of vaccination services, individuals are influenced by factors such as complacency and confidence to delay or refuse vaccination,¹⁶ which is detrimental to the uptake of booster shots. The reluctance of the French public towards vaccination can stem from various causes, including the impact of politicisation. Nearly 25% of French adults would not proactively seek out COVID-19 vaccination, pointing to politicisation as a factor in the French vaccine attitude.¹⁷ Hesitancy may result from the recent anti-vaccine or anti-

15 Peter T. Leeson and Louis Rouanet, “Externality and COVID-19,” *Southern Economic Journal* 87 (4), 2021.. <https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12497>.

16 Noni E. MacDonald, “Vaccine Hesitancy: Definition, Scope and Determinants,” *Vaccine* 33 (34), 2015, 4161–64. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.04.036>.

17 Jeremy K. Ward et. al., “The French Public’s Attitudes to a Future COVID-19 Vaccine: The Politicization of a Public Health Issue,” *Social Science & Medicine* 265 (November 2020), 113-414. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113414>.

universal vaccination campaigns by the extreme left and right groups. As articulated by political economist Anthony de Jasay,¹⁸ political institutions can be akin to certain drugs, inducing addiction in some and allergic reactions in others, or sometimes both. Consequently, vaccine hesitancy may be due to the fact that certain segments of the French populace may have developed a form of institutional hypersensitivity as a response to a series of top-down and stringent measures. On the other hand, this hesitancy could also reflect the increasing politicisation of debates around the pandemic. Moreover, about 40% of French citizens believe government agencies are not best suited to manage key policy issues, with particularly low trust in sectors and the European Union.¹⁹ This echoes the analysis indicating that groups with lower trust in the government are more resistant to receiving the COVID-19 vaccine, with this factor having the strongest correlation with vaccine willingness.²⁰ There is widespread apprehension about vaccine safety in Europe, with France displaying notable levels of scepticism as 45% of participants voiced significant doubts about vaccines.²¹ Furthermore, the French public's readiness to get vaccinated during the COVID-19 outbreak was initially low and remained largely unchanged,²² potentially reflecting a lack of trust in the country's crisis management tactics. This hesitancy contributed to delays in vaccine uptake. The French are split on the necessity of compulsory COVID-19 vaccinations. A study found that 43% of participants supported mandatory vaccination starting in 2021, while

18 Anthony De Jasay, *The State*, Liberty Fund, 1998.

19 Alistair Cole et. al., "Political Trust in France's Multi-Level Government," *Journal of Trust Research* 8 (1), 2018, 45–67. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21515581.2018.1457534>.

20 Nathalie Bajos, Alexis Spire, and Léna Silberzan, "The Social Specificities of Hostility toward Vaccination against Covid-19 in Franc.," Edited by Sanjay Kumar Singh Patel. *PLOS ONE* 17 (1), 2022. e0262192. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0262192>.

21 Heidi J Larson et. al. 2016. "The State of Vaccine Confidence 2016: Global Insights through a 67-Country Survey," *EBioMedicine* 12 (October 2016), 295–301. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ebiom.2016.08.042>.

22 L. Cambon, M. Schwarzinger, and F. Alla, "Increasing Acceptance of a Vaccination Program for Coronavirus Disease 2019 in France: A Challenge for One of the World's Most Vaccine-Hesitant Countries," *Vaccine* 40 (2), 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2021.11.023>.

42% opposed it. Younger individuals were more inclined to oppose mandatory vaccination, with opposition rates of 54% and 61% in the 18-24 and 25-34 age groups respectively.²³

This phenomenon can be explained in terms of psychological rebellion, a concept that provides a framework for understanding people's reactions to coercive measures. When people feel limited in their choices and freedom by external demands, they may develop a motivational state that pushes them to reject rules and persuasion to maintain or regain their own sense of autonomy and control.²⁴ In the context of vaccinations, this may lead people to delay vaccinations or reject them altogether, even when doing so may affect their own health and that of others. In a centralised polity such as France, the public has demonstrated a clear wariness of the policies implemented by the central government over time. With the COVID-19 outbreak, the French government's mandatory lockdown measures and vaccination policies combined with past controversies and misbehaviour in the health policy area caused public distrust. For instance, the fact that redistributive mechanisms of the health insurance system failed to overcome barriers caused by social health inequalities may have led to widespread public dissatisfaction and psychological rebellion against government directives.²⁵ This rebellious mentality is not only directed at specific health measures but is also a manifestation of an overall distrust of the government in terms of the effectiveness of its actions and the transparency of its administration.

Furthermore, legal rulings like the one by the European Court of Human Rights on August 24, 2021, which upheld mandatory vaccinations for French firefighters,²⁶ illustrate that even legally

23 Amandine Gagneux-Brunon et. al., "Public Opinion on a Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination Policy in France: A Cross Sectional Survey," *Clinical Microbiology and Infection* 28 (3), 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cmi.2021.10.016>.

24 Rabia Bokhari and Khurram Shahzad, "Explaining Resistance to the COVID-19 Preventive Measures: A Psychological Reactance Perspective," *Sustainability* 14 (8), 2022, 4476. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su14084476>.

25 Olivier Nay et. al., "Achieving Universal Health Coverage in France: Policy Reforms and the Challenge of Inequalities," *The Lancet* 387 (10034), 2016, 2236–49. [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736\(16\)00580-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(16)00580-8).

26 European Court of Human Rights, "Requests for Interim Measures from" 239

endorsed mandates can stir a sense of resistance among individuals. Such opposition may stem from perceptions that these mandates infringe upon personal autonomy. Legally, it has been suggested that utilising the Article 15 exemption mechanism by more Council of Europe states could bolster vaccine development and combat vaccine hesitancy.²⁷ This mechanism permits states to implement extraordinary measures during public health crises, like mandatory vaccinations, aiming to mitigate the impacts of vaccine hesitancy on inoculation rates. However, this strategy risks intensifying the public's aversion to mandatory vaccination measures, potentially leading to a more pronounced backlash.

Within France's centralised framework, enforcing coercive public health measures risks invoking "hard paternalism," which refers to the forced interference in people's independent choices, potentially provoking public discontent and resistance. To alleviate such tensions, the government should explore employing "nudging" as a subtler strategic alternative.

Nudge, as an intervention strategy, aims to direct people to take a particular action while preserving their freedom to choose other paths according to their personal wishes.²⁸ This strategy could theoretically be effective in increasing vaccination rates in France without the implementation of coercive measures. It also increases the public's willingness to participate and take initiative, thus reduces the potentially negative effects of centralised politics in France. A study showed the significance of the inclusion of an implementation intention cue in flu vaccination reminder emails prompting recipients to explicitly write down the planned flu vaccination. The move to date and time can significantly increase vaccination rates.²⁹ On a related note, it has been

672 *Members of the French Fire Service Concerning the Law on the Management of the Public Health Crisis Fall Outside the Scope of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court*," August 24, 2021. <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press#%20>.

27 Silvio Roberto Vinceti, "COVID-19 Compulsory Vaccination and the European Court of Human Rights." *Acta Bio-Medica: Atenei Parmensis* 92 (S6), 2021. e2021472. <https://doi.org/10.23750/abm.v92iS6.12333>.

28 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R Sunstein, *Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness* (New York: Penguin Books, 2008).

29 L. K. Milkman et. al., "Using Implementation Intentions Prompts to

suggested that nudging measures can increase the social acceptance of vaccination.³⁰ In light of this finding, France may need to consider the use of booster measures to increase public acceptance of a mandatory vaccination policy before implementing it. This strategy can help enhance individual and public health protection, especially in terms of boosting herd immunity.

Under a centralised system of government, the implementation of a home quarantine policy does not rely solely on coercive legal means. Effective outbreak control can also be achieved through non-coercive interventions, such as providing clear and accurate information about the outbreak and ensuring that people in home confinement have access to necessities and medical supplies. The government can use reminder-based communication strategies to clearly communicate the transmission mechanism of the outbreak, the importance of home confinement, and relevant health guidelines to the public through radio and other media. This deliberate design of how information or choices are presented can influence individual behaviour.³¹ It implies that through specific design, such types of nudging strategies can steer people towards intended outcomes. In contrast, simple information transmission involves providing objective factual data or information without attempting to influence behaviours or decision-making.

However, concerns are raised about nudging strategies, pointing to the possibility of infringement on individual autonomy, the perception of manipulation, especially when the actual effect is not evident.³² Although nudging measures are considered ethically acceptable as they capitalise on human cognitive biases in the decision-making process while respecting individual autonomy, factors like socio-

Enhance Influenza Vaccination Rates,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 108 (26), 2011, 10415–20. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1103170108>.

30 Adriaan Barbaroux et. al., “Nudging Health Care Workers towards a Flu Shot: Reminders Are Accepted but Not Necessarily Effective. A Randomized Controlled Study among Residents in General Practice in France,” *Family Practice* 38 (4), 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1093/fampra/cmab001>.

31 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, *Nudge*.

32 Alejandro Hortal, “Nudges: A Promising Behavioral Public Policy Tool to Reduce Vaccine Hesitancy,” *Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas* 12 (1), 2022. <https://doi.org/10.5102/rbpp.v12i1.7993>.

cultural background need to be considered. This is to ensure that the measure is tailored to the needs of the individual.³³

4.2 Sweden

During the pandemic, Sweden's corresponding responses were controlled by policy experts, which led to the manifestation of "tyranny of experts" phenomenon. As technocrats moved from their traditional role as advisors to policymakers, they mixed scientific and value-based judgment. For example, experts believed asymptomatic individuals were unlikely to spread the virus, prompting calls for stricter measures and harsh criticism of the public health authority. However, the people who complained faced severe censure.³⁴ By emphasising scientific certainty to oppose preventive measures and rejecting outside criticism, they monopolised problem definition and policy making.³⁵

Questions have been raised about the collaborative relationship between all levels of government in the Swedish public health system,³⁶ arguing that Sweden's strategy may be based on faulty assumptions such as asymptomatic infected people do not transmit the virus, causing Sweden's initial mortality rate to be higher than other countries. "Tyranny of Experts" manifests here with experts over-relying on their initial assumptions without sufficiently considering other possibilities or accepting external criticism and suggestions, thereby formulating failed response policies.

33 Hiroshi Murayama et. al., "Applying Nudge to Public Health Policy: Practical Examples and Tips for Designing Nudge Interventions," *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 20 (5), 2023. 3962. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20053962>.

34 Gretchen Vogel, "'It's Been So, so Surreal.' Critics of Sweden's Lax Pandemic Policies Face Fierce Backlash," *www.science.org.*, October 6, 2020. <https://www.science.org/content/article/it-s-been-so-so-surreal-critics-sweden-s-lax-pandemic-policies-face-fierce-backlash>.

35 Staffan Andersson et. al., "Democracy and Technocracy in Sweden's Experience of the COVID-19 Pandemic," *Frontiers in Political Science* 4 (May 2022). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.832518>.

36 Jon Pierre, "Nudges against Pandemics: Sweden's COVID-19 Containment Strategy in Perspective," *Policy and Society* 39 (3), 2020: 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2020.1783787>.

The centralisation of power among epidemic prevention expert groups in the Swedish COVID-19 administration is to some extent like the French national centralisation system. In France, centralisation is primarily expressed in the broad powers and decision-making capacity of the president, who is often perceived to possess a more comprehensive understanding of the overall state of the nation due to the nature of their role. In contrast, in Sweden, although the outbreak experts had specialised knowledge in the field of disease prevention and control, their decision-making could be knowledge biased. Their perspectives are often limited to their areas of expertise and may not adequately consider broader societal impacts.³⁷ Furthermore, policies developed by experts are usually implemented nationally rather than adapted to local circumstances. This renders communication of response measures to the public complex, leading to confusion among individuals regarding what applies to where and when.³⁸ From this perspective, this practice of experts constitutes a form of “Tyranny of Experts”, whereby experts wield excessive decision-making power without adequate democratic oversight and social participation.

The phenomenon is similar to argument that technocratic solutions are often disconnected from the actual problem, leading to social stratification and internal interest serving in policymaking.³⁹ The COVID-19 pandemic is a devastating example of this tyranny of the experts, a situation that uniquely illustrates the short-sightedness of the technocratic approach to problem-solving by policy experts, who are motivated by a selfish desire to protect their social status, combined with a subjective view, relying heavily on precedent and theoretical modelling rather than current scientific knowledge.

The results in one study showed that less than half of the population (42%) expressed high or very high trust in the government’s response

37 Gail Davies and Jacquelin Burgess, “Challenging the ‘view from nowhere”

38 Ulrika Winblad et. al., “Soft Law and Individual Responsibility: A Review of the Swedish Policy Response to COVID-19,” *Health Economics, Policy and Law* 17 (1), 2021, 48–61. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744133121000256>.

39 Per L. Bylund, and Mark D. Packard. “Separation of Power and Expertise: Evidence of the Tyranny of Experts in Sweden’s COVID-19 Responses,” *Southern Economic Journal* 87 (4), 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12493>.

to the pandemic, while 34% of the respondents expressed low trust.⁴⁰ This finding points to the Swedish public's mixed feelings of trust in the government's outbreak policies, echoing the argument that the selection of management strategies does not only depend on their structural efficacy, but is also based on the public's trust in the government.⁴¹ When trust is low, a centralised response may be the best way to avoid confusion.

When the public is sceptical of the government, they may not actively or voluntarily follow the guidelines issued by the government. In this scenario, a centralised response mechanism, in which the state establishes a uniform and comprehensive policy, may be the best way to ensure compliance by the public and to improve the accuracy of the policy. In addition, given that previous analyses have pointed to shortcomings in the policies developed by Swedish experts, centralised management can improve the quality of policy development and implementation by pooling expertise and information and avoiding single-point decision-making failures.

While decentralisation theoretically provided flexibility, it also revealed an over-reliance on herd immunisation and high levels of evidence-based medical protective measures, as well as deficiencies in international cooperation.⁴² In this context, centralised management may be a more appropriate solution to the challenges of a large pandemic. It is also observed that a need for increased centralisation to improve decision-making efficiency has emerged in Swedish society.⁴³

However, this attempt to move towards centralised management

40 Thomas Kalleose et. al. "Political Trust in the Handling of the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Survey in Denmark and Sweden," *BMC Global and Public Health* 1 (1), 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s44263-023-00009-2>.

41 Evangelia Petridou and Nikolaos Zahariadis, "Staying at Home or Going Out? Leadership Response to the COVID-19 Crisis in Greece and Sweden," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* (January 2021). <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12344>.

42 Martin Lindström, "The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Swedish Strategy: Epidemiology and Postmodernism," *SSM - Population Health* 11 (August 2020): 100643. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2020.100643>.

43 Jostein Askim and Tomas Bergström. "Between Lockdown and Calm Down. Comparing the COVID-19 Responses of Norway and Sweden," *Local Government Studies* 48 (2), 2022., 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2021.1964477>.

has triggered disputes over the attribution of responsibility between the central and local levels, which has exacerbated the phenomenon of mutual blame-shifting within the bureaucracy, thus affecting the timeliness and effectiveness of public health emergency response.

As Sweden considers a centralised response to the outbreak, care needs to be taken to control the degree of centralisation to avoid challenges posed by over-centralisation similar to those previously faced by France. It is important to distinguish that introducing centralised policies here is for under specific emergency crises such as COVID-19 not the introduction of a national-level centralised system.

To be more specific, ‘centralisation’ here means policy making should not solely rely on strategies which only take experts’ theoretical knowledge; rather, there is a need for comprehensive national-level macro-regulation, taking a broader perspective to oversee the overall situation and considering local needs in formulating methods tailored to different regions. In the future, Sweden must carefully design policies to ensure that centralised policies utilise expert knowledge while avoiding excessive concentration of power in their hands, thus ensuring an effective and adaptable health crisis response mechanism. It should be noted that centralised policies should be treated as a special case in Sweden, as the excessive use may provoke significant political controversy in Sweden as a decentralised country. Therefore, it is necessary to balance the interests of all parties and public opinion when implementing these policies.

5. Conclusion

This paper provides an overview of the different strategies adopted by Sweden and France in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, discussing the responses and their effectiveness under centralised versus decentralised regimes. France, as a centralised state, faced the dual problems of low public trust in the government and hesitancy to get vaccinated. Although there is no absence of state-level compulsory interventions, Sweden encountered the issue of expert tyranny, which may have led to decision-making that was more skewed towards the

experts' perspective. A moderate degree of policy centralisation in Sweden in response to such health crises may help to mitigate the problem of expert governance. In summary, France may need to consider decentralising to address local concerns in the face of the pandemic, while Sweden might require centralising authority during crises to ensure overall efficacy. Thus, centralised and decentralised powers should complement each other under appropriate circumstances to better navigate public health emergencies, as no single political system is universally applicable to all situations.

Appendix

Daily COVID-19 vaccine doses administered

7-day rolling average. All doses, including boosters, are counted individually.



Figure 1: Daily COVID-19 vaccine doses administered, obtained from Our World in Data (2023).⁴⁴

	Sweden	France
2019	10.8%	11.1%
2020	11.3%	12.2%
2022	10.7%	12.1%

Table 1: Health Expenditure as % of GDP, data obtained from The World Bank.⁴⁵

44 Our World in Data, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations - Statistics and Research,” *Our World in Data*. 2023. <https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations>.

45 The World Bank, “Current Health Expenditure (% of GDP) | Data,” *Worldbank.org*. April 7, 2023. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.CHEX.GD.ZS>.

	France Ends Dec 22 2022	Sweden Ends Dec 18 2022
Total doses per 100 residents	227.3	245.4
Vaccinated in % (at least one dose)	81.1	75.5
Fully vaccinated in %	78.8	73.7
Booster doses per 100 residents	69.0	93.3

Table 2: Vaccination Status, data obtained from Visual and Data Journalism team.⁴⁶

46 Visual, F. T., and Data Journalism team. “Covid-19 Vaccine Tracker: The Global Race to Vaccinate.” Ig.ft.com. December 23, 2022. <https://ig.ft.com/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker/?areas=gbr&areas=isr&areas=usa&areas=eue&areas=are&areas=chn&areas=chl&cumulative=1&doses=total&populationAdjusted=1>.

