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War, Crime and Disease: An Evaluation of the Double Threat of Terrorism

David Pannocchia

Since 9/11 and the declaration of the War on Terror, terrorism has featured prominently in the 21st century security agenda. As a result, a wide range of counterterrorist measures have been developed in order to provide security in states across the globe. Yet their intensification, while ostensibly diminishing one threat, has arguably increased the threat to another: civil liberties. By adopting Sederberg's typology of counterterrorist measures into war, crime and disease approaches, the following analysis seeks to determine the degree to which they alter the balance between security and liberty. Drawing upon evidence from counterterrorist strategies in the US, UK, EU, France and Norway, this article demonstrates that liberal democracies should refrain from securitising or de-politicising terrorism, as either approach would come at a cost to liberty and security, respectively. Rather, the politicisation of counterterrorism, found particularly within the crime approach, offers the most practicable balancing solution to the 'double threat' of terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

Across the fields of political science and philosophy, there has been longstanding debate on the relationship between security and civil liberties. Traditionally, this debate has been anchored to discourses of war through assertions of *inter arma enim silent leges* (in times of war, the law falls silent), particularly the suspension of civil liberties under the auspices of 'supreme emergency' when under existential threat¹. However, since 9/11 and the declaration of the 'War on Terror', this debate has been refocused within the context of counterterrorism. Although counterterrorist approaches tend to overlap and complement each other, Sederberg conceptualises such measures as fitting into three

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¹ M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (Harmondsworth, 1980), 4, 125.

analogical categories: 'war', 'crime' and 'disease'². Each of these has a fundamental impact upon the relationship between state and citizen in terms of the balance between security and civil liberties. As such, Buzan argues that terrorism presents liberal democracies with a 'double threat': the axiomatic threat of violence and destruction and the 'insidious erosion [of civil liberties] as a consequence of the countermeasures taken'³. The intensification of counterterrorism in the years since 9/11 has made the question of how to balance security with civil liberties increasingly pertinent for liberal democracies. The methods employed to resolve the double threat posed by terrorism has fundamental consequences for shaping the nature of the 21st century polity.

This article will evaluate the impacts of counterterrorist strategies within Sederberg's framework on the double threat of terrorism identified by Buzan in order to assess the extent to which they alter the balance between civil liberties and security. This will be achieved through use of primary and secondary sources in conjunction with the relevant theoretical approaches. As this work is concerned with counterterrorism in liberal democracies that possess long-established civil liberties, the broad range of responses to terrorism in the U.S., U.K., E.U. France and Norway will provide the evidential basis for discussion. First, key terms and theoretical approaches will be defined and conceptualised in order to establish a framework for analysis. Thereafter, the double threat will be analysed in terms of the extent to which the war, criminal and disease approaches respectively mitigate or exacerbate the threat to human life or civil liberties. Ultimately, it will be argued that imbalance to either side will lead to the increase of threat to the other and that politicised counterterrorist strategies offer the most attractive balancing solution to the double threat.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to assess the double threat posed by terrorism in terms of the impact of countermeasures on security vis-à-vis civil liberties, definitions terrorism and civil liberties are necessary. Terrorism is a notoriously ill-defined concept. However, multiple definitions find their points of agreement in defining terrorism as the use of violence to

² P. Sederberg, 'Global Terrorism: Problems of Challenge and Response' in C.W. Kegley ed., *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, (Prentice Hall, 2003).

³ B. Buzan, 'Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the new Cold War?', (2006) 82 *International Affairs*, 1117.

provoke fear and gain the attention of the public and governments with the aim of achieving political goals⁴. This definition clearly identifies it as a tactic that may be used by both state and non-state actors. Grob-Fitzgibbon divides non-state terrorism, which is the type examined hereto, into national, revolutionary, reactionary and religious⁵ in order to distinguish the aims for which terrorism is used.

The second key concept to address is civil liberties. While variant across states, civil liberties are ubiquitous in liberal democracies and may be defined as ‘those freedoms which are [...] guaranteed to persons to protect an area of non-interference from others, particularly power holders and legal authorities’⁶. As they provide legal protection to citizens from intrusion by the state, it is arguable that such protections impede counterterrorist measures. This argument places civil liberties in direct tension with security by restraining the coercive arms of the state in dealing with threats such as terrorism. However, the liberal character of democratic states and the individual rights guaranteed by civil liberties may come under threat if the state is granted extraordinary powers over its citizens.

Another vital task is to establish an understanding of security. Wolfers states that ‘security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked’⁷. Thus, the innately value-laden and open-ended nature of security makes it an essentially contested concept with little agreement over what is to be protected or how to achieve it. Theoretical approaches to security may be broadly divided into two: state-centric, which view the state as being the ‘referent object’ – that which is deemed to be under existential threat⁸ – and human security, which views individuals as being the referent object of security. Extrapolation of realism’s propositions provides the basis for positioning the state as the referent object. Hobbesian assertions that humans form states

⁴ P. Rogers, ‘Global Terrorism’, in M. Cox, and D. Stokes (eds), *US Foreign Policy*, (Oxford, 2012), 336.

⁵ B. Grob-Fitzgibbon, ‘What is Terrorism? Redefining a Phenomenon in Time of War’, 2005 *Peace & Change*, 3, 236.

⁶ A. Reeves ‘Civil Liberties’ in I. McLean and A. McMillan (eds), *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, (Oxford, 2009).

⁷ A. Wolfers, ‘“National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol’, (1962) 67 *Political Science Quarterly*, 149.

⁸ C. Peoples and N. Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: an Introduction* (Oxon, 2015) .93.

to escape the State of Nature, places the state as the referent object of security⁹. By this logic, national security equates the safety of its citizens. Alternatively, proponents of human security have demonstrated that the state itself can be a source of insecurity to individuals¹⁰. Thus, human security scholars place the individual as the referent object. However, as demonstrated by the provided definition of security, it is evident that there is no objective measure of what constitutes a security threat, whether to the state or individual. Therefore, the identification of an issue as a security threat is largely the result of the issue being framed as such.

One of the most prominent fields to emerge in security studies on how issues become framed in security terms is securitisation. Securitisation, a concept closely associated with the Copenhagen School, may be defined as the process of 'shifting an issue out of the realm of 'normal' political debate into the realm of emergency politics by presenting it as an existential threat'¹¹. Thus, securitisation is distinct from non-politicisation, wherein an issue is not conceived as a threat or addressed by government, and politicisation, where an issue is addressed through conventional public policy¹². Buzan *et al.*¹³ outline the process of a 'securitising move' as follows. An issue is presented by a securitising actor to the public as an existential threat through a 'speech act'¹⁴. As the securitising move requires the acceptance of the speech act by the audience, securitisation is an 'intersubjective' process¹⁵. The acceptance of the speech act and following securitisation can only occur under the correct 'felicity conditions'¹⁶, such as after a terrorist attack. However, most securitisation scholars are highly sceptical of the benefits of such extreme measures, arguing that securitisation should be seen 'as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics', and the desecuritisation of issues 'out of this

⁹ K. Krause and M.C. Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies' in K. Krause and M.C. Williams (eds.) *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, (London, 1997), 40.

¹⁰ P. Kerr, 'Human Security' in A. Colins (ed) *Contemporary Security Studies*, (Oxford, 2013), 107.

¹¹ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: an Introduction*, 94.

¹² B. Buzan, O. Waever, and J. Wilde, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, (London, 1998), 23.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ B. Buzan, O. Waever, and J. Wilde, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, 25.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁶ O. Waever, 'The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimistic Constructivist on Post-Sovereign Security Orders' in M. Kelstrup and M.C. Williams (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration*, (London, 2000), 252.

threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere' is seen as the optimal course of action¹⁷.