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A Critical Discussion of the Relationship Between Processes of Spatial Transformation and Youth Gang Activity in Denver

Janka Deák

Denver, Colorado is one of the most rapidly gentrifying cities in the United States. Case studies of gentrifying cities, including Chicago and Los Angeles demonstrate a relationship between urban restructuring and the emergence of youth gangs. However, this phenomenon is under-investigated in Denver. Drawing on an integrative literature review, this paper engages in a critical discussion of the relationship between processes of spatial transformation and youth gang activity in Denver. The contestation of urban space is identified as a central contributor to rising rates of gang criminality in the city's gentrifying areas. These findings highlight the significance of community activism in popular resistance to gentrification and the protection of residents' rights to the city.

Introduction

Gentrification and the redivisions of urban space are inherent to globalised urbanisation.¹ Wright defines the process as the economically motivated repair and reconstruction of deteriorating areas in the inner city, resulting in the significant socioeconomic restructuring of urban space.² Urban revitalisation in the context of a globalised capitalist system is characterised by instability and exclusion; the expansion of the urban core results in a conflict over space and the forced displacement of marginalised populations.^{3,4} The city of Denver has

1 John M. Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008).

2 Travis D. Wright, "Gentrification and Its Effects on Changes in Neighborhood Socio-Economic Characteristics and Crime Patterns for the City of Denver, Colorado from 1990 to 2015," (PhD diss., University of Denver Colorado, 2020), 1.

3 Laura Conway, "Gentrification In The Neoliberal World Order: A Study of Urban Change in the River North District of Denver, Colorado," (PhD diss., University of Colorado Boulder, 2015), 1.

4 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*.

undergone significant spatial transformation, starting in the 1970s and continuing at a rapid pace today.⁵ The first wave of gentrification – the demolition and reconstruction of Auraria starting in 1968 – enabled the extensive physical and socioeconomic overhaul of the city’s urban core in subsequent years.⁶

In recent years, Denver has experienced a steady increase in rates of gang-related violence.^{7,8} 2015 reported 23 dead in gang-related homicides on the city’s northeast side, with gang violence accounting for 15% of all homicides in the period between 2016-2019.⁹ Hagedorn links historical processes of spatial transformation to shifts in gang activity in the city of Chicago, a relationship applicable to Denver as another major U.S. city undergoing rapid gentrification.¹⁰ The definition of gangs and the nature of their relation to the city are widely contested in sociological research.¹¹ As such, the present paper aims to investigate the relationship between gentrification and gang activity in relation to power, identity, and resistance in the battle for space in Denver’s urban core.¹²

Using Langegger’s concept of the ‘right to the city’¹³ to explore

5 Wright, “Gentrification and Its Effects”, 2.

6 Brian Page and Eric Ross, “Legacies of a Contested Campus: Urban Renewal, Community Resistance, and the Origins of Gentrification in Denver,” *Urban Geography* 38, no. 9 (September 2017): 1316, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2016.1228420>

7 Loretta Wimbley and Allison Sherry, “A wave of gun violence in Denver and Aurora troubles community members and law enforcement,” CPR News, November 2, 2022, <https://www.cpr.org/2022/11/03/denver-aurora-gun-violence/>

8 Elise Schmelzer, “Denver homicides fell slightly in 2022, but non-fatal shootings rose — and more teens are being killed”, *The Denver Post*, January 29, 2023, <https://www.denverpost.com/2023/01/29/denver-homicides-shootings-2022/>

9 Elise Schmelzer, “Killings among Denver’s teens continue, even as city and community leaders try new solutions”, *The Denver Post*, February 16, 2020, <https://www.denverpost.com/2020/02/16/denver-aurora-youth-gun-violence-2019/>

10 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*

11 John M. Hagedorn, “Gangs, Institutions, Race and Space: The Chicago School Revisited,” in *Gangs in the Global City: Alternatives to Traditional Criminology*, ed. John M. Hagedorn (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007a)

12 Page and Ross, “Legacies of a Contested Campus”, 1295.

13 Sig Langegger, “Viva la Raza! A Park, a Riot and Neighbourhood Change in North Denver,” *Urban Studies* 50, no. 16 (April 2013) <https://doi.org/10.1080/00420132.2013.781111>

the contestation of space in Denver, this paper will outline the role of racialisation and segregation in the gentrification of downtown Denver, as well as the role of law enforcement in the construction of gang activity and youth criminality.¹⁴ The Chicano movement and its legacy of youth activism, the emergence of Latino gangs in inner-city neighbourhoods, and the intersection of class and race in power relations between gangs, and institutions of social control will be analysed as well.¹⁵ Continuities in the processes of spatial transformation will be explored focusing on areas experiencing significant degrees of historical and contemporary gentrification, spanning a timeframe of three decades (1970s-2000s). These areas include Auraria, Lower Downtown, and Highland, all neighbourhoods with historically high Latino populations in the vicinity of Denver's central business district.^{16,17}

Methods

An integrative review was conducted, combining the investigation of Denver's history of gentrification with a critical review of literature investigating the prevalence, nature, and socioeconomic antecedents of the city's youth gangs phenomenon. This was followed by the application of sociological theory to explain and critically discuss the relationship between processes of spatial transformation, community activism, and youth gang activity in Denver.

Denver's History of Gentrification

The creation of the preconditions of gang affiliation in Denver predates gentrification and can be traced back to the early 20th-century industrial era. According to Wacquant,¹⁸ residents of the urban ghetto have historically been subject to institutionally mandated ethno-racial
org/10.1177/0042098013483603

14 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*

15 Zackary Ridge, "Racial Capitalism in Denver: Gentrification and Racial Capitalism in Denver," (PhD diss., University of Colorado Boulder, 2020), 8.

16 Langegger, "Viva la Raza!"

17 Page and Ross, "Legacies of a Contested Campus".

18 Loïc J. D. Wacquant, *Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 49.

closure and control, setting the precedent for contemporary uses of spatial change as an instrument of social closure and control. This is no different in the case of Denver. Socioeconomic inequalities were drawn along racial lines by discriminatory hiring practices targeting recently arrived Latino immigrants.¹⁹ The relegation of Latino residents to overcrowded, decaying inner-city housing precipitated the spatialisation of race and the stigmatisation of the deteriorating urban core used to justify contemporary processes of gentrification.²⁰ The connection between urbanisation and gang activity is illustrated by the criminalisation and over-policing of Latino youth in the 1940s.²¹ Denver law enforcement sought to justify increased punitive interventions against ‘delinquent’ youth through the application of the gang member label. Night-time curfews were put in place to restrict the activities of youth of colour, contributing to a rise in reported rates of juvenile delinquency and arrests.²² Tensions between Latino youth and law enforcement manifested in the escalation of gang conflicts and violence in the late 1940s.²³ This dynamic between social control agents and Denver’s urban youth sets the precedent for gangs’ responses to changing processes of urban transformation in the city of Denver.

Conway conceptualises space as a social structure,²⁴ within which spatial transformation functions as an expression of power and an instrument of social control. Within these spatial structures, ‘blighted’ neighbourhoods are frequently constructed as a “social *elsewhere*,” internally disorganised and threatening the stability and prosperity of the greater city.²⁵ Gentrification pursues the removal of these designated

19 Robert J. Durán, “Racism, Resistance, and Repression: The Creation of Denver Gangs, 1924-1950,” in *Enduring Legacies: Ethnic Histories and Cultures of Colorado*, eds. Arturo J. Aldama, Elisa Facio, Daryl Maeda, and Reiland Rabaka (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2010).

20 Page and Ross, “Legacies of a Contested Campus”.

21 Durán, “Racism, Resistance, and Repression”.

22 Page and Ross, “Legacies of a Contested Campus”.

23 Durán, “Racism, Resistance, and Repression”.

24 Conway, “Gentrification”.

25 Jock Young, “Globalization and Social Exclusion: The Sociology of Vindictiveness and the Criminology of Transgression,” in *Gangs in the Global City: Alternatives to Traditional Criminology*, ed. John M. Hagedorn (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 54.

‘areas of change’ through the extensive demolition and reconstruction of the city’s urban core.²⁶ In Denver, the historical genesis of this process of spatial transformation is illustrated by the demolition of the district of Auraria in the 1970s.²⁷ Designated as a blighted area since the 1940s, Auraria was characterised by widespread physical dereliction and was inhabited primarily by low-income, working-class Latino residents.²⁸ Its condemnation and redevelopment were prefaced by decades of strategic rhetoric emphasising the threat posed by concentrated urban poverty, associated in local political discourse with criminality and social blight. The characterisation of this ‘blight’ as “capable of overrunning the rest of the city if left unchecked” contributed to the stigmatisation of the neighbourhood as well as its population and aided the justification of securitisation and redevelopment.^{29,30} The case of Auraria illustrates the significance of aspirations to gentrify in the social construction of youth delinquency and gang activity by agents of social control as outlined in Durán.³¹

This process is further demonstrated by the systematic restructuring of the neighbourhood of Highland, precipitated by the la Raza Park riots in 1981 and resulting in the extensive physical and social reorganisation of shared neighbourhood spaces.³² In this instance, spatial transformation was used as “restoration of public order” in the face of escalating social unrest, achieved through the restriction of the local community’s access to urban space.³³ Authoritarian control and the city’s right to space were reasserted through the increased enforcement of nuisance laws, disproportionately targeting Latino youth, once again underlining the role of social control agents in the construction of Denver’s gang problem.³⁴ In the case of Lower

26 Lucas W. Palmisano, “Post-industrial approaches to urban development in Denver, Colorado: evaluating strategic neighborhood plans,” (PhD diss., University of Colorado Denver, 2014).

27 Page and Ross, “Legacies of a Contested Campus”, 1294.

28 Ibid., 1299.

29 Ibid.

30 Ridge, “Racial Capitalism in Denver”, 80.

31 Durán, “Racism, Resistance, and Repression”.

32 Langegger, “Viva la Raza!”.

33 Ibid., 3368.

34 Sig Langegger, “Right-of-way gentrification: Conflict, commodification

Downtown in 1995, gentrification as a method of spatial control was manifested through street-level securitisation and the stigmatisation of the neighbourhood's 'ethnic' character.³⁵ Urban planners called for increased landscaping "without creating meeting places as 'hang outs' for people perceived to be physically threatening," advancing a criminalised image of Latino youth and further restricting their access to public space.³⁶ These examples illustrate the nature of spatial transformation as a self-perpetuating process, sustained by the criminalisation of Latino youth as justification for prolonged and escalating intervention. The systematic targeting of working-class, Latino-majority neighbourhoods by policies of gentrification demonstrates the mechanisms of structural racism underpinning gang affiliation and its preconditions.³⁷

Youth Gangs in Denver

Thrasher describes youth gangs as an aberrant, spatially, and socially interstitial phenomenon, localised to bounded, ethnically segregated spaces and integrated through conflict.³⁸ They are differentiated from other stable social formations by their continued engagement in conflict, most notably with other gangs and law enforcement.³⁹ According to Spergel,⁴⁰ deprivation and marginality interact to create the preconditions for a rise in gang affiliation and activity in gentrifying areas. In this context, gangs act as a viable organisational substitute and source of stability, status, respect, and personal dignity in the absence of sufficient social integration and authoritarian control.^{41,42} This view and cosmopolitanism," *Urban Studies*, 53, no. 9 (May 2016): 1811., <https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098015583783>

35 Palmisano, "Post-industrial approaches", 73.

36 Northeast Downtown Neighborhood Plan, 1995: 48 in Palmisano, "Post-industrial approaches", 75.

37 Irving A. Spergel, *The Youth Gang Problem* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

38 Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 6.

39 Spergel, *The Youth Gang Problem*, 149

40 Ibid., 110.

41 Alistair Fraser, *Urban Legends: Gang Identity in the Post-Industrial City* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 45.

42 Spergel, *The Youth Gang Problem*, 62.

is supported by the findings of the Denver Youth Survey, a longitudinal study investigating the incidence of gang activity in “socially disorganised, high-crime areas” between 1988 and 1991.⁴³ The areas examined were minority-dense neighbourhoods, characterised by high rates of economic disadvantage and a general lack of established informal structures of social control.⁴⁴ Gang involvement was indicated by participation in acts of juvenile delinquency, defined as street offending in the form of altercations with other gangs, robbery, theft, assault, and joyriding.⁴⁵ According to the findings, 5-6% of at-risk youth identified as gang members in a given year, though this membership was often short-lived, lasting only between one to two years.⁴⁶ The majority of serious criminal offenses committed in at-risk areas were attributable to gang-affiliated youth, though not all of these could be confirmed to be gang-related.⁴⁷ Additionally, only a minority of respondents reported involvement in drug sales, with no evidence indicating that this was a coordinated as opposed to individual enterprise.⁴⁸ The high rates of attrition and transitory membership indicated align the Denver gangs of the late 1980s and the early 1990s with Thrasher’s definition of youth gangs of industrial Chicago.⁴⁹ The lack of organised involvement in an informal economy indicates the absence of heavily institutionalised gangs, emphasising the social, as opposed to economic function of gangs in Denver.⁵⁰

Gentrification and Thrasher’s Gang Theory

One explanation for the prevalence of gangs in Denver’s gentrifying urban core is Thrasher’s theory of gangs, which underlines the constitutive

43 Finn-Aage Esbensen and David Huizinga, “Gangs, drugs, and delinquency in a survey of urban youth,” *Criminology*, 31 no. 4 (November 1993): 568, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1993.tb01142.x>

44 David Huizinga, Anne Wylie Weiher, Scott Menard, Rachele Espiritu, and Finn-Aage Esbensen, “Some Not So Boring Findings From The Denver Youth Survey,” (Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science University of Colorado: 1998).

45 Esbensen and Huizinga, “Gangs, drugs, and delinquency”.

46 Huizinga et al., “Denver Youth Survey”.

47 *Ibid.*, 14.

48 Esbensen and Huizinga, “Gangs, drugs, and delinquency”, 582.

49 *Ibid.*, 575.

50 Hagedorn, “Gangs, Institutions, Race”, 22.

role of social disorganisation in the emergence of urban gangs.⁵¹ Social disorganisation is characterised by the collective failure of formal and informal social control and manifests in substandard living conditions, lack of access to amenities, political disempowerment, unemployment and social disintegration at the family or community level.^{52,53} Social disorganisation is associated with spatial transformation and has been linked to the development of ‘conflict subcultures,’ arising from a lack of legitimate opportunities, economic insecurity, and stunted social mobility.⁵⁴ They are symptomatic of “disorganisation in the larger social framework”, marked by precarity, instability, and conflict, and crystallize through their opposition to external agents or structures of formal organisation.⁵⁵

The escalation of gang-related violence and criminality in Denver is concurrent with the gentrification of Highland and neighbouring areas.^{56,57,58} In the period between 1979 and 1991, the incidence of gang fights increased from 8% to 16%. The use of weapons in gang fights increased from 42% to 58%, and violence resulting in hospitalisation increased from 33% to 58%. In the period between 1987 and 1991, 85-87% of youth in high-risk areas were victimised, with 66% of respondents being chronic victims of multiple offenses.⁵⁹ In the summer of 1993, a total of 108 Denver youth were killed in violent gang conflicts.⁶⁰ These increases in gang-related deviance are attributable to the lack of adequate provisions characteristic of low socioeconomic status neighbourhoods and the temporary social disorder stemming from residential instability in gentrifying areas, demonstrating the significance of gentrification as a wider structural

51 Ibid., 18.

52 Thrasher, *The Gang*, 33.

53 Huizinga et al., “Denver Youth Survey”.

54 Spergel, *The Youth Gang Problem*, 149.

55 Thrasher, *The Gang*, 33.

56 Huizinga et al., “Denver Youth Survey”, 5.

57 Langegger, “Viva la Raza!”.

58 Wright, “Gentrification and Its Effects”, 19.

59 Huizinga et al., “Denver Youth Survey”, 11.

60 Sig Langegger, “Emergent public space: Sustaining Chicano culture in North Denver,” *Cities* 35 (December 2013): 28, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2013.04.013>

determinant of deprivation and the breakdown of social order as it relates to crime and gang activity in the city of Denver.^{61,62,63}

However, it is important to note that the initial rise in gang violence coincides with the arrival of Los Angeles gangs in Denver in the 1980s.⁶⁴ According to Hagedorn's study of gentrification in Chicago,⁶⁵ processes of spatial transformation have the potential to exacerbate gang violence by undermining the spatial autonomy of gangs and making low-income urban neighbourhoods more vulnerable to external attack.⁶⁶ Increases in gang conflict can therefore in part be ascribed to local street gangs defending their territory, limiting the significance of social disorganisation as an isolated variable in the modulation of gang activity. Additionally, the social disorganisation view fails to account for the influence of political narratives and institutional aspirations to social control in both the reshaping of the city and the appearance of youth gangs, instead portraying social disorganisation as a naturally occurring feature of urban poverty.

Securitisation, Territorial Stigmatisation, and the Development of a Resistance Identity

The alternative perspective to social disorganisation theory emphasises the significance of space and the exercise of power within said space in the interaction between urban renewal and gang dynamics. Contemporary urban renewal policies represent a continuity from historical expressions of power, gentrification becoming a new mechanism of the maintenance of power inequalities along racial lines.⁶⁷ Gentrification is described as a form of physical

61 Huizinga et al., "Denver Youth Survey", 10.

62 James Diego Vigil and Steve C. Yun, "A Cross-Cultural Framework for Understanding Gangs: Multiple Marginality and Los Angeles," in *Gangs in America* (3rd ed), ed. C. Ronald Huff (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002), 167.

63 Loïc J. D. Wacquant, "Three Pernicious Premises in the Study of the American Ghetto," in *Gangs in the Global City: Alternatives to Traditional Criminology*, ed. John M. Hagedorn (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 36.

64 Langegger, "Viva la Raza!", 3365.

65 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*, 125.

66 Ibid., 121.

67 Durán, "Racism, Resistance, and Repression".

and symbolic spatial violence, directed at populations left vulnerable to gentrification by socioeconomically determined restrictions to their spatial autonomy.^{68,69} State-mandated processes of urban revitalisation facilitate the reproduction of areas of urban blight, concentrated deprivation, and misery.⁷⁰ They sustain perpetual and involuntary segregation along racial lines through the stigmatisation of deteriorating urban spaces with substantial working-class minority populations and the extensive criminalisation of Latino communities.^{71,72,73} Spatial revision functions as an instrument of social control, maintaining social exclusion and perpetuating an unequal power dynamic between state and community central to gang identity.⁷⁴

In accordance with this line of argument, restrictions of access to physical space result in increased territoriality and the development of a gang identity as a form of resistance to racial oppression. According to Fraser,⁷⁵ gang membership plays a significant role in the identity formation of marginalised urban youth. Intersecting oppressions and social stigma encourage the establishment of social enclaves external to the hostile mainstream in urban minority population.⁷⁶ Youth's immersion in gang culture functions as a defence against the symbolic and physical violence of gentrification, as well as a compensatory strategy against the loss of social status inherent in the marginality of racialised urban existence.⁷⁷ Spatial transformation and displacement challenge spatially defined social identities, contributing through a reactionary increase in territoriality and attachment to locale.^{78,79} Gangs arise in an identity vacuum, functioning to offset ontological insecurity

68 John M. Hagedorn, "Gangs in Late Modernity," in *Gangs in the Global City: Alternatives to Traditional Criminology*, ed. John M. Hagedorn (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007b).