WAR

The war perspective holds that terrorism may be countered and defeated by the use of military methods¹⁸. These methods are often associated with international actions, but also have implications for the domestic front, which will be considered here. The securitisation of terrorism in the US and France after a major act of terrorism followed the war approach. President George W. Bush declaration of the War on Terror pledged to use 'every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network'¹⁹. Thus, the immediate post-9/11 period was framed through speech acts as one of supreme emergency with international religious terrorism posing imminent danger to national security. Similarly, the 2015 Paris Attacks produced a permissive environment for President François Hollande to make securitising moves through declaring the attacks an 'act of war' by Daesh and promising a 'merciless' response²⁰. The scale and scope of the attacks of 9/11 and Paris created adequate felicity conditions for such securitising moves to be accepted amongst the general public. For example, an IFOP poll by *Le Figaro* and RTL Radio published four days after the Paris Attacks 'found 84% of French people were prepared to accept more controls and a certain limitation of their liberties to guarantee their security'²¹. Yet, the implications of the war framing of such attacks and the resultant securitised measures meant that the 'home front became a battlefield'²².

¹⁷ Buzan, Waeber and Wilde, *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, 29.

¹⁸ B. Lutz, and J. Lutz, 'Terrorism' in A. Colins (ed), *Contemporary Security Studies*, (Oxford, 2013), 274.

¹⁹ CNN, *Transcript of President Bush's Address*, 21 September 2001. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/> [Accessed: 18 March, 2015].

²⁰ L. Dearden, 'Paris terror attack: Francois Hollande vows merciless response to Isis "barbarity"' *Independent*, 14 November 2015. Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/> [Accessed: 12 January: 2016].

²¹ A. Chrisafis and J. Borger, 'French MPs vote to extend state of emergency after Paris attacks' *The Guardian*, 19 November 2015. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/> [Accessed: 6 January, 2016].

²² N. Baker, 'National Security Versus Civil Liberties', *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 33 (2003): 549.

While two wars were fought abroad, the domestic countermeasures in the US also followed the 'logic of war'²³. The 2001 PATRIOT Act expediently granted a broad range of powers to the executive and agencies that were directly accountable to it²⁴. Imbedded in the Act was the suspension of numerous civil liberties. Arguably, the purpose for this was to remove barriers to counterterrorist measures. Attorney General John Ashcroft argued that civil liberties were not only impediments to security, but also sources of insecurity by stating that 'terrorists are told how to use America's freedom as a weapon against us'²⁵. In France, the National Assembly voted on 8 February, 2016, to constitutionally enshrine the executive's emergency powers for 'as long as the threat is there'²⁶. The instatement of emergency powers in France has given authorities the ability to place suspects under house arrest and allow police to conduct searches without warrants amongst other prerogatives²⁷. Therefore, the war approach to counterterrorism inherently favours security over civil liberties.

Examples of the countermeasures that are reflective of those used in wartime are manifold in the cases of the US and France. In the US, 1,200 people were detained soon after 9/11²⁸. At the time of writing, official reports have confirmed 2,700 police raids have been conducted, 1,000 individuals have been arrested and 360 persons have been placed under house arrest since the Paris Attacks²⁹. The severity of such measures does not preclude the war logic from having a human security focus with the individual as the referent object. Such recourses may be morally justifiable by consequentialist assertions of the 'ends justifying the means', the ultimate end being human 'freedom from threat, danger or harm'³⁰. David Blunkett's parliamentary discussion paper, for

²³ P. Roe, 'Is Securitization a "Negative" Concept? Revisiting the normative debate over normal versus extraordinary politics', (2012) 43 *Security Dialogue*, 43, 250.

²⁴ Ibid, 251.

²⁵ Baker, 'National Security Versus Civil Liberties', 549.

²⁶ L. Jancinto, 'Paris Is on Wartime Footing', *Foreign Policy*, 9 February 2016, Available from: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/09/paris-is-on-wartime-footing> [Accessed: 12 February 2016].

²⁷ A. Chrisafis, and J. Borger, 'French MPs vote to extend state of emergency after Paris attacks' *The Guardian* 19 November 2015. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/> [Accessed: 6 January 2016].

²⁸ Baker, 551.

²⁹ B. Wazir, 'From Charlie Hebdo attacks to a state of emergency' *Aljazeera*, 6 January 2016, Accessed: 8 January, 2016, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/>.

³⁰ P. Pham, 'Law, Human Rights, Realism and the 'War on Terror'', (2004) 4 *Human Rights & Human Welfare*, 93.

instance, took the view that powers of the ACTS Act IV had a 'disruptive effect' on terrorist activity within the UK and that terrorists viewed the UK as 'a far more hostile place in which to operate'³¹. Consequently, Pham argues that 'a liberal democracy's principle of self-defence compels it to take a course of action that strays from its own foundational commitments'³². Thus, it is arguable that, if effective, the emphasis of security over liberty is necessary when combatting terrorism.

Although these measures may be excused as the necessities of wartime, it is questionable if securitized countermeasures are lawful or indeed effective. The 2001 PATRIOT Act has been notorious in terms of its inconsistency with the US constitution. For example, the detention of individuals, whether foreign nationals or citizens, is a violation of their First and Sixth Amendment rights³³. In addition, the increase of executive power in the UK, US and France, with minimal judicial or legislative oversight, threatens the integrity of democratic checks-and-balances. Furthermore, as Paul cautions, war informed countermeasures may create new enemies faster than the state can apprehend them³⁴. Indeed, many who join terrorist organisations in Europe are from diaspora communities that are marginalised and alienated from wider society³⁵. The targeting of minority groups has been seen to increase alienation, leading to radicalisation. The contention that the 7/7 bombings were the result of frustration by the British attackers at UK conduct in the war on terror³⁶ should cause Western states to reflect on whether the infringement of human and civil rights is turning counterterrorism into a cyclical, self-perpetuating exercise by providing terrorist organisations with recruitment capital.

Overall, it is questionable whether the broad definition of terrorism applied to an equally ill-defined war on terror is a strategically sound method of providing either state or individual security. Arguably, the war framing of the post-9/11 countermeasures was the least desirable outcome for both state and human security. It places democratic

³¹ D. Blunket, 'Counter-Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society: A Discussion Paper', (2004) *Home Department*, 2.

³² P. Pham, 'Law, Human Rights, Realism and the 'War on Terror'', 93.

³³ Baker, 551.

³⁴ R. Paul, 'Trading Freedom for Security: Drifting toward a Police State', (2003) 14 *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 7.

³⁵ M. Abrahms, 'What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy', (2008) 32 *International Security*, 97.

³⁶ B. Hayes, 'There is no Balance between Security and Civil Liberties - Just Less of Each', (2005) 12 *ECLN*, 2.

regimes at risk of becoming purveyors of state violence and suppression and its efficiency in countering the terrorist threat is of dubious merit. As Buzan states, 'war is seldom good for liberal values even when fought in defence of them'³⁷.

CRIME

Alternative to the war approach, the crime perspective argues that terrorism is a form of crime which cannot be defeated but can be contained³⁸. This approach addresses terrorism like other crimes, where arrest is followed by trial and, if proven guilty, punishment³⁹. However, since 9/11, it is deemed insufficient to capture terrorists after the fact. Rather, terrorist activities are to be pre-empted⁴⁰. This emphasis on prevention has profound implications for both security and civil liberties. In order to contain and pre-empt terrorism, security agencies have increasingly turned to technology based measures, notably surveillance⁴¹. Under Title II of the PATRIOT Act, US security services were given legal authority to conduct counterterrorist surveillance⁴². However, the Snowden leaks of 2013 revealed a far more extensive surveillance programme conducted by the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), involving the collection and storage of personal data *en masse*. While such measures threaten civil liberties like the right to privacy, it is arguable that greater security over under-legislated areas, such as the internet, is necessary to provide both individual and state security⁴³. Especially since 'new terrorist' organisations, such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh have been known to use these technologies for their activities. Moreover, threats to civil liberties from data collection and location tracking has been mitigated to some extent by judicial review of police access to such information within the US and EU⁴⁴. Therefore, if maintained within the remit of democratic checks-and-balances, the crime approach offers a plausible solution

³⁷ Buzan, 117.