69 Ridge, "Racial Capitalism in Denver", 30.

70 Wacquant, *Urban Outcasts*, 52

71 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*, 120.

72 Page and Ross, "Legacies of a Contested Campus".

73 Ridge, "Racial Capitalism in Denver".

74 Hagedorn, "Gangs in Late Modernity", 307.

75 Fraser, *Urban Legends*, 52.

76 Ridge, "Racial Capitalism in Denver", 64.

77 Langegger, "Viva la Raza!", 3361.

78 Ridge, "Racial Capitalism in Denver", 4.

79 Fraser, *Urban Legends*, 43.

stemming from an undermined sense of locality, disconnection from space and spatial identity brought on by gentrification or forced displacement.⁸⁰

The processes of securitisation inherent in processes of urban renewal violate urban minorities' 'right to the city,' i.e., their ability to inhabit and act within urban spaces freely and without fears of violent repercussion.⁸¹ Increased police presence in gentrifying neighbourhoods delegitimises territorial claims to public spaces, establishing an unequal power dynamic between local youth and external control agencies.⁸² Delinquency and gang affiliation thus function as a vehicle for resistance and defence against gentrification and historical and contemporary experiences of racial oppression.^{83,84} Gangs become social actors in a battle for space, conceptualised by Hagedorn as a battle against structural racism and segregation.⁸⁵ Engagement in agentic violence facilitates the creation of self-defined and self-regulated autonomy in opposition to the encroaching threat of the city, with delinquency representing a rejection of oppressive authority.⁸⁶ The development and exercise of this identity of resistance is best illustrated by the reactionary deviance displayed by Latino youth during the 1981 la Raza Park riots, where vandalism served as a form of protest and a reassertion of personal agency and right to the city in the face of increased spatial restrictions, criminalisation, and escalating police aggression.^{87,88} The example of la Raza illustrates the function of gangs as sources of empowerment in the face of unequal power relations manifested through the city's repossession of community spaces.⁸⁹ Moreover, it highlights the catalysing role played by agents of social control in the emergence of gang violence.

80 Young, "Globalization and Social Exclusion", 72.

81 Langegger, "Viva la Raza!", 3372.

82 Ibid., 3373.

83 Hagedorn, "Gangs in Late Modernity", 299.

84 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*, 60.

85 Ibid., 129.

86 Fraser, *Urban Legends*, 43.

87 Langegger, "Viva la Raza!", 3367.

88 Langegger, "Right-of-way gentrification", 1811.

89 Ibid.

Explaining the Phenomenon of Denver Youth Gangs

As demonstrated above, though there is a link between urban transformation and shifts in gang activity exists in the city of Denver, it is less significant in comparison to U.S. cities undergoing similar levels of gentrification. Nor can the appearance of Denver gangs be traced back to the first wave of gentrification in the 1970s, contrary to expectations based on research conducted in other American cities.⁹⁰ This is due to the city's history of organised community resistance to urban transformation. Originating with the contestation of the Auraria project by Chicano activists and residents, beginning in 1968, political mobilisation for Latino rights to self-determination in the face of social and spatial marginalisation has provided an alternative expression of resistance for Latino youth.⁹¹ The gentrification of Auraria galvanised Latino political consciousness, with the tendency of community organisation carrying over to subsequent waves of gentrification affecting neighbouring areas in the decades following.⁹²

This alternative method of claiming space and asserting agency in the face of the encroaching city served as a protective factor against gang involvement.^{93,94} The heightened tensions between law enforcement and Latino youth in the early 1970s are attributable to youth involvement in radical political activism as opposed to gang affiliation.⁹⁵ Police aggression was used as a strategy to incite violence and combat political organisation through the control of space.^{96,97} The conflict, localised to Highland, contributed to the blanket criminalisation of local Chicano activists “based upon fears over gang violence from the 1980s to the 1990s” and served to justify neighbourhood gentrification as a crime reduction initiative.⁹⁸ This example demonstrates the continuity between the historical and

90 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*

91 Page and Ross, “Legacies of a Contested Campus”, 1305.

92 Ridge, “Racial Capitalism in Denver”.

93 Langegger, “Emergent public space”, 30.

94 Page and Ross, “Legacies of a Contested Campus”, 1311.

95 Ridge, “Racial Capitalism in Denver”.

96 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*.

97 Langegger, “Viva la Raza!”, 3368.

98 Ridge, “Racial Capitalism in Denver”, 89.

contemporary role of law enforcement in the social construction of crime and gang criminality in Denver, as well as the city's uniqueness in the maintenance of youth's access to alternative organisational structures through the development and cultivation of political consciousness.^{99,100} Furthermore, the presence of a strong political consciousness in the city's marginalised communities may account for the lack of a significant institutionalised gang presence in Denver relative to cities such as Chicago or Los Angeles.^{101,102}

Krohn and Thornberry identify Denver as an emerging gang city,¹⁰³ with the gang problem first being recognised around the 1980s. This is in contrast with Los Angeles and Chicago, both cities with long histories of gangs, altering the interaction between spatial change and gang dynamics in Denver relative to cities undergoing similar processes of gentrification.^{104,105} The territoriality and relative impermanence of Denver gangs aligns with Thrasher's conception of deviant youth groups, realised at a time when Chicago gangs themselves were a relatively recent social phenomenon.¹⁰⁶ This explains the limited institutionalisation of Denver gangs, as well as the lack of an organised response to processes of spatial transformation. Additionally, it supports the argument that gangs originating in Denver are the product of reactionary deviance, produced by the restriction of their right to the city by gentrifying forces.¹⁰⁷

Evaluation of Denver's Gang Literature

This perspective is further supported by the import of Los Angeles

99 Durán, "Racism, Resistance, and Repression".

100 Langedger, "Emergent public space".

101 Page and Ross, "Legacies of a Contested Campus".

102 Vigil and Yun, "A Cross-Cultural Framework".

103 Marvin D. Krohn and Terence P. Thornberry, "Longitudinal Perspectives on Adolescent Street Gangs". in *The Long View of Crime: A Synthesis of Longitudinal Research*, ed. Akiva M. Liberman (New York: Springer, 2008), 148.

104 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*

105 Vigil and Yun, "A Cross-Cultural Framework".

106 Thrasher, *The Gang*.

107 Langedger, "Viva la Raza!".

gangs in the 1980s.¹⁰⁸ According to the Denver Youth Survey, a significant portion of self-identified gang members were affiliated with the Bloods and the Crips.¹⁰⁹ The attribution of Denver's recent increase in homicide rates to the resurgence of conflict between the Park Hill Bloods and the Crips from the city's northeast side provides additional support for this perspective.¹¹⁰ A potential interaction with processes of spatial transformation is indicated by the concentration of these imported gangs in Denver's central 'areas of change' (primarily Highland), though the literature supporting this is highly limited.¹¹¹

This ties into a second issue, the lack of academic research investigating contemporary gang dynamics in the city of Denver. The underreporting of the city's gang presence makes it difficult to link processes of spatial transformation to changes in gang activity even in neighbourhoods with a stronger gang presence. The scarcity of sociological research on this interaction leaves crime rates as the chief indicator of gang activity, restricting the present analysis to a criminological framework in determining the nature and prevalence of gang activity in gentrifying areas.¹¹² The lack of recent academic literature on gang activity in Denver compromises the temporal relevance of the analysis included in this paper.

Furthermore, existing literature heavily emphasises the role of social disorganisation in the formation and maintenance of gangs in Denver, failing to consider the active role played by social control agents in the criminalisation of urban youth.^{113,114} This is illustrated by the data presented in analyses of the Denver Youth Survey, the most comprehensive investigation of youth gangs in Denver to date.¹¹⁵ Though the study links delinquency to processes of spatial transformation in

108 Ibid., 3365

109 Finn-Aage Esbensen, David Huizinga, and Anne W. Weiher. "Gang and Non-Gang Youth: Differences in Explanatory Factors", *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 9, no. 2 (May, 1993): 101.

110 Schmelzer, "Killings among Denver's teens".

111 Palmisano, "Post-industrial approaches".

112 Wright, "Gentrification and Its Effects".

113 Spergel, *The Youth Gang Problem*.

114 Wright, "Gentrification and Its Effects".

115 Huizinga et al., "Denver Youth Survey".

vulnerable neighbourhoods, it relies on a criminological definition of youth gangs. Its emphasis on criminal conduct as a requirement for gang membership contributes to the potential underreporting of gang prevalence in gentrifying urban areas and the presentation of a skewed image of Denver's 'gang problem'.¹¹⁶

Moreover, its analysis is largely divorced from the active role played by state institutions in driving processes of urban renewal and shaping the preconditions for the emergence of gangs. In line with this is the tendency of prior research to treat race as a politically and socially neutral variable, spatially associated with reduced quality of life and social disadvantage.^{117,118} There is a limited emphasis on the influence of the city's history of racial oppression directed at Latino populations in the consideration of the interaction between social groups and spatial processes in the context of urban development and gang activity. The perspective identifying gentrification as a significant driver of racial segregation and the criminalisation of minority youth is rarely considered, diminishing the role of state policy and police intervention in the creation of gangs.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the reaction of gangs to spatial transformation in Denver is a complex and dynamic process. Existing research on gangs in Denver focuses primarily on the impact of gentrification-induced social disorganisation on gang affiliation in deprived areas surrounding the city's central business district.^{119,120} This paper offers an alternative view, accounting for the historical and socio-structural frameworks underlying the processes of urban renewal in the districts of Auraria, Highland, and Lower Downtown over a period of five decades. Considering the active influence of social control agents on the systematic restructuring of Denver's urban core, the control of space and the city's infringement upon citizen's 'right to the

116 Esbensen and Huizinga, "Gangs, drugs, and delinquency".

117 Huizinga et al., "Denver Youth Survey".

118 Spergel, *The Youth Gang Problem*.

119 Huizinga et al., "Denver Youth Survey".

120 Spergel, *The Youth Gang Problem*

city' appears to play a more significant role in the formation and maintenance of Latino youth gangs.¹²¹ Spatial and racial stigmatisation play a significant role in this process. The centrality of territorial legitimacy and spatial belonging to identity formation in urban youth in Denver catalysed the integration into youth gangs as a conduit for the formation and expression of resistance.¹²² Authorities' restriction of access to space through securitisation, surveillance, and racial profiling contributed to the criminalisation of Latino youth, furthering gentrification on the grounds of security provision.¹²³ The relationship between spatial transformation and gang activity is best illustrated by the case study of the la Raza riots in Highland, where delinquency functioned as a vehicle to defend residents' right to the city.¹²⁴ The alternative – community activism and the development of a strong political consciousness – appears to be a protective factor against youth's involvement in gang criminality, though authorities treat it as a crime all the same. To summarise, spatial transformation and gang activity appear to be mutually constitutive phenomena, where urban renewal spurs resistance and the criminalisation of resistance provides a rationale for further gentrification of areas constructed as threatening and blighted.

121 Langegger, "Viva la Raza!".

122 Langegger, "Right-of-way gentrification".

123 Hagedorn, *A World of Gangs*.

124 Langegger, "Viva la Raza!".

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Modern Conflict, Transnational Migration and the Experiences of a Sudanese Youth

Thomas Hutton

“But the other boat is falling ...umm... down in the water. They die I think - Or most of them or all of them... yeah [5 seconds of silence] – these the most horrible things I have seen in the sea...”

This paper explores the experiences of a Sudanese youth through interviews and analysis, tracing their journey from conflict in their home country to transnational immigration. The objective is to humanise the collective immigrant experience, particularly in the context of modern conflict and migration. Originating as an assignment on oral history, the research employs an interdisciplinary oral historical methodology for data analysis. Integration of linguistics and psychology with oral history methods is emphasised, facilitating a nuanced understanding of the interview transcripts and the socio-political implications of the discussed topics. Additionally, the paper contextualises the interview findings within relevant secondary literature to deepen comprehension. Lastly, it examines the socio-political climate of 21st-century Europe concerning immigration influx, challenging stereotypes and highlighting the complexity of collective experiences. From facing terrorisation from a tyrannical regime and its secret police to being stranded on the Mediterranean and travelling Europe, this paper examines the story of a young Sudanese man.

1. Introduction

Scholars have labelled our century as the ‘century of the refugee’¹ with Sudan considered one of the ‘world’s leading exporters of refugees’.² In the U.K., refugees are some of the most marginalised and vilified groups in our society.³ We must look at what drives people from their homes

1 Anne Ward-Lambert, *The Refugee Experience: A Legal Examination of the Immigrant Experiences of the Sudanese Population* (Florida: Nova South-eastern University, 2009), 672.

2 Jon D. Holtzman, *New Lives: Sudanese Refugees in Minnesota*, (Oxford: Routledge, 2007), 15.

3 Alice Bloch and Carl Levy, *Refugees, Citizenship and Social Policy in*

en masse to support an understanding, as opposed to the vilification of those less fortunate. With far-right groups gaining traction in Germany (AfD), the Netherlands (PVV), Italy (FDL) and France (RN) it is crucial that the experiences of immigrants are humanised against the demonising media campaigns and unsympathetic migration policies being set by western governments. This work is an extension of my original interview with a Sudanese refugee, where I got the privilege to record their story. I was enthralled and saddened by his experiences in modern conflict and his boat journey to Europe. This paper retells his story alongside the formation of an unlikely friendship, alongside thought-provoking literature and analysis to fully sympathise with his personal experiences in conflict and immigration.

2. Historical Contextualisation and Oral History

2.1 The Situation in Sudan

Since the mid 20th Century Sudan has been the invisible centre of political and economic turmoil. In 1956 after the abolition of British-Egyptian colonial rule Sudan has seen the last five leaders removed via violent coup d'état. As modern conflict is one of the key topics, this section aims to contextualise the period between 2003-2023.

In 2003 revolutionaries seized the city of Al-Fashir wanting an end to dictator Omar Al-Basheer's reign of terror, and the beginning of a democratic Sudanese state. Currently Al-Basheer is wanted by The International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, rape and murder. According to the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) this first 2003 Sudanese War, caused '200,000-400,000 deaths and 2 million displaced from homes'.⁴ For enhancement of the seriousness of this conflict, it is estimated that 60% of Sudan's entire GDP was being funnelled into the security sector.⁵ A secondary ramification to the war with the diversion of major state

Europe (New York: Macmillan Press, 1999), 10.

4 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 'The World Factbook: Sudan' <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/sudan>, accessed 27th November 2023.

5 Monica Toft, A Legitimacy Chain Approach to Security Sector Reform: Working for Citizens and States, *LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development*, (2018), 1-13.

funding from medical facilities and social infrastructure⁶ means that as of 2021, for every 1000 births that occur in Sudan, 54.9 will result in death.⁷ These deaths are often simple, preventable and treatable. For comparison, the National Office for Statistics suggested in 2021 that infant mortality rates in the UK were at ‘3.7 deaths per 1,000’.⁸

After many years of skirmishes between revolutionaries and the government, Basheer drastically reorganised his military to make himself ‘coup-proof.’ In 2013 Basheer rebranded the Arab Militia ‘Janjaweed’ as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (عيرسلا معدلا تاوق) as part of his campaign to consolidate power. His right-hand man Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, given the infamous pet name Hemiti, which derives from the Arabic word ‘hamyati’ (يتايماح) meaning my protector, was given control of the RSF. Basheer simultaneously made great relations with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) (تاوقلا) spearheaded by Abdal Fattah Al-Burhan. Basheer gave Hemiti control of Sudan’s gold mines, as well as the liberty exporting minerals to Chad and Libya, and gave Al-Burhan control over weapons production and telecommunications. The RSF and SAF under strict control of Basheer would crackdown on various pro-democratic demonstrations. For example on June 3rd, 2019, The Khartoum Massacre alone claimed the lives of 100 peaceful protestors as well as the rape of 70 women by the RSF.⁹

Such was the agitation against Basheer’s regime that despite all of his efforts to concretise his violent autocracy, his thirty-year long reign would meet its end in 2019 at the hands of both Hemiti and Burhan. His reign of ethnic cleaning, genocide and war crime was stopped by none other than Burhan, Hemiti and revolutionaries. Since 2019, Hemiti and Burhan have waged civil war across Sudan in the wake

6 Anne Ward-Lambert, *The Refugee Experience*, 664.

7 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) <https://data.unicef.org/country/sdn/>, accessed 5th February 2024.

8 Office for National Statistics (ONS), Child and Infant Mortality in England and Wales, 2021 <https://www.ons.gov.uk/>

9 Zeinab Mohammed Salih, ‘Zeinab Mohammed Salih in Khartoum’, *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/11/sudan-troops-protesters-attack-sit-in-rape-khartoum-doctors-report>, accessed 5th February 2024

of this power vacuum. They have both separately attended various international political events to bolster foreign support for their regimes, as well as using their massive sources of wealth for mobilisation and suppression of democratic insurgency groups. A temporary coalition government was forced upon Sudan via international pressures and the acceptance of a power sharing agreement. This civil war has devastated Sudan, and the citizens are left betrayed by their leaders as well as international powers that claimed to support their hopes of democracy, alongside a flurry of meaningless broken ceasefires. This is just one of the world conflicts that has triggered the recent flux of transnational immigration, but it is also sadly perhaps one of the lesser-known modern conflicts.

2.2 What is Oral History?

Oral history is one of the oldest forms of historical record predating the written word. This multidisciplinary methodological approach to history can be transformative and empowering to the individual. It can give them their own central place in the historical record, giving history back to those who experienced and made it. Oral history can be used to give agency to marginalised groups and change the popular narrative; and in a world where narrative can change the lives and perceptions of millions, it is important we record the truth. Because oral history is an interactive form of history, we are forced to discover and analyse the hidden meanings between the words spoken.¹⁰ This is where the interdisciplinary approach to history begins. Oral historians consort with linguistics, psychology or even neurobiology to fully understand the source they create with the interview participant. Neuro-linguist Franco Fabbro postulated that one of the most useful strategies for survival is forecasting the future.¹¹ Through a series of external cues, reinforcement and learning, humans have adapted to utilise long-term memory as one of our defining survival traits. The sharing of memories between communities however supersedes our need for survival, and corroborates a collective narrative.

10 Lynn Abrams, “The Peculiarities of Oral History”, in *Oral History Theory* (London: Routledge, 2016), 18.

11 Franco Fabbro, *The Neurolinguistics of Bilingualism* (East Sussex: Psychology Press Ltd., 1999), 89.

In many respects, oral history embodies a post-modernist approach to history, aiming to challenge traditional narratives and ideologies with personal subjective experiences, rather than relying on the grand established narratives and systems presented by media, government, or social convention and tradition. This is significant more now than ever as the press both reflects and reinforces public attitudes, and consequently reality becomes buried under layers of myth and prejudice.¹² Subsequently, qualitative spoken word becomes our most generous source of information on a person. Their life, experiences, personality, emotions and mood all combine to create a woven tapestry of the human experience. And without a doubt, the oral historical method is the machine that spins that material together.

3. The Genesis of the Research

On January 8th, 2023, at a train station in Nottingham I was slowly approached by a tall dark man who seemed lost and confused. He asked me which train to catch showing me a rugged ticket. By coincidence he was catching the same train as me. He was clearly new to the U.K., and I invited him to sit with me on the journey. We introduced ourselves, and this is where I found out he was from Sudan. He described the country in such colour but with overshadowed tones of sadness and longing. Eventually we parted ways, but he intrigued me greatly and we decided to swap phone numbers for language exchange. At the back of my mind I knew there was more to him than met the eye.

Nine months later on the 12th of September 2023, I went and visited him in Newcastle. He introduced me to many other immigrants from all around the Arab world. It was like a silent sub-society that was all of a sudden opened up to me. Many of them escaping modern conflict and immigrating to the UK for a better life. This cultural excursion operated fortunately in coalition with my oral history studies. But at this time, I was weary of prying into his past. I knew from the moment that I had met him that his story should be more widely understood and shared. My studies and meeting this stranger, turned friend, served as

¹² Roy Greenslade, "Seeking Scapegoats: The Coverage of Asylum in the U.K. Press, Asylum and Migration 5th Paper" *Institute of Public Policy Research*, 2005, 6.

some kind of transcendental destiny; I therefore decided that I would interview him and snatch at the rare opportunity to talk one-on-one with an illegal immigrant.

4. Methodology

4.1 Selecting a Question and a Participant

As this research was originally a part of my course on oral history, I was tasked with creating my own primary source. As described in Section 3, I had met my participant by chance which is an example of convenience sampling. Moreover, as modern conflict and immigration are both poignant topics in contemporary literature, political and cultural debate, I therefore found it opportunistic to explore these subjects through oral history. There is a significant gap in the public domain relating to the plight of the Sudanese people, who are facing genocide, war and economic failure. According to reports, Sudan's capital city Khartoum is now a lawless playground for paramilitary groups who flaunt humanitarian and international laws.¹³ Subsequently, I felt my research thesis would be able to uncover truths and raise awareness for a crises that receives very little attention.

4.2 Research Design

The case study on the Sudanese youth is in an interview form as per a qualitative research method. I prepared fourteen pre-approved open-ended questions for the interview. They covered topics such as: identity, trauma, memory, political violence, migration and conflict. Then performing thematic text coding using my verbatim transcript of the interview conducted I accurately pinpointed these themes in our conversations. The Jefferson Transcription System (See Section 10) was particularly conducive to the verbatim transcript and success of the results. Recurring instances of all the themes as mentioned above were rife in the transcript. Analysing the qualitative data produced through the interdisciplinary oral historical method, I successfully generated both a humanising and detailed experience of modern conflict and immigration.

¹³ Al-Jazeera Media Network, <https://www.aljazeera.com>, accessed 5th February 2024.

4.3 Ethical and Legal Considerations

When preparing for the interview, my primary concern was the legal and ethical implications of such a delicate socio-political topic. And while there is no law that even mentions oral history,¹⁴ my primary concern therefore was the ethics. The safety of my participant was of upmost importance as prior to the interview they had not received full British citizenship and therefore their legal status in the UK was in flux. Therefore, I offered anonymity to my participant, which was to be fully used in the interview and in any research afterward. From now on he will be referred to as his preferred title ‘X’. An equally as important approach is to recognise the participant’s feelings. Oral historian Alessandro Portelli suggested it is important that while you conduct the interview, to remember ‘the person is real, and we should relate to their humanity’,¹⁵ instead of viewing them as a faceless emotionless piece of qualitative data. This quote was most meaningful to my project, as previously stated, I had long since wanted to raise awareness of his story, and not just receive a grade for my studies.

4.4 The Interview

Understanding the gravity of the interview and its value, I planned and researched everything meticulously. I wanted the interview and questions to follow a chronological structure, starting from early childhood to present day. This was to humanise his narrative, listening to his childhood dreams and ambitions, and then juxtaposing what instead happened in adulthood.

The interview lasted 1 hour 47 minutes and 53 seconds. I went to Newcastle to perform the interview in their new home (See Figure 1). I stayed from 1:30pm until 5:30pm on a cold winter evening, which unbeknownst to me would sadly mimic the tone of the interview to come. We sat in his living room, as I wanted to make my participant as comfortable as possible in a familiar environment. We ate food, drank and smoked tobacco together like friends. Moreover, as

¹⁴ Oral History Society.org (OHS) <https://www.ohs.org.uk/legal-and-ethical-advice/>, accessed 6th February 2024.

¹⁵ Alessandro Portelli, *Oral History as a Genre* (London: Routledge 1998), 18.

aforementioned, when I transcribed the interview, I chose to do it verbatim using the Jefferson Transcription System to capture every pause, sigh and shift in tone to truly capture the rich profile of emotion in our conversation.

4.5 The Importance of Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity

Subjectivity according to Lynn Abrams refers to the participants sense of self– how their identity is shaped by experience, language, culture and environment. Whereas intersubjectivity is described as the relationship between the narrator and the interviewer and how they cooperate to create a shared narrative. X and I come from completely different backgrounds, systems and cultures. Our race, colour, religion, age and gender are important factors while exploring the themes of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, paired with our relationship as friends and not strangers. Intersubjectivity also highlights the importance of a reflexive approach, realising our effect and place as interviewers in the narrative.

In addition, historian Alan Wong’s chapter ‘*Interviewing with Friends*’, suggests that interviewing a friend can have an impact on the validity and findings of the interview.¹⁶ Both the interviewer and interviewee might have preconceived notions about each other’s perspectives and experiences, which can influence the way questions are framed and responses are given. However Tillman-Healy highlighted that with the foundation of friendship we can produce an emotionally rich and personal account.¹⁷ For me, this interview represented the creation of a historical source through the shared authority over the narrative, as opposed to a one sided narrative.

16 Alan Wong, ‘Listen and Learn: Familiarity and Feeling in the Oral History Interview’, in Anna Sheftel and Stacey Zembrzycki (eds.), *Oral History Off the Record: Toward an Ethnography of Practice* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 97-112.

17 Lisa M. Tillman-Healy, *Friendship as Method* (California: Sage Publications, 2003).

5. Interview Transcript Analysis – Modern Conflict and Transnational Immigration

5.1 Introductions – Home and Conflict

[00:00:53]X:

My name is 'X'(.) I grow up in - (0.4) – I born in Sudan in small uh- (0.3) city, (0.3) It's called Nertiti and is located in the centre of the Darfuri State (0.5), we have like five state of Darfur (.), West and North and South and East and middle (0.2).

I born in middle of Darfur which is Nertiti, which is beautiful city (.) have uh- (0.3) like you know when the water fall from the mountain? [T: Yeah] and to (*unintelligible*) (0.2), we have like this view(.) we have like three. Martigolo, Galol, and- Jabal Marrah Mountain as well (0.3). Jabal Marrah mountain is one of the most famous places in Sudan [T: Yeah]. People come to visit and enjoy the view.

hhh and, our- our city is contains different of tribes (0.5) based on uh- # African race (0.3) or- other race as well. They- they used to live together in peaceful (.) without – without uh- problems^o or fighting or conflicts. But, -uh (0.3) since 2003 (0.5) (T: Yeah^o) -uh (0.3) our last -uh president of Sudan Omar Al-Basheer (T: yeah, yeah, yeah) have -uh support the Arab tribes in Darfur -um (0.3) for the reason of a – stop – uh (0.5) the you know the (*clears throat*) (0.5) the group of people when the group of people have weapons against the -uh (0.5) -the country or the government –

Within the first minute of X introducing himself, the narrative quickly shifts to war. The intertwining of his environment and identity is so crucial here. This compliments historian Lynn Abrams assertion well, suggesting: 'his or her identity is informed and shaped by experience, perception, language, and culture – in other words an individual's emotional baggage...' ¹⁸ The juxtaposition between the 'beautiful city... the water fall from the mountain' versus the past tense clause of 'they used to live in peaceful ... without uh- problems^o or fighting or conflicts' – is a use of coded subliminal language . There seems to

18 Lynn Abrams, Self and Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity: in *Oral History Theory*, 54.

be an inextricable link between his working memory of home, and conflict.

When my participant is addressing his memories on the subject of conflict, he will be working from a 'larger framework of collective memory'.¹⁹ My participant's stressful experiences, according to Abrams, will extend 'far beyond the personal' and gravitate towards a cohesive historical, familial, social and cultural framework of which to structure his response and recollection within. As suggested by Thomson (*Popular Memory*, 1990), memory reconstruction and maintenance are very public, and not private.²⁰ This is because individuals in a community or group wish to adhere to the wider recognised experience. Recollection needs acceptance from the community. His plural use of 'they' and 'we' are indicative of his community's collective memory, and the impact of this shared experience on the construction of identity and narrative.

5.2 Militia Violence

[00:16:16]X: <I was like 15, when I'm 15 – when I'm working on building, I see the first time. People – uh some people. Doing you know, that- that things, like hiding them face, you can just see them eyes, and they #-uh on the bike, they riding a bike -uh the driver and behind him is the -uh other partner holding the gun, and they stop in front of like 50 years old guy. And they ask him to give money. Like to you know? And he didn't -uh give it to them, and then they kill him - # <they give him like two shots here [points to each side of his chest] his chest.>

[00:17:12]T: °To the chest.

[00:17:13]X: # Yeah – and they took uh- his bag and then, # go to the bike – the uh motor, and gone.

19 Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).

20 Alistair Thomson, *Popular Memory* (London: Routledge, 1994).

[00:17:22]T: So what happened to his body afterwards?

[00:17:24]X: [*clears throat*] The people come, uh, all the people come, they're used to seeing it, the people in the area, used to hear the gun shot and these things. They coming and running to the guy, and they look at him still alive at that time, # ↓

after 10 or 15 minutes (.) he gone. (.) he passed away.

And then, the woman cry and people cry and these things happen. and uh- many many many of bad things happen in Darfur – because - because our government, we have – have police in the area, police centre, we have -uh like -uh like what I will say in English? – we have army as well – but the army and police they don't solve these problems, it's bigger than them you know?

The RSF or Janjaweed (ديوجنَج) is the aforementioned Arab militia group responsible for the rape, brutalisation and tribal sterilisation of countless Sudanese people. This excerpt is just one tragic case of the many traumatic events that X witnessed. The narrative and memory features are most interesting here too. A study by G.W. Beatie in 1978 on hesitation and pauses in speech found these language features to be a form of temporal planning structure for their sentence, at the same time forming ideas and retaining attention from the listener.²¹ Noam Chomsky in 1959 during the cognitive revolution in the field of psychology suggested that speech must be explored further, designing neural and behavioural mechanisms specific to linguistics.²² Qualitative spoken word is our most generous source of information on a person. All languages have a way of encoding this information, and we can turn to the transcript to properly digest what was said to us.²³ This excerpt from the transcript not only observes the experiences of one individual, but the collective experience of those suffering under

21 Brian Butterworth, *The Psychological Laboratory: 'Pragmatic Constraints on Linguistic Production'*, (London: Academic Press, 1980).

22 E. Remez and B. Pisoni, *The Handbook of Speech Perception* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008), 653.

23 Suzanne Romaine, *Bilingualism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989), 270.

oppression. The saddest fact from this section of the transcript is the length of time it took the man to perish, lying helpless in the street, another soul in the hundreds of thousands claimed by the tyrannical regime. Yet more destroying is how this death is one of the few that gets recorded. To quote Kurt Tucholsky: ‘The death of one man: that is a catastrophe. A hundred thousand deaths: that is a statistic!’.²⁴

5.3 National Sudanese Security Agency (NISS)

(Note: The Sudanese Security Agency (ين طولا تارباخمل او نمألا زاهج) (ين ادوسلا) is Sudan’s equivalent of the CIA or the U.K.’s Security Service MI6).

[00:28:20]T: Okay, so how long were you in the prison for?

[00:28:26]X: I be like three weeks.

[00:28:26]T: Three weeks.

[00:28:27]X: ٩three weeks - ↑ So, they – they talk shit (.) with me, they talk- they talk racist speech with me.

[00:28:36]T: What did they say to you?

[00:28:38]X: Like, you are -uh (0.2) دب ع تنأ [you are a slave] like you are a slave, and you, - like that you know.

[00:29:05]T: So these were Arabs saying this to you?

[00:29:06]X: Arabs used to say these things to the black people in Sudan, (0.3) so that, - this word it mean we are higher than you, and you are just slave- slaves, and these things. And he say that for me, and -uh – he talk -uh bad about my family, about me, my race. And -uh as well as .hhh they hitting me, using -uh (0.2) stick- a stick, and -uh belt of the- the military clothes, they hit me as well. And they do many things to make me speak, you know. (0.3) –

24 Kurt Tucholsky, “Französischer Witz,” *Vossische Zeitung* 23, (1925).

All the time, I have just one thought (0.2), I am just selling tyres – I don't- I'm not a part of any movement (0.1), I do my own business. I don't have any things. (0.1) And then after -uh after three weeks, someone else, some -uh someone else come in to do investigation with me, and then he said -uh (0.2), you are free, we – we will let you go, but we have conditions. Like -uh you will work for us, like you gonna tell us -uh, about the people (0.2) – uh – who – who – who let the people – the people who support the-uh, like -uh burning wheels on the street, like resistance you know. The people who support resistance and do these things, and who is behind them, who is supporting, who is plan for them, and the time they will go out again, and these things.

And then, you have to come every week, sign up, and to tell us information. I said 'okay, I will do.' £ I just want to go you know [laughs lightly]

[00:31:33]T: Yeah.

[00:31:34]X: And then – and if you don't (.) do these things we gonna ↓ kill you. Like, (0.1) these the conditions. # And then they took me in the car, and hiding my eyes, and threw me in the part of our Nertiti Market, big market. And then I go, I was so tired and all my body was swollen, ↓# you know, from the hit. And then, hhh, and then I go home (.) I told my father (0.2) ↓# I was in the prison and they do one, two, three with me. And then they said you have to leave this area, <'they will not leave you, they will come again, and they're gonna take you'>. # °And then, he advise me to leave – to move, from the area or the country. And then I travelled to Libya.

This passage demonstrates Sudan's secret police (NISS) terrorising a civilian through torture, coercion and death threats. Historians and linguists alike regard narrative as a 'communication strategy',²⁵ with the verbatim transcript capturing the subliminal. Defined by J.J. Grumperz, code switching is defined as 'the juxtaposition within the same speech exchange of passages of speech belonging to two

different grammatical systems or subsystems'.²⁶ The code switch to the Arabic derogatory phrase 'دب ع تنأ [you are a slave]' should be examined. The indexical phrase of 'you' demonstrates how he recollects experience as it was, quoting them, feeling the pain all over again. His identity was indelibly marked by this experience, recollecting it in his native language, reliving the experience perhaps. Moreover, code switching serves as an expressive function and has pragmatic meaning, because expressing oneself in a second language is not always as meaningful as the mother tongue.²⁷ This is an excellent example of the autobiographical or episodic memory. The episodic memory refers to the individuals near memorisation and conscious recollection of a unique personal experience.²⁸ For example, many people can recall exactly what they were doing when they found out about the 9/11 attacks. This is a powerful testament to how X was profoundly affected by this experience from such a young age.

5.4 The Trauma of Migration

[00:48:36]T: What was the most memorable thing? (0.2) – that sticks in your memory, from that time.

[00:48:42]X: Ohh. <hhhh, Okay from that time> (0.5) [*long pause*] Okay, when we are in our boat we see from too far area, there is other boat going down to the water.

[00:49:02]T: Sinking?

[00:49:04]X: Yeah. ↓ People are dying in front of us as well.

[00:49:07]T: The other boat sank from Libya?

[00:49:09]X: Yeah. Because of uh- hhh, I think they are not balancing the boat – °something happen for them and they go down into the water. And the second day, we have a big wave, you know, but -uh لا ينعاي [I mean... thank God] we are safe and – Because our

26 J. J. Grumperz, *Discourse Strategies*, (University of Cambridge Press: Cambridge, 1982), 59.

27 Suzanne Romaine, *Bilingualism*, 259.

28 Franco Fabbro, *The Neurolinguistics of Bilingualism*, 97

boat was big, like 86 passengers, and we sitting like balance the boat, that's why we don't fall this side or that side. But the other boat is falling #umm down in the water. They die I think. °Or most of them or all of them... yeah [5 seconds of silence] hhh – these the most horrible things I have seen in the sea. ↑ But, I think I am lucky, there is many people who try to get to Europe many times, I just once- I did once, it was horrible, but I arrive... °I arrive.