³⁸ Lutz and Lutz, 'Terrorism', 284.

³⁹ Ibid, 283.

⁴⁰ Baker, 555.

⁴¹ D. Bigo, 'To Reassure and Protect, After September 11', *Social Science Research Council*, (2002). Available at: <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/bigo.htm> [Accessed: 15 March, 2015].

⁴² *USA PATRIOT Act*, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).

⁴³ P. Heymann, 'Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview', (2001) 26 *International Security*, 31.

⁴⁴ D.J. Phillips, 'Locational Surveillance: embracing the patterns of our lives' in A. Chadwick and P.N. Howard, *Handbook of Internet Politics*, (London, 2008), 343.

to the dilemma of maintaining security against terrorism while being less invasive to civil liberties.

While the crime analogy offers countermeasures that are more conducive to civil liberties, its application in the post-9/11 context has a number of flaws. Firstly, it is questionable whether the ‘ends justify the means’ with regard to the invasion of privacy by the state. Blair’s admission that ‘all the surveillance in the world’ would not have foreseen the 7/7 attacks⁴⁵ and the assertion by the former Norwegian head of intelligence services, Janne Kristiansen, after the Anders Breivik attacks that pre-emption would have required ‘a chip inside the head of every single Norwegian’⁴⁶, raises questions as to the effectiveness of these measures. However, the lack of transparency regarding the effectiveness of counterterrorist measures precludes a quantitative assessment. Thus, the following evaluation will focus on the qualitative effects of the post-9/11 criminal approach.

Critics have argued that bureaucratic competition between various agencies has resulted in the merging military, police and intelligence services functions⁴⁷. The danger therein is that ordinary crimes will be treated on par and with the same measures as those against terrorism. For example, stop-and-search measures have become applicable to crimes ranging from drug trafficking to credit card fraud. Additionally, due to the focus of states like the US and UK on Jihadist terrorism, racial profiling has become prolific. Mike Chenoff, the former head of the Criminal Division in the Justice Department, despite denying the use of racial profiling, stated that the US targets persons from ‘where Al Queda [sic] support is thought to exist’, which are predominantly Muslim, Middle Eastern countries⁴⁸. Moreover, the Framework Decision adopted by the EU has appropriated nebulous definitions of terrorism and support for terrorism. As a result, legitimate forms of political dissent, such as peaceful protests, have fallen under counterterrorist prerogatives⁴⁹. Such developments are the adverse effects of securitising

⁴⁵ Hayes, ‘There is no Balance between Security and Civil Liberties - Just Less of Each’, 5.

⁴⁶ R. Orange, ‘“Answer hatred with love”: how Norway tried to cope with the horror of Anders Breivik’, *The Guardian*, 15 April 2012. Available from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/> [Accessed: 21 March 2015].

⁴⁷ Bigo, ‘To Reassure and Protect, After September 11’.

⁴⁸ D.D. Cole, ‘Security and Freedom - Are the Government’s Efforts to Deal with Terrorism Violative of Our Freedoms?’, (2003) 29 *Canada-United States Law Journal*, 334.

⁴⁹ T. Bunyan, ‘The War on Freedom and Democracy: an Analysis of the Effects on Civil Liberties and Democratic Culture in the EU’, (2002) 13 *Statewatch analysis*, 13.3.

areas which are held to be the province of traditional law enforcement or even healthy democratic practice. Ergo, the criminal approach, while offering states a course of action which balances civil liberties and security, may generate undemocratic practices if countermeasures move from a politicised to a securitised method of response.