To contextualise, X had no prior intention of coming to Europe, but Libya had become too unsafe for him. He paid a human trafficker 1000 USD after months of exploitative labour just to escape. The boat ran out of diesel and the GPS signal was lost; they were destined to drift on the vast expanses of the Mediterranean until death. This part of the interview left me in a state of shock. At this stage we had superseded the bounds of the oral historical methodology and instead our personal relationship was brought to the forefront of discourse. This passage also finds ground with Phillip Marfleet's observation that 'people do not willingly undertake long and dangerous journeys to unknown or uncertain destinations, abandoning their material, social, cultural and other resources, unless they are under extreme pressure'.²⁹

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) defines post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) under section A as: 'Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence in one (or more) of the following ways: 1) Directly experiencing the traumatic event(s). 2) Witnessing the event as it occurred to others.'³⁰ In a study by Hadden, Rutherford and Merret (1978) investigating the effects of political violence during The Troubles in Ireland. They investigated 1532 patients admitted to the accident and emergency unit of Belfast hospital after an explosion. Strangely however, they only found 50% of the witnesses to have

29 Phillip Marfleet, *Refugees in a Global Era* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

30 American Psychiatric Association, "DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for PTSD," *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 5th ed., (Washington D.C: APA, 2013), 271-272.

sustained psychological shock.³¹ This number seems worryingly low, and it is hypothesised that they were simply desensitised to such events as over 16,000 bombings occurred during this dark period.³² When interviewing X there was sorrow in his voice but no visible trace of trauma, as it is no doubt hidden within. His entire life has been overshadowed by the parlous nature of a post-colonial state in the midst of conflict. Consequently he was forced to immigrate and undertake the most treacherous of journeys, slowly floating to uncertain death or salvation. Akin to the Greek mythologue of Charon ferrying poor souls across the black waters to eternal peace. But what all of these unfortunate souls come to discover is a mirage on the horizon. The opulence of the white marble pillars of European egalitarian society shimmering in the intangible distance – a miserable hellscape of yet even more trials.

5.5 An Immigrant's Account: Politics and Refuge

[00:55:05]T: It's getting worse?

[00:55:06]X:   Yeah. (0.5) [silence] - And then, what do you think? Because its getting worse – because of war you know. I think – I think uh – ↑ America and the West did nothing for us. And till now they are watching, just watching. # Sudan is dying every day and they are just watching. Just that.

[00:55:42]T: Like they are watching ن يظسلف ?
[Like they are watching Palestine?]

[00:55:43]X: Yep. Or – uh Palestine, and the bombing.

[00:55:50]T: And no one is watching Sudan, you feel like no one cares?

31 Stephens et. al., *Understanding Post-Traumatic Stress: A Psychological Perspective on PTSD and Treatment* (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 1997), 59-60.

32 Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), Security Related Incidents in Northern Ireland, shootings, bombings and incendiaries, 1969 to 2003, <http://cain.ulster.ac.uk>, accessed 6th February 2024.

[00:55:52]X: ʔahaha – they are not watching, yeah. £ But -uh no problem hahaha. ↑ But you know why I say no problem!? Because even if they watch, they won't do anything. # That's why. Now they are watch Gaza and won't do anything. So... That's the game. [Silence]

[00:56:20]T: The game?

[00:56:21]X: # Yeah. That's the game of politics. They just say we condemn, we do – they don't do anything, they just talk – we don't need your talk, just your action.

Since the 90's Sudanese have been living in periods of exile from their home country. Specifically, those living in Cairo in this time defied the contemporary stereotypes that immigrant diasporas from third world countries are uneducated and ignorant. Social anthropologist Nadje Sadig Al-Ali described this diaspora as “highly educated and politically aware”.³³ This finds common ground with X, his education is minimal, yet he still is able to talk to me on a deep socio-political level. The founders of a centre for Sudanese refugees in Cairo were convinced that the national crisis in Sudan was being further fed by ignorance, suspicion, distrust and fear. The long-term solution they felt therefore was to change people's attitudes.³⁴ This statement said in 1997 still rings true today, for both modern conflict and the flux of migrants it produces, yet we are still in the same position of prejudice and intolerance.

6. Discussion - Immigration Politics in the 21st Century: Arguments and Analysis

6.1 The Rwanda Plan

In the wake of what has been recorded, transcribed and analysed, what we are left with is a highly valuable historical source. It demonstrates

33 Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser, *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational communities and the transformation of home* (New York: Routledge Ltd., 2002), 48.

34 Ibid., 49., citing: Taybah Sharif and Jane Lado, in *Survey of Sudanese and International Organisations Serving the Displaced Sudanese Community in Egypt* (1997).

the multifaceted complexities of 21st century immigrant experience, demystifying and uncovering new perceptions. What remains however is to place the latter part of his immigration into our current political context, and argue for a humanist approach to the immigration dilemma. By examining current political debate and dogma, I aim to use the full force of the emotional impact of the interview on the reader as a form of soft power for the re-evaluation of immigrant perceptions.

We begin with The Collingridge Dilemma. The Collingridge Dilemma is an example of humans attempting to forecast outcomes of technological advancements.³⁵ While at the beginning controlling those new technologies is very easy, for example, how user interface will look on the newest smart phone; the future ramifications, however, of such inventions are often unknown and unpredictable.³⁶ This idea finds common ground now with the socio-political ramifications of mass deportation of immigrants from Europe and blockading immigrant routes. We cannot tell in what ways our decisions now will manifest, especially in regard to policy making and border control. This paper does not pretend to hold all the answers to immigration and modern conflict, but any humanist approach would immediately denounce the fortification of Europe as a credible longstanding solution.

For example, the case of the UK government's Rwanda Plan. In an interview with the BBC on January 7th, 2024, Rishi Sunak stated: "I absolutely believe in the value and importance of having deterrents and Albania and Rwanda are linked because they're both returns agreements".³⁷ One can suggest at early stages it will deter illegal immigration, but what of the future ramifications for the globe and our own society in doing this. From the Hansard parliamentary archives however I found a logical response. Similarly to when Karl Marx wrote upon the completion of his magnum opus *Das Kapital*, stating it "is without question the most terrible missile that has yet been hurled

35 David Collingridge, *The Social Control of Technology* (Frances Printer, 1980).

36 David Edmonds and Hazem Zohny, *Future Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 7.

37 Rishi Sunak and Laura Kuenssberg, Sunday with Rishi Sunak and Laura Kuenssberg *BBC One*, 7th January 2024 <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m001v6j0>, accessed 5th February 2024.

at the heads of the bourgeoisie”,³⁸ I find MP Patrick Grady’s response equivalent to that in its impact and social critique. MP Grady is quoted in the transcript as stating: “if the risk to life of crossing the channel is not a deterrent—why should the prospect of being sent to Rwanda be a deterrent? If Rwanda is a safe and secure country where they can have a comfortable life, why should the prospect of being sent there be a deterrent?”³⁹

6.2 The Media and Immigration

The 2005 London Bombings were a dark day for Great Britain. On the 7th of July as four British Muslim suicide bombers blew themselves up on a bus and three tube trains, fifty-two lives were claimed. Of the fifty-two victims, many were foreign to the U.K, and whose residence ranged from short to long term. This event was as tragic as it was eye opening. The blast and those it claimed however is an interesting snapshot demonstrating the diverse and historically cosmopolitan city that London has been for centuries. Amongst the dead were a 48-year-old Iranian biomedical officer at Great Ormond street hospital, a 46-year-old Romanian dental technician and a 55-year-old cleaner of Ghanaian origin who had spent half her life in London.⁴⁰ ‘These immigrants were not the lazy, dishonest scroungers of tabloid flare; they were the lifeblood of a diverse and dynamic global city’.⁴¹

For western media and political leaders, immigrants make convenient scapegoats. Following the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks, a percentage increase of 35.42% of hate crime incidence against Asians and Arabs in the U.K. occurred.⁴² Despite the attackers being born and raised

38 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels - *Collected Works (MECW)*, (Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), 358.

39 Patrick Grady, Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration Bill), *Hansard* January 16th 2024, [https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2024-01-16/debates/6EF16CCA-91F1-469C-BC41-1D01B1FD888D/SafetyOfRwanda\(AsylumAndImmigration\)Bill](https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2024-01-16/debates/6EF16CCA-91F1-469C-BC41-1D01B1FD888D/SafetyOfRwanda(AsylumAndImmigration)Bill), accessed 5th February 2024.

40 Phillipe Legrain, *Immigrants Your Country Needs Them* (Great Britain: Little, Brown & Company, 2006), 3-136.

41 Ibid.

42 Emma Hanes and Stephen Machin, *Hate Crime in the Wake of Terror Attacks: Evidence From 7/7 and 9/11* (London: University College London), 15.

in Leeds, retaliation is felt by immigrants, minorities and second-generation citizens. This demonstrates the cynical manipulation of public opinion, that people only care that the perpetrators were foreign and not the victims. It shows how easy it is to pollute the narrative; this wasn't foreigners or migrants killing British citizens, this was British citizens killing hard working migrants as well as British citizens. Linking back to X, this exemplifies how migrants are consistently demonised in the media, but it is work like this that consequently rehumanises the experience of immigrants to ameliorate some level of compassion and understanding.

Immigration is not just a modern problem though; it is seen throughout the historiography. Alison Mountz suggests that 'for as long as nation-states have asserted control of mobility along their borders, people have employed assistance to cross them'.⁴³ Moreover, because of the sensationalism surrounding human trafficking, immigration and people smuggling, the media partakes in and promulgates these events as crises.⁴⁴ Moreover, it is even easier in the wake of this technological revolution for political campaigners, through social media manipulation, misrepresentation, distortion and bots.⁴⁵ Subsequently, the escalated media coverage 'heightens public fears about sovereign control of migration'.⁴⁶ Again, what my work aims to do in part, is humanise this experience better, and surmount the grand media narrative that would have these people seen as invaders, and otherwise expunged from society and sent back to conflict or death.

7. Conclusions

X's journey to the U.K. is Homeric in its design. To me, X is like the legendary Odysseus coming home from a long tiring war, albeit with a sadistic twist as X finds even more misery and pain in Europe. X

43 Alison Mountz, *Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 2.

44 Ibid., 4.

45 Meiqing Zhang et. al., "Social Bots and Social Media Manipulation in 2020: The Year in Review," *Handbook of Computational Social Sciences*, Vol.1 (London: Routledge, 2021).

46 Alison Mountz, *Seeking Asylum*, 4.

had told me many times, he wants to be remembered as the hero of his story, and not an example of misery in the world. It is my hope that this paper has demystified the immigrant experience and raised awareness for an ongoing humanitarian crisis. I consider myself honoured for the opportunity to have sat down with an asylum seeker, one-to-one, and asked them questions.

What remains still is the debate on immigration and the responsibility the western world must accept. Many of the problems suffered by the global south and eastern immigrant diasporas are a result of historical and contemporary western imperialism and interference. It is a sad reality that western governments are unwilling to accept this responsibility, and instead demonise and label migrants as dissemblers.⁴⁷ No more true a word has been said on the issue of immigration than from Economist and US diplomat J.K. Galbraith: “Migration is the oldest action against poverty. It selects those who most want help. It is good for the country to which they go; it helps break the equilibrium of poverty in the country from which they come. What is the perversity in the human soul that causes people to resist so obvious a good?”⁴⁸ Every day, thousands die from conflict, starvation and disease, therefore it is no wonder why ‘for centuries parents have opted for migration’⁴⁹ to protect their loved ones. Consequently, it has become more necessary now than ever in this globalised integrated world that prejudice and intolerance are left to history. And that the plates of tectonic political discourse and narrative shift towards ameliorating this goal.

47 Philip Marfleet, *Refugees in a Global Era*, 16.

48 J. K. Galbraith, *The Nature of Mass Poverty* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1979).

49 Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoeder, *What is Migration History?* (Cambridge: Polity Press 2009), 135.

X: Yeah, like- £ like, you are just [laughs], you know? -uh the feeling of if you don't know how to swim and you are just like dying inside the water and someone threw the -uh, what you call in English? The life... [T: Life Jacket] Life jacket for you, to save your life. We feel just like that you know -

When see the border, and we see the -uh, it was white, £ I still remember. When you are coming in the sea, you will see the border of Dover is too high from the sea, and it was white like mountain. And we see that, I still remember...

Appendix



Figure 1: Thomas Hutton, 'Interview Setting', 24th November 2023.

Abbreviation Symbol Area – Jefferson Transcription System

- [word] = Overlapping Talk.
- (.) = Brief Pause between 0.08 seconds and 0.2 seconds.
- (1.4) = Time (in absolute seconds) between end of a word and beginning of next.
- ↑word or ↓word = Marked shift in pitch, up (↑) or down (↓).
- °word° = Degree sign indicate syllables or words distinctly quieter than surrounding speech by the same speaker.
- word- = A dash indicates a cut-off. In phonetic terms this is typically a glottal stop.
- >word< = Right/left carats indicate increased speaking rate (speeding up).
- <word> = Left/right carats indicate decreased speaking rate (slowing down)
- .hhh = Inbreath. Three letters indicate ‘normal’ duration. Longer or shorter inbreaths indicated with fewer or more letters.
- hhh = Outbreath. Three letters indicate ‘normal’ duration. Longer or shorter inbreaths indicated with fewer or more letters.
- £word£ = Pound sign indicates smiley voice, or suppressed laughter.
- #word# = Hash sign indicates creaky voice.
- ~word~ = Tilde sign indicates shaky voice (as in crying).
- (word) = Parentheses indicate uncertain word; no plausible candidate if empty
- (()) = Double parentheses contain analyst comments or descriptions

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The Myth of Sovereignty in the Era of Hyper-Globalisation: Western Fears, Postcolonial Realities

Callum Tonkins

Globalisation has made it necessary to review modernity's paradigms. One such paradigm that may no longer be an accurate descriptor (if it ever was) of international society is that of the sovereign nation-state.

Through an exploration of both the western nation-state and the space collectively referred to as 'postcolony', two different experiences of globalisation are exhibited, each with different power manifestations. For the former, globalisation has challenged both internal and external legitimacy, which as in turn led to perceptions of a loss of sovereignty. However, the loss of sovereignty does not imply the loss of power; sovereign power has morphed into biopower, with power remaining within that space. In contrast, the postcolony's historical relationship with sovereignty is one of negation- the *denial* of it. Globalisation thus threatens not the specific manifestation of power in sovereignty, but rather the *continued subordination to western sovereignty*. This has occurred due to a continuation of the 'state of exception' and socioeconomic hegemony.

The piece does not, however, claim to be a definitive analysis of power, sovereign or otherwise, under globalisation. Such an inquiry would be a much greater project that went beyond the two broad categories west/postcolony, looking at specific national contexts: 'realities' rather than 'reality', accounting for the heterogeneity of both the forms and experiences of colonialism. It is a map of the terrain, and like any map is pitched at the level of generalisation.

Introduction

Modernity saw the rise of a variety of paradigms that would dominate the socio-political terrain. One such paradigm was the nation-state, under which there was an inextricable link between *sovereignty* and *power*. Yet, this paradigm must be re-evaluated following present-day developments, particularly globalisation under deregulation.

For certainty, this paradigm is far from universal. Historically localised to the west, context is essential for carrying out a nuanced investigation. Globalisation's impact will be measured from two angles: the western nation-state, where sovereign power has been the traditional form of power, and the postcolony. Historically placed beyond sovereignty, the postcolony has in turn been defined through a *negation* of power, and *subjugation*. To neglect this would give an incomplete account of globalisation's impact upon the realities of power.

The binary I have constructed between the 'west' and 'postcolony' may appear problematic due the breadth of these categories which risk ignoring the heterogeneity of colonial forms and experience. Indeed, many countries now considered 'western' have been subjected to a 'colonial matrix of power'.¹ To counter this risk some clarifications needed to ensure against ignorance of 'extraordinary diversity of subjective positions, social experiences and cultural identities'.² The two categories I have selected are *ideal types*. Ideal types are 'not a *description* of reality...[but rather are] formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many...*concrete individual* phenomena'.³ They operate as means to description, rather than as description itself.⁴

Here, the western nation-state is defined via its close association with sovereignty and power. The postcolony in turn has its accentuated trait as negation of this power. It is these two models that will form the basis of analysis for the impact of globalisation upon nation-state sovereignty, and more fundamentally distributions of power.

Structure

The west will be considered first. The paradigm of state-sovereignty-constitution as closely bound will be expounded, noting the importance

1 Epp Annus, *Soviet Postcolonial Studies* (Routledge 2018) 14.

2 Stuart Hall, 'New Ethnicities' in Morley and Chen (eds), *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies* (Routledge 1996) 443.

3 Max Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Free Press 1949) 90. Indeed, Weber points out the very concept of the state is itself an ideal type; 99.

4 Ibid., 92.

of *legitimacy* and *borders/territory* to this. The metamorphosis of power in the twentieth-century as asserted by Foucault will then be explored, allowing for a better idea of power's reality today. Economic and political globalisation pose challenges to this traditional understanding; however, its consequences should not be overstated, as sovereign power is now only one part of a wider constellation alongside disciplinary power and governmentality. Power remains in the west, albeit in a new form.

The postcolony will then be turned to. These territories were not privy to the states-system of classical social theory, thus their exclusion from power becomes the focus: sovereignty unravels. The continued negation of power shows that it continues to be found within the occident despite formal decolonisation. The sovereignty of these nations is *formal* and not *substantive*. Overall, perpetuation of the 'state of exception' and hegemony mean globalisation does not threaten to introduce new problems, merely to perpetuate the old.

Part I – Globalisation and the West

Sovereignty in Modernity

To give an account of the rise of sovereignty without the state would be incomplete and vice-versa; furthermore, if one does not account for the context of modernity, one will not grasp its historical specificity. 'Modernity' here is that period which lasted from 1648 until the beginning the First World War: the 'Westphalian' period. The eponymous treaty that inaugurated this period developed a 'language and logic of rule and statecraft'.⁵ It is the starting point here.

'Sovereignty expresses the basic features of the state', and the two are 'entirely inseparable'.⁶ Indeed, 'State formation became the dominant theme of the era, and sovereignty the desideratum of all rulers'.⁷ One can add constitutionalism to this, acting as the agent that binds the two. In what follows, this triangle (state-sovereignty-constitution) will

5 Emilios Christodoulidis et al, *Jurisprudence* (3rd edn, Routledge 2018) 18.

6 Martin Loughlin, *The Idea of Public Law* (Oxford University Press 2003)

75.

7 Dieter Grimm, *Sovereignty* (Columbia University Press 2015) 5.

be expanded upon, taking each in turn and analysing their links.

State

There are four unities which demarcate the nation-state: unity of territory, a single fiscal system, a national language, and a unified legal system.⁸ Additionally, the state is seen as deliberately *posited*, and maintaining *functional specificity* with an ‘imputation of a teleological basis’.⁹ This specificity is usually the need for a ‘modus vivendi’ achieved via the imposition of universal commands.¹⁰ The state comes to be rather complex and must act in aid ‘of a plurality of coordinated tasks’, however cannot do so ad-hoc.¹¹ This institutional arrangement has sovereignty as its animus.

Sovereignty

In modernity, ‘the state...reserves to itself the business of rule’.¹² It thus wields a vast amount of *power*. Sovereign power is the distinctively modern form of this power. From the Seventeenth-century onwards, it ‘featured as the central element of how unified state power is exercised’.¹³ Loughlin lays out several tenets of sovereignty, of which the following will be focussed upon: as facet of the modern state; public power as product of political power; and its relational nature. First, the key to modern sovereignty is the centralisation of the state, as for centralisation to occur and authority to be legitimated, a new way of utilising law as an instrument of command was necessary.¹⁴ Second, the public power of the sovereign derives from the *political* relationship between it and subject. The power of the sovereign is legitimated through allegiance; it is not unilateral.¹⁵ Closely connected is relationality: ‘sovereignty constitutes the essence of the modern state’; the political relationship of sovereign and subject informs the

8 Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (Hutchinson 1978) 93.

9 Ibid., 96.

10 Ibid., 97.

11 Ibid., 98.

12 Ibid., 1.

13 Christodoulidis (n 5) 17.

14 Loughlin (n 6) 73-75.

15 Ibid., 81-82.

administrator's capacity.¹⁶

'The conception of sovereignty...operates in the realm of imagination and ideas'.¹⁷ Accordingly, it is related to theories of social contract and subjects ceding authority to the sovereign.¹⁸ Consequently, the role of *authority* and *legitimacy* become of central concern. Finally, sovereignty is *internal* and *external*. Internal is concerned the vertical relationship between state and citizen. Legitimacy is of central importance here.¹⁹ In contrast, external sovereignty's primary concern is *territory/border*. The state is necessarily surrounded by other states in tension.²⁰ Classical international law was 'essentially designed on the basis of internal sovereignty and built a protective barrier around it'.²¹

Legitimacy and Constitutionalism

Legitimacy is necessary for the commands of the state to be binding. Here, legitimation is provided for via general laws. This is the departure point from the standestaat.²² Drawing upon Weber's idea of legal-rational legitimacy, Poggi identified the need for depersonalisation and legal circumscription in the exercise of power.²³ In the nation-state, this requirement is fulfilled via constitutionalism, allowing 'comprehensive regulation of public authority'.²⁴ The constitution should not be mistaken as the source of sovereignty; it exists *beyond* the constitution.²⁵ Put summarily 'the democratic constitutional state... is a political order created by the people themselves and legitimated by their opinion'.²⁶

16 Ibid., 83-94.

17 Grimm (n 7) 8.

18 Gurminder K Bhambra & John Holmwood, *Colonialism and Modern Social Theory* (Polity 2021) ch1.

19 Poggi (n 8) 92-95; 101.

20 Ibid., 87-92.

21 Grimm (n 7) 80.

22 Roberto Unger, *Law in Modern Society* (Free Press 1976) 176; 179-181.

23 Poggi (n 8) 101-104.

24 Grimm (n 7) 68.

25 Ibid., 73.

26 Jurgen Habermas, 'The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy' in Max Pensky (ed), *The Postnational Constellation* (Polity 2001) 65.

The Metamorphosis of Power in the Twentieth-Century

One must remember that the Westphalian model is entrenched in a particular historical context, one far removed for the present day. Though a controversial label, post-modernity appears to be the context of the present, bringing with it new challenges to the conceptualisation of power. Foucault argued sovereign power had declined since the early-modern period and become part of a wider system. Power ‘which can no longer be formulated in terms of sovereignty, is... one of the great inventions of bourgeois society’, as the reality is that power is constituted in ‘a myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects.’²⁷ Despite this, sovereignty is still seen as definitive, concealing reality.²⁸ Account must be taken of this transformation to properly gauge globalisation’s impact.

Sovereign power was *deductive*, dealing with the right to kill; in contrast, power is now also *generative*, acting ‘over life’.²⁹ One pole of this biopower is the ‘*anatomo-politics of the human body*’ (discipline), the other ‘biopolitics of population’ (governmentality).³⁰ Now the deployment of power increasingly orbits the ‘norm’, ‘no longer a matter of bringing death into play...but of distributing the living’.³¹ Sovereign power is not gone completely, however- ‘one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government’.³² The three reinforce one another.³³

This can be applied to the analysis of nation-state sovereignty; ‘the state is...the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’, given it has the power to (re)define its ambit.³⁴ Thus, ‘the survival and

27 Michel Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in Gordon (ed), *Power/Knowledge* (Pantheon 1980) 102-103.

28 Ibid., 105.

29 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* vol.1 (First Published 1976, Penguin 2020) 136.

30 Ibid., 139.

31 Ibid., 144.

32 Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in Faubion (ed) *Power* (Penguin 2020) 219.

33 Carol Smart, *Feminism and the Power of Law* (Routledge 1989) 162.

34 Ibid.

limits of the state should be understood on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality'.³⁵ It calls for a reformulation of how we account for power, with sovereignty only being one star in the constellation.³⁶ It really must be stressed, however, that sovereign power has not been lost to the ages; rather, its significance has diminished, and now makes up only one part of a broader reality. It must be recognised that, even if globalisation does further limit sovereign power, it does not necessarily signal the death of the nation-state nor the power that inheres within it.

Globalisation's Impact on Sovereign Power

A new degree of connectivity can be seen as emerging following the Second World War, particularly in relation to the increasingly merged spheres of politics and economics. The fundamental question is whether these changes signal mere intensification or 'a more fundamental rupture with the past'.³⁷ This section aims to clarify the impact of these changes upon the notion of nation-state sovereignty, and whether globalisation, understood this way, marks a paradigmatic shift.

Politically, globalisation has 'erode[d] the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs'.³⁸ There has been an 'intensification of political interconnectedness' whereby global regulation and policy is possible. Here, borders have become less important in demarcating the political space.³⁹ Economically, one can divide the post-war period into the 'Bretton Woods' period and 'deregulation'.⁴⁰ The first, referred to as the 'golden age of controlled capitalism',⁴¹ allowed for state regulation of cross-border capital movement. The latter, however, saw the emergence of neoliberalism, bringing in a tsunami of deregulation.

35 Foucault (n 32) 219.

36 Loughlin (n 6) 96-97.

37 Christodoulidis et al (n 5) 101.

38 Anthony McGrew, 'Politics as Distorted Global Politics' in Adrian Leftwich (ed), *What is Politics?* (Polity 2004) 166.

39 Ibid., 167-170.

40 Manfred B Steger, *Globalization* (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2023) 41-45.

41 Ibid.

This period has seen the growth of the transnational corporation as an ever-more powerful institutional. It enters the political arena when governments fear corporate relocation.⁴² The two key concerns are, for internal sovereignty, *legitimacy*; for external sovereignty, control of *borders/territory*.

Challenging Legitimacy

Legitimacy comes to be threatened particularly by economic globalisation. Habermas argues legitimation is only possible where the welfare state provides ‘appropriate allocation and a fair distribution of rights’ to address the material imbalances of power caused by capitalism.⁴³ Consequently, policy initiatives play a major role in legitimation. However, deregulation has meant ‘national governments steadily lose their capacity to influence economic cycles’ due to a shrinking tax-base.⁴⁴ This in turn makes policy implementation harder. Crouch argues government becomes seen as an ‘institutional idiot, its every ill-informed move being...discounted by smart market actors’.⁴⁵ Indeed, economisation begins to influence other subsystems, replacing their internal logic and threatening their functional differentiation and autonomy; ‘the reflexivity of the legal and political system is short-circuited back into the market paradigm’.⁴⁶ The results are depressing: the subjects of the nation either acquiesce in ‘informed abstinence’, or they crave ‘political charisma’.⁴⁷ Both are symptomatic of a lack of legitimacy. This is no theoretical problem; one can see Western leaders increasingly favouring pro-trade tariff nationalists at elections, the site where legitimacy is symbolically granted.

External Sovereignty

Questions of sovereignty also arise because of the increasing delegation of power to supranational institutions in efforts to tackle

42 Ibid., 56-61.

43 Habermas (n 26) 77.

44 Ibid.

45 Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy* (Polity 2004) 41.

46 Emiliios Christodoulidis, *The Differentiation and Autonomy of Law* (Cambridge University Press 2023) 42.

47 Habermas (n 26) 80.

developments that cannot be addressed via domestic legislation. This manifests particularly in relation to border control, the hallmark of classical external sovereignty. As issues begin to cut across territories, the Westphalian model struggles to account for them. State autonomy is thus impacted. Whilst somewhat redressable via cooperative measures, the reliance on supranational institutions lead to the emergence of ‘legitimation gaps’, and a loss of practical sovereignty.⁴⁸

Whilst in theory sovereignty is retained, one must appreciate the qualitative difference this represents compared to the traditional model. Indeed, subjects may treat it as a loss of sovereignty. The subjects of the nation may treat it as a loss of sovereignty, with the UK exemplifying this, first in its withdrawal from the EU, and now with legislation which explicitly states international laws do not apply, attempting to restore external sovereignty.⁴⁹

Assessing the Impact

Comparing the state of sovereignty before and after deregulation, a very different arrangement of power can be seen. Globalisation has challenged both the internal and external sovereignty of the state, reducing legitimacy and leading to perceptions sovereignty no longer resides with the state. Yet this does not necessarily mean power has evaporated. Sovereignty-disciplinarity-governmentality is the arrangement of power in the twentieth century; sovereign power was no longer dominant even before deregulation. The same power still exists, just in other forms. Furthermore, the space in which this metamorphosis has occurred is highly specific: the impacts described only occurs in the west. We must therefore, if we are to fully understand globalisation’s impact, consider those territories *beyond* the west: the postcolony and the global south.

48 Ibid., 71.

49 Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) HC Bill (2023-24) [38] s1(4).

Part II – The Experience of the Postcolony

Decolonising Social Theory

The west makes up only a small proportion of the world, and the power once manifested in sovereignty still inheres in that space. This new constellation is what is material. The impact of globalisation on the postcolony must be assessed. Never having been privy to the occidental states system, the impact on the specifics of sovereignty is less significant than globalisation's impact on their ability to escape power imbalances in general.

At the beginning of the twentieth-century 85% of the world's territory was colony.⁵⁰ European social theory arose during the age of empires, yet accounts on the development of the state conspicuously leave out the experience of most of the world. These 'disregarded legacies of colonialism' highlight the Eurocentricity of the paradigm; rather than being merely contingent to the development of the western nation-state, 'colonialism and imperialism are integral'.⁵¹ The colonial experience considered here will be those victim to the European 'scramble for sovereignty' in Asia and Africa', as these offer specific 'histories of domination and resistance' that are particularly pertinent to the current investigation.⁵²

The Negation of Sovereignty Under Empire

The localisation of the Westphalian system to Europe 'allowed the exercise of sovereignty over non-European Others as an expression of that sovereignty'.⁵³ Colonised populations were 'Othered', excluded from the order of power entirely. Inherent in the process of Othering is a violence that constructs the dominant term through *exclusion of the subordinate*.⁵⁴ On application to our problematic, the colony

50 Yehouda Shenhay, 'Imperialism, Exceptionalism and the Contemporary World' in Marcelo Svirsky & Simone Bignall (eds), *Agamben and Colonialism* (Edinburgh University Press 2012) 21.

51 Bhambra & Holmwood (n 18) 1-6.

52 Upendra Baxi, 'Postcolonial Legality: A Postscript from India' (2012) 45 *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee* 178, 178.

53 Bhambra & Holmwood (n 50) 7.

54 Alpana Roy, 'Postcolonial Theory and Law' (2008) 29 *ALR* 315, 321.

is defined via *lack of sovereignty*. Anghie develops this, suggesting ‘mechanisms of exclusion are as essential a part of the sovereignty doctrine as the mechanisms of incorporation’.⁵⁵ *The very notion of sovereignty unravels*.

The State of Exception

The notion of the ‘state of exception’⁵⁶ has gained credence with a host of postcolonial scholars. In the colony, Mbembe proposes the relation of power and authority made it ‘in both theory and practice the exact opposite of the liberal model’.⁵⁷ Here, ‘commandment was based on a regime d’exception- that is, a regime that departed from the common law’.⁵⁸ The aim of this was the absolute submission of the colonised population.

Given how sovereignty was never material to actions in the colony, the need for legitimacy provided by universal rules was diminished, and ‘ruling was based on...ad-hoc arrangements or exceptions’.⁵⁹ To talk of peace in this period is absurd in consideration of its violence, however the construction of the colony as exceptional has marginalised this.⁶⁰ Mbembe urges us not to think of the state of exception as being suspension of the norm, rather it is the *continuation* of the norm. The colony ‘is...the site par excellence where controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended’ and represents ‘a site in which sovereignty fundamentally consists in exercising power outside the law’.⁶¹

In view of this, one cannot even talk about sovereign power. What was exhibited was *negation*, with power held exclusively by colonisers. To think this ended with the decolonisation efforts of the 20th century,

55 Antony Anghie, ‘The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities’ (2006) 27 *Third World Quarterly* 739, 341.

56 See Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology* (Chicago University Press 2006).

57 Achille Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (California University Press 2001) 25.

58 *Ibid.*, 29.

59 Shenhav (n 50) 23.

60 See Nadine El-Enany, *(B)ordering Britain* (Manchester University Press 2020) 186.

61 Achille Mbembe, *Necropolitics* (Duke University Press 2019) 77.

however, would be a mistake. The mask of formality must be cast away to reveal the substance of power.

Power and the Postcolony

Following the Second World War, a series of decolonisation movements were initiated.⁶² Thus emerged the postcolonial nation-state, modelled upon the western paradigm. It is important to analyse the state of power in these allegedly sovereign states, to see whether emancipation actually occurred. Only if it did can the impact of globalisation on these states be considered the same as the west.

Unfortunately, in practice western dominance continues in an unbroken lineage. Despite purportedly being independent, the sovereignty enjoyed by postcolonial nations is not what one could call sovereign *power*; power remains firmly within the west. Subordination is attained via two broad means. One is that the state of exception has not ended. The other is western hegemony, both material and intellectual; materially in economic domination, and intellectually in the inherent occidentalism of the legal doctrines alleged to emancipate the postcolony.

Continuation of the State of Exception

Despite the end of formal colonialism, it has continued via alternative means. The fact European states no longer impose their *sovereign* power on these nations does not matter, as they never needed to in the first place; the very nature of power exerted on the colonies was it was beyond legality altogether.⁶³ If legality was completely absent from the colonial ventures in the first place, the introduction of the legal status of statehood will not change much.

This is compounded by technological change. Mbembe sketches how each stage of imperialism has taken advantage of certain essential technologies; whilst historically ‘sovereignty meant occupation’,

62 Dane Kennedy, *Decolonisation* (Oxford University Press 2016) 38-45.

63 Shenhav (n 50) 27.

this is no longer necessary.⁶⁴ Using Palestine as an example, modern technology has transformed occupation into one of ‘vertical sovereignty’.⁶⁵ Physical occupation is no longer necessary for power to be exerted. Thus, imperial domination can continue, exerting the same degree of power in a novel way.

Hegemony

Hegemony involves a cultural process where ‘practical movement and theoretical thought are united’.⁶⁶ Certain ideas become ‘popular, mass phenomenon, with a concretely world-wide character, capable of modifying...popular thought’.⁶⁷ It creates consent and allows for the perpetuation of dominance of one group over another. In the postcolony there is a ‘continuing hegemonic position of western economies’.⁶⁸ This has only intensified with globalisation but can be dated back to the decolonisation movement itself. This informs Harvey’s idea of ‘capitalist imperialism’, seeing it as a new form of imperialism. Arguing it is distinctive due to its concealment of ‘ambitions in an abstract universalism’, money-power comes to dominate cultural production.⁶⁹ This coercion is different as it is not based upon coercion or racism.⁷⁰

Whilst Harvey is right to emphasise economic domination, he overemphasises the novelty of such an arrangement. There is little new about it; there is a clear lineage, for example, between UK control of the middle east and the US taking up the mantle following the second world war.⁷¹ This is not to say that the economy is not hegemonic- it absolutely is- however it is a *tool of maintaining* pre-existing subordination. There is an uninterrupted pattern of control

64 Mbembe (n 61) 79; see also Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ (1992) 59 October 3.

65 Ibid., 81.

66 Antonio Gramsci, ‘Hegemony of Western Culture Over the Whole World Culture’ in *Selections From the Prison Notebooks*, [5].

67 Ibid [6].

68 Roy (n 54) 320.

69 David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford University Press 2005) 50-55.

70 Ibid., 44-45.

71 Ibid., 19-24.

in the territories affected by this hegemony dating back to the nineteenth-century. The economy is a tool of domination, but not the core. Indeed, Roy reminds us of the need to view neocolonialism as mere continuation of colonial rule, as stopping at the economic as a ‘new’ imperialism ‘does not significantly challenge the concept of economic development as a western idea’.⁷² It is the same imperial logic underlying it, and the same imperial power enabling it.

One can also see continuity via the intellectual hegemony that asserts the legal form of the nation-state is necessary for emancipation. Constitutionalism emerged in the west, and despite the appearance of neutrality and universality it has a subtle ideological coding. Schmitt maintained the ‘neutralisations and depoliticizations...[under liberalism] are, to be sure, of political significance’.⁷³ Whilst liberal forms may ostensibly move away from actively distinguishing friend/foe,⁷⁴ they perpetuate it in much more discrete ways. For example, ‘the political concept of battle in liberal thought becomes competition in the domain of the economic’.⁷⁵ It ‘cannot escape the logic of the political’.⁷⁶

Applying this to the form of the constitution, and legality more generally, it reproduces a logic of truth that creates a gulf between western legal forms and others that it frames as regressive. Baxi draws upon this through the idea of the imperial project of ‘ethical violence’ whereby European colonisers embarked upon ‘civilising’ missions based upon enlightenment reason. Because of this, counter-violence in the form of *insurgent reason* in the postcolony ‘may never be regarded as bearing the weight of dignity of the title...’Reason’.⁷⁷ This is shown in the narrative of constitutionalism in these territories, which he sees as ‘a massive indictment of accomplishments of liberal thought’.⁷⁸ Constitutions allow for both rule and resistance- they are not

72 Roy (n 54) 337.

73 Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago University Press 2007) 69.

74 Ibid., 26. This is for Schmitt is the core dichotomy of the political.

75 Ibid., 71-72.

76 Ibid., 79.

77 Baxi, (n 52) 179.

78 Ibid., 181.

inherently colonial, as ‘colonialism and constitutionalism were always strangers’.⁷⁹ Because of this, the enunciation of a constitution marks a rupture with the past- creative resistance is possible. Unfortunately, whilst not *colonial*, constitutional forms are *colonised*, as the reason and language of law informing these projects ‘established...the reach of eclectic mimesis’.⁸⁰ Constitutional forms are hegemonic and allow for subtle rule through standards of reason.