DISEASE

The disease perspective sees terrorism as the symptom of broader, underlying causes and advocates the use of long-term remedies⁵⁰. Its ultimate aim is the reduction of threat through addressing the root causes of terrorism⁵¹. This approach is least invasive on civil liberties and is largely conducive to human security. In the UK, the PREVENT aspect of the 2003 CONTEST strategy has focused on preventing radicalisation since the 7/7 bombings⁵². Alternatively, in the aftermath of the 2011 'lone-wolf' terrorist attacks committed by Breivik, the Norwegian response was not securitisation, but rather politicisation, verging on non-politicisation. Aside from assuring the physical security of some government buildings and a relatively minimal increase in policing⁵³, Prime Minister Stoltenberg articulated the Norwegian response as being 'more openness, more democracy'⁵⁴. Surveys showed that Norway was less supportive of stronger security measures after the terrorist attacks than before, which may be attributable to the differing nature of the attacks and the differences in the framing of the crisis through their speech acts⁵⁵. Ergo, the disease analogy's focus on prevention and politicisation of terrorist threats is less intrusive on civil liberties than the war or crime perceptions of terrorism.

However, the diminished threat to civil liberties does not entail its absence. The measures taken by PREVENT against radicalisation have been criticised as the securitisation of Islam⁵⁶, arguably impinging upon freedom of religion. Additionally, Abrahms has contended that the assimilation of Muslim communities could require

⁵⁰ Lutz and Lutz, 274.

⁵¹ Ibid, 283.

⁵² Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 146.

⁵³ Orange, "Answer hatred with love": how Norway tried to cope with the horror of Anders Breivik'.

⁵⁴ J. Stoltenberg, *Norway Mission to the UN* (2011). Available at: http://www.norway-un.org/NorwayandUN/Norwegian_Politics/ [Accessed: 20 March, 2015].

⁵⁵ A.L. Fimreite *et al.*, 'After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in the Balance Between Security and Liberty in Norway?' (2013) 36 *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 846-847.

⁵⁶ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 146.

democratic societies ‘cracking down on bigotry’⁵⁷. Yet, measures such as blasphemy laws to prevent instances such as the 2014 Charlie Hebdo attacks would in turn contradict freedom of speech. Furthermore, the fact that there has been a long history of terrorism pre-9/11 implies that there will be a long future hence. As such, a condition of non-politicisation through the disease approach is unlikely to be realised on this issue. If terrorism is to be a permanent feature of the security agenda, we may question if the measures taken by Norway to counterterrorism through ‘more openness, more democracy’ will be sufficient to protect against the physical threat of terrorism. This raises the dilemma that even the least intrusive countermeasures will produce contradictions between civil liberties while possibly leaving the threat posed to human life unaddressed.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the double threat of terrorism through the prism of Sederberg’s typology provided above makes it possible to argue the following. On the one hand, it has been demonstrated that the war approach and the securitisation of terrorism might be a popular recourse of action, for policymakers and public alike, in the wake of a devastating terrorist attack. However, examination of the securitisation of terrorism casts doubt on the benefits of such measures, not only in terms of its negative impacts on civil liberties, but also in terms of its effectiveness in combatting terrorism.

On the other hand, the disease approach offers a sustainable, long-term method of addressing terrorism at its roots. Moreover, it is the least invasive to civil liberties. Yet, the treatment of terrorism as a disease is not without problem or paradox. Firstly, this approach possesses internal contradictions, as attempts to address issues such as radicalisation or impetuses for terrorism may still lead to the repression of some civil liberties. Second, the disease approach offers no short-term provision for the physical security of citizens in isolation.

In the middle of this spectrum, addressing terrorism as a form of crime has been argued to provide the most practicable balancing solution. If a politicised approach is undertaken wherein the legal authorities remain within the remits of the rule of law and democratic checks-and-balances, the criminal approach may provide effective countermeasures to terrorism while respecting civil liberties. However, the securitisation of criminal countermeasures since 9/11 poses a number of challenges to

⁵⁷ Abrahms ‘What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy’, 105.

the integrity of civil liberties. Issues such as extensive surveillance, racial and religious profiling and the merging of security service functions under broad definitions of terrorism with limited accountability to the public give rise to undemocratic practices. Ultimately, terrorism poses a complex threat that makes the achievement of a perfect balance between security and civil liberties in countermeasures to it improbable. However, by adhering to the strengths found within democratic systems, rather than scorning their constraints, it is possible to provide security, not only for the nation or individual, but also for the liberties they embody.

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