Baxi points to the Indian Constitution, which departs in substantial ways from the traditionally western constitutional form⁸¹ - because of this departure, hegemonic reason steps in to label such arrangements as regressive. This is the power of western hegemony in action, excluding non-western thought. Power remains with the west, as the limits of sovereignty are shaped by it.

It is worth stating again sovereign power has declined as the pre-eminent power formation in the west; power is now far more subtle. Therefore, it can be said that the ‘gift’ of sovereignty to these nations was more performative than substantive when compared to what such a transfer of power would have been a century before. Sovereign power has greatly declined. The west has displaced little.

Conclusions

Taking a properly global survey of the realities of power, the impact of globalisation appears far from uniform. In the west, the seat of power and the birthplace of the sovereign nation-state, globalisation has posed new challenges to this paradigm. Internal sovereignty is threatened by legitimacy-crises generated by economic hyper-globalisation, and external sovereignty is altered by political and social globalisation requiring the delegation of sovereign power to supranational bodies. However, the impact of this on the overall power balance within the nation should not be overstated- now, sovereign power is only one element of a wider structure of sovereignty-disciplinarity-governmentality. Power still very much remains, just in different

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., 189.

forms.

In contrast, the postcolony paints a different picture. Here the effect of globalisation on power more generally is the central concern, given how such territories were never granted access to the Westphalian system. Power continues to remain firmly with the west, representing a lineage that can be traced from today back to the early-modern period. Here, globalisation does not pose a new challenge; the major concern is how it will *perpetuate the negation of power*. Sovereignty has only been formally granted; power has not been substantively given.

Going forward, there is much to explore considering these findings. Recall the identification of ‘west’ and ‘postcolony’ as ideal types. Future research ought to take this as merely provisional, investigating specific national contexts, recognising ‘realities’ rather than a singular ‘reality’. Furthermore, an investigation into the significance of some western attempts to ‘re-establish’ sovereignty in globalisation’s wake would be potentially fruitful considering the decline of sovereign power in favour of biopower.

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82 * The edition of Gramsci's *Selections from The Prison Notebooks* that I own strangely does not have any publication details within it- this is why this information has not been provided.

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Reconceptualising Barriers to Engagement with Climate Change

Dylan Brotherston

This paper contributes to the discourse on climate change by emphasising the imperative for inclusive engagement, particularly at the intersection of socio-economic challenges and climate impacts in Glasgow, Scotland. Despite recent shifts towards a ‘Just Transition’ and increased public engagement efforts, working-class voices remain marginalised. To address this gap, the paper first reviews existing literature on Climate Change Communication (CCC), examining some of the competing conceptualisations of barriers and public engagement and their policy implications, and more specifically, participatory policymaking and its role in engagement. Through doing so, the central debates of how public engagement with climate change ought to be pursued will be established, and to what degree this can be understood in the context of developing engagement with working-class people. Subsequently, it proposes a novel framework synthesising insights from Lorenzoni, Sutton, and Tobin utilising an ecological Marxist perspective that aims to address barriers to climate change engagement among the working class.

Introduction

Climate change represents one of the most daunting global challenges of our time, necessitating inclusive and comprehensive responses. The urgency of this crisis, highlighted by the UN since 1992 and further emphasised by the IPCC’s call for broader public engagement to meet the 1.5-degree temperature limit,¹ is compounded by its disproportionate impact on different societal groups. Both King (2018) and Paavola (2017) highlight the vulnerability of different demographic segments, including older adults, individuals with pre-existing medical conditions, low-income and socially disadvantaged groups, urban and rural residents, women, and children.^{2,3}

1 IPCC, *Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees* (Geneva: 2008).

2 Andrew D. King and Luke J. Harrington, “The Inequality of Climate Change from 1.5 to 2 C of Global Warming,” *Geophysical Research Letters* 45, no. 10 (2018): 5030-5033.

3 Jouni Paavola, “Health Impacts of Climate Change and Health and Social

Hence, this paper adopts an ecological Marxist perspective. At its core, this theoretical framework posits that the inherent drive for profit and accumulation within capitalist systems inevitably leads to the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, exacerbating ecological crises.⁴ Central to this perspective is the recognition that capitalism's pursuit of growth and expansion prioritises short-term economic gain over long-term environmental sustainability. In other words, ecological Marxism is characterised by its understanding of how evolving human relationships, shaped by changing capital flows and labour relations, lead to individuals' relation to and experience of nature being inherently different.⁵ Through this lens, capitalism emerges as the primary driver of climate degradation and can be seen as the continuous process through which working-class individuals not only suffer economic injustices but also the effects of environmental degradation. As such, climate change represents the extension of working-class struggles and risks actively exacerbating structural inequalities and, more broadly, economic, and social inequalities. Within this context, working-class engagement is not only essential to fighting the climate crisis but also critical to the notion of a just transition, a fair assessment given the well-documented effects of climate change and its intersection with other socioeconomic and political issues.^{6,7}

Yet ecological Marxism is not without criticism. While some Marxists have claimed universality for their theories, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations inherent in much of the existing literature. Indeed, as Grundmann (1991) notes ecological Marxism alone, does not offer a suitable framework to adequately account for how drastically capitalism has altered economic and social

Inequalities in the UK," *Environmental Health* 16, no. 1 (2017): 61-68.

4 John B. Foster, *Marx's Ecology: Materialism and Nature* (NYU Press, 2000).

5 Camilla Royle, "Ecological Marxism," *Routledge Handbook of Marxism and Post-Marxism* (2020): 443-450.

6 Ian Preston et. al., *Climate Change and Social Justice: an evidence review* (Joseph Rowantree Foundation. (2014).

7 Nazrul Islam and John Winkel, *Climate Change and Social Inequality* (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017).

relationships both in and between countries.⁸ This inadequacy can result in a disproportionate emphasis on engagement models tailored to Northern societies, neglecting the challenges and perspectives of the global South.⁹ This bias is reflected in many of the engagement models discussed within this paper, and it's crucial to recognise the limitations inherent in extrapolating these models and this paper's analysis of them to regions outside of the global North.

However, given the focus of this paper, the framework offers a suitable foundation. In Scotland, particularly in Glasgow, the intersection of socio-economic challenges and climate change presents a compelling case for studying working-class engagement. Approximately 44% of Glasgow's residents live in 20% of the most deprived areas of Scotland, with deprivation being a combined metric of seven domains: income, employment, education, health, access to services, crime, and housing¹⁰ —reflecting a broader narrative of economic and urban challenges. Recent policies do reflect a shift towards a 'Just Transition' and attempts to enhance public engagement, reflected in both Scottish national policy,^{11,12} and Glasgow City Council's climate emergency plans.¹³ Nonetheless, they often fall short of effectively representing the voices of the working classes, whose perspectives are crucial yet frequently marginalised in climate change discussions. Consequently, this paper argues for a more inclusive approach to engagement and policymaking, one that resonates with and actively involves the working class.

To address this gap, this paper reviews existing literature on climate change communication (CCC) and barriers to public engagement, with a particular emphasis on participatory policymaking, setting the

8 Reiner Grundmann, "The Ecological Challenge to Marxism," *New Left Review* 187, no. 1 (1991): 103-120.

9 Emily Nicolosi and Julia B. Corbett, "Engagement with Climate Change and the Environment: a review of the role of relationships to place," *Local Environment* 23, no. 1 (2018): 77-99.

10 Scottish Government, *Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation* (2020)

11 Scottish Government, *Big Climate Conversation: report of findings* (2020).

12 Scottish Government, *Climate Change – Net Zero Nation: public engagement strategy* (2021).

13 Glasgow City Council, *Glasgow's Climate Plan* (2020).

stage for a novel framework. This framework synthesises the work of Lorenzoni et al., (2007), which highlights the existence of barriers to engagement at both individual and social levels, adopting a non-linear approach to engagement,¹⁴ and the work of Sutton & Tobin (2011), who conceptualise engagement as a linear process.¹⁵ The proposed framework seeks not only to further our understanding of barriers to working-class engagement in terms of both policy and personal connection but also to provide a tool conducive to the pursuit of social justice and equity in climate policy within Glasgow and more broadly in the UK.

Methodology

The literature review was conducted using a Scopus and Google Scholar search, in which keywords such as ‘climate change’, ‘working-class’, ‘engagement’, ‘barriers’, ‘adaptation’, and ‘mitigation’ were included across the subject areas of environmental science, social sciences, and psychology. To identify relevant literature, results were sorted according to the “best fit” framework,¹⁶ using Wibeck’s (2014) literature review as a starting point.¹⁷ This conceptual model allows for factors previously not considered in the initial search to be incorporated. The logic is that the literature on climate change engagement spans multiple disciplines; therefore, to provide a more comprehensive review, this was deemed the most appropriate approach. Moreover, the best-fit approach is widely used in policy

14 Irene Lorenzoni et. al., “Barriers Perceived to Engaging with Climate Change among the UK Public and their Policy Implications,” *Global Environmental Change* 17, no. 3-4 (2007): 445-459.

15 Stephen G. Sutton and Renae C. Tobin, “Constraints on Community Engagement with Great Barrier Reef Climate Change Reduction and Mitigation,” *Global environmental Change* 21, no. 3 (2011): 894-905.

16 Yu Xiao and Maria Watson, “Guidance on Conducting a Systematic Literature Review,” *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 39, no. 1 (2019): 93-112.

17 Victoria Wilbeck, “Enhancing Learning, Communication and Public Engagement about Climate Change—Some lessons from recent literature,” *Environmental Education Research* 20, no. 3 (2014): 387-411.

urgent areas.^{18,19}

The result was a collection of literature that included initial factors and new ones that were not anticipated. In this case, this included broader literature on communication and participatory policymaking, which were not initially considered in the search. The literature was subsequently sorted according to the number of citations and impact score, respectively, to identify seminal works in the field. The abstracts of the articles were then read to further ensure their relevance.

The Development of Climate Change Communications and Engagement

While the field of CCC encompasses both engagement and understanding, this was not always the case. Much of the earlier literature emphasised the scientific knowledge gap of laypeople, or the ‘information deficit model’ (IDM), as an explanation for the lack of interest in the issue.^{20,21,22} Potentially, since climate change is often viewed as a scientific issue, disregarding its multifaceted socioeconomic and political implications.²³ The underlying assumption of the IDM is representative of the broader attitudes that scientific disciplines adopted in the period preceding the 1990s and is indicative of governments and scientists’ contemporary perspective that public disinterest and lack of support for proposed policies are because they

18 Mary Dixon-Woods, “Using Framework-based Synthesis for Conducting Reviews of Qualitative Studies,” *BMC Medicine* 9 (2011): 1-2.

19 Christopher Carroll et. al. ““Best Fit” Framework Synthesis: Refining the Method,” *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 13 (2013): 1-16.

20 Dominique Brossard and Bruce V. Lewenstein, “A Critical Appraisal of Models of Public Understanding of Science: Using practice to inform theory,” In *Communicating Science* (Routledge, 2009): 25-53.

21 Matthew C. Nisbet and Dietram A. Scheufele, “What’s Next for Science Communication? Promising Directions and Lingering Distractions,” *American Journal of Botany*, 96, no. 10 (2009): 1767-1778.

22 Sally Eden, “Public Participation in Environmental Policy: Considering Scientific, Counter-scientific and Non-scientific Contributions,” *Public Understanding of Science* 5, no. 3 (1996): 183.

23 Mike Hulme, *Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity* (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

do not know any better.²⁴

Such a view promotes education as the primary means of countering public disinterest, intending to correct knowledge gaps and increase public acceptance of policies.^{25,26} Engagement through this model was not paramount. This is epitomised by much of the communication strategies at the time, which primarily saw the simple transmission of information from experts to the public. Given what we know now about the role of public and civic engagement in developing quality democracies,²⁷ it is clear why such strategies have been ineffective. However, during the 1980s, governments broadly speaking did not assign great importance to the public's role in policy processes or their engagement thereof. However, throughout the 1980s, the UK Royal Society was the first to challenge the IDM and the methods it promoted. They posited that these approaches and their sole emphasis on knowledge gaps undermined democratic processes by reinforcing hierarchies of expertise that marginalised lay perspectives and diminished public trust in scientific institutions.²⁸ By excluding the public from participating in policymaking processes, governments and scientists were conflating significant political, social, and policy decisions with scientific choices, all while claiming objectivity and leveraging their established social standing. This, of course, impedes the democratic process by imposing what are in reality not objective viewpoints but rather contestable normative decisions on the public and therefore depriving them of the opportunity to engage in policy processes.

Consequently, a new approach that corrected the previous over simplistic assumptions was necessitated. Indeed, this was part of a

24 Ulrike Felt et. al., *Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously* (Luxembourg: DG for Research, EUR 22, 2007): 700.

25 Ibid.

26 Royal Society, *The Public Understanding of Science. Report of a Royal Society Ad Hoc Group Endorsed by the Council of the Royal Society* (London: Royal Society, 1985).

27 Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Robert Leonardi and Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

28 Royal Society, *The Public Understanding of Science*.

broader revolution that saw a turn to public participation as a research objective, which highlighted the need to involve the public and other stakeholders in governments' decision-making processes.²⁹ Within CCC, this shift has prompted a re-evaluation of the underlying principles and assumptions to better align with these new objectives. As Scoones (1999) notes, the increasing complexity of climate change has meant that positivist and objective viewpoints are less applicable in this context;³⁰ hence, there has been a shift towards the constructivist school of thought coupled with an interpretive ontological position, respectively. These have in turn underpinned much of the core literature that has informed the development of the field since.^{31,32} Within CCC, the constructivist approach suggests that traditional knowledge transmission is insufficient for acquiring and promoting engagement, and instead, individuals should participate in knowledge-building processes like assemblies, workshops, and forums, fostering local context-specific learning and generating new insights.³³ This approach, while acknowledging the role public understanding plays in engagement, recognises the limitations of a sole focus on increasing objective understanding, as one's understanding is ultimately influenced and informed by pre-existing beliefs and such variables as gender, ethnicity, social class, and other social factors.^{34,35,36}

29 Magda Pieczka, "Critical Perspectives of Engagement," *The Handbook of Communication Engagement* (2018): 549-568.

30 Ian Scoones "New Ecology and the Social Sciences: What Prospects for a Fruitful Engagement?," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 28, no. 1 (1999): 479-507.

31 Victoria Wibeck, *Enhancing Learning*.

32 Ville Kumpu, "What is Public Engagement and How Does it Help to Address Climate Change? A Review of Climate Communication Research," *Environmental Communication* 16, no. 3 (2022): 304-316.

33 Svend Brinkmann and Steinar Kvale, *Doing Interviews*, Vol. 2 (Sage, 2018).

34 Johanna Wolf and Susanne C. Moser, "Individual Understandings, Perceptions, and Engagement with Climate Change: Insights from In-depth Studies Across the World," *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 2, no. 4 (2011): 547-569.

35 Patrick Sturgis and Nick Allum, "Science in Society: Re-evaluating the Deficit Model of Public Attitudes," *Public Understanding of Science* 13, no. 1 (2004): 55-74.

36 Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne, *Misunderstanding Science?: The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology* (1996).

When accounting for this, advocates of this school call for a more nuanced and context-dependent approach to research that shifts beyond top-down expert-centric models, whereby the knowledge-building process is taken to be a continuous process and contends the public should be actively involved in this. Leading to more qualitative forms of research, such as interviews, focus groups, and ethnography. In turn, a valid criticism of much of the research has been the inability to generalise results; indeed, this represents a significant limitation of much of the existing research as most studies have taken place within the UK and America.^{37,38,39} In reality, the theoretical departure from the IDM and transition to a more critical constructivist and engagement-focused approach is not as drastic as it first may seem. Through understanding that public understanding is an implicit part of public engagement, the two can be seen as not mutually exclusive concepts but rather two ideas that are intrinsically linked.⁴⁰ Critically, the primary difference under the constructivist approach is not a rebuke of public understanding itself but a shifting of importance and altering of its definition.

Conceptualising Engagement and Barriers

Despite the widespread adoption of the constructivist approach, there is disagreement on the definition and scope of public engagement in climate communication.⁴¹ In a meta-analysis of 44 studies, Kumpu (2022) found that the term is rarely defined and often used as a general reference to interest.⁴² While there are two broad perspectives on how to approach public engagement that are fundamentally connected, they have rarely been synthesised and integrated.⁴³

37 Irene Lorenzoni et. al., “Barriers Perceived to Engaging”.

38 Lorraine Whitmarsh and Saffron O’Neill, “Opportunities for and Barriers to Engaging Individuals with Climate Change,” In *Engaging the Public with Climate Change* (Routledge, 2012): 1-14.

39 Johanna Wolf and Susanne C. Moser, “Individual Understandings”.

40 Brian Trench, “Towards an Analytical Framework of Science Communication Models,” *Communicating Science in Social Contexts: New models, New Practices* (2008): 119-135.

41 Ville Kumpu, “What is Public Engagement”.

42 Ibid.

43 Corina Höppner and Lorraine Whitmarsh, “Public Engagement in Climate

Regarding the definitions of engagement, the first perspective takes engagement to mean public engagement with climate science and policymaking, which can be viewed as civic engagement.^{44,45,46} Fundamentally, this interpretation necessitates the active presence of individuals in decision-making as part of a broader aim to empower the public and widen access to the issue.⁴⁷ Through this understanding, engagement is to be approached as a matter of involving the public in policy deliberation processes as a means of democratising decision-making and building consensus amongst communities; critically, this requires a redistribution of power. Without it, the focus on engagement is ultimately a fruitless endeavour and serves only to enforce existing social power relations between government institutions and the public.^{48,49,50} This approach places a strong emphasis on involving the public in policy processes, the logic being that this is one of the most direct means through which the public can exercise influence and make their opinions vocal when done effectively.⁵¹ Hence, measures to increase engagement from this perspective often lead to government institutions facilitating environments like workshops or forums where individuals can discuss, develop, and deliberate alternative opinions and decisions. Institutions should strive to establish forums that adhere to trust, transparency, openness, and equity principles, as

Action: Policy and Public Expectations,” In *Engaging the Public with Climate Change* (Routledge, 2012): 47-65.

44 Roger Few et. al., “Public Participation and Climate Change Adaptation: Avoiding the Illusion of Inclusion,” *Climate Policy* 7, no. 1 (2007): 46-59.

45 Debashish Munshi et. al., “Centering Culture in Public Engagement on Climate Change,” *Environmental Communication* 14, no. 5 (2020): 573-581.

46 Susanne C. Moser and Cara Pike, “Community Engagement on Adaptation: Meeting a Growing Capacity Need,” *Urban Climate* 14 (2015): 111-115.

47 Bruce V. Lewenstein and Dominique Brossard, *Assessing models of public understanding in ELSI outreach materials. No. DOE/ER/63173-1* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ., 2006).

48 Sherry R. Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation,” *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 35, no. 4 (1969): 216-224.

49 Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, eds. *Participation: The New Tyranny?* (Zed Books, 2001).

50 Susan Owens, Tim Rayner, and Olivia Bina, “New Agendas for Appraisal: Reflections on Theory, Practice, and Research,” *Environment and Planning A* 36, no. 11 (2004): 1943-1959.

51 Roger Few et. al., “Public Participation”.

suggested by Mitchell (2013).⁵² For this to work, such environments must be tailored to the specific audiences, contexts, and problems of the intended area; without doing so, this will likely not result in any constructive results.^{53,54} Ergo barriers to engagement here can be understood as anything that challenges or negatively affects this process. This would seem to be an unsatisfactory conceptualisation of barriers, and that is largely because it is. A significant criticism of this approach is that it doesn't explicitly account for the complexity of barriers. While from the literature one can infer what would act as a barrier, for example, institutional reluctance to cede power to participants or a lack of demand on participants' parts, an actual framework for conceptualising and identifying barriers does not exist.

Furthermore, despite the ease of operationalising this definition, its limited scope perhaps fails to account for the broader manners in which people may be engaged with climate change. Therefore, employing this approach alone in the context of this paper and its aims may not be appropriate. While increasing participatory policymaking is important, an exclusive emphasis on this aspect fails to address the practical challenges associated with its implementation, particularly within contexts where the intended participants typically demonstrate low engagement with the issue of climate change.^{55,56} For this approach to be viable, existing concern or interest is a prerequisite, which is not the case for the working class, especially in Glasgow.⁵⁷ While a relevant starting point, this interpretation does not go far enough. Hence, an

52 Bruce Mitchell, *Resource and Environmental Management*. (Routledge, 2013).

53 Neil W. Adger, Katrina Brown, and Emma L. Tompkins, "Making Waves: Integrating Coastal Conservation and Development," *Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal* 15, no. 1 (2004): 79-80.

54 Gard Lindseth, "Local Level Adaptation to Climate Change: Discursive Strategies in the Norwegian Context," *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning* 7, no. 1 (2005): 61-84.

55 Ciaran Mulholland et. al., *Understanding and Engaging the Public on Climate Change* (Ipsos MORI, 2020).

56 Robert Gifford and Andreas Nilsson, "Personal and Social Factors that Influence Pro-environmental Concern and Behaviour: A Review," *International Journal of Psychology* 49, no. 3 (2014): 141-157.

57 Ciaran Mulholland et. al., *Understanding and Engaging the Public on Climate Change*.

approach that provides a broader understanding of engagement and a concrete framework for identifying barriers is required.

This approach can be found in the second perspective on engagement and has been widely employed throughout the literature. This understanding of engagement posits that engagement should be understood as a personal state of connection with the issue of climate change, with engagement comprising three elements: cognitive, affective, and behavioural, which interact non-linearly.^{58,59} Critically, this perspective contends that simply involving people in policy processes is inadequate, but rather their ‘hearts, bodies, and minds’ need to be involved with the issue of climate change to elicit sustained engagement with the issue.^{60,61} Fundamentally, to be engaged in this perspective is to understand climate change, to care about it, and to be able to act on it. This can, in turn, manifest as political engagement, civic engagement, or consumer engagement; however, it is not confined to one type of engagement.⁶² The distinction here is the notion that engagement, viewed only as involving citizens in policy processes, is not a sufficient objective. This can be construed as temporary engagement, whereby individuals are briefly involved with the policy processes, but involvement with these processes does not guarantee sustained engagement.⁶³ This is not to say individuals cannot enact environmentally friendly behaviours or choices without being involved with their hearts, bodies, or minds, but rather they are not consciously engaging in those behaviours with the issue of climate as a motivating factor, hence not embodying a personal state of connection. While this sounds pedantic, it is an important distinction to draw, as sustained active engagement is integral to the success of mitigation and adaptation measures.⁶⁴

58 Irene Lorenzoni et. al., “Barriers Perceived to Engaging”.

59 Johanna Wolf and Susanne C. Moser, “Individual Understandings”.

60 Susanne C. Moser and Carol L. Berzonsky, “There Must Be More: Communication to Close the Cultural Divide,” *The Adaptive Challenge of Climate Change* (2014): 287-310.

61 Lorraine Whitmarsh and Saffron O’Neill, “Opportunities for and Barriers to”.

62 Irene Lorenzoni et. al., “Barriers Perceived to Engaging”.

63 Susanne C. Moser and Carol L. Berzonsky, “There Must Be More”.

64 John Wiseman et. al., “Community Engagement and Climate Change:

By accepting this interpretation, engagement becomes a somewhat ambiguous term in terms of operationalisation. Having shifted from the sole emphasis on engagement as participation in policy processes, there is a need to present how engagement might be pursued in this regard. However, it is essential to note that individuals engage with the issue differently according to their demographic characteristics.⁶⁵ Hence, efforts to increase engagement vis-à-vis this interpretation could take a variety of forms depending on what audience one is speaking to. For example, basic information provision on the causes of climate change could provide one with knowledge on how best they can act appropriately with the issue.^{66,67} However, this information must be communicated in a manner deemed credible by the prospective audience to be effective.⁶⁸ This represents one example; however, policy options are widely context-dependent and contingent upon the state of the audience's baseline engagement, although a better understanding is gained through the conceptualisations of barriers in this interpretation. Building upon existing literature on psychological, social, and institutional barriers concerning climate change,^{69,70} Lorenzoni et al., (2007) separates 'barriers' into the categories of social and individual based on a comparative analysis of three international empirical studies. Individual barriers relate to constraints that are endogenous and specifically apply to one on a personal level, such as lack of knowledge, externalising responsibility, helplessness, and Learning from Recent Australian Experience," *International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management*, 2, no. 2 (2010): 134-147.

65 Jan C. Semenza et. al., "Public Perception of Climate Change: Voluntary Mitigation and Barriers to Behavior Change," *American Journal of Preventive Medicine*, 35, no. 5 (2008): 479-487.

66 Willett Kempton, "How the Public Views Climate Change," *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 39, no. 9 (1997): 12-21.

67 Keith R. Stamm et. al., "Mass Communication and Public Understanding of Environmental Problems: The Case of Global Warming," *Public Understanding of Science* 9, no. 3 (2000): 219.

68 Susanne C. Moser and Lisa Dilling, "Making Climate Hot," *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 46, no. 10 (2004): 32-46.

69 Susanne Stoll-Kleemann et. al., "The Psychology of Denial Concerning Climate Mitigation Measures: Evidence from Swiss Focus Groups," *Global Environmental Change* 11, no. 2 (2001): 107-117.

70 James Blake, "Overcoming the 'Value-action gap' in Environmental Policy: Tensions Between National Policy and Local Experience," *Local Environment* 4, no. 3 (1999): 257-278.

reluctance to change lifestyles.⁷¹ Comparatively, social barriers are exogenous and represent constraints that are beyond the individual's capacity to change alone.⁷² Consequently, policy measures should be tailored to these overarching barriers. This separation of individual and social, while simple, reveals how barriers are experienced by the public on multiple levels, thus providing a more nuanced framework to diagnose barriers to public engagement and highlight more appropriate policy solutions. However, there are some questions to ask about this approach. For example, how does one negotiate barriers that stray across the boundaries of social and individual? And perhaps more pertinently, how does one decide which barriers warrant prioritisation?

To provide a comprehensive understanding, Sutton and Tobin's (2011) development of this approach warrants inclusion. They argue for refinement and expansion of the previous approach, which can answer some of the above questions. A central contention of Sutton and Tobin (2011) is that engagement is a linear process.⁷³ Whereby cognitive dictates the affective, the sum of which influences the level of desire for behavioural engagement.⁷⁴ This has significant implications for operationalising this approach and importantly it contrasts the conceptualisation outlined by Lorenzoni et al., (2007). Arguing for a linear process means that one can understand the cognitive and affective elements as being the sum of an individual's desire to engage with the issue, which informs the behavioural element, representing one's ability to act on this desire.⁷⁵

In this same vein, barriers then correlate to constraints on desire and ability, and using Tanner's theory (1999), engagement with climate action can be categorised as subjective and objective, respectively.⁷⁶ If one accepts this development, then barriers to engagement can be viewed as a hierarchy that individuals must navigate to increase their

71 Irene Lorenzoni et. al., "Barriers Perceived to Engaging".

72 Ibid.

73 Stephen G. Sutton and Renae C. Tobin, "Constraints on Community Engagement".

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Carmen Tanner, "Constraints on Environmental Behaviour," *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 19, no. 2 (1999): 145-157.

engagement.^{77,78} From this position, it then becomes clearer how to tackle barriers. While subjective and objective barriers coexist and exert influence at the same time, in this view, they are separate. In other words, subjective barriers only impede cognitive and affective engagement, whereas objective barriers only affect behavioural engagement. Intuitively, policy measures should start with removing barriers that inform one's desire to be engaged.

The Role of Participation in Policymaking

Participation in policymaking has received a lot of attention; indeed, it is a central form of engagement. While the above approach places less emphasis on participation in policy processes, it is a recurring theme throughout engagement literature, and there is nearly universal agreement that it is intrinsically good.⁷⁹ Yet a comprehensive review should entail an analysis of the role it plays. Participation in policymaking can play two roles: as an instrument from the perspective of policymakers and as an intrinsic aspect of empowerment.⁸⁰ The latter is more relevant in this context. Normatively speaking, participative policymaking can be viewed as a fundamental pillar of inclusive and deliberative approaches that place participants' concerns and knowledge at the centre of decision-making processes, contrasting the top-down managerial approach that often does not incorporate the concerns of those less privileged.⁸¹ Hence, through an emancipatory understanding, participation in policy processes can be seen as more than just simply involving people but rather as an intrinsic medium that individuals may use to engage with democracy, which is essential

77 Edgar L. Jackson, Duane W. Crawford, and Geoffrey Godbey, "Negotiation of Leisure Constraints," *Leisure Sciences* 15, no. 1 (1993): 1-11.

78 Duane W. Crawford, Edgar L. Jackson, and Geoffrey Godbey, "A Hierarchical Model of Leisure Constraints." *Leisure Sciences* 13, no. 4 (1991): 309-320.

79 Stephan Hügel and Anna R. Davies, "Public Participation, Engagement, and Climate Change Adaptation: A Review of the Research Literature," *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 11, no. 4 (2020): 645.

80 Judy B. Rosener, "Citizen Participation: Can We Measure Its Effectiveness?," In *The Age of Direct Citizen Participation* (Routledge, 2015): 365-373.

81 Roger Few et. al., "Public Participation".

to improving legitimacy and representation.⁸² Yet the effectiveness of participatory policymaking is fundamentally influenced by its structure. For example, is there a genuine commitment from governmental institutions to listen to and cede deliberative power to participants? If this is not the case and there is no redistribution of power, this approach, as O’Neill (2001) notes, can only result in a false consensus.⁸³ In this sense, participative policymaking may reinforce existing power structures, especially within inherently inequitable institutions, by failing to address underlying power imbalances, thus suppressing genuine dialogue, and perpetuating hierarchical control, stifling meaningful engagement.⁸⁴

With participation in policy processes playing such an essential role in empowering individuals, the first approach to engagement might be the most suitable for this context. However, while the second interpretation places less emphasis on participation in policy processes, it is still incorporated into its conceptualisation of engagement instead of being limited to it. Rather than separate the two approaches, as is often the case, I would contend that they are both inherently fundamental to understanding engagement, and an integrated approach is needed. A combined approach is justified due to the limitations of existing research. For example, in Hugel and Davies’ (2020) review of 484 publications related to the topic, they found relatively few that looked at the issue of engagement with climate change for low-income communities.⁸⁵ Despite the acknowledgement that material capabilities and unequal power distribution influence engagement, there is a lack of focus on working-class individuals.^{86,87}

82 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

83 John O’Neill, “Representing People, Representing Nature, Representing the World,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 19, no. 4 (2001): 483-500.

84 John Bosco Isunju and Jaco Kemp, “Spatiotemporal Analysis of Encroachment on Wetlands: A Case of Nakivubo Wetland in Kampala, Uganda,” *Environmental Monitoring and Assessment* 188 (2016): 1-17.

85 Stephan Hügel and Anna R. Davies, “Public Participation, Engagement”

86 Mark Kammerbauer and Christine Wamsler, “Social Inequality and Marginalisation in Post-disaster Recovery: Challenging the Consensus?,” *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction* 24 (2017): 411-418.

87 Dries LT Hegger et. al., “The Roles of Residents in Climate Adaptation:

Theoretical Underpinnings and Proposed Framework

Central to the analysis of this literature is the employment of critical theoretical frameworks, namely ecological Marxism,⁸⁸ rational ecology,⁸⁹ and green political theory.⁹⁰ These frameworks critically examine the exacerbation of traditional class conflicts under capitalist systems in the context of climate change. A fundamental tenet shared across these theories is the presumption that addressing climate change necessitates a broad class coalition and systemic changes in political and economic structures.⁹¹ This perspective underscores the intrinsic connection between class dynamics and climate change, emphasising how the working class's ability to adapt and mitigate its effects is constrained by their social position.^{92,93} Moreover, limited resources exacerbate their challenges, further reducing their capacity to cope with climate change.^{94,95} Thus, these critical theories are instrumental in providing a perspective that interweaves the complexities of class and climate change. This approach aligns with past research in the field, notably the seminal work of Lorenzoni et al., (2007).⁹⁶ However, given the focus on addressing the gap in working-class individuals' engagement with the issue in this paper, it is important to explicitly acknowledge their contribution.

A Systematic Review in the Case of the Netherlands," *Environmental Policy and Governance* 27, no. 4 (2017): 336-350.

88 James R. O'Connor, ed. *Natural Causes: Essays in Ecological Marxism* (Guilford Press, 1998).

89 John S. Dryzek, "Foundations for Environmental Political Economy: The Search for Homo Ecologicus?," *New Political Economy* 1, no. 1 (1996): 27-40.

90 Robyn Eckersley, *Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach* (Routledge, 2023).

91 Dale Jamieson, ed. *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy* (John Wiley & Sons, 2008).

92 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1972).

93 Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, vol. 1 (University of California Press, 1981).

94 Jan C. Semenz et al., "Public Perception of Climate Change".

95 Susan M. Shaw, Arend Bonen, and John F. McCabe, "Do More Constraints Mean Less Leisure? Examining the Relationship Between Constraints and Participation," *Journal of Leisure Research* 23, no. 4 (1991): 286-300.

96 Irene Lorenzoni et al., "Barriers Perceived to Engaging".

While the above theory has influenced the direction of the paper, a clear outline of the framework for analysis is required to understand the barriers to engagement. I argue that integrating the framework from Lorenzoni et al., (2007) with that of Sutton and Tobin's (2011) provides a complementary approach that synthesises alternative conceptualisations of engagement and barriers to provide a more comprehensive framework that can account for the interconnectedness of barriers. This approach includes an understanding of Tanner's (1999) application of the ipsative theory of behaviour,⁹⁷ on which Sutton and Tobin's (2011) framework is based, but with a key difference. The central distinction I contend is that, while Lorenzoni et al., (2007) are correct in their assertion that the three elements of engagement are related in a non-linear fashion, their explanation does not sufficiently account for barriers that stray across the boundaries of social and individual and operate concurrently. Similarly, as outlined by Sutton & Tobin (2011), engagement can be understood conceptually as a linear process, and barriers will coexist; however, subjective barriers are not invariably tied to the affective and cognitive elements of engagement but can also influence the behavioural element independent of informing an individual's desire for behavioural engagement. Likewise, objective barriers can also influence the affective and cognitive aspects, as illustrated by Figure 1.1. This assertion rests on the view that persistent objective barriers consequently reduce one's desire to be engaged. Indeed, as Sutton & Tobin (2011) note, their model assumes that subjective and objective do not overlap.⁹⁸ However, this is not a realistic interpretation or readily applicable to everyone, but it represents one path to engagement. Hence, while barriers can be navigated in a hierarchical manner, the framework is not confined to this and views engagement as a dynamic and continuous process. In essence, the proposed framework combines non-linear and linear understandings to provide a model that is more consistent with the various pathways to engagement that exist in reality. The principal conclusion from this integrated view is that policy must tackle both types of barriers at the same time. Accordingly, and in conjunction with the critical theories noted, this should allow for a more holistic

97 Carmen Tanner, "Constraints on Environmental Behaviour".

98 Stephen G. Sutton and Renae C. Tobin, "Constraints on Community Engagement".

approach, one that can identify barriers and assist in explaining the social, economic, and systemic roots of these barriers in Glasgow.

Concluding Remarks

Through an in-depth examination of the evolution of the field of CCC and the literature and appreciation of critical theories, alongside the integration of Lorenzoni's framework with Sutton and Tobin's conceptualisation of engagement barriers, this study has offered a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted barriers impeding working-class individuals' engagement with climate change. The synthesis of these theoretical perspectives has illuminated a critical, albeit intuitive, finding: that both subjective and objective barriers to climate change engagement are deeply embedded in the socio-economic fabric of the working class. This understanding challenges the simplistic dichotomy often portrayed in policy and academic discourse and recognises the dynamic and continuous nature of engagement.

By doing so, this paper underscores the necessity of addressing both types of barriers concurrently, a strategy that is more conducive to providing effective policy interventions and fostering engagement among the working class. However, it's important to acknowledge the limitations of paper. Firstly, the focus on Glasgow, while illustrative of broader socio-economic challenges, limits the applicability of the analysis and proposed framework to other contexts. Additionally, the theoretical frameworks employed, while insightful, may not fully capture the diversity of perspectives and experiences surrounding climate change engagement. Secondly, this paper has strayed away from providing concrete policy suggestions, as this is beyond the scope of the paper and inherently context dependent. However, this remains an equally important avenue for future research. Moreover, further research is required to uncover what drives engagement among working-class individuals. Understanding these factors is crucial, as the removal of subjective and objective barriers alone is not sufficient to induce sustained engagement.

Appendix




Figure 1.1: Theoretical Model for Understanding Engagement and Barriers to it. (Author's own).

